

# Nordic Wittgenstein Studies

## Volume 5

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Avner Baz

# The Significance of Aspect Perception

Bringing the Phenomenal World into View

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# Acknowledgments

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# Abbreviations for Works of Wittgenstein Cited

- BB *The Blue and Brown Books*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958.
- PR *Philosophical Grammar*. R. Rhees (ed.), A. Kenny (trans.), Oxford: Blackwell.
- RPPI *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, Vol. I, G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (eds.), tr. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980).
- RPPII *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, Vol. II, G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (eds.), tr. C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980).
- CV *Culture and Value*, G. H. von Wright (ed.), Winch, P. (tr.) (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1980).
- Z *Zettel*, Anscombe, G. E. M. and von Wright, G. H. (eds.). Anscombe, G. E. M. (trans.). Oxford: Blackwell.
- LWI *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology*, Vol. I, G. H. von Wright and H. Nyman (eds.), tr. C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
- LCAPR *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*, Cyril Barrett (ed.) Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983.
- LWII *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology*, Vol. II, G. H. von Wright and H. Nyman (eds.), tr. C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992).
- PI *Philosophical Investigations*, G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte (trans.) (Malden, MA: Basil-Blackwell, 2009).<sup>1</sup>
- RPMI *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees, and G. E. M. Anscombe (eds.), G. E. M. Anscombe (trans.) (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978).
- PPF *Part II of the Philosophical Investigations*.

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<sup>1</sup>The early papers in this collection, and occasionally the later papers too, use the original Anscombe translation of Parts I and II of the *Investigations*, as opposed to the more recent Hacker and Schulte revision of that translation. Where I saw no reason to update Anscombe's original translation, I didn't.