

New Security Challenges

Series editor
George Christou
Dept. of Int. Relations
University of Warwick
Coventry, UK

I commend Lee Corder for this project. The Indian Ocean region is crucial to our security and prosperity. This book provides unique and useful insights into maritime security and policy challenges in a region that lacks established security architectures that we deal with in other parts of the world.

—Ray Griggs, *Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF), Australia*

The last decade has demonstrated that threats to security vary greatly in their causes and manifestations and that they invite interest and demand responses from the social sciences, civil society, and a very broad policy community. In the past, the avoidance of war was the primary objective, but with the end of the Cold War the retention of military defence as the centrepiece of international security agenda became untenable. There has been, therefore, a significant shift in emphasis away from traditional approaches to security to a new agenda that talks of the softer side of security, in terms of human security, economic security, and environmental security. The topical New Security Challenges series reflects this pressing political and research agenda.

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Lee Cordner

Maritime Security Risks, Vulnerabilities and Cooperation

Uncertainty in the Indian Ocean

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Lee Corder
University of Adelaide
Kiama, New South Wales, Australia

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FOREWORD

The book that you hold in your hands could not have been written by just anyone. Combining a naval officer's grasp of maritime power with a mariner's fund of nautical expertise and the analytical rigour of a scholar, the author, Dr. Lee Cordner, formerly a Commodore in the Royal Australian Navy, has brought to bear a lifetime's accumulation of expertise on a vexed but topical issue—Indian Ocean maritime security.

While doing so, he has also taken a giant leap of faith and attempted a new, and path-breaking, approach to an old problem. Having evolved a 'risk, vulnerability and security' analytical framework, he has ventured to develop fresh maritime security policy options for the Indian Ocean region (IOR). The author's unique 'tool-kit' includes, among much else, ISO Standard 31000:2009, which provides guidelines on risk management, and German sociologist Ulrich Beck's 'risk society' theory, which is a systematic way of dealing with "hazards and insecurities induced and introduced in society by modernization". He also uses a painstakingly derived definition of 'vulnerability', as "the state of susceptibility to harm from exposure to risks posing unquantifiable uncertainty combined with insufficient capacities to prevent, prepare, respond or adapt".

As the author admits, applying risk management processes to a complicated international scenario presents daunting challenges—especially in the diverse and largely incoherent Indian Ocean context. Since the IOR has no clearly identified regional organization, he reasons that a workable basis for defining the risk context and conducting risk assessments would involve viewing the IOR as a 'virtual organization'. In such an open system, the participants would, presumably, have mutually shared objectives,

as well as common risks and vulnerabilities, which, he hopes, will accentuate the need for collective risk treatment and vulnerability reduction efforts.

The author examines the IOR maritime risk context, across a 30-year time horizon, seeking to evolve integrated approaches to attainment of common objectives. In the process, he derives 15 generic ‘strategic objectives’ for the IOR, spanning the full spectrum of maritime security—starting from relatively mundane objectives such as ‘maintaining maritime territorial sovereignty’ and ‘assuring freedom of navigation’ to more ambitious ones, such as ‘addressing the uneven effects of globalization’, ‘establishing a nuclear weapons free zone’ and ‘encouraging political order in IOR states’.

As one follows the author’s persuasive arguments about the shared destiny of Indian Ocean nations, and the “need to put aside traditional enmities to deal with existential risks to humanity”, one has to pause and ask why the IOR has no regional organization, and why has it remained ‘diverse and incoherent’? Perhaps no one is better placed to address these questions than an Indian.

The discovery of sea routes across the Indian Ocean in the late fifteenth century made the region, for the next 500 years, virtually a European monopoly, where trading nations, paying scant heed to Asian civilizations, cultures and races, engaged in a relentless quest for spice and specie. It is an Asian belief that, despite an ancient maritime tradition, they became laggards at sea—for want of technology as well as for the lack of enterprising princes, merchants and sailors.

