Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

2019 Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello

Trade Secrets Law

  • Luigi Alberto FranzoniEmail author
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_564

Abstract

Standardization of trade secrets protection was one of the goals of the TRIPs Agreement of 1998. Still, substantial differences across jurisdictions remain. In defining the optimal scope of trade secrets law, lawmakers should consider that strong protection is likely to promote inventiveness but also to retard the diffusion of knowledge and stymie competition.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of BolognaBolognaItaly