Political competition in a model of economic growth: Some theoretical results Richard T. BoylanJohn LedyardRichard D. McKelvey Research Articles Pages: 191 - 205
Equilibria and Pareto optima of markets with adverse selection Douglas Gale Research Articles Pages: 207 - 235
A lower bound on computational complexity given by revelation mechanisms Kenneth R. MountStanley Reiter Research Articles Pages: 237 - 266
Two characterizations of the uniform rule for division problems with single-peaked preferences Gert -Jan OttenHans PetersOscar Volij Research Articles Pages: 291 - 306
Changing economic mechanisms: A model of the transition from budget regulation to the competitive market Vadim I. ArkinAlexander D. Slastnikov Research Articles Pages: 307 - 321
The convergence of equilibrium strategies of approximating signaling games Alejandro M. Manelli Research Articles Pages: 323 - 335
A model of the federal funds market Wilbur John Coleman IIChristian GillesPamela A. Labadie Research Articles Pages: 337 - 357
Arrow's theorem on the optimality of deductibles: A stochastic dominance approach Christian GollierHarris Schlesinger Exposita Notes Pages: 359 - 363
A geometric proof of Gibbard's random dictatorship theorem John Duggan Exposita Notes Pages: 365 - 369
On the set of Pareto efficient allocations in economies with public goods Dimitrios DiamantarasSimon Wilkie Exposita Notes Pages: 371 - 379