

GURWITSCH'S RELEVANCY FOR COGNITIVE SCIENCE

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
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Scope

The purpose of this series is to foster the development of phenomenological philosophy through creative research. Contemporary issues in philosophy, other disciplines and in culture generally, offer opportunities for the application of phenomenological methods that call for creative responses. Although the work of several generations of thinkers has provided phenomenology with many results with which to approach these challenges, a truly successful response to them will require building on this work with new analyses and methodological innovations.

GURWITSCH'S RELEVANCY FOR COGNITIVE SCIENCE

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Preface

When I heard the rumor that the findings about the central nervous system obtained with new technology, such as Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) and Positron Emission Tomography (PET), were too subtle to correlate with the crude results of many decades of behavioristic psychology, and that some psychologists were now turning to descriptions of subjective phenomena in William James, Edmund Husserl, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty—and even in Buddhism—I asked myself, “Why not Aron Gurwitsch as well?” After all, my teacher regularly reflected on the types, basic concepts, and methods of psychology, worked with Adhémar Gelb and Kurt Goldstein in the institute investigating brain-injured veterans at Frankfurt in the 1920s, conspicuously employed Gestalt theory to revise central Husserlian doctrines, and taught Merleau-Ponty a thing or two. That the last book from his Nachlass had recently been published and that I had recently written an essay on his theory of psychology no doubt helped crystallize this project for me.¹

What is “cognitive science”? At one point in assembling this volume I polled the participants, asking whether they preferred “the cognitive sciences” or “cognitive science.” Most who answered preferred the latter expression. There is still some vagueness here for me, but I do suspect that cognitive science is another example of what I call a “multidiscipline.”² A multidiscipline includes participants who confront a set of issues that is best approached under more than one disciplinary perspective. There is little or no merger of disciplinary perspectives involved, but there is considerable will to learn from work in other fields. Colleagues also told me that the term “cognitive science” took root in the 1970s, following a Slone Foundation grant for conferences, and that The Cognitive Science Society asserts that it “brings together researchers from many fields with a common goal: Understanding the human mind. We promote scientific interchange across disciplines, including Artificial Intelligence, Linguistics, Anthropology, Psychology, Neuroscience, Philosophy, and Education.” The philosophers involved then were originally in the analytic tradition, but of late also include some in the phenomenological tradition.³

¹ Aron Gurwitsch, *Esquisse de la phénoménologie constitutive*, ed. José Huertas-Jourda, introduction by Lester Embree (Paris: J. Vrin, 2002) and Lester Embree, “Gurwitsch's Theory of Cultural-Scientific Phenomenological Psychology,” *Husserl Studies* 19 (2003): 43-70.

² Cf. Lester Embree and Stanford Lyman, “Ethnic Studies as Multi-Discipline and Phenomenology,” in *Phenomenology of the Cultural Disciplines*, ed. Mano Daniel and Lester Embree (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), 211-49.

³ Cf. Jean Petitot, Francisco J. Varela, Bernard Pachoud, and Jean-Michel Roy, *Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999) and the new journal, *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*.

With the goal of showing that Gurwitsch is relevant for cognitive science, it only remained to identify a set of suitable colleagues and to bring them together for another of the research symposia I had been holding at the Seagate Hotel and Beach Club in Delray Beach, Florida since 1991. Dr. Olav Wiegand proved invaluable in this connection, contributed well to the discussions, and I regret that he needed to withdraw from the project. I have depended on Dr. Kirk Besmer, the William F. Dietrich Fellow in Philosophy at Florida Atlantic University in 2001-2003, and his successor, Mr. Daniel Marcelle in 2003-2005 for help in ways too numerous to list.

Lester Embree

Delray Beach
November 2003

Introduction:

Explanation, the Noematic Core, the Essays, and More Relevancies for Cognitive Science

Lester Embree

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Abstract

Before some commentary on the contents of this volume, something is offered about Aron Gurwitsch's model of explanation, which involves the central nervous system, and how, for him, the noematic core, which is fundamental to his phenomenological descriptions, can be abstractly discerned.

I. Psychological Explanation

Like that of his master Edmund Husserl, Aron Gurwitsch's philosophical project can be characterized as a philosophy of science, or better, a theory of science—*Wissenschaftslehre* or *Wissenschaftstheorie* in German. Many metaphysically preoccupied post-Husserlian phenomenologists have forgotten this original philosophical project of our tradition. My teacher was delighted when I suggested the title for his last collection of essays.¹ His "science theory," as *Wissenschaftslehre* can also be rendered, includes reflections not only on logic and mathematics, physics, biology, and the cultural sciences, but also on psychology. Among other things in his theory of psychology, he supports a revision of the traditional model of explanation.

It is my impression that what cognitive scientists (and analytic philosophers) most find lacking in phenomenology is a preoccupation with causal explanation. The downplaying of causality is quite deliberate in phenomenological philosophy, but Gurwitsch does not extend it to psychology as a positive science. Thus in his masterpiece he writes as follows:

From the psychological point of view, acts of consciousness are considered as events of a specific nature occurring in the same real world and in the same objective time as events of other kinds, e.g., organismic processes (especially of the nervous system), and physical processes of all sorts. Acts of con-

¹ Aron Gurwitsch, *Phenomenology and the Theory of Science*, ed. Lester Embree (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1974), hereafter cited as "PTS."

sciousness are causally or functionally related to physiological processes which, in turn, are aroused by certain physical processes, namely, external stimulations of the sense-organs. It is with regard to such functional dependencies that consciousness may be, and actually is, studied in psychology. Psychology thus is a positive science. Like the other positive sciences, psychology chooses a well circumscribed realm of reality, as one mundane realm among others, and connected with these realms. It is in full conformity with this choice, that, in its exploration and explanation of consciousness, psychology continues and, partly, relies upon the physical and biological sciences.²

Following Gestalists of the Berlin School, Gurwitsch shows how the constancy hypothesis played a fateful role in pre-Gestaltist psychological explanation. Briefly, what is hypothesized is a one-to-one correlation between external stimuli and the mental events usually called sensations, *sensa*, or sense data (on Gurwitsch's interpretation, Husserl's hyletic data are sense data). Interestingly, however, subjects often do not perceive what the stimulation of their sense organs lead psychologists to predict that they will perceive. The traditional solutions to this problem assume dualistic conceptions of sensuous perception in which, in addition to the sense data, secondary processes are posited. Gurwitsch focuses on the work of Alexis Meinong, Vittorio Benussi, and the School of Graz (FC, Part I, Ch. 3), but philosophers today are probably most familiar with this model through the equation whereby

$$\text{perception} = \text{sensation} + \text{interpretation.}$$

Gestalt psychologists call this the "meaning theory" or the "interpretation theory" (FC, 44 n. 46). This theory is attractive because the recourse to sensations can support the belief that physical reality is always contacted, while all sorts of differences, including those of class, ethnicity, gender, and generation, can be attributed to interpretation, interpretive frameworks, etc., and philosophers as well as scientists can then analyze these added conceptual components in perception, looking for them first of all in language.

