This entry summarizes the main theoretical contributions and empirical findings in relation to concentrated ownership from a law and economics perspective. The various forms of concentrated ownership are described as well as analyzed from the perspective of the legal protection of investors, especially minority shareholders. Concentrated ownership is associated with benefits and costs. Concentrated ownership may reduce agency costs by increased monitoring of top management. However, concentrated ownership may also provide dominating owners with private benefits of control.
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