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Béatrice Hibou

The Political Anatomy of Domination

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macmillan

Béatrice Hibou
CERI-SciencesPo
Paris, France

Translated by Andrew Brown

Based on a translation from the French language edition: *Anatomie politique de la domination* by Béatrice Hibou Copyright © La Découverte, 2011 All Rights Reserved

The Sciences Po Series in International Relations and Political Economy
ISBN 978-3-319-49390-9 ISBN 978-3-319-49391-6 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-49391-6

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017930260

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Printed on acid-free paper

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The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

It's all relationships. And if you want to give it a more exact name, then call it ambiguity. (...) Music is ambiguity as a system. Take this note or this one. You can understand it like this or again, like this, can perceive it as augmented from below or as diminished from above, and, being the sly fellow you are, you can make use of its duplicity just as you like.

Thomas Mann, Doctor Faustus, (New York: Vintage International), p. 51

PREFACE

This book, based on the analysis of situations usually characterized as authoritarian or totalitarian, tackles one of the most classic questions of political science: the exercise of domination and the relations based on it. This issue sometimes seems hackneyed, and is to some extent considered outdated, but it remains fundamental in many ways. Still, was this sufficient reason for attacking such a monster head-on, without being restricted to a particular ‘field,’ and tackling it generically? This task would have obliged me to read at least three quarters—perhaps all—of the books on political science, not to mention a significant proportion of the output of the other social sciences. If I had followed the dictates of scientific rationality and lucid foresight, I would never have ‘gone for it.’ But chance encounters, the vicissitudes of research, the vagaries of scientific life—intellectual adventure, in a word—impelled me to take this direction, somewhat in spite of myself. The music of domination had become ever more obvious to me: it seemed to be developing in rich and ambiguous ways that were sometimes traditional and sometimes surprising, seemingly repetitive but always singular.

Unlike my other works, the fruit of lengthy fieldwork and often solitary reflections arising from circumscribed readings and discussions, this book was truly born from my repeated confrontation with specialist colleagues from other ‘cultural areas.’ It was the debates that followed the publication of my book on the political economy of domination in Tunisia that gave me the idea of writing these pages.¹ Indeed, the wealth of interactions and new lines of thought have come less from specialists in Tunisia, North Africa or the Arab world than from researchers—mainly political

scientists but also historians, anthropologists and sociologists—working not only on Russia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), on fascism or Salazarism, on the former Eastern bloc, on China or sub-Saharan Africa, but also, more surprisingly, on France, Italy and contemporary democracies. These exchanges of ideas, always fruitful and friendly, first led me to try to write a methodological article that, under the impact of enthusiasm and interest kindled by my reading, gradually turned into a comparative book on the political economy of domination. I gradually got caught up in the game and set to work conceptualizing the relations and exercise of domination on the basis of totally heterogeneous experiences in time and space. To achieve this, I obviously drew inspiration from different approaches, although what initially gave me food for thought was the historical sociology of the political especially as developed by the Africanist studies that formed me intellectually.

I would quite logically describe as Weberian² my conception of political economy if Weber had not (yet again) become a fashionable author, so that extremely different schools or approaches, some of them poles apart, now lay claim to the heritage of the grand master of Heidelberg. The vision I have of political economy is that of a ‘social and cultural science,’³ which means that the economy involves a special meaning in a given society and history, and our understanding of the economy depends mainly on how a society considers phenomena and directs its interests: in more modern terms, we would, like Bourdieu, state that the economy is a social construct.⁴ In this perspective, the contours of the economy are not defined in advance and the ‘invention of the economic’ results from a complex process related to both the construction of the national state and to the social reality and the disciplinary exercise of power.⁵ Political economy is also an empirical science, a science of the real or rather a science of ‘historical reality,’⁶ of ‘man and [concrete] types of behavior,’⁷ of the ‘living man’ and ‘individual subjective life’⁸ which, by definition, includes multiple dimensions. This approach takes seriously what Max Weber calls ‘human foolishness,’ in other words the fact that reality does not conform to economic theory.⁹ This conception, clearly, is adamantly opposed to that of economic science as a set of formulas, formal models and any ‘abstract and mathematical utopia,’¹⁰ and argues for an empirical and concrete approach.