There are two difficulties with this traditional model. To begin with, it is unacceptable because, as Wolfgang Köhler already showed in 1913, it is "nei-

² Aron Gurwitsch, *The Field of Consciousness* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1964), 157-58. Hereafter cited as "FC." Cf. Aron Gurwitsch, *Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1966), 89, hereafter cited as "SPP," and Aron Gurwitsch, *Marginal Consciousness*, ed. Lester Embree (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1985), 15-16, hereafter cited as "MC."

ther self-evident nor verifiable” (FC, 91). Moreover, if one actually reflects on things-as-perceived, no phenomenological difference can be discerned between the sense data and a meaning, interpretation, or other subjective addition. “While listening to a melody or seeing a geometrical configuration, one is unaware of any non-sensory process, nor is the theme experienced as consisting of two strata of different origin. On the contrary, the melody or the configuration, as given in immediate experience, appear as both homogeneous and altogether a matter of sensibility” (FC, 88-89).

I hasten to add that Gurwitsch was well aware of a discernable difference between the “meaning” and the “meaning carrier” in language (see FC, 267 ff.; PTS, 228 ff.), and acknowledges that “Husserl admits a certain parallelism between the perceptual apprehension of material things and the comprehension of meanings in the proper and more narrow sense ...” (FC, 269). What is at issue, however, is precisely the perceptual apprehension of material things when one listens to their sounds or looks at their shapes. It is the interpretationist theory of perception, not that of language, that is rejected.

To introduce the alternative he advocates, Gurwitsch contrasts two models of explanation that he formulates in mathematical terms:

Denoting the stimuli and external conditions playing a part by x_e , the subjective conditions by x_i (internal conditions), the resulting percept by P , we may illustrate Benussi’s theory by the mathematical expression: $P = f_1(x_e) + f_2(x_i)$, f_1 and f_2 standing for functional dependencies. This expression renders Benussi’s interpretation of the percept as consisting of two heterogeneous strata, one of which depends only upon external conditions, and the other, founded by the former, only upon internal conditions. If the external conditions are kept constant, while allowing the internal conditions to vary, the illustrating mathematical expression assumes the form: $P = \text{Const.} + f_2(x_i)$. This fits very well with Benussi’s view in which the percepts have a constant common stratum, but differ as to the variable part which, on account of its origin, is the ‘higher’ stratum.

To expound the Gestalt theoretical interpretation ..., let us consider, for the sake of simplicity, the case of mental isolation only. We compare two perceptions: P_1 when the subject looks at the figure as a whole; P_2 when he concentrates on certain lines, disregarding others. With respect to the two perceptions, one must insist upon the identity of the stimuli, and upon the difference in the attitude of the perceiving subject. When in consequence of a change in attitude, different percepts result, the only warranted conclusion is that *the percept*

depends upon both external and internal conditions. Abandoning the constancy-hypothesis, one can no longer justify distinguishing between two strata within the percept, either stratum varying in dependence upon conditions of only one special kind ... *if the percept varies in dependence upon both external and internal conditions, it does so as a whole and as a homogeneous entity.* (FC, 94-95)

A mathematical illustration of the Gestalt theoretical view is provided by the expression $P = f(x_e, x_i)$. If the external conditions are kept constant, this expression becomes $P = f(\text{constant}, x_i)$, which obviously is not the same thing as $P = \text{constant} + f_2(x_i)$. Especially as to the above-mentioned percepts $P_1 = f(x_e, x_i)$ and $P_2 = f(x_e, x'_i)$ —the external conditions being kept constant, while the internal conditions are permitted to vary—Gestalt theory maintains that P_1 and P_2 differ really and substantially from one another and rejects the interpretation of P_2 as somehow “contained” in P_1 . (FC, 95)

Here the internal conditions mentioned are attitudes (attitudes will be discussed below more extensively), but they are not the only internal conditions.

Internal conditions comprise any operational factors other than the actual stimulation of sense-organs. More, therefore, than the adopted attitude of the experiencing subject must be taken into consideration, when one time, he looks at a presented figure as a whole, while another time he tries to single out one or another of the component lines. Among the internal conditions, the past of the individual is of paramount importance. (FC, 96)

Concerning past experience, traditional theory has memories, images, etc., that somehow come back from the past and are added to current sense data. “If the suit of polished armor ‘looks’ cold, hard, and smooth, it is because sensations of coldness, hardness, and smoothness have been experienced in the past and the sight of the object ‘instantly reinstates and steadily maintains’ those sensations” (FC, 250). But no such data can be observed returning from the past to attach to present sense data. Instead, what one actually does perceive due to past experience can be described as follows:

What in the visual appearance is given in direct sense experience is but one constituent of the total percept and as such is qualified by, and organized with respect to, other constituents.

Seeing an orange, we perceive the spherical orange surface as enveloping juicy and tasty content. In the visual perception of a piece of polished iron, a grayish color appears as covering a hard, cool, and smooth surface of a certain geometric shape. The piece of iron does look hard, cool, and smooth because its visual appearance is essentially determined by references it implies to tactile properties not given in direct sense-experience. (FC, 278)

In other words, what is directly perceived predelineates certain possible future perceptions, present references to perceivings and appearances in the future being not the same as data returning from the past.

Finally, where past experience is concerned, it is not necessarily a matter of remembering what was previously perceived, which is of course also often possible. Concerning what is necessary in this connection, however, Gurwitsch again follows the Gestaltists in holding that “previous experiences leave ‘traces’ in the nervous system which modify that system as the medium in which processes aroused by external stimulation take place” (FC, 98). This may suffice to show that the model of explanation that Gurwitsch supports recognizes not only external stimuli, but also internal conditions that pertain to such things as attitudes and modifications of the central nervous system by experience.

