

PART THREE

**THE CONFRONTATION OF HUSSERL'S AND
HEIDEGGER'S ACCOUNTS OF INTENTIONALITY**

INTRODUCTION TO PART THREE

§ 84. Preliminary Considerations.

Having brought into relief both Husserl's and Heidegger's accounts of the phenomenon of intentionality in the exegeses of Parts One and Two, my study is now in a position to begin its mediative venture with respect to these respective accounts. Inasmuch as both of these thinkers understand their accounts of intentionality to be phenomenological, that is, to have their basis or 'philosophical warrant' in an appeal to *die Sachen selbst*, and inasmuch as their respective accounts of precisely what is manifested therein are controversial, it seems to me that some kind of philosophical mediation is called for. It appears to me, however, that such mediation, if it is to remain faithful to the 'spirit' of phenomenology so aptly characterized by Gadamer in terms of the common philosophical commitment to "the priority of self-giveness over against everything merely inferred or postulated,"¹ must, out of a healthy respect for 'the matters themselves', attempt to avoid the phenomenologically alienating pitfalls of certain historical and critical points of view.

Within the context of the present study, I understand by a 'historical' point of view the attempt to mediate the controversial issues by granting any kind of ultimate *philosophical* authority to the so-called historical situation surrounding, or even permeating, the matters at issue. Thus neither Husserl's and Heidegger's assessments of their philosophical relationship, nor any historical narrative which would "reconstruct" the mutually pertinent development of the matters at issue within the context of their philosophies, manifests any degree of *phenomenological* ultimacy. This is the case since, in each instance, the historical point of view introduces a shift in the would be historical arbiter's orientation toward the matters themselves at issue, such that these matters are now encountered within the context of 'historical distance'. This distance is achieved at the expense of the phenomenological commitment to the self-giveness or self-showing of

the matters at issue, since the historical arbiter suffers no compulsion to work through these issues beyond essaying their congruence with their purported historical determination.²

Also within the context of the present study, I understand by the 'critical' point of view the tacit or explicit granting of privilege with respect to the philosophical access to the matters at issue, such that the would be critical assessment assumes an argumentative authority over both Husserl's and Heidegger's accounts of the issues. In my estimation, the philosophical peculiarity of the phenomenological commitment precludes this often subtle shift of ultimate philosophical warrant away from appeals made to the matters themselves, to arguments which refer to, but do not directly take up or encounter, these very matters. Again, in my opinion the assumption of such a critical point of view manifests a disservice to the spirit of phenomenology.

In an effort to avoid what I take to be these pitfalls, my attempted appraisal of Husserl's and Heidegger's accounts of the phenomenon of intentionality will first bring into relief what, on the basis of the exegeses of the first two parts of this study, emerges as both the common and divergent themes of their respective accounts. From what I suggest are the matters proper to these accounts, I will then offer what I find to be the 'Husserlian' and 'Heideggerian' prerogatives on the key issues that manifest the divergences of these accounts. Finally, within the context of this effort to encounter the matters themselves which issue forth these divergences, I will venture what appears or shows itself as having greater "phenomenological" warrant. This does not mean that either the Husserlian or Heideggerian prerogative need emerge as exclusively satisfying this "criterion" but rather, that I will endeavor to leave open the possibility for some kind of phenomenological mediation, though only such mediation deemed appropriate to *die Sachen selbst*. Not unaware of that epiphenomenon of partisanship which has played and continues to play such an, I dare say, "unphenomenological" role in the attempts made by others to encounter the thought of these two great thinkers, my own thoughts on this matter will be offered, following Kant, with all the finality of a "suitor for agreement"—and by this I understand of course, with no finality at all.