I would also like to say a word about the comparative approach I have chosen and that may be seen as ‘daring.’ This approach brings different historical situations into dialogue: my reflection borrows from both

the political regimes of the early twentieth century and those of the early twenty-first century, those of late antiquity as well as those of the Ancien Régime, industrialized as well as developing countries, in Africa and Asia as well as Europe. To put it briefly, I propose a comparison not of situations, relations and practices of domination, but of their modes of problematization. This approach is directly inspired by Paul Veyne's methodological proposals who in his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, invites us, through the analysis of a situation that is totally alien to us, distant and remote—that of the Roman Empire—to come 'out of ourselves' and 'make explicit the differences' that separate us from that distant past.¹¹ This approach has been developed further by Jean-François Bayart, who proposes that we juxtapose ways of conceptualizing totally heterogeneous contemporary situations.¹² This is what I intend to do in this book by comparing situations deemed 'incomparable'¹³ in time and in space. Domination is, as I have said, one of the most discussed subjects in social science, but over time our way of understanding it has changed. Moreover, the languages used to analyze and problematize the exercise of domination are different in space, depending on the intellectual tradition specific to a cultural area, a thematic field or disciplinary trajectory, and depending too on the historical situations being analyzed and the different sets of circumstances that are taken into account. These differences and discrepancies can help us conceptualize this universal practice precisely because the work of abstraction and increasing generality—necessary if we are to highlight the major springs of the multiple and ambiguous practices of domination—that this comparativism requires leads us, paradoxically, to leave all-encompassing analyses behind. The following pages attempt to clarify the originality and practices of domination in relation to a number of issues, to bring out the different ways in which these practices are expressed and explained, and to show the subtle variations that these general and universal themes produce. They do so on the basis of everyday life, small concrete facts, 'human foolishness' and such fundamental things as the quality of sausage¹⁴ or, I would add in tribute to Bernard and Françoise Poujade who welcomed me to Còquou (in Ardèche, France) to complete my manuscript in peace and quiet, nut tart! This obviously does not mean I advocate a return to an empiricism devoid of theoretical questions, but that I conceive concepts or ideas in their heuristic validity as instruments and approaches that can be used in other specific situations. This comparative essay is thus the opposite of studies that analyze types of regime—for example totalitarianism, which Slavoj Žižek rightly

points out is a notion that ‘relieves us of the duty to think and even actually stops us doing so,’¹⁵ and more generally everything that is labeled as one of the ‘-isms’ (totalitarianism, authoritarianism, absolutism, reformism, populism, despotism etc.), which are more often ‘death to free feeling and frank thinking.’¹⁶

Thus, this book is different from classificatory definitions that say nothing about the modes of government and the concrete exercise of power. Therefore, from this perspective—in which I compare problematics and not situations—it can also be read with the aim of understanding, between the lines, the contemporary democracies in which we live. It goes without saying that in a democracy, as in any political situation, there are relations of domination. Organizing my thinking not by the criteria of classification of ‘regimes’ but by socio-economic practices and their political significance, the analyses in this book enable us to understand certain universal forms of domination. Such is the case, for example, of the analysis that grants primacy to pragmatism and economic efficiency over any other form of political rationality, or explanations that highlight the ‘historical necessity’ of a certain mode of government, decision or alliance. The same applies to our consideration of ideology: we discuss the forms ideology takes in the exercise of domination (and particularly the fact that it does not exercise its influence through its contents, but through the games it allows us to play with rules and laws), the place of technocracy and expertise in its development and in its (as it were) invisible nature, and the strength of formalism and the effects of consensus reinforced by international bodies—and these discussions are part and parcel of what can be observed in neoliberal democracies. We could also mention the problematics of the concrete construction of hegemony, whose complex modalities make general considerations on concurrence or opposition outdated, or the problematics of the political ambiguity fed by the plural notions of security and stability or by the desire people feel for state, protection and justice.¹⁷ This does not mean that I agree with the increasingly common idea that contemporary democracies are ‘slipping’ into regimes that can be treated as authoritarian. The approach developed in this book provides an understanding of different political situations by highlighting not their similarities and convergences but on the contrary their differences and their specificities.

Two types of sources have provided me with the concrete basis for this comparative work: first, the ‘fieldwork’ in areas that I know well and where I have already conducted research, including not only Tunisia¹⁸ and

