

PART FOUR
DISCUSSION OF THE CONCLUSIONS

INTRODUCTION TO PART FOUR

§ 109. Preliminary Considerations.

Even a cursory review of the literature dealing with the relationship between Husserl's and Heidegger's phenomenology, reveals a trend in conclusions that are at considerable variance with the findings of the present study. By far, the most prevalent tendency among the commentators, has been to find Heidegger's disquisitions on the *phenomenological* priority of the *Seinsfrage* (Being-question), and the resultant existential analytic, more convincing than Husserl's (or anyone else's) cognitive or theoretical attitude. Heidegger's claims about the derivative, and therefore 'ontic', status of intentionality are consequently either explicitly or implicitly endorsed. The methodological result of this tendency is the concurrence with Heidegger's conclusion regarding the phenomenological priority, of the 'hermeneutical situation', over the reflective reduction to 'pure consciousness'. Discussions on this topic by Gadamer, Biemel, Caputo, Von Herrmann, J. C. Morrison, Stapleton, and Bernet are representative of this tendency.

A second trend among the commentators, again at odds with the conclusions of the present study, is the tendency to *argue* that the phenomenological method and/or content in Husserl and Heidegger are not *necessarily* mutually exclusive. One variation of this tendency is to maintain that hermeneutics and reflectively executed phenomenology "presuppose" one another. Another variation claims that, on the one hand, the *Auslegung* (interpretation) operative in the hermeneutic methodology is inherently *descriptive*. And on the other hand, that the content of such descriptions transcends the limitations of the 'pure consciousness' maintained by the parochial Husserlian position, and thus admits into the content of transcendental phenomenology an interpretive 'opaqueness'. And a final variation of this tendency holds that phenomenology for Husserl and Heidegger is *transcendental*. Therefore, the issue that divides them, whether this transcendentality is more appropriately *interpreted* epistemologically or ontologically,

nonetheless presupposes a context of basic agreement. The first variation of this tendency is found in the discussions of Ricoeur; its second variation is found in Mohanty's discussions, and the third variation is found in Crowell's discussion.

A final trend, again challenged by the results of the present study, is the tendency to accept Heidegger's critique of the ontologically derivative status of Husserl's formulation of the immanence of consciousness. As the result, an insuperable tension between Husserl's program of an eidetically grounded, and therefore absolute, descriptive phenomenological science and the intimations of a non-objectifiable transcendence that, like a specter, haunts this program, is maintained to be at work in Husserl's self-understanding of phenomenology. The result of this tension is held to be, in the final analysis, the impossibility completing the phenomenological reduction. One variation of this tendency argues that Husserl's phenomenological project flounders as a, however magnificent, "shipwreck." While another variation claims that the basic concepts of his phenomenology remain, again in the final analysis, unthematizable and therefore "operative." The work of Landgrebe reflects this first variation, while that of Fink reflects the second.

At this point, I think it is worthwhile to situate the results of my study of intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger, within the context of the various analyses represented by these trends. Therefore, Part Four of this study will be devoted to precisely this task.

Before turning to this task however, the following general remarks are in order regarding the contrast, in both design and focus, between the present study and those mentioned above. First, with the exception of the work of Bernet treated in the Introduction, none of these studies focuses their treatment of the issues in controversy on the phenomenological status of intentionality.¹ Therefore, none of these studies are guided by the self-conscious goal of attempting to limit all conclusions about the matters in controversy to the *phenomenal status* of these matters, let alone to the matters of a single phenomenon. This factor, combined with the essay medium of all but one² of the discussions in question, results in both a broader thematic focus in these studies than the present study, as well a tendency to either substitute, or eschew, appeals to *die Sachen selbst*, in favor of often quite traditional forms of philosophical argumentation. This last criticism will of course have to be substantiated in the discussion to follow. And indeed, this criticism will only be considered important by those who take seriously, as I do, both Husserl's and Heidegger's 'agreement' during the period of their controversy, that phenomenology's 'breakthrough' discovery opens up a domain of philosophical inquiry which has heretofore been concealed

to the philosophical tradition, and therefore to traditional modes of philosophical argumentation.