Volume 18, Issue 2

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September 2001

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13 articles in this issue

Differential information economies: Introduction
Beth Allen
Nicholas C. Yannelis
Introduction Pages: 263 - 273
An alternative proof of the nonemptiness of the private core
Isabelle Lefebvre
Symposium Articles Pages: 275 - 291
An extensive form interpretation of the private core
Dionysius Glycopantis
Allan Muir
Nicholas C. Yannelis
Symposium Articles Pages: 293 - 319
Competitive and core allocations in large economies with differential information
Ezra Einy
Diego Moreno
Benyamin Shitovitz
Symposium Articles Pages: 321 - 332
Non-myopic learning in differential information economies: the core
Konstantinos Serfes
Symposium Articles Pages: 333 - 348
Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies
Françoise Forges
Aviad Heifetz
Enrico Minelli
Symposium Articles Pages: 349 - 365
On coalitional stability of anonymous interim mechanisms
Gabrielle Demange
Roger Guesnerie
Symposium Articles Pages: 367 - 389
Signaling in markets with two-sided adverse selection
Douglas Gale
Symposium Articles Pages: 391 - 414
Risk aversion and incentive compatibility with ex post information asymmetry
Martin F. Hellwig
Symposium Articles Pages: 415 - 438
Ex ante contracting with endogenously determined communication plans
Jülide Yazar
Symposium Articles Pages: 439 - 450
Core concepts in economies where information is almost complete
Stefan Krasa
Wayne Shafer
Symposium Articles Pages: 451 - 471
The bargaining set of a large economy with differential information
Ezra Einy
Diego Moreno
Benyamin Shitovitz
Symposium Articles Pages: 473 - 484
Coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation in differential information economies
Guangsug Hahn
Nicholas C. Yannelis
Symposium Articles Pages: 485 - 509

Volume 18, Issue 2

Differential information economies: Introduction

An alternative proof of the nonemptiness of the private core

An extensive form interpretation of the private core

Competitive and core allocations in large economies with differential information

Non-myopic learning in differential information economies: the core

Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies

On coalitional stability of anonymous interim mechanisms

Signaling in markets with two-sided adverse selection

Risk aversion and incentive compatibility with ex post information asymmetry

Ex ante contracting with endogenously determined communication plans

Core concepts in economies where information is almost complete

The bargaining set of a large economy with differential information

Coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation in differential information economies

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