Morocco but also a certain number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa; and second, historical situations that I ‘discovered’ for this occasion, including fascism and Salazarism, the Third Reich, Greater China, the USSR and Eastern countries, and more specifically the German Democratic Republic (GDR). From the outset, this juxtaposition struck me as fruitful: the lack of common reference points associated with the convergence of certain conclusions convinced me of the importance of continuing along this path, especially as all these works venture only to a very small degree into a comparative approach. When they do so, they confine this approach to situations deemed a priori comparable (Stalinism and Nazism; different forms of fascism or authoritarianism; authoritarianism in the Arab world etc.) and to very specific objects (mass violence, ideology, the concept of totalitarianism or authoritarianism etc.). While Africanist work is generally open to research coming from outside its favored fields or fields that are ‘close,’ the converse is not true. Thus, even the most innovative historiographical work on fascism, Nazism and Stalinism does not refer to the wide research on the historical sociology of the political developed in the 1980s relating to non-Western countries (mostly former colonies, starting with Africa). Nor do they take into account certain older historical situations which in a similar way, albeit via different paths and theoretical reference points, had already challenged the duality of ‘dominant/dominated’ and the simplistic alternative ‘resistance/obedience,’ instead showing the plurality of space–time structures prevalent in societies and the ambiguity of power relations. In contrast, the opening of archives in the East and disputes among historians in Germany have profoundly changed our way of understanding these problematics and have reignited the debate about the practice of domination. While research previously emphasized the role of ideology and belief, the strength and consistency of these regimes, the charisma of the chief, the way he was subject to veneration or stigmatization, the identification of classes or social groups supposed to be naturally ‘collaborationist’ or ‘resistant,’ the exceptional status of the authoritarian or totalitarian moment vis-à-vis the historical trajectory of the country or region, and the uses of fear and violence, the new historiography has staked out its territory *against* these positions. First, it rejected the abstract visions of totalitarianism and authoritarianism (those that follow Hannah Arendt, one might say disrespectfully), the allegedly monolithic nature of these regimes and the thesis of a secular religion; it then challenged the functionalism and structuralism of these interpretations and the melding of regimes, and relativized the role of state institutions and ruling elites in the rise and

acceptance of the latter.¹⁹ More positively, these new readings showed that we were dealing less with systems and constraints imposed from above than with subtle and diffuse terms of domination and persuasion; that the complex and ambiguous processes that shaped a hegemony also operated by inclusion and accommodation beyond the mere exercise of physical and institutional coercion orchestrated by political machines (especially the police); and that we could not just describe behavior as ‘collaboration’ or ‘resistance,’ ‘participation’ or ‘refusal,’ but that what needed to be emphasized was, rather, the multiplicity of arrangements whose political meanings are ambiguous. This work has highlighted practices as diverse as the actors involved, the degree of unexpectedness and randomness in the socio-political dynamics that operate, and the segmentation of the places of decision. Similarly, Africanist work is now experiencing a renewal, particularly around issues of the police (here we find the tradition of the openness of Africanism to themes and reflections developed in other cultural areas) and the control of social ‘elders’ over their ‘juniors,’²⁰ in the field of witchcraft, for example.

It became apparent to me however, that neither group has given much importance to the political economy of domination. Although economic historians can be read and their work used with this in mind, they have rarely played much part in this debate. Based on this observation, and my own research on Tunisia, various sub-Saharan African countries and Morocco, this book is specifically aimed at taking a first step in this direction and proposing an analysis of domination from the point of view of comparative political economy. Of course, I was not starting out from scratch. Early on, for example, Janos Kornai attempted to examine the relation between economic practices, political systems and bureaucratic functioning in communist countries. If his description of the ‘economics of shortage’ helps us understand the practical cogs of the interdependencies between actors and institutions,²¹ his economicism led him to understand the political as a ‘separate’ sphere, well defined and fully differentiated from the economic, in a mechanistic view of power that gives a fundamental weight to ideology as a system of thought.²² In my own approach, governed by political economy, I propose less to analyze the economy of a political regime—whatever its nature and type—than offer a political analysis of the economic that shows how the most banal economic dispositifs and the economic functioning of everyday life simultaneously involve mechanisms of domination. This approach is not new. Specialists in monetary and financial issues, public policy, labor relations

and the functioning of businesses, researchers studying the ordinary life of people, sociologists of statistics, experts in despoliation and ‘economic collaboration,’ and sociologists and anthropologists of material culture have already produced work of this kind, emphasizing the banality of power mechanisms and the dispositifs of everyday life’s management. They have thereby demonstrated the usefulness of analyzing authoritarian or totalitarian regimes with instruments forged for other situations, and the need to make the analysis more sophisticated by integrating the socio-historical context, differences of temporality, relational practices and feedback. Two historiographical traditions seem to me particularly rich from this point of view: *Alltagsgeschichte* (the history of everyday life), on the one hand, especially Alf Lüdtke, who definitively challenged to any classifications in terms of ‘acceptance’ and ‘refusal,’ suggesting the significance of the socio-political context, lifestyles, economic practices and daily micro-decisions in the perceptions that different actors have of a political situation and the meaning they give it²³; and a more classic trend in economic history, of which Adam Tooze is one of the most illustrious representatives. In a monumental study, this British historian has highlighted economic mechanisms of domination in all their subtlety through his systematic and detailed analysis of the Nazi war economy.²⁴ I intend to continue this line of thought, in a way that is both more modest (in terms of erudition and mastery of the material) and more ambitious (because of my comparative approach), analyzing everyday life in its properly economic dynamic and considering the economic as a place of power, a non-autonomous field, a site of analysis of power relations and power games.

