Volume 172, Issue 7

Search all Philosophical Studies articles

July 2015

Special Issue: Consciousness Offline: Selected Papers from the Fifth Online Consciousness Conference

Issue Editor:

Richard Brown

14 articles in this issue

If materialism is true, the United States is probably conscious
Eric Schwitzgebel
OriginalPaper 08 October 2014 Pages: 1697 - 1721
Perceptual content and the content of mental imagery
Bence Nanay
OriginalPaper 05 October 2014 Pages: 1723 - 1736
Introspective misidentification
Peter Langland-Hassan
OriginalPaper 26 September 2014 Pages: 1737 - 1758
The idols of inner-sense
Chad Kidd
OriginalPaper 28 October 2014 Pages: 1759 - 1782
The HOROR theory of phenomenal consciousness
Richard Brown
OriginalPaper 21 September 2014 Pages: 1783 - 1794
The Demonstrative Model of first-person thought
Daniel Morgan
OriginalPaper Open access 26 September 2014 Pages: 1795 - 1811
The geometry of visual space and the nature of visual experience
Farid Masrour
OriginalPaper 25 October 2014 Pages: 1813 - 1832
What panpsychists should reject: on the incompatibility of panpsychism and organizational invariantism
Miguel Ángel Sebastián
OriginalPaper 26 September 2014 Pages: 1833 - 1846
Evidentialism, circularity, and grounding
Bob Beddor
OriginalPaper 11 September 2014 Pages: 1847 - 1868
Are moral properties impossible?
Wouter F. Kalf
OriginalPaper 29 August 2014 Pages: 1869 - 1887
The concept horse with no name
Robert Trueman
OriginalPaper 02 September 2014 Pages: 1889 - 1906
Assertion, practical reasoning, and epistemic separabilism
Kenneth Boyd
OriginalPaper 07 September 2014 Pages: 1907 - 1927
Reliability for degrees of belief
Jeff Dunn
OriginalPaper 13 September 2014 Pages: 1929 - 1952
Favoring
Antti Kauppinen
OriginalPaper 16 September 2014 Pages: 1953 - 1971

Volume 172, Issue 7

If materialism is true, the United States is probably conscious

Perceptual content and the content of mental imagery

Introspective misidentification

The idols of inner-sense

The HOROR theory of phenomenal consciousness

The Demonstrative Model of first-person thought

The geometry of visual space and the nature of visual experience

What panpsychists should reject: on the incompatibility of panpsychism and organizational invariantism

Evidentialism, circularity, and grounding

Are moral properties impossible?

The concept horse with no name

Assertion, practical reasoning, and epistemic separabilism

Reliability for degrees of belief

Favoring

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