A consequentialist account of Narveson’s dictum John CusbertRobyn Kath OriginalPaper 26 March 2018 Pages: 1693 - 1709
The inefficacy objection to consequentialism and the problem with the expected consequences response Mark Bryant Budolfson OriginalPaper 10 April 2018 Pages: 1711 - 1724
Correction to: Linguistic convention and worldly fact Brett Topey Correction 03 May 2018 Pages: 1753 - 1755
A new defense of trope content view of experience Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira OriginalPaper 09 April 2018 Pages: 1757 - 1768
Is pleasure all that is good about experience? Willem van der Deijl OriginalPaper Open access 16 April 2018 Pages: 1769 - 1787
Quantum gravity, timelessness, and the contents of thought David Braddon-MitchellKristie Miller OriginalPaper 20 April 2018 Pages: 1807 - 1829
A patchwork epistemology of disagreement? Yoaav Isaacs OriginalPaper 28 April 2018 Pages: 1873 - 1885
The dispositional architecture of epistemic reasons Hamid Vahid OriginalPaper 24 April 2018 Pages: 1887 - 1904
Saving which differences? Creeping minimalism and disagreement Christine Tiefensee OriginalPaper 02 May 2018 Pages: 1905 - 1921