Historically, the spread of Hinduism and Buddhism, from their birthplace in India, across Southeast and East Asia was facilitated by an Indian seafaring tradition going back to the pre-Christian era. The coming of Islam, in the seventh century, further enhanced maritime interaction, because, in the words of historian Robert Kaplan, it “encouraged intermingling and co-existence, communal prayer and haj pilgrimages”. Having carried trade, religions, cultures and people, for centuries, the waters of the Indian Ocean had thus been a strong unifying factor for this region. This osmotic process was disrupted because the exploitative and mercantilist interests of the colonialists, focused on the prosperity of their own people, required the suppression of native industry as well as of trade. The strategic importance of this region was, therefore, downplayed, and most in the West saw the Indian Ocean simply as an economic thoroughfare, criss-crossed by sea lanes, carrying their vital commerce.

The United States, which succeeded Britain as the predominant Indian Ocean power, remained focused on the security of Middle East oil and the containment of Communism, and confirmed the IOR's status as a strategic backwater by splitting this part of the world between three geographical US Combatant Commands, whose tri-junction pierces the heart of the Indian Ocean.

In the post-colonial era, however, a major share of blame for the IOR not acquiring its own identity must be accepted by those who live on its shores. Not only has the level of intra-regional trade and political interaction remained low, but IOR nations have invariably gone beyond the region to seek partners. As the largest IOR nation and economy, India must accept its part of the responsibility. This calls for a brief look at India's own stance towards the IOR, post independence.

In the mid-1960s, the impending withdrawal of the Royal Navy from East of Suez aroused fears, in New Delhi, of an IOR 'power vacuum' that the United States and the USSR would rush to fill, and prompted the mooted of a proposal for an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZOP). Formalized by a UN resolution of December 1971, the IOZOP was, largely, ignored by the 'Big Two'. India's earnest endeavours to keep extra-regional powers out of the IOR were, however, seen by some of its smaller neighbours as a stratagem to buttress its own position as the sole regional hegemon.

The IOZOP died a natural death but left India wary of taking any further regional initiatives. India's ill-conceived military intervention in Sri Lanka's civil war, between 1987 and 1990, prompted accusations of 'big-brotherly' behaviour and the secret existence of an Indian Monroe Doctrine, further reinforcing India's chariness about regional enterprises.

With the end of the Cold War and the globalization of India's economy, its foreign policy has undergone a pragmatic reorientation. The 1998 nuclear tests and the 2005 Indo-US nuclear deal resulted in a fundamental transformation of India's relationships with America, Russia and the West. The detritus of the non-alignment era has been swept away, with the only remnant being the elusive holy grail of 'strategic autonomy'. However, the political indecisiveness and diplomatic lassitude that continue to prevent India from taking bold initiatives to coalesce and galvanize the IOR are of concern, especially in the face of major politico-economic and military inroads being made by China.

Here, we need to note that, unlike most other regions of the world, Asia has, historically, lacked forums and institutions which could facilitate

dialogue, or help create a cooperative response to developments affecting the whole region. At this moment, there is no security architecture in the IOR because regional diversity, combined with chauvinistic self-interest, has prevented formation of pan-Asian institutions which could facilitate dialogue, or help create cooperative responses. While Asia-Pacific groupings and organs such as ASEAN, APEC, ARF and ADMM+ have been success stories, IOR endeavours such as SAARC, IORA, IONS and BIMSTEC have, for various reasons, languished.

There is, however, no denying that most challenges in the IOR demand a collective response. To take just two examples, even as the shipping world was breathing a sigh of relief at the subsidence of IOR piracy, this scourge has reared its ugly head, once again, off Somalia. The commendable international anti-piracy response remained suboptimal, because much of the initiative was extra-regional, and given the huge challenges of time and space, it was also deficient in platforms as well as in coordination. One is also painfully aware of how prone the IOR is to natural disasters. Given the scale of effort and level of expertise required, most nations cannot hope to cope with the sheer magnitude of natural catastrophes on their own. But pooling of resources for a multinational effort could save lives and limit damage.