With his acceptance of the Gestaltist revision of the explanatory model in psychology, Gurwitsch was able to appreciate the descriptive findings of Gestalt theory and use them to revise Husserl’s phenomenology. And where methodology is concerned, he considers the abandonment of the constancy hypothesis an “*incipient* phenomenological reduction” (FC, 168). This is not the occasion to discuss whether what is involved in this case is the phenomenological-psychological or the transcendental-philosophical *epochē*, reduction, and purification.

It deserves mention, however, that descriptions produced in transcendental-philosophical phenomenology can be interpreted as mundane or worldly. This was Husserl’s assertion in his “Nachwort zu meinen ‘Ideen...’” (1930), which text Gurwitsch reviewed in 1932, and his close friend Alfred Schutz relied upon this mundanizing interpretation for his own investigations in the “constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude” (Husserl’s phrase). Moreover, in his *magnum opus* (completed in 1953), Gurwitsch himself recognized the validity of Schutz’s “phenomenological psychology” carried out within the natural attitude (FC, 400-401), and in 1966 he also studied Husserl’s own 1925 lectures on phenomenological psychology thoroughly and critically (PTS, 77-112). In speaking of phenomenology, then, one needs explicitly or by context to qualify that title as philosophical or psychological. I was interested to see that the colleagues at our research symposium did not refer to this distinction, or to the interpretive move in question, but seemed simply to take it for granted.

II. About Some Terminology

What contrasts with explanation is description, which is concerned not with why something is, but with what it is. It would seem obvious that explanation presupposes description, i.e., that the first need is for description. With a description in hand, one knows what to explain and can try to do so. Common sense and ordinary language may often seem to be adequate for descriptive and explanatory purposes. But this is dubious, if only because the psychological terminology found in ordinary language is so often a sediment of earlier psychological theory. For example, it is doubtful that concern with unconscious psychological motivation goes back in the history of common sense further than Sigmund Freud. This is, of course, part of a wider problem: not only does science shape culture, but even obsolete science can continue to exert an influence.

Wherever its terms have come from, ordinary language can mislead. For example, the centermost concept in phenomenology is traditionally expressed with the word "intentionality" and then there is talk of "intentional experiences" or "intentional acts." Now in ordinary English intentions and intentionality are concerned with purposes and plans for the future, often with moral connotations. According to phenomenology, however, the remembering of earlier events and the thinking of atemporal things are also characterized by intentionality and are thus also intentional processes, as is perceiving. Confusions can be resisted by employing technical terminology in this connection.

Having heard "intentionality" used at our symposium in a seemingly phenomenological context but with the ordinary English signification, I mentioned that my other teacher, Dorion Cairns, had revived the verb "to intend to," current in Isaac Newton's time, and derived the adjective "intensive" and the abstract noun "intensiveness." While these words have general signification, there are times when "purposiveness," "purposing," etc., are best for the specific intensiveness to the practical future. I doubt that any who heard me at the symposium were moved thereupon to reform their linguistic habits, so I have seized this opportunity to repeat the comment in print! The more general point is that phenomenology, whether philosophical or psychological, needs constantly to work at clarifying and refining its technical language. More efforts of this sort will be found below.

III. Reflective or Noematic Analysis of Looking at a Building

The following exposition of what is central to Gurwitsch's work is more systematic than what is to be found in any one place in his oeuvre, and some of the terminology is refined. Quotations will nevertheless show that he accepts most of the distinctions made. The chief source he relies on is Husserl's *Ideen I*

(1913) and the main example he employs is that of *looking at a building*, which one can engage in seriously in perceiving or remembering or feign in perception or pretend to remember. Such a case actually involves a great deal. For example, the following passage reflects the difference between the theme and the rest of the field of consciousness.

In looking at a house and choosing it as the theme of our present perception, we perceive the house as flanked by other buildings, as located beside a park. We see the street on which the house is located, the passersby, and the cars moving along. The other buildings on the street, the people, the cars, the park, and all other things perceived, while we are dealing with the perceived house as our theme, do not, of course, become themes themselves. Rather they form a background around the house, the theme of our present perception. (FC, 320-21)

Ten steps lead to the heart of Gurwitsch's analysis of such a case. The first step of this analysis is to recognize that what one looks at in the example is the whole building.

To perceive a building from a certain side is not to see that side as in a drawing, or as a wing on a stage, or a silhouette. The building itself is given through any single perception, though it appears from a particular side. Every single perception proves to be a perception of the thing itself and as a whole, though from a determinate point of view. To express this in phenomenological terms, the experience of any single appearance proves tantamount to the apprehension of the entire noematic system through the apprehension of one of its members. It is by virtue of such references to further noemata that the appearance presently actualized is essentially determined as appearance of the perceived thing itself. (FC, 219; cf. PTS, 253)

This statement seems confined to the visual, but a passage quoted above in relation to explanation includes gustatory and tactual appearances and such matters will be mentioned in later steps of the analysis.

Second, we can recognize that there can be an episode of looking at the building in which the appearances change:

If we are interested in a building, in order to see it from many sides and angles we walk around it, come close to it, draw away from it. In the course of our perceptual exploration, we

are presented with a multiplicity of perceptual appearances which succeed each other more or less immediately. All these appearances, while differing to a greater or lesser extent, are experienced as perceptual presentations of one and the same thing, namely, the building in which we are interested. (FC, 2; cf. MC, 32, MC, 53)

We can, of course, be conscious also of the building from inside:

Sitting in a room, we are aware of the things behind our back through horizontal consciousness as things which fit into a room of this kind, whether or not these things present themselves with full determinacy regarding their particular details. In this case, the experience of context rests upon the experienced suitability of the things in question to the purpose of the room, the awareness of this purpose being conveyed by those things which are given in actual perception. (MC, 47; cf. FC, 340)

Now we can recognize more clearly that there is a difference between the thing that is seen and how it appears, i.e., how it is seen. This is a relation between the same building and the multiplicity of what were just called “appearances” (although other names are used as well).

