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Voting Power Indices

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Abstract

This entry introduces Shapley-Shubik index, Banzhaf index, Deegan-Packel index and Public Good Index. It discusses the properties of these measures of a priori voting power focusing on monotonicity. Applications are listed.

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References

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Further Reading

  • Felsenthal D, Machover M (1998) The measurement of voting power. Theory and practice, problems and paradoxes. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham

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  • Holler MJ, Owen G (eds) (2001) Power indices and coalition formation. Kluwer, Boston/Dordrecht/London

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  • Holler MJ, Nurmi H (eds) (2013) Power, voting and voting power: 30 years after. Springer, Heidelberg

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Correspondence to Manfred J. Holler .

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Holler, M.J. (2019). Voting Power Indices. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G.B. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_503

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