Abstract
Despite substantial attention over the last decade, risk management in biosecurity is still fragmented and non-standardized at the operational level. Fragmentation is often a result of selective implementation of various building blocks which all together would constitute a comprehensive biosecurity risk management framework. For example, while most countries have adopted export control measures on biosecurity sensitive materials, additional key elements of such a comprehensive framework, like personnel security and information security, are often not addressed. Furthermore, risk perception varies among stakeholders, and international agreement on the adequate level of risk management (and sometimes even on the need for it) is missing, contributing to the heterogeneity of standards currently applied to biosecurity sensitive research. For example, some countries like the USA have opted for stringent stand-alone biosecurity legislation also covering research, while other countries like Germany operationalize biosecurity primarily through integration in biosafety risk management frameworks. Furthermore, in light of inconsistent, incomplete, and/or missing legal guidance, individual and collective responsibility-based risk management frameworks have been proposed by the scientific community. These self-governance attempts by the scientific community have resulted in a plethora of different approaches ranging from simple awareness raising concepts to individual self-censorship of research publications.
This chapter highlights some of the challenges in governing biosecurity sensitive research. Key principles and processes constituting a comprehensive biosecurity risk management framework in line with international risk management standards are outlined and discussed.
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Rath, J., Ischi, M. (2019). Biosecurity Risk Management in Research. In: Iphofen, R. (eds) Handbook of Research Ethics and Scientific Integrity. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-76040-7_10-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-76040-7_10-1
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