1. Editorial

   • Matthew Jackson
   • William Thomson

   Original paper Pages: 383 - 383

2. Are serial Condorcet rules strategy-proof?

   • Donald E. Campbell
   • Jerry S. Kelly

   Original paper Pages: 385 - 410

3. Stable and efficient bargaining networks

   • Antoni Calvó-Armengol

   Original paper Pages: 411 - 428

4. Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence by market games

   • Carmen Beviá
   • Luis C. Corchón
   • Simon Wilkie

   Original paper Pages: 429 - 442

5. Implementing efficient market structure

   • Veronika Grimm
   • Frank Riedel
   • Elmar Wolfstetter

   Original paper Pages: 443 - 463

6. RJVs in product innovation and cartel stability

   • Luca Lambertini
   • Sougata Poddar
   • Dan Sasaki

   Original paper Pages: 465 - 477