Cooperative Game and the Law
While noncooperative game theory applied to the law is now a subfield of law and economics literature, cooperative game theory has a more strange history. Many of the founding fathers of the cooperative game theory (Shapley, Shubik, Owen, Aumann) were interested in legal examples to illustrate their games; however, law and economics literature has not systematically investigated the meaning of cooperative game theory for the law and is still mostly noncooperative oriented. The aim of the entry is to draw a general picture of what cooperative game theory may add to the law and economics literature. We focus on the positive and normative aspects of cooperative game theory, and we provide illustrative examples in different fields (private law, public law, regulation, theory of the law).
Cooperative Game Theory and the Law: A Missed Rendezvous?
In their famous book Game Theory and the Lawpublished in 1994, Baird, Gertner, and Picker said nothing about cooperative games and the...
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