In the third place, the present analysis will be confined to looking at a building from a fixed place outside. Then, “while abiding by the same point of observation, we alternately open and close our eyes, or . . . , after an absence from a certain point of observation, we return to it—so that the same noema corresponds to a multiplicity of acts” (PTS, 247). Thus there is again a multiplicity in contrast with an identity. In short, the appearance, now called “noema,” is located in relation to the thing looked at, on the one hand, and in relation to the multiple seeings or lookings at the building, on the other hand.

Fourth, the analysis of the noema in the case of a looking at a building has an aspect that raises terminological questions. More than sensuous perception strictly speaking is involved:

What we encounter are cultural objects, objects of value, e.g., works of art, [and] buildings which serve specific purposes, like abodes, places for work, schools, libraries, churches, and so on. Objects pertaining to the life-world present themselves as tools, instruments, and utensils related to human needs and desires; they have to be handled and used in appropriate ways to satisfy those needs and to yield desired results. It is the spe-

cific sense of their instrumentality which essentially defines those objects and makes them be what they are, that is, what they mean to the members of the sociohistorical group to whose life-world they belong. (PTS, 143-44)

A terminological refinement may help in this connection. The case of “looking at a building” emphasizes visual perception, but besides being given in that manner, buildings also have uses. In this connection, Gurwitsch speaks of “instrumentality,” which is a type of “functional character” (FC, 39 ff., FC, 98 ff.). A broader concept that includes the uses of things as well as strictly visual percepts or sights (and much more besides) can be expressed with words based on the verb “to encounter,” even though this actually *reverses* how Gurwitsch, who was following Robert Sokolowski in this respect, began to use the word “encounter” in his last writings (e.g., PTS, 139 n.). Alternative expressions to Husserl’s “noesis” and “noema” can then be “encountering” and “thing-as-encountered.” Consequently, the thing-as-seen is a part of thing-as-encountered and is the result of abstracting from uses and the like.

If there is a difference between the house as seen and the uses that it has, what is it that noetically correlates with uses and parallels the seeing component within the encountering? In a broad signification that includes inactual using, e.g., inclinations to use, and habitual forms, the parallel to seeing can be called “willing.” Seeing and willing can then be said to be prominent components of encounterings in which a building is encountered and different from but intensively correlative to the building-as-seen and the building-as-willed within the building-as-encountered. (The use of hyphens in this way is derived from James’s *Principles of Psychology*.)³ Further noetic and noematic components of encountering a building will be distinguished presently.

In the fifth place, to recognize the noetic and noematic components just mentioned, one needs to reflect. Reflecting is a different sort of encountering than the sort of encountering that includes seeing and willing as just described. More specifically, it contrasts with the straightforward encountering in which all humans, even phenomenologists, spend most of their waking lives (it is not easy to say whether members of other biological species ever reflect). Reflecting is clearly not sensuous, but it is still an observing. “Here as everywhere reflection consists in nothing other than rendering explicit and disengaging what had pertained to the act reflected upon, albeit in an undisclosed fashion, previously to

³ When I sent out the first draft of the present introduction to the colleagues in the project, Gallagher responded by saying “There is a good parallel here to contemporary neuroscientific theory of vision as involving two distinct but interrelated pathways—the ventral pathway that allows for object recognition and the dorsal pathway that guides motor behavior for, e.g., instrumental manipulation (Milner, A.D. & Goodale, M.A. (1995) *The Visual Brain in Action*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.)”

and independently of its being reflected upon.”⁴ And reflection takes at least two forms, i.e., reflective observing of the encountering and reflective observing of the thing-as-encountered (whether there is a reflectively observable ego or, better “I” who encounters, which Gurwitsch disputes, does not need to be decided here).

As I have explicated elsewhere, Aron Gurwitsch was a noematically oriented constitutive phenomenologist.⁵ Briefly, constitutive phenomenology is the project of accounting for things that are or can be encountered in terms of the actual or possible encounterings of them—or as Gurwitsch would say, in terms of consciousness. His emphasis is on the thing-as-encountered, in this case a building. And reflection discloses that a thing is not only given in some way or other, but also posited in various ways.

In the sixth place, there is more mentioned by Gurwitsch that relates to positing and the posited, i.e., the positional or thetic, than is obvious in his writings because the pertinent passages are few and scattered. How a building is volitionally posited has already been described somewhat. To say more, it might be added that a house can be encountered as able to protect persons and property. It can thus be used against the weather and thieves, but it can also be used for privacy, it can be used as an investment, it can be used to show accomplishment and claim social status, etc., etc. Reflective analysis can hence classify uses as negative (“against”) and positive (“for”), and also as intrinsic, i.e., as characteristic of purposes or ends, and extrinsic, i.e., as characteristic of means.⁶

Yet reflection easily discloses that a thing-as-encountered is posited in at least two other ways that correlate respectively with valuing and believing. The valuing component in the building-encountering might be an aesthetic liking, and correlative to that, the building would have positive aesthetic value and

⁴PTS, 243; cf. SPP, 272 ff. See also Lester Embree, “Gestalt Law in Phenomenological Perspective,” *Journal of Phenomenological Psychology* 10 (1979): 112-27.

⁵ See Lester Embree, “Editor’s Introduction: Gurwitsch’s Phenomenology of the Margin, Body, and Being,” in MC, xi-xlii.”

⁶The emphasis in Gurwitsch regarding the positional is on the volitional. He recognizes willing, preferring, or deciding; cf. Aron Gurwitsch, *Human Encounters in the Social World*, ed. Alexandre Métraux, trans. Fred Kersten (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1979), 45, hereafter cited as “HE.” Moreover, conscious acts of all types have their noemata (EPC, 216), and thus there is a noema of willing (SPP, 339). His concern is especially with what can be called secondarily passive or habitual willing. In most of his descriptions, objects have correlative “functional characters” (FC, 49) and thereby are functional objects, but they can also be called “use objects” and said to have “uses.” See Lester Embree, “Some Noetic-Noematic Analyses of Action and Practical Life,” in *The Phenomenology of the Noema*, ed. John Drummond and Lester Embree (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992), 157-210. Gurwitsch does not distinguish positive and negative modalities of willing and the corresponding praxic characteristics in the noema, but he does refer to the difference between ends and means (FC, 22; EPC, 322), and thus implicitly to that between end uses and means uses.

could be said to be beautiful, pretty, or at least attractive. Or it can be ugly correlative with disliking. And one can be apathetic about it, which is a third valuational modality, and in this case it would have neutral value. Since there are already interesting parallels between the valuational and the volitional, one might then be led to wonder if there is volitional neutrality. That there are intrinsic and extrinsic values parallel to end uses and means uses is relatively obvious.⁷

The type of positing (Husserl and Husserlians also speak of “thesis” and the “thetic” in this connection) that is called *doxa* or belief is also relatively parallel or analogous in most respects. (Yet, in English, one “believes” propositions but “believes in” things.) There can be positive believing in or negative disbelieving in the thing, e.g., the building, and an attitude of so-called suspended judgment or skeptical neutrality can also be adopted toward it. Correlatively, one can reflectively discern in the thing-as-encountered not only uses and values of various sorts, but also belief characters. Whether there are intrinsic and extrinsic belief characters is another question that does not need to be answered on this occasion.

