Bureaucratic choice and nonoptimal provision of public goods: Theory and evidence Kathy J. HayesLaura RazzoliniLeola B. Ross OriginalPaper Pages: 1 - 20
The industrial structure of the California Assembly: Committee assignments, economic interests, and campaign contributions Jay K. DowJames W. EndersbyCharles E. Menifield OriginalPaper Pages: 67 - 83
The relationship between congressional spending and tenure with an application to term limits W. Robert ReedD. Eric SchansbergZhen Zhu OriginalPaper Pages: 85 - 104
Governmental failures in evaluating programs Amihai GlazerRefael Hassin OriginalPaper Pages: 105 - 115
Why join the party in a one-party system?: Popularity versus political exchange Adi SchnytzerJanez Šušteršič OriginalPaper Pages: 117 - 134
Are the rich too rich to be expropriated?: Economic power and the feasibility of constitutional limits to redistribution Friedrich BreyerHeinrich W. Ursprung OriginalPaper Pages: 135 - 156
The impact of campaign expenditures on political competition in the French legislative elections of 1993 Filip PaldaKristian Palda OriginalPaper Pages: 157 - 174
The role of political parties: An analysis based on transaction costs Philip JonesJohn Hudson OriginalPaper Pages: 175 - 189
Rational moralists: The role of fairness in democratic economic politics Reiner EichenbergerFelix Oberholzer-Gee OriginalPaper Pages: 191 - 210
Robert B. Ekelund, Jr., Robert F. Hébert, Robert D. Tollison, Gary M. Anderson, and Audrey B. Davidson, Sacred trust: The medieval Church as an economic firm William F. Shughart II BookReview Pages: 211 - 216
Gordon L. Brady and Gordon Tullock (Eds.), Formal contributions to the theory of public choice: The unpublished works of Duncan Black. Bernard Grofman BookReview Pages: 216 - 219
International Joseph A. Schumpeter Society: Schumpeter Prize Competition 1998 Legacy Pages: 222 - 222