My approach is therefore located at the crossroads of this double historical filiation and a Weberian–Foucauldian approach to domination. Weber showed that, insofar as ‘any real relation of domination involves a minimum of willingness to obey,’ it was important to analyze concrete, singular and historically situated situations to understand these ‘special interests in obeying.’²⁵ This proposal has been understood primarily in political terms. Without being exhaustive, we can think of Michel Foucault and his heterogeneous conception of power, ‘a series of complex, difficult relations that are never functionalized and, in a sense, never function.’²⁶ Power relations, in his view, lie within conflicts, compromises, arrangements and, in general, social relations: domination and discipline cannot therefore be apprehended outside of their exercise. Also worth mentioning is Norbert Elias’ sociology of interdependence and his notion of ‘configuration’: mutual dependencies that bind individuals to each

other constitute the matrix of society; these interdependencies are historically situated and so, understanding power requires that we understand concrete functions, relations and concrete relations.²⁷ Note also Antonio Gramsci's conception of hegemony, which is not only coercion but is also a form of cultural and ideological managing that emerges from power relations, social struggles, negotiations, compromise, co-option, representations and shared beliefs.²⁸ I will not cover this already well-known ground again. However, it seems important to pursue a direction that is rarely taken, one that combines this approach with one based on political economy and therefore includes a better understanding of the economic dimension of power dispositifs in the analysis of domination, of discipline, of 'voluntary servitude,'²⁹ of community enslavement³⁰ and hegemony. Concrete economic practices play an active part in power struggles and power relations. The objective of this work is to analyze, within this tradition, economic techniques in the same way as political, institutional, security or cultural techniques, which involves being sensitive to the multiplicity of actors, rationalities, understandings and logics of action at stake, so to question causal relationships, simplistic explanations, the imputation of motives and the quest for paternity. The theoretical implications of the approach proposed by economic history, especially *Alltagsgeschichte*, overlap with Foucauldian analyzes, even though neither of these refers to the other: both approaches emphasize the importance of struggles and power plays, conflicts and tensions, and the power struggles in the way domination is shaped. The additional interest of the history of everyday life is that it takes seriously economic objects and economic dynamics—something that the analyses proposed by Foucault and especially by those researchers inspired by him too often neglect. In this, *Alltagsgeschichte* converges with the analysis of political economy advocated here, which seeks to combine a Foucauldian understanding of power with an approach attentive to concrete economic practices: it is Weberian in that it takes into account the 'effects of composition' and the 'constellations of interests' in play³¹; Marxist, in that it considers that 'labor' as such does not exist, that there is only 'practical work.'³² Thus, it does not aim to find one cause for 'voluntary servitude,' normalization and the authoritarian exercise of power, but is instead sensitive to the incomplete nature of practices and explanations, to causal plurality and the diversity of the processes involved and their possible interpretations within society.

Deepening the scope of my reflection on the disciplinary or repressive exercise of power by going into actual mechanical workings of the

economy has demanded that I bring out their dimension and their political rationalities through a ‘political anatomy of the detail,’³³ more particularly of economic detail. In this perspective, the processes involved appear much more subtle than might be suggested by claims that the ‘political’ manipulates and instrumentalizes the ‘economic,’ or assumptions that assert the existence of an ‘exchange’ between the ‘politicization’ or ‘political uses’ of the economy, or interpretations that highlight an ‘economy’ in the service of the ‘political’ (or its somewhat banal variant, the ‘economic miracle’ that makes ‘political stability’ possible). These proposals all imply a separation between distinct ‘spheres’: economic, political and social. They imply that the relations between these ‘spheres’ are unequivocal in nature, and they convey a mechanistic and utilitarian view of social dynamics and relations. Instead, Weber’s political economy, as I understand it, aims to understand the economy politically, in its own technical nature and mechanisms. For Weber, ‘it is obvious that the boundaries of the “economic” phenomena are fluid and cannot be precisely defined.’³⁴ He recalled that ‘it is equally obvious that, for instance, the “economic” aspects of a phenomenon are in no way *solely* “economically conditioned” nor do they *solely* have “economic effects.”’ More importantly for the purpose of this research, he pursued saying that ‘generally speaking, it goes without saying that a phenomenon will have an “economic” character only to the extent that, and *only* as, our *interest* is exclusively focused on its *importance* for the material struggle for existence.’³⁵ This approach allows us to restore the ambiguity and incompleteness of mechanisms and dispositifs of control and discipline, taking into account the complexity of social relations, the plurality of practices of domination, and the multiplicity and ambiguity of the meanings that different actors give to them.

