1. Lobbying and regulation in a political economy: Evidence from the U.S. cellular industry

   • Tomaso Duso

   OriginalPaper Pages: 251 - 276

2. The role of intermediaries in corruption

   • Güzin Bayar

   OriginalPaper Pages: 277 - 298

3. Keeping the other candidate guessing: Electoral competition when preferences are private information

   • Adam Meirowitz

   OriginalPaper Pages: 299 - 318

4. Anyone for higher speed limits? – Self-interested and adaptive political preferences

   • Olof Johansson-Stenman
   • Peter Martinsson

   OriginalPaper Pages: 319 - 331

5. Reputational capital, opportunism, and self-policing in legislatures

   • Glenn R. Parker

   OriginalPaper Pages: 333 - 354

6. A logistic growth theory of public expenditures: A study of five countries over 100 years

   • Massimo Florio
   • Sara Colautti

   OriginalPaper Pages: 355 - 393

7. Why does centralisation fail to internalise policy externalities?

   • Robert Dur
   • Hein Roelfsema

   OriginalPaper Pages: 395 - 416

8. The European constitution project from the perspective of constitutional political economy

   • Lars P. Feld

   OriginalPaper Pages: 417 - 448

9. Leviathans, federal transfers, and the cartelization hypothesis

   • Marko Köthenbürger

   OriginalPaper Pages: 449 - 465

10. Elections with contribution-maximizing candidates

    • Amihai Glazer
    • Mark Gradstein

    OriginalPaper Pages: 467 - 482

11. Supreme Court consensus and dissent: Estimating the role of the selection screen

    • Brian Goff

    OriginalPaper Pages: 483 - 499

12. Charles K. Rowley, William F. Shughart II, and Robert D. Tollison (Eds.), The economics of budget deficits. The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics 153, ed. by Mark Blaug. Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, MA, U.S.A.: Edward Elgar, 2002. 2 vols.; 1, 112 pages. USD 370.00/GBP 245.00 (cloth).

    • Daniel J. Mitchell

    Review article Pages: 501 - 512