It is this Indian Ocean stasis and impasse that Dr. Corder boldly attempts to resolve through the risk–vulnerability paradigm, which offers “non-threatening and non-confrontational means for considering common security concerns, and for developing cooperative ends”. Having listed out 15 objectives, Corder goes on to tabulate 19 IOR maritime strategic security risks. He then draws up a composite ‘risk matrix’ that combines the strategic objectives with the strategic risks, providing an illuminating overview that highlights discontinuities and areas of convergence, as well as opportunities for collective risk mitigation efforts.

Risk-based approaches to developing strategic-level organizational solutions have long been successfully employed, but only in the worlds of finance and industry. Therefore, one cannot help admiring the audacity of thought that impelled Dr. Corder to attempt this approach in the maritime security domain. Ploughing a lonely furrow, he has pursued this unique project with dedication, bringing new tools and techniques to bear on what has, so far, seemed an intractable issue. Rather than simply analysing the problems, he provides tabular matrices, as well as detailed and calculative reasoning for the policy approaches and solutions he recommends.

This book provides rich food for thought for policy advisers, security professionals and academic researchers alike, and is bound to make a significant contribution to Indian Ocean regional maritime security. Most importantly, it lays out the logic and the framework for an action plan for regional decision-makers to adopt. One fervently hopes that they will find the time and capacity to note Dr. Cordner's sage advice and fulfil his belief that "[t]he idea of a shared destiny in the Indian Ocean and the need to put aside traditional enmities to deal with existential risks to humanity should compel decision makers to act".

Dabolim, Goa, India, May 2017

Admiral Arun Prakash (Retd),
Indian Navy




Fig. 1 The Indian Ocean region—littoral and inland states: areas within national jurisdiction and the high seas, and major sea lanes. (Map prepared by GIS Lab, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, India. Published with permission.)

PREFACE

The Indian Ocean went largely unnoticed in the global geopolitical discourse until recently. The region was mainly seen as a strategic backwater, a thoroughfare for maritime trade in transit elsewhere—primarily East Asia or Europe. In the ‘Asian Century’, the Indian Ocean has grown in strategic importance to become an arena for competition between the Asian great powers. The interests of regional and extra-regional actors significantly converge at sea. The regional sea lines of communication have emerged as the world’s most important, vital to global and regional energy and economic security. Environmental security in the Indian Ocean, profoundly impacted by climate change, is forecast to inflict the greatest human and ecological tragedies of the modern era—and the region is poorly prepared to respond. Although maritime domain security in the Indian Ocean is rising in importance, regional cooperative and collective security arrangements are at a nascent stage. Associated with this is an acute lack of region-wide policy-level research, particularly with a maritime security focus. This book is intended to contribute to filling the lacunae.

The book is written for decision-makers, policy advisers, professionals and academic researchers. It comes from my perspective as a strategic policy analyst, seafarer, naval commander and academic researcher deeply immersed in the Indian Ocean maritime security context. During many years at sea, I sailed the length and breadth of the Indian Ocean. I also benefited from time ashore working with regional navies, policy advisers and academics. This included significant operational experience in West Asia (the Middle East) and Southeast Asia, plus opportunities to undertake

research and build networks in India, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa, the United States and elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific. An informed understanding of strategic outlooks concerning the Indian Ocean rim can only be achieved by spending time there. I have also had the privilege of gaining insights into the viewpoints of major industry players in my work as a political risk analyst, mainly with the resources sector, and while working on offshore oil and gas safety and security.

A pragmatic line is taken in the book that recognizes the difficulties the incoherent regional and subregional political environment poses in advocating practical solutions that can enhance regional maritime security. The analysis is from a whole of Indian Ocean regional standpoint. It seeks to identify mutual maritime security issues and outcomes for regional and extra-regional actors, rather than focusing upon individual states such as the United States, China or India, as is often the case.