Finally, I would like to say what my work is *not*, or, more precisely, what it has deliberately decided not to dwell on, namely violence, coercion and fear. I chose to focus on those forms of ‘insidious leniency’ referred to by Michel Foucault,³⁶ which, in the daily practices of domination, play simultaneously on the mutual dependence of subjects, on their autonomy and desire for emancipation. Not that violence should be left out: quite the opposite. Authoritarian and totalitarian situations are most often analyzed from the perspective of violence. Yet no government, including the most totalitarian (such as Nazism or Stalinism), is based exclusively on violence. Therefore, to understand the exercise of domination in all its ambiguity, I thought it would be more interesting and original to focus my research on economic dispositifs and practices, even analyzing their relationship

with violence and fear as with more traditional dispositifs and practices of control, surveillance and discipline (such as mechanisms of persuasion, hierarchical dispositions, and institutional and administrative cogs). This methodological choice must be interpreted as a way of bringing out more clearly the violence and fear involved: their centrality does not reside in their direct and intrinsic presence; rather, it is their integration into everyday life—in the most insignificant dispositifs and the most mundane practices—that gives them all their power.

You will of course not find any new analyses of Nazism, fascism, Stalinism in this chapter, or even of the contemporary situations in the societies on which I worked directly. Nor will you find any general conclusions, or any lessons. I aim rather to articulate ways of thinking and problematizations that will echo one another and may be mutually enriching, in an attempt to abstract practices of domination and render them intelligible, rising to a somewhat higher level of generality so as better to identify the simultaneity of close or similar practices and situations—and thus meanings—that are very different, even poles apart. Thus, the comparative political economy of the exercise of power in authoritarian situations does not appear ‘interesting for itself,’ but comprises a ‘place of fieldwork’ where one can learn more about domination and the countless modes of its exercise; it is, in other words, a ‘means of producing a general anatomy’ of domination.³⁷ In the space afforded me by a comparative essay, there is obviously no question of developing a general theory of the political economy of domination. I first have to defend an approach that could be called eclectic, or ‘metadoxal,’ insofar as it attempts to articulate approaches inspired by Foucault, Weber, de Certeau and Veyne; it thereby attempts to understand domination simultaneously as a complement and contrast to three dominant interpretations of it: a reading ‘from above’ that insists on the uniform and intentional ubiquity of mechanisms of domination; an ‘infra-political’ reading that sees resistance everywhere; and an ‘anarchic’ or ‘individualistic’ reading that highlights the confusion of everyday life, the lack of overall consistency and the disparate and disorganized blossoming of power relations. I also aim, through examples from my own research and especially from a wide range of reading, to show how this approach provides material for the debate on two main questions of political sociology at the heart of Weber’s work: the legitimacy of power and processes of legitimation, and the problematics of intentionality. The first question is fundamental if we are to grasp the plurality and heterogeneity at work behind the practices of domination and to deepen the question of

obedience by not viewing as submission such phenomena as acceptance, silence and participation and by not understanding docility as acceptance. The second question is essential if we are to enter the complexity and ambiguity of domination, which emerges not only from a vision or dispositifs that are consciously constructed by state actors, but is a largely unconscious and contradictory complex historical process, made up of conflicts, negotiations and compromises between groups and individuals.

Béatrice Hibou
Paris, France

NOTES

1. B. Hibou, *The Force of Obedience: the Political Economy of Repression in Tunisia*, transl. Andrew Brown (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011) [1].
2. I initially developed this understanding of political economy through a reading of the various texts on the theory of science by Max Weber collected as *Max Weber. Collected Methodological Writings*, ed. H.H. Bruun and S. Whimster, transl. H.H. Bruun (London & New York: Routledge, 2012) [2]; I further refined it with the help of new French translations of Weber, and the readings of Weber put forward by my colleagues: historians, sociologists and philosophers, such as H. Bruhns, 'À propos de l'histoire ancienne et de l'économie politique chez Max Weber,' in M. Weber, *Économie et société dans l'Antiquité* (Paris: La Découverte, 1998), pp. 9–59 [3]; C. Colliot-Thélène, *Études weberiennes. Rationalités, histoires, droits* (Paris: PUF, 2001) [4]; S. Kalberg, *Max Weber's Comparative Historical Sociology* (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1994) [5]; H. Bruhns (ed.), *Histoire et économie politique en Allemagne de Gustav Schmoller à Max Weber* (Paris: Éditions de la Maison des sciences de l'homme, 2004) [6]; and especially J.-P. Grossein, 'Présentation,' in M. Weber, *Sociologie des religions* (Paris: Gallimard, 2006), pp. 51–125 [7] and 'Présentation,' in M. Weber, *L'Éthique protestante et l'Esprit du capitalisme, suivi d'autres essais* (Paris: Gallimard, 2003), pp. v–lviii [8].
3. M. Weber, *Collected Methodological Writings*.
4. P. Bourdieu, *The Social Structures of the Economy* (Cambridge: Polity, 2005) [9].

