Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

2019 Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello

Administrative Law

  • Giulio NapolitanoEmail author
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_526

Abstract

The law and economics literature has traditionally paid very little attention to administrative law history and rules.Economic analysis of law, however, can provide a useful explanation of the logic of administrative law, beyond the purely legal top-down approach. On one side, administrative law provides public bodies with all the needed powers and prerogatives to face and overcome different types of market failures. On the other side, administrative law is a typical regulatory device aiming to face some structural and functional distortions of bureaucracy, as a multi-principal agent. From this economic (and political) point of view, administrative law is much less stable than what it is usually thought to be. Frequent changes in both substantive and procedural rules can be explained as the outcome of repeated interactions among the legislator, the bureaucrats and the private stakeholders.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.

References

  1. Barzel Y (2002) A theory of the state. Economic rights, legal rights, and the scope of the state. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  2. Bawn K (1997) Choosing strategies to control the bureaucracy: statutory constraints, oversight, and the committee system. J Law Econ Organ 13(1):101–126CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Bishop W (1990) A theory of administrative law. J Legal Stud XIX(2):489–530CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Cooter RD (2000) The strategic constitution. Princeton University Press, PrincetonGoogle Scholar
  5. Farber DA, e Frickey PP (1991) Law and public choice. A critical introduction. Chicago University Press, ChicagoCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Ferejohn J, Shipan C (1990) Congressional influence on bureaucracy. J Law Econ Organ 6:1–20CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Holburn GLF, Vanden Bergh R (2006) Consumer capture of regulatory institutions: the creation of public utility consumer advocates in the United States. Public Choice 126:45–73CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Horn MJ (1995) The political economy of public administration. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Josselin JM, Marciano A (2005) Administrative law and economics. In: Backhaus JG (ed) The Elgar companion to law and economics, IIth edn. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp 239–245Google Scholar
  10. Kagan E (2001) Presidential administration. Harv Law Rev 114:2245–2385CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Macey J (1992) Organizational design and the political control of administrative agencies. J Law Econ Organ 8(1):93–110Google Scholar
  12. Mashaw JL (1985) Prodelegation: why administrators should make political decisions. J Law Econ Organ 1(1):81–100Google Scholar
  13. McCubbins M, Schwartz T (1984) Congressional oversight overlooked: police patrols versus fire alarms. Am J Polit Sci 28(1):165–179CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. McCubbins M, Noll R, Weingast B (1987) Administrative procedures as instruments of political control. J Law Econ Organ 3(2):243–277Google Scholar
  15. McCubbins M, Noll R, Weingast B (2007) The political economy of law. In: Polinsky AM, Shavell S (eds) Handbook of law and economics, IIth edn. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp 1651–1738Google Scholar
  16. Mueller DC (1996) Constitutional democracy. Oxford University Press, New York/OxfordGoogle Scholar
  17. Napolitano G (2014) Conflicts and strategies in administrative law. Int J Constit Law 12(2):357–369CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Posner RA (1997) The rise and fall of administrative law. Chicago-Kent Law Rev 72:953–963Google Scholar
  19. Posner EA (2001) Controlling agencies with cost-benefit analysis: a positive political theory perspective. Univ Chicago Law Rev 68(4):1137–1199CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Rose-Ackerman S (1986) Reforming public bureaucracy through economic incentives? J Law Econ Organ 2:131–161Google Scholar
  21. Rose-Ackerman S (2007) Introduction. In: Ead (a cura di) The economics of administrative law. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp XIII–XXVIIIGoogle Scholar
  22. Tirole J (1994) The internal organization of government. Oxf Econ Pap 46(1):1–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Ulen TS (2004) The unexpected guest: law and economics, law and other cognate disciplines, and the future of legal scholarship. Chicago-Kent Law Rev 79(2):403–429Google Scholar
  24. von Wangenheim G (2004) Games and public administration. The law and economics of regulation and licensing. Edward Elgar, CheltenhamGoogle Scholar
  25. von Wangenheim G (2005) Should non-expert courts control expert administrations? In: Josselin J-M, e Marciano A (eds) Law and the state. A political economy approach. Elgar, Cheltenham/Northampton, pp 310–332Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Law DepartmentRoma Tre UniversityRomeItaly