Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

2019 Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello

Raising Rivals’ Costs

  • Naoufel MzoughiEmail author
  • Gilles Grolleau
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_403

Abstract

We describe the different possibilities that a protagonist has to start a process to raise rival’s costs (RRC). We present the general RRC mechanism and necessary conditions to make it successful. We also expose the strengths and weaknesses of RRC theory.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.INRA, UR 767 EcodéveloppementAvignonFrance
  2. 2.Supagro, UMR 1135 LAMETAMontpellierFrance
  3. 3.Burgundy School of Business – LESSACDijonFrance