Abstract
We describe the different possibilities that a protagonist has to start a process to raise rival’s costs (RRC). We present the general RRC mechanism and necessary conditions to make it successful. We also expose the strengths and weaknesses of RRC theory.
The authors of this essay previously investigated the strategic uses of environmental-related standards and eco-labeling schemes in order to raise rivals’ costs (e.g., Grolleau et al. 2007). Hence, several parts are inspired from the mentioned previous works.
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Mzoughi, N., Grolleau, G. (2019). Raising Rivals’ Costs. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G.B. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_403
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_403
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