5. See T. Mitchell, ‘Society, Economy, and the State Effect’ (pp. 76–97) in G. Steinmetz (ed.) *State/Culture. State-formation after the cultural turn* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999) [10].
6. A. Gramsci, *Écrits politiques I (1914–1920)* (Paris: Gallimard, 1974) [11], especially ‘Einaudi ou “de l’utopie libérale”’ (1919).
7. Weber, *Collected Methodological Writings*.
8. See K. Marx, *Grundrisse: foundations of the critique of political economy (rough draft)*, translated and with a foreword by Martin Nicolaus (London: Allen Lane, New Left Review, 1973) [12] and *Capital: A critique of political economy*, transl. Ben Fowkes (Harmondsworth: Penguin in association with New Left Review, 1976) [13]. This dimension has been highlighted by M. Henry, *Le Socialisme selon Marx* (Cabris: Sulliver, 2008) [14].
9. M. Weber, ‘The meaning of “value freedom” in the sociological and economic sciences’ in *Collected Methodological Writings*, p. 332.
10. Gramsci, ‘Einaudi ou “de l’utopie libérale”’: the quotation in full states that the economy is ‘a scheme, a pre-established plan, one of the paths of Providence, an abstract, mathematical theory that has never had and never will have any point of contact with historical reality’ (p. 234).
11. P. Veyne, ‘The inventory of differences,’ transl. E. Kingdom, *Economy and Society*, 11(2) (May 1982), p. 176 [15].
12. J.F. Bayart, ‘Comparing From Below,’ *Sociétés Politiques Comparées*, 1, January 2008 (available on the FASOPO website, <http://www.fasopo.org/reasopo/n1/comparerparlebas.pdf> [16]); ‘Comparer en France. Petit essai d’autobiographie disciplinaire,’ *Politix*, 21(83) (2008): 205–232 [17], and *L’Islam républicain. Istanbul, Téhéran, Dakar* (Paris: Albin Michel, 2010) [18].
13. The expression ‘incomparable’ is, of course, taken from M. Détienné, *Comparing the Incomparable*, transl. Janet Lloyd (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008) [19].
14. I am here alluding to A. Zinoviev, *The Radiant Future*, transl. Gordin Clough (New York: Random House, 1980) [20] in which Tamurka, one of the characters in the novel, says: ‘If you’ve got any idea of attacking the system, [...] don’t behave like those idiotic dissidents. They spend all their time debating all those high-flown ideas like freedom of speech, creative individuality, and the

- right to emigrate, and never a word about what really matters—that there isn't a sausage worthy of the name (p. 28).
15. S. Žižek, *Did somebody say totalitarianism?: five interventions in the (mis)use of a notion* (London: Verso, 2011), p. 3 [21].
 16. A. Mérodack-Jeaneau, 'Kandinsky. La gravure sur bois, l'illustration,' *Les Tendances Nouvelles*, 26 [22], Christmas 1906 (quoted in the Kandinsky exhibition, Centre Pompidou, 8 April–10 August 2009).
 17. Analyses of this kind are appearing, implicitly or explicitly, in ever more studies. See, for example, G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller (eds), *The Foucault Effect. Studies in Governmentality* (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991) [23]; A. Barry, T. Osborne and N. Rose (eds), *Foucault and Political Reason. Liberalism, neoliberalism and Rationalities of Government* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1996) [24]; N. Rose, *Powers of Freedom. Reframing Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) [25]; A. Ogien, *L'Esprit gestionnaire. Une analyse de l'air du temps* (Paris: EHESS, 1995) [26] and A. Ogien and S. Laugier, *Pourquoi désobéir en démocratie?* (Paris: La Découverte, 2010) [27]; L. Boltanski, *Rendre la réalité inacceptable. À propos de la production de l'idéologie dominante* (Paris: Demopolis, 2008) [28] and especially *On Critique: A Sociology of Emancipation*, transl. Gregory Elliot (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011) [29]; P. Dardot and C. Laval, *The New Way of the World: On Neoliberal Society* transl. Gregory Elliott (London: Verso, 2015) [30]; F. Gros (ed.), 'Nouvelles menaces, nouvelles sécurités: de la sécurité nationale à la sécurité humaine,' *Raisons politiques*, 32(4) (2008): 5–127 [31].
 18. Insofar as this book was written between June 2008 and October 2010, my analyses of the situation in Tunisia concern the country as it was in that period, under the Ben Ali regime. I conducted fieldwork there between 1995 and 2005.
 19. This is, of course, an overall presentation that cannot do justice to the temporal and thematic specificity of these new trends that vary with each country, context and field. For this, see the specialists working on each of these historical trajectories. See, for example, for the USSR, N. Werth, 'Le stalinisme au pouvoir. Mise en perspective historiographique,' *Vingtième siècle. Revue d'histoire*, 69 (January–March 2001), pp. 125–135 [32]; for Nazism, I. Kershaw, *The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation*, 4th

