Encyclopedia of Systems and Control

Living Edition
| Editors: John Baillieul, Tariq Samad

Network Games

  • R. SrikantEmail author
Living reference work entry

Latest version View entry history

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-5102-9_35-2


Game theory plays a central role in studying systems with a number of interacting players competing for a common resource. A communication network serves as a prototypical example of such a system, where the common resource is the network, consisting of nodes and links with limited capacities, and the players are the computers, web servers, and other end hosts who want to transfer information over the shared network. In this entry, we present several examples of game-theoretic interaction in communication networks and a simple mathematical model to study one such instance, namely, resource allocation in the Internet.


Congestion games Network economics Price-taking users Routing games Strategic users 
This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.


  1. Courcoubetis C, Weber R (2003) Pricing communication networks: economics, technology and modelling. Wiley, HobokenCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Hardin G (1968) The tragedy of the commons. Science 162:1243–1248CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Johari R, Tsitsiklis JN (2004) Efficiency loss in a network resource allocation game. Math Oper Res 29:407–435MathSciNetCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Kelly FP (1997) Charging and rate control for elastic traffic. Eur Trans Telecommun 8:33–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Qiu D, Srikant R (2004) Modeling and performance analysis of BitTorrent-like peer-to-peer networks. Proc ACM SIGCOMM ACM Comput Commun Rev 34:367–378CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Roughgarden T (2005) Selfish routing and the price of anarchy. MIT Press, CambridgezbMATHGoogle Scholar
  7. Saad W, Han Z, Debbah M, Hjorungnes A, Basar T (2009) Coalitional game theory for communication networks: a tutorial. IEEE Signal Process Mag 26(5):77–97CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Shakkottai S, Srikant R (2007) Network optimization and control. NoW Publishers, Boston-DelftCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Yang S, Hajek B (2007) VCG-Kelly mechanisms for allocation of divisible goods: adapting VCG mechanisms to one-dimensional signals. IEEE J Sel Areas Commun 25:1237–1243CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag London Ltd., part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering and the Coordinated Science LabUniversity of Illinois at Urbana-ChampaignChampaignUSA

Section editors and affiliations

  • Tamer Başar
    • 1
  1. 1.Coordinated Science Laboratory and Department of Electrical and Computer EngineeringUniversity of Illinois at Urbana-ChampaignUrbanaUSA