In my earlier academic research, I was struck by the intellectual divisions between the worlds of international studies, defence strategy and security, environment and business. Each academic and conceptual area had largely evolved in separate silos, yet they have much in common. There is a pressing need for better understanding and closer collaboration, particularly in a globalized context. There needs to be greater cooperation between the various communities operating in the international maritime policy domain; the communities can learn much from each other—false conceptual partitions are unhelpful.

For collaboration to improve, communication needs to be enhanced. This requires a lexicon of acceptable definitions, and common policies and processes, underpinned by mutually understood theories where appropriate. In particular, I have drawn from concepts of risk, vulnerability, security, systems theory, contingency theory, strategic studies and international studies to develop and propose an analytical framework. An essentially risk-based approach aligns conceptually with much of the theory. It offers opportunities for promoting non-confrontational dialogue between diverse actors, building shared understandings of mutually concerning problems and, importantly, developing cooperative strategies for action.

A primary intent of the book is to advocate practical policy approaches and solutions, rather than simply analysing the problems. The aim is to make a significant contribution to Indian Ocean regional maritime security and, concomitantly, inform international security policy research. Hopefully, all who read this book will be given serious food for thought about how to enhance cooperative discourse in complex international contexts.

I wish to acknowledge the many individuals and institutions that have provided information, experiences, advice, friendship and direct assistance with the research behind this book over many years. Professors Timothy Doyle and Dennis Rumley gave me much encouragement and practical advice. Colleagues in India have been most helpful, particularly Admiral Arun Prakash, and also staff at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Mr. Kwa Chong Guan and Ms. Jane Chan at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore gave me opportunities, and Professors Andrew Winner and Peter Dombrowski, plus the excellent library staff at the Naval War College, USA, were most helpful. Sincere and special thanks to my wife, Ann Farrell, who has travelled every inch of this journey with me. In addition to her unstinting support and understanding, her contribution as an experienced legal editor in proofreading and indexing has been invaluable.

Kiama, Australia
May 2017

Lee Corder

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AADMER	ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response
ABNJ	Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction
ADF	Australian Defence Force
ADMM+	ASEAN-Plus Defence Ministers' Meeting
AHA Centre	ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management
AMF	ASEAN Maritime Forum
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF ISM on MS	ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Meetings on Maritime Security
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association for Southeast Asian Nations
BIMSTEC	Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CLCS	Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
CoC	Code of Conduct in the South China Sea
CSCAP	Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific
DCoC	Djibouti Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden

DoC	2002 ASEAN–China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea
DPRK	Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
EAC	East African Community
EAMF	Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum
EAS	East Asian Summit
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
ENSO	El Niño–Southern Oscillation
ERM	Enterprise Risk Management
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FPSO	Floating Production, Storage and Offloading Vessel
FSO	Floating Storage and Offloading Unit
FSP	Floating Production Systems
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council (Full Title: Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf)
GFC	Global Financial Crisis
HADR	Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IMO	International Maritime Organization
IN	Indian Navy
IO	Indian Ocean
IOD	Indian Ocean Dipole
IOGOOS	Indian Ocean Global Observing System
IOMAC	Indian Ocean Marine Affairs Cooperation
IONS	Indian Ocean Naval Symposium
IOR	Indian Ocean Region
IORA	Indian Ocean Rim Association (Formerly IOR-ARC: Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation)
IORAG	Indian Ocean Rim Academic Group
IORG	Indian Ocean Research Group
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ISC	Information Sharing Centre
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and the Greater Syria
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
IUU Fishing	Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing
LDCs	Least Developed Countries

MSP	Malacca Strait Patrols
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Government Organization
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PLAN	People's Liberation Army Navy
PNG	Papua New Guinea
PSI	Proliferation Security Initiative
ReCAAP	Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia
RoK	Republic of Korea
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAR	Search and Rescue
SCS	South China Sea
SLOCs	Sea Lines of Communication
SST	Sea Surface Temperature
SWIOFC	Southwest Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission
TAC	Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982)
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNEP	United Nations Environment Program
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICPOLOS	United Nations Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea
UNISDR	United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States of America
WMDs	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WPNS	Western Pacific Naval Symposium

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