Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

2019 Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello

Good Faith and Game Theory

  • Caspar RoseEmail author
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_52

Abstract

This article shows how game theory can be applied to model good faith mathematically using an example of a classic legal dispute related to rei vindicato. The issue is whether an owner has a legal right to his good if a person has bought it in good faith by using updated probabilities. The article illustrates that a rule of where good faith is irrelevant Pareto dominates a rule where good faith may protect an innocent buyer.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Copenhagen Business SchoolCopenhagenDenmark