

# PREFERENCES AND DEMOCRACY

# International Studies in Economics and Econometrics

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PREFERENCES AND DEMOCRACY  
Villa Colombella Papers

*Edited by*

Albert Breton  
*University of Toronto, Canada*

Gianluigi Galeotti  
*University of Perugia, Italy*

Pierre Salmon  
*University of Bourgogne, France*

and

Ronald Wintrobe  
*University of Western Ontario, Canada*



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## LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Marc Bilodeau  
Département d'économique  
Université de Sherbrooke  
Sherbrooke, Québec  
J1K 2R1 Canada

Albert Breton  
Department of Economics  
University of Toronto  
150 St. George Street  
Toronto, Ontario  
M5S 1A1 Canada

Giorgio Brosio  
Corso Chieri, 233  
I-10132 Torino  
Italy

Gianluigi Galeotti  
Via Seneca, 29  
I-06100 Perugia  
Italy

Michele Grillo  
Università degli Studi di Modena  
Dipartimento di Economia Politica  
Via Giardini, 454  
I-41100 Modena  
Italy

Peter Howitt  
Department of Economics  
University of Western Ontario  
London, Ontario  
N6A 5C2 Canada

Richard Johnston  
Department of Political Science  
University of British Columbia  
Vancouver, British Columbia  
V6T 1W5 Canada

Jean-Dominique Lafay  
Université Paris I  
90 rue de Tolbiac  
F-75634 Paris Cédex  
France

Carla Marchese  
Facoltà di Economia e Commercio  
Università degli Studi di Torino  
10122 Torino  
Italy

Peter Nannestad  
Institute of Political Science  
University of Aarhus  
8000 Aarhus C  
Denmark

Martin Paldam  
Institute of Political Science  
University of Aarhus  
8000 Aarhus C  
Denmark

Michele Polo  
Università L.Bocconi  
Via Sarfatti, 25  
20136 - Milano  
Italy

Thomas Rutherford  
Department of Economics  
University of Colorado  
Boulder, Colorado 80309-0256  
U.S.A.

Pierre Salmon  
Faculté de Science Economique  
4, Boulevard Gabriel  
F-21000 Dijon  
France

Stanley Winer  
School of Public Administration  
Carleton University  
Colonel By Drive  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1S 5B6 Canada

Ronald Wintrobe  
Department of Economics  
University of Western Ontario  
London, Ontario  
N6A 5C2 Canada

Robert Young  
Department of Political Science  
University of Western Ontario  
London, Ontario  
N6A 5C2 Canada



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