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Norms and Standardization

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Abstract

The purpose of this chapter is to survey the academic literature on the economics of norms and standardization in the domain of administrative law and to synthesize their main themes. The chapter begins by introducing basic economic framework and continues addressing the issues of norms and tax compliance. Next, the chapter surveys some of the most important areas in the administrative law and economics literature. Topics include norms and environmental compliance, standards in traditional law and economics scholarship, the issues of norms, standards and regulatory functions of the state and the occupational heatly and safety standards and norms.

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Correspondence to Mitja Kovac .

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Kovac, M. (2019). Norms and Standardization. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G.B. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_654

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