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GE/Honeywell

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Definition

The GE/Honeywell case, one of the most controversial merger cases in the history of European merger control, was subject to a long and heated transatlantic debate on the vertical and conglomerate aspects of the European Commission’s 2001 prohibition decision. However, horizontal overlaps in the specific markets for aircraft and marine engines were, ultimately, the only reason given by the Court of First Instance for upholding the controversial decision.

The GE/Honeywell Case

In 2001, the attempted US$ 45 billion merger between General Electric Company (GE) and Honeywell International, Inc. could have become the largest deal of its kind in industrial history. However, while the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DoJ) allowed the merger on the condition that minor structural remedies be carried out, the European Commission prohibited the merger (European Commission 2001a, b). Although the Court of First Instance (CFI) criticized the Commission’s analysis of the...

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Schumacher, P. (2019). GE/Honeywell. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G.B. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_186

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