Abstract
Quantitative studies are surveyed which indicate that the Court is biased towards political centralization. The econometric evidence shows that this bias is not due to a lack of political independence but to self-selection and vested interest. Various reforms are discussed which would reduce self-selection and vested interest, notably the requirement of judicial experience, delegation of judges from the highest national courts, and the establishment of a separate “Subsidiarity Court.”
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Vaubel, R. (2019). Court of Justice of the European Union. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G.B. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_73
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_73
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