When belief is firm, this can be termed positive or negative certitude, but positive and negative believing and things-as-believed-in (or as-disbelieved-in) can be shaky instead of firm, in which case terms such as conjecture or probability can be used. The firm/shaky distinction also holds for the valuational and volitional, in the latter case being expressed in terms of resoluteness and hesitancy. Husserl emphasized doxic modalities, but Gurwitsch also summarizes that account in passing, e.g., “a certain state of affairs (the identical matter of a proposition) is asserted or denied, doubted, questioned, or deemed probable.”⁸

This brief analysis should suffice to show that things-as-encountered are posited in many ways. Gurwitsch alludes to practically all that has just been expounded, but his results indicate that most of the time he tacitly disregards or abstracts from how things are posited in our encounterings of them.

But these too can nevertheless be distinguished reflectively:

When perceiving a hammer as a tool, we may adopt an attitude of reflection and proceed to an analysis of the perception and the corresponding perceptual noema. We disengage the

⁷ Regarding valuing, Gurwitsch does discuss synthetic and synthesized loving (SPP, 245), mentions values (HE, 66, HE, 173 n. 96; EPC, 114, f., EPC, 121, EPC, 165), and correlates acts of appreciation with the values conferred on the object (EPC, 127), but he does not distinguish negative and positive modalities, species of valuing and values, or intrinsic and extrinsic values, as Husserl does. See Lester Embree, “Advances Regarding Valuation and Action in Husserl’s *Ideas II*,” in *Issues in Husserl’s “Ideas II*,” ed. Thomas Nenon and Lester Embree (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996), 173-98.

⁸ FC, 327; cf. EPC, 127: “*Si une act est vécu dans les modalités de la présomption, de la conjecture, de la question, du doute, l’objet noématique correspondant porte respectivement les caractères ‘possible,’ ‘probable,’ ‘problématique,’ ‘douteux.’*”

noematic constituents and bring them out in the roles they play for the constitution of what presents itself through the act of perception, considered exactly as it appears through the given act. Among such constituents, we mention functional characters upon which depends the specific instrumentality of the hammer perceived as a tool. (FC, 235)

Presumably Gurwitsch would also say that values and belief characters can be disengaged in the same way.⁹

Seventh, things are not only posited but also given, so that there is also discernment and classification of “manners of givenness” (*Gegebenheitsweise*) in the thing-as-encountered. Gurwitsch speaks of how things are given “in perception, in memory, in clear intuition (*klar anschaulich*), in thought (*denkmässig*), etc.” (PTS, 248). Correlatively, for temporal things, there are noematic characters of being present: being past or having been present; and of going to be present (EPC, 136; cf. SPP, 197). Thus there are indeed remarks about memory and imagination, but he is chiefly concerned with perception. Above all, there is the character of “perceptivity” (FC, 179). And there are further types of givenness: “The thing presents itself in a certain orientation relative to the observer and his standpoint as near or far, as at the center of the visual field or more toward the periphery, etc. Finally, the manner of appearance of the perceived thing varies according to whether it is seen in bright daylight or at dusk, in a fog, and so forth” (SPP, 332).

In the eighth place, the running example for this analysis is looking at a building, but what is looking? More adequately it can be called a type of visual perceiving. The visual can be distinguished from the tactual, auditory, olfactory, and gustatory. Houses have their smells (at least inside), the walls are smooth or rough to the touch, one hears something distinctive when the door is knocked on or the wind rattles the windows, and so on. Gurwitsch’s analyses are typically visualistic, yet it deserves mention that he not only alludes to other sensuous modalities, but refers to audition on a number of occasions (e.g., FC, 123, 137, 233, 258). He also accepted from the Gestaltists what can be called the doctrine of synaesthesia. It has already been pointed out that a suit of polished armor “looks” cold, hard, and smooth and that an orange “looks” tasty; presumably one

⁹ The difference between the naturalistic and the cultural sciences also depends on this abstraction. Cf. Lester Embree, “A Gurwitschean Model of Culture or How to Use a Spear Thrower,” in *To Work at the Foundations: Essays on the Phenomenology of Aron Gurwitsch*, ed. J. Claude Evans and Robert Stufflebeam (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), 141-71.

also “sees” how they would sound differently if they fell to the floor, a clatter not being a thump. Nevertheless, he usually disregards non-visual modalities.

In the ninth place, what Gurwitsch writes about how things are posited and given is probably meager and scattered because he was primarily concerned with what is left when they are abstracted from. The analyses above focused on two species of what are called “noematic characters,” “mode of presentation” or “manner of givenness,” on the one hand, and “thetic or positional character,” on the other. Such characters have been dwelt upon here to clarify just what the difference is between the noematic characters of the concrete thing-as-encountered and the visual noematic core. Once again, there is an identity in contrast with diversity here, this time between core and characters rather than between noema and noeses or between thing encountered and thing-as-encountered. Gurwitsch approvingly refers to “Husserl’s distinction between the central noematic nucleus and noematic characters, and ... his insistence upon the invariance of the noematic nucleus in the face of variations occurring in the characters” (FC, 363). The nucleus or core of the thing-as-encountered can remain the same while there is change in givenness from being expected to being perceived and to being remembered, and/or when there is change in positedness from being probable to being certain, being liked to being disliked, or from being willed as an end to being willed as a means.

Besides “nucleus,” Gurwitsch uses the words “What,” “core,” and “sense” (*Sinn*) to name what remains of a concrete thing-as-encountered when the noematic characters of givenness and positedness are abstracted from, a point that seems easier to verify if one remains in one place outside the thing and concentrates on visual perceiving and, e.g., the building-as-seen.

