1. On cooperative games, inseparable by semivalues

   • Rafael Amer
   • Jean Derks
   • José Miguel Giménez

   OriginalPaper Pages: 181 - 188

2. The core and the bargaining set in glove-market games

   • Yevgenia Apartsin
   • Ron Holzman

   OriginalPaper Pages: 189 - 204

3. On finding curb sets in extensive games

   • Vitaly Pruzhansky

   OriginalPaper Pages: 205 - 210

4. Fundamental cycles of pre-imputations in non-balanced TU-games

   • Juan Carlos Cesco

   OriginalPaper Pages: 211 - 221

5. Shapley value for constant-sum games

   • Anna B. Khmelnitskaya

   OriginalPaper Pages: 223 - 227

6. Pure Nash equilibria in finite two-person non-zero-sum games

   • Wojciech Połowczuk

   OriginalPaper Pages: 229 - 240

7. Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism

   • Marilda Sotomayor

   OriginalPaper Pages: 241 - 251

8. The Harsanyi-Shapley solution and independence of irrelevant expansions

   • Chih Chang
   • Yan-An Hwang

   OriginalPaper Pages: 253 - 271

9. Hide and seek in Arizona

   • Robert W. Rosenthal
   • Jason Shachat
   • Mark Walker

   OriginalPaper Pages: 273 - 293

10. Simple random order methods to share costs

    • YunTong Wang

    OriginalPaper Pages: 295 - 314