1. Risky allocations from a risk-neutral informed principal

   • Michela Cella

   OriginalPaper Pages: 191 - 202

2. Entry deterrence under financial intermediation with private information and hidden contracts

   • Neelam Jain
   • Thomas D. Jeitschko
   • Leonard J. Mirman

   OriginalPaper Pages: 203 - 225

3. Externalities do not necessarily require larger message spaces for realizing pareto-efficient allocations

   • Hiroaki Osana

   OriginalPaper Pages: 227 - 269

4. Nash implementation with an infinite-dimensional trade space

   • Guillaume Bernis
   • Gaël Giraud

   OriginalPaper Pages: 271 - 287

5. Manipulation of the Walrasian mechanism in production economies with unbounded short-selling

   • Laurence Kranich

   Erratum Pages: 289 - 305