A linguistic aspect of the “meaning theory” or “interpretation theory” can now be considered. In English, the Husserlian word *Sinn* is often translated as “meaning,” which is naturally comprehended as signifying the signification of a word. That is how Husserl used *Sinn* in the *Logische Untersuchungen* (1900-1901), but in *Ideen I* (1913) and afterwards, he tried to broaden the signification of *Sinn* to include various sorts of sense, and considered *Bedeutung*, which is best rendered as “signification,” as one sort. Nevertheless, the older verbal habit often continued even for Husserl, and confusions followed. In English translations, it seems best to render the *Sinn* of the mature Husserl as “sense” and either not to use “meaning” at all or to reserve it to render *Meinung*. Unfortunately, Gurwitsch also regularly uses “meaning” to render *Sinn*, and some colleagues seem to have been misled by this into thinking that his theory of perception includes a linguistic component, which is not the case. Is a translation preference possible regarding *Sinn* for Gurwitsch? There are problems forming an adjective from “What,” as there are with the adjective “nuclear,” but the third alternative, “core,” may be preferred because it can easily be used as an adjective as well as a noun in current American English.

In the tenth place, if what remains of the thing-as-encountered after one abstracts from how it is given and how it is posited is called the “noematic core,” how can this core itself be described? Gurwitsch again refers to Husserl: “The expressions to be used for the description of the noematic sense or noematic nucleus may be formal-ontological in character, like ‘object,’ ‘property,’ ‘state of affairs’; or material-ontological, like ‘thing,’ ‘figure,’ ‘cause.’ They may, furthermore, have material content (*sachhaltig*) like ‘rough,’ ‘hard,’ ‘colored’” (PTS, 248; cf. SPP, 183).

Because he was chiefly a theorist of logic, Husserl had an emphasis on formal ontological terms, and, within it, on formalization as productive of formally eidetic knowledge. As Gurwitsch puts it, “This procedure consists in replacing all terms of substantive, qualitative, and material denotation by terms, like algebraic symbols, entirely indeterminate as to material content and defined solely by certain relations” (FC, 147; cf. FC, 331). He appreciates his master’s emphasis, but seems more concerned with the other type of universalization, i.e., “generalization” (PTS, 267 n. 34), by which one can ascend from this particular green to Greenness, then to the species Color, and then to the genus Sensuous Property (in contrast to other genera of non-sensuous properties, e.g., Intentionality). The noematic core in the case of looking at a building prominently includes not only “rough” and “hard” as referred to in possible future touching, but the shapes- and colors-as-seen from which there are references to touching.

This result of ten steps of analysis may seem anticlimactic to a reader unfamiliar with Gurwitsch’s accomplishment. What we have reached, however, is the point where he can introduce descriptive findings of Gestalt theory into descriptions of noematic cores and thus revise Husserl in fundamental respects. This is not the occasion to summarize all that he takes over from the Gestaltists, which includes extensive interpretations of experimental results and the clarification of such expressions as “Gestalt-character” and “Gestalt-coherence,” but something must still be said in relation to looking at a building.

To begin with, and as was evident above in the section on explanation, with the constancy hypothesis abandoned, the thing-as-encountered visually is recognized to be integral. It is a Gestalt, also called a configuration:

It is an ensemble of items which mutually support and determine one another. Thus they realize a total structure which governs them and assigns to each of them (as a part of the whole) a function or a role to be performed as well as a determinate place in that whole. Each detail exists only at the place at which it plays the role assigned to it by the whole of which it is a part. (SPP, 25)

The side of the building as seen from a fixed outside standpoint already fits this. Within what thus appears, perhaps there is a roof, a wall, and within a wall a door and several windows. The roof, however, would not appear as it does without a wall beneath it, and vice versa; similarly, the door and windows would not appear as they do without each other and the wall without the roof above them. While “roof,” “door,” and “window” are indeed words with practical connotations, at this point the noematic functional characteristics are abstracted from, so that, although the familiar words are used for convenience, they actually refer only colors and shapes here.

Recalling the discussion in Section I above, it can now be emphasized how the visual appearance is a subtly different appearance when one feature, say the left-most window, is focused on rather than the whole, because of a change in attitude, while the external conditions of stimulation remain the same. On the other hand, should a cloud pass in front of the sun while one is looking, then the external conditions change and so does the core of the noema of looking. Or if there is a row of windows, then the left-most is a “terminal” in relation to the others, which have “intervals” between them, and the windows in a row might (or might not) appear with similarity and equidistance (FC, 106 ff.). And in the first passage quoted in the present section, the building stands out from the rest of the street as a figure on a ground (FC, 110 ff.). (More could, of course, be said about colors and their relations with one another and how they are bounded by edges and lines within the configuration.)

What is basic to Gurwitsch’s reform of Husserl, then, is that there are no longer hyletic data on which sense is intently bestowed; instead, there is an integral but structured noematic core. And there is more than what is immediately given in visual perceiving, including the inside of the building as well as its other sides. Gurwitsch describes how they all fit into the configuration that is the building:

Suppose we perceive a building presenting itself from the front side. That perceptual encounter could not be what it is were it not for references to other sides of the building, not seen at the moment, which contribute toward determining the noematic sense of the present perception as one-sided adumbrational appearance of the building from its front side. Moreover, the front side appears as an architectural form requiring a specific total architectural configuration into which it fits. On the one hand, the perceptual appearance in question arouses, or rather motivates, certain expectancies concerning the total architectural configuration—or, noematically expressed, it predelineates and pretraces the total architectural configuration along more or less indeterminate but specifically generic and typical lines. On the other hand, the total configuration de-

termines the front side of the building as an architectural detail occupying a specific place within the total architectural configuration. In this sense, the latter may be said to be present in each and every detail; conversely, each and every detail makes its specific contribution toward the architectural configuration as a whole. (PTS, 253)

This is a different account of the relation between the thing-as-encountered and the thing that is encountered than is found in Husserl.

And Gurwitsch clearly goes beyond Husserl when he shows the total field of things-as-encountered always to be structured into a *focus or theme*; a *thematic field or context* of items relevant to the theme; and a *margin* with the important ontological constants of the subject's body, perceptual surroundings, and inner time that have, while marginal, no relevancy to the theme. This fundamental Gurwitschian contention recurs again and again in the chapters of this volume, which now deserve some comments of their own.

