THE LIMITS OF LOGICAL EMPIRICISM
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STUDIES IN EPISTEMOLOGY,
LOGIC, METHODOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

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Preface

We would like to begin by telling a bit of the somewhat complicated story of how this volume came into being.

Several years ago, one of us—Keupink—stumbled across some of Arthur Pap’s major publications in a secondhand bookstore in Groningen. As a Ph.D. student in philosophy of science with a special interest in the history of logical positivism, he was taken by the fecundity of Pap’s thought. Here was someone who, to him at least, seemed equally well-versed in all kinds of different philosophical traditions (notably ordinary language philosophy and logical empiricism), yet always with something original to say. Keupink quickly made a decision to compile a list of Pap’s writings. He discovered, to his surprise, that Pap had written over fifty papers during an extremely productive but all too short life. Gradually Keupink formed a plan to edit this material, in order to make it more accessible to a wide philosophical audience. He contacted Kluwer and in the Spring of 2003 submitted a manuscript entitled Arthur Pap: Collected Papers. It contained all of Pap’s papers and Keupink hoped that they could be published in two volumes.

Kluwer asked Shieh to review Keupink’s manuscript. Nowadays Pap’s work is relatively unknown in Anglo-American analytic philosophy. Mostly he is read only by philosophers interested in the history of the analytic tradition. Indeed, it is because one of Shieh’s main research interests is in the development of modal logic and the concept of necessity in analytic philosophy that he knew parts of Pap’s magnum opus, Semantics and Necessary Truth, before Kluwer contacted him. As he read through the papers in the proposed collection, he became more and more impressed by the historical and philosophical significance of Pap’s work.

The principal criteria that the two of us share for historical-philosophical assessment are:

1. Did the work play an important role in the development of the tradition to which it belongs?

2 Did it anticipate prominent subsequent developments?

3 Did it provide distinctive solutions or perspectives on problems of contemporary concern, perhaps by pointing out unnoticed problems in contemporary work, perhaps by proposing arguments that are more cogent than contemporary ones, perhaps by allowing us to see the significance of the problems differently?

Shieh’s suggestion was that the best way of making Pap’s work more visible and easily available to the philosophical community is to make a smaller selection of Pap’s papers that best satisfy these criteria, and provide an introduction that clarifies their significance. Shieh was very happy to be asked by Keupink (via a letter written by Prof. Theo Kuipers and Dr. Jeanne Peijnenburg of the University of Groningen), to make the small selection and write the introduction.

We hope that the present edition will have the effect of furthering interest in Arthur Pap’s thought and contributing towards a reevaluation of his highly original and stimulating contribution to the development of 20th-century (analytic) philosophy (of science).

Alfons Keupink
Groningen,
the Netherlands, 2005

Sanford Shieh
New York, USA, 2005
Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Arthur Pap’s wife, Mrs. Pauline Pap, for her confidence and support; Keupink would like also to thank her for her help with his Intellectual Biography of Pap. We are also very grateful for the help and advice of Prof. Dr. Theo Kuipers, and Dr. Jeanne Peijnenburg. Our other colleagues in Groningen made various constructive remarks on earlier versions of the Intellectual Biography of Pap and the Introduction. In addition, Dr. Peijnenburg carried out the unenviable task of tracking down the copyright holders of the essays herein reprinted, and securing permission for this reprinting; without her help this volume would not have been possible. Acknowledgments are also due to the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), which partly sponsored the research for this project. We would like to thank Andrew Catalano of Wesleyan University and Julia Perkins of History and Theory and Wesleyan University for their invaluable editorial assistance.

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the editors of *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Brown University.


Acknowledgements


19 “Reduction Sentences and Open Concepts,” in Methodos 5, 1953, pp. 3-30. The editors were unable to trace or contact the copyright holder.


22 “Are Physical Magnitudes Operationally Definable?,” in C. West Churchman & P. Ratoosh (eds), Measurement: Definitions and Theories. New York: John Wiley, London: Chapmann & Hall (1959), pp. 177-91. (Publications of contributions to the symposium of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1956.) The editors were unable to trace or contact the copyright holder.

A Note on this Edition

Minimal editorial changes have been made to the originally published versions of the essays reprinted in this volume. Typographical mistakes are corrected; references, spelling, and punctuation are made uniform throughout the volume.

Details of original publication of the essays are given both in chapter 25, a bibliography of Pap’s publications, and in the relevant entries for Pap in the References, starting on page 387 below.

All citations of Pap’s works in this volume are exclusively by the entries in the References.