

**PART TWO**

**HEIDEGGER'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL  
ACCOUNT OF INTENTIONALITY**

## INTRODUCTION TO PART TWO

### § 37. Preliminary Considerations.

Heidegger's phenomenological account of intentionality emerges within the context of his concern with the "question of the meaning (*Sinn*) of Being"<sup>1</sup> (*BT*, 19/1). His concern is, initially, to "reawaken an understanding (*Verständnis*) for the meaning of this question" (*BT*, 19/1). Toward this end, Heidegger finds it necessary to recast both phenomenology's primary field of research and the method by which it proceeds. In order to unravel, from the "matters themselves," the interrelation of Heidegger's recasting of phenomenology's agenda and his phenomenological account of intentionality, I will begin my considerations of his account of this phenomenon with a general discussion of his concept of phenomenology. After these general considerations, I will proceed to focus my study on Heidegger's formulation and execution of the phenomenological task of inquiring into the Being of intentionality's *intentio* and *intentum*. Heidegger's phenomenological inquiry into the Being of the entity (*Seiendes*)<sup>2</sup> which manifests the structure of intentionality, *Dasein*, will then be discussed in terms of its basic composition (*Grundverfassung*)<sup>3</sup> as being-in-the-world, and the movement (*Bewegtheit*) of transcendence peculiar to this basic composition. Finally, I will conclude my considerations of Heidegger's account of the phenomenon of intentionality with a discussion of the temporal meaning he uncovers as the meaning of transcendence, and the questionableness of the priority and originality of intentionality that he finds to be the result of this meaning.