IV. Aspects of Gurwitsch Relevant for Cognitive Science

In effect, the contributors to this volume sought aspects of the work of Aron Gurwitsch that were relevant to their own ongoing research. One chapter is pure scholarship (rather than investigation of matters), i.e., my own: I had not expected to contribute more than the introduction to this volume, but it became obvious at the symposium that the central category of relevancy was not as clear, even for me, as I had thought.

The others pursued critical examinations of aspects of Gurwitsch that were relevant to their own investigations, sometimes finding his thought inadequate but always gaining insight from it. If two colleagues had proposed similar topics, I would have urged reconsideration, but, remarkably, this only came close to happening for two chapters, and their convergence only emerged later.

Introductions that merely summarize chapters in the same volume can often be tedious, but a few comments seem worthwhile on what was actually done, including remarks about things I have come to wonder about as well as things I have learned. I defer mention of five additional aspects on which more work might be done to the concluding section.

(1) The first essay is by *Shaun Gallagher* and has been placed there because it is as clear and well written as any other, is by a phenomenologist well informed about cognitive science, and relates to a heretofore under-appreciated aspect of Gurwitsch's work. This aspect is his reflections on encountering other humans, whom he considers originally encountered within practical situations, in their functions, which is to say in their social roles, just as instruments are

practically and situationally encountered in their instrumentality. Gallagher's basis is Gurwitsch's *Habilitationsschrift* of 1931,¹⁰ but the topic can also be found in 1953: "Fellowmen encountered within the sphere of professional activity appear in, and appear as defined by, their roles within that sphere" (FC, 383). Beyond this advance in the phenomenological account of intersubjectivity, however, Gallagher is also concerned with what he calls "primary intersubjectivity."

(2) While Gallagher holds that Gurwitsch advanced the account but still did not reach a completely adequate treatment of intersubjectivity, *Natalie Depraz*, another phenomenological philosopher, finds Gurwitsch's insight quite penetrating where social encountering is concerned, and hints at ethical implications. Her focus is on what Gurwitsch calls "fusion."

In editing these two chapters it occurred to me for the first time that Gurwitsch's account of "signals" in the second essay of *Marginal Consciousness*¹¹ could be used to describe how the bodies of others, as well as the things they deal with in their actions, signal or indicate psyches in a subcategorical or, in a broad signification, perceptual way. This indicative experience would originate in a subject's consciousness of how the processes in her own psyche indicate processes in her own soma and vice versa. Thus others come to be encountered in indirect consciousness analogous to the way the depicted is indirectly encountered in picture consciousness (*Bildbewusstsein*), but without there being any similarity between bodily movements and mental processes. Again, there is no "meaning theory" or "interpretation theory" in this indirect consciousness as there is in linguistic consciousness. Perhaps someone more specialized than I in "alterology" can see whether this account of signals advances the problems.

(3) *Louis Sass* is a psychopathologist who finds Gurwitsch's category of thematic field illuminating for understanding schizophrenia and other types of mental illness. I am not competent to say more than that this seems plausible to me as a matter of noematic description and that it brings to mind how, as seen in Section I above, past experience affects the brain and then combines with attitudes to explain what is encountered. Post-conference discussion via e-mail with Sass has led me to appreciate more about the category of attitude, something that will be returned to below.

(4) *John Barresi* is a social psychologist who finds great affinity between his own position and that of Gurwitsch with respect to intentiveness and also the ego. Enough has already been said above about intentiveness as a correlation of noesis and noema after one abandons both the constancy hypothesis and the unverifiable distinction between alleged strata within sensuous perceiving (and correlatively within things-as-perceived, e.g., sense data and bestowed "meaning"). About the ego or I, however, it must be said that Gurwitsch also rejects the need, à la neo-Kantianism, for a transcendental ego to organize sense data.

¹⁰ See HE, whose original title is *Die mitmenschlichen Begegnungen in der Milieuwelt*.

¹¹ "The Phenomenology of Signals and Significations," MC, 83-106.

Here Gurwitsch certainly had an unacknowledged indirect influence through Merleau-Ponty on Sartre's "non-egological conception of consciousness" (cf. SPP, Ch. 11). Nevertheless, there is for Barresi an I—or, perhaps better, subject—who is constituted in encountering one's own somatopsychic self and who is in the world, as are others. I believe Gurwitsch would have especially appreciated this convergence of positions.

(5) *Robert Pilat* is a phenomenological philosopher of cognitive science. His topic is the now in inner time, which is presented through Gurwitsch's interpretation of James's description of the stream of thought, in relation to which Pilat shows connections with materials in Husserl's *Nachlass*. The present moment in the stream is intentive (specifically, "protentive") to yet-to-occur mental processes, and also intentive (specifically, "retroentive") to already-occurred mental processes. The impressional "now" is crucial in this situation. Like the other colleagues in the project, Pilat brings in many results of contemporary cognitive science, including some about neurological conditions.

The recognition that the temporality of the stream of consciousness is not the same as that of the surrounding world in which, e.g., trees grow, is extremely important in the phenomenological tradition. In the natural attitude, the two temporalities are identified, while in the transcendental attitude they are distinguished so that the world can be grounded in a non-worldly consciousness. Such philosophical concerns aside, cognitive science thus has the question of the type of temporality immediately correlated with neurological activity, something that particularly interested Francisco Varela.

(6) Nobody in this project has explored the neurological basis of what Gurwitsch describes more than the young philosopher *Jeff Yoshimi*. He draws on work in analytic-philosophical thought concerning supervenience in order to see how Gurwitsch's field theory of consciousness, which he concisely reconstructs, might be correlated in one or another way with work begun by Wolfgang Köhler on the magnetic fields in the brain. Although I recognize the clarity of Yoshimi's distinctive exposition, I would go beyond even the shallowest edges of my knowledge to say much more about the promise of the hypotheses here for cognitive scientific research. But I am sure Gurwitsch would have been very interested in the experimental results that Yoshimi's analyses could motivate.