- edition (London: Arnold, 2000) [33], or the special issue of the *Journal of Contemporary History* on ‘Understanding Nazi Germany,’ 39(2) (April 2004): 163–294 [34]; for the GDR, A. Lüdtke, ‘La République démocratique allemande comme histoire. Réflexions historiographiques,’ *Annales HSS*, 1 (January–February 1998): 3–39 [35]. For a comparative analysis of the intellectual trajectory of totalitarianism, E. Traverso, *Le Totalitarisme. Le XXe siècle en débat* (Paris: Le Seuil, 2001) [36].
20. This terminology is taken from Marxist anthropological studies and is used to analyze relations of power and domination by J.F. Bayart in *L’État au Cameroun* (Paris: Presses de la FNSP, 1979) [37] and in *The State in Africa. The politics of the belly*, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009) [38].
 21. J. Kornai, *Economics of Shortage*, 2 vols (Amsterdam; Oxford: North-Holland, 1980) [39].
 22. J. Kornai, *The Socialist System: The political Economy of Communism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) [40].
 23. A. Lüdtke, *The History of Everyday Life: Reconstructing Historical Experiences and Ways of Life*, transl. William Templer (Princeton, NJ; Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1995) [41] and *Des ouvriers dans l’Allemagne du XXème siècle: le quotidien des dictatures* (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2000) [42]. There is a veritable school of such studies. See also, for example, the works of Thomas Lindenberger, ‘La Police populaire de la RDA de 1952 à 1958. Une micro-étude sur la gouvernamentalité de l’État socialiste,’ *Annales*, 53(1) (January–February 1998): 119–152 [43] and ‘Société et police dans l’historiographie de la RDA,’ *Genèse*, 52 (September 2003): 17–31 [44].
 24. A. Tooze, *The Wages of Destruction. The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy* (London: Penguin Books, 2007) [45].
 25. M. Weber, *Economy and Society; An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, transl. Ephraim Fischhoff and others (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), p. 212 [46]. See also M. Weber, *Political Writings* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994) [47].
 26. M. Foucault, ‘Précisions sur le pouvoir. Réponses à certaines critiques,’ *Dits et Écrits III, 1976–1979* (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), pp. 625–635 [48]. Translation of the quote by Andrew Brown. For his conceptualization of power, see also *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, transl. Alan Sheridan (Harmondsworth:

- Penguin Books, 1979) [49] and ‘*Society must be Defended*’: *Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–76*, ed. Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana; transl. David Macey (London: Allen Lane, 2003) [50], especially the lecture of 7 January 1976.
27. N. Elias, *The Society of Individuals*, ed. Michael Schröter; transl. Edmund Jephcott (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991) [51], and *What is sociology?*, transl. Stephen Mennell and Grace Morrissey; with a foreword by Reinhard Bendix (London: Hutchinson, 1978) [52].
 28. A. Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, edited and introduced by Joseph A. Buttigieg; transl. Joseph A. Buttigieg and Antonio Callari, 3 volumes (New York; Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2011) [53]; see also the French version *Cahiers de prison*, 5 volumes (Paris: Gallimard, 1996) [54] and the reading of Gramsci by J.F. Bayart, in ‘Les chemins de traverse de l’hégémonie coloniale en Afrique de l’Ouest francophone,’ *Politique africaine*, 105 (March 2007): 201–240 [55] and in ‘Hégémonie et coercition en Afrique subsaharienne. La “politique de la chicotte,”’ *Politique Africaine*, 110 (June 2008): 123–152 [56].
 29. É. De La Boétie, *Discourse on Voluntary Servitude*, transl. by James B. Atkinson and David Sices; introduction and notes by James B. Atkinson (Indianapolis, IN; Cambridge: Hackett, 2012) [57] and its contemporary readers, notably C. Lefort, ‘Le nom d’Un,’ P. Clastres, ‘Liberté, malencontre, innommable’ and M. Abensour and M. Gauchet, ‘Présentation. Les leçons de la servitude et leur destin,’ in É. De La Boétie, *Le Discours de la servitude volontaire* (Paris: Payot, 1993), respectively pp. 247–307, pp. 229–246 and pp. vii–xxix [58–60].
 30. A. Zinoviev, *The Reality of Communism*, transl. Charles Janson (London: Paladin, 1985) [61].
 31. Weber, *Economy and Society*; Kalberg, *Max Weber’s Comparative Historical Sociology*; Colliot-Thélène, *Études webériennes*.
 32. Marx, *Grundrisse*, discussed by Henry, *Le Socialisme selon Marx*.
 33. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, p. 139.
 34. M. Weber, ‘The “objectivity” of knowledge in social science and social policy,’ in *Collected Methodological Writings*, p. 109.
 35. *Ibid.*, p. 109. Marx would not have denied this conception: see his defense, in *Grundrisse*, of the idea that the economy *as such* does not exist. His whole investigation turns on this question: what enables a reality to become, at a given moment, in a given context

for given individuals and groups, an *economic* reality? The work of K. Polanyi, meanwhile, suggests that the political project of a separate economy is not viable—in other words, that the institutional separation between ‘economics’ and ‘politics’ is utopian. See K. Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1957) [62] and the analysis by A. Buğra, ‘Polanyi’s concept of double movement and politics in the contemporary market society,’ in A. Buğra and K. Ağartan eds. *Reading Karl Polanyi for the 21st Century: Market Economy as a Political Project*, Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, pp. 173–189 [63].

36. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, p. 308.
37. P. Veine (conversations with Catherine Darbo-Peschanski), *Le Quotidien et l'intéressant* (Paris: Hachette Littératures, 1995) [64].

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

More than any other, this book would never have seen the light without discussions with colleagues who encouraged me to make my thinking clearer and come out of my safety zone by sharpening my curiosity on their own specialized fields. I would like to express my thanks to Richard Banégas, Jean-François Bayart, Irene Bono, Jean-Louis Briquet, Antonela Capelle-Pogăcean, Gilles Favarel-Garrigues, Fabien Jobard, Mohamed Kerrou, Alfio Mastropaolo, Hamza Meddeb, Françoise Mengin, Christine Messiant, Victor Pereira, Nadège Ragaru, Boris Samuel, Mohamed Tozy and Olivier Vallée, for asking me unsettling questions, pointing to me exciting new material, reading and rereading me, giving me ideas, arguments, examples and counter-examples, and sometimes preventing me from saying silly things, even if I must have let errors slip through, inevitably left out indispensable references that they had recommended, and must have left them wanting more or even disappointed them. Many thanks also to those friends who invited me to organize with them, or to take part in, conferences, seminars and colloquia, in particular Simona Taliani and Roberto Beneduce, of the University of Turin, and Dino Cutolo, of the University of Siena. They allowed me to discover new fields of inquiry, made sure that I did not neglect certain perspectives, and helped me to ask new questions. I am deeply grateful, finally, to colleagues who invited me to discuss my book on the political economy of domination in Tunisia. By critiquing my work, forcing me to adopt a more general point of view and contrasting my experience with that of others, and by demanding of me a greater degree of methodological clarity and abstraction, they helped me

to systematize my approach, to refine my problematization of domination, and to widen my range of references. Thanks especially to Frédéric Sawicki and the members of the CRAPS (University of Lille-II), to Pierre-Robert Baduel who was then in Tunis (IRMC), to Jay Rowell and the journal *Politix*, to Jean-Philippe Bras and his colleagues at the IISMM, to Luc Boltanski and his associates at the GSPM (EHESS), to the CRPS team (Paris-I), to Michel Péraldi (Centre Jacques Berque in Rabat) and to my friends at the Centre marocain de sciences sociales (Hassan II University of Casablanca), Pascale Laborier (Centre Marc Bloch) and Nora Lafi (ZMO Berlin), Mounia Bennani-Chraïbi (University of Lausanne) and various colleagues in anthropology and the political sciences at the Universities of Turin and Sienna.

I cannot finish without mentioning the intellectual and financial support I have received from two institutions: the Center for International Studies (CERI) at SciencesPo, especially via the financing of a special project and the Fonds d'analyse des sociétés politiques (FASOPO). These two places of discussion are particularly open to a comparative approach and to a permanent process of learning from differences: they have enabled me to carry out a piece of fundamental research jeopardized by current demands to 'respond to social questions,' to have a 'high profile' institutionally and to 'contractualize' research. I would like to thank Christian Lequesne, the then director of the CERI, for supporting research not guided by 'social impact' and external funding, and for fostering a non-utilitarian approach to scholarship, Céline Ballereau for a logistical support that is always both rigorous and ironic, Grégory Calès for his essential help with IT problems and Martine Jouneau for her indispensable help with bibliography and calming my last-minute panics about finding a particular quotation or book. Faithful to its objective, the FASOPO has played its transinstitutional and pluridisciplinary role by financing and organizing research trips, seminars and conferences. A big thank you to Michèle Ignazi, my bookseller friend who ensured this work would be a little less prone to obsolescence by continuing to flag up the latest publications on the subject for me, to François Gèze for his renewed confidence and to Rémy Toulouse for his publishing competence, which comes with an unusual availability and kindness.

Finally, for the English translation, I would first like to extend my warmest thanks to Andrew Brown who for some years has been translating my work with a profound grasp of my ideas: as a good translator, he is

well placed to point out inconsistencies and imprecisions. I would also like to say how grateful I am to Miriam Perier, without whom this translation would never have been published: her professionalism, her friendly perseverance, her ever-cheerful dynamism and her generosity have been essential in helping me to reach this final stage.

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