

PART ONE

**HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL
ACCOUNT OF INTENTIONALITY**

INTRODUCTION TO PART ONE

§ 6. *Preliminary Considerations.*

Husserl's phenomenological method, and the fundamental phenomenon of intentionality uncovered by this method, are inextricably bound together. Indeed, Husserl even goes so far as to refer to phenomenology's method as the "method of intentionality" (*PP*, 270).¹ In order to unravel, from the "matters themselves" (*Sachen selbst*), the complex relationship between method and the phenomenon of intentionality in Husserl's thought, I will begin my considerations of his account of this phenomenon with a discussion of the general principles which serve to guide his methodical orientation. After these general methodological considerations, which will necessarily have to touch on Husserl's account of intentionality, I will proceed to focus my considerations on the major differentiations which mark his specific account of intentionality. These differentiations concern the logical, material ontological, psychological, and transcendental manifestations of intentionality as the essence of pure consciousness. Having brought into relief the matters themselves of these various aspects of Husserl's account of intentionality, I will conclude my considerations of his account with a discussion of the intentionality of the succession and simultaneity of time.