(7) *Frédérique de Vignemont* is another young analytic philosopher. Her concern is with the body. Although there are passing remarks elsewhere, Gurwitsch's chief exposition on this topic is in *Marginal Consciousness*. (It may amuse colleagues outside phenomenology to know that there was a time when Husserlians were accused by existential phenomenologists of positing not only solipsistic, but also disembodied and de-situated transcendental egos, which amounts to something of an angelology! Now most phenomenologists know better, and some have even noticed the references to *Ideen II* in Merleau-Ponty.)

It is clear that de Vignemont fully appreciates Gurwitsch's descriptions of the body. This is not the organism constructed in biological science but rather what is sometimes called the lived body.¹² In his ontology, he contends that this body as well as the stream of consciousness and the surrounding world are constants always already there at least in the margin of the field of consciousness (when one thematizes an ideal object, e.g., in mathematical thinking, all three are marginal). But where the organism is concerned, a great deal has been learned since his time. Accordingly, de Vignemont draws on much cognitive science in exploring whether bodily states need to be "objects" even of marginal consciousness, or could instead sometimes be unconscious. She recognizes that the body can be thematic, relevant, and marginal, but also sees a need for the unconscious. More than any other contributor, she seems to have approached her topic from cognitive science. Nevertheless, she interprets Gurwitsch insightfully, appreciating that there is also structure within the margin of the field of consciousness for him, and also that he well recognizes much vagueness and indeterminacy there.

As for the psychological unconscious, I can report that Gurwitsch traced it back to Fechner, whose Gymnasium textbook Freud certainly read, and much appreciated James's objections to it in the chapter of *The Principles of Psychology* on "The Mind-Stuff Theory," chuckling at the statement that the unconscious is the "tumbling ground of whimsy," and agreed with James's suggestion that what is usually called unconscious within the mind is better understood as neurological processes in the brain. Hence the psychology of unconscious processes might be differently interpreted in neuroscience. But this assumes a metaphysical difference between psychological and neurological data. If unconscious and conscious representations (to use cognitive-scientific terms) are both neurological, as a physicalist would hold, then the alternative of James and Gurwitsch does not come to much, something that will be returned to below.

(8) The philosopher *Sven Arvidson* has already written the most thus far on Gurwitsch in relation to cognitive science. At the symposium and in our editorial interactions since then, I was initially more resistant to his position than to that of any other colleague. Eventually, however, I was brought to recognize that our difference was chiefly linguistic. Of course I would not go so far as to say that intentionality is attentionality (or intentiveness is attentiveness), although I fully recognize that the intensive processes said to be attentional (I prefer Gurwitsch's "thematization") belong to a species of intentiveness in general. Nevertheless, I now take the point that if the types of consciousness intensive to the theme, the thematic field, and the margin are described as three species of attention, communication with cognitive scientists could be easier.

¹² See Elizabeth A. Behnke, "Edmund Husserl's Contribution to the Phenomenology of the Body in *Ideas II*," in *Issues in Husserl's "Ideas II*," ed. Thomas Nenon and Lester Embree (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996), 135-60.

(9) *David Woodruff Smith* is an analytic philosopher who has taken Gurwitsch's thought very seriously in an effort to advance his own developments of formal ontology beginning from Husserl. Strictly speaking, the theme/thematic field/margin structure is indeed structural, but—like shape and pattern—it is not formal in the same way as something arising from formalization. Again, Smith is not a Husserl philologist, but a creative philosopher whose leapfrogging over now Gurwitsch as Gurwitsch earlier leapfrogged over Husserl is in many respects fascinating. He has explained to me that he considers Husserl's noematic *Sinn* a technical term referring to intentional content and in many cases expressible in language and thus *Bedeutung*.

(10) Another philosopher, *NOE, Shinya*, relates Gurwitsch's position to other tendencies in the 20th century that emphasize the category of system. I am again too ignorant—this time concerning systems theory—to say much about this essay beyond how intelligently it is written, but I can attest that Gurwitsch was deeply interested in structural linguistics ever since he was, according to Elmar Holenstein, the first phenomenologist to write about it in French,¹³ once telling one of my fellow graduate students who had gone to France in the 1960s that he (Gurwitsch) might have become a structuralist if he had not already become a phenomenologist. I am impressed by NOE's interpretations of Husserl as well as of Gurwitsch. Most interesting for me is his discussion of Francisco Varela's work, especially of how transcendental consciousness can be considered an autopoietic system.

(11) I have placed my own essay in the penultimate position because it is merely scholarship and contains no investigation as the other eleven essays do, and will say no more about it here.

(12) The concluding essay is by Michael Schwartz, a psychiatrist, and Osborne Wiggins, another phenomenological philosopher, it concisely presents Gurwitsch's overall position—the big picture one might say—in the theory of science, and I for one find it easy to relate the contents of the other chapters to it. My only difference with them is that I would prefer to say “cultural science” or “cultural discipline” rather than defer to current American academic institutional usage with the expression “social science and humanities.”¹⁴ After all and despite many naturalistic tendencies, these disciplines are all concerned with different aspects of the sociocultural lifeworld.

¹³ Aron Gurwitsch, “Étude critique de Psychologie du langage,” *Revue philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger* 120 (1935): 399-439. Merleau-Ponty is thanked in this article for correcting Gurwitsch's French. Otherwise concerning Gurwitsch's interest in language, see MC, 122 n.10 and Embree, “Introduction” to EPC, 32 ff.

¹⁴ Cf. Lester Embree, “Introduction: Reflection on the Cultural Disciplines,” in *Phenomenology of the Cultural Disciplines*, ed. Mano Daniel and Lester Embree (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), 1-37.

V. Some other yet-to-be Investigated Relevancies of Gurwitsch for Cognitive Science

At least five more aspects of Gurwitsch's work deserve attention from future researchers. (1) As mentioned, Louis Sass led me to ponder the category of attitude further than before. He responded to my comment that the noetic correlate of the thematic field is sometimes called attitude by Gurwitsch (EPC, 144; SPP, 377-80; FC, 238-39; and SPP 203). If one has a taxonomic bent, one might ask the following question. If there is a general consciousness of which the total field is the noematic correlate and "marginal consciousness" and "thematic consciousness" are then species of consciousness intensitive to the margin and to the theme respectively, what should the type of consciousness that is intensitive to the thematic field be called? "Attitude" is one answer. Another, which some colleagues have already tended toward in their essays, is "contextual consciousness" or "consciousness of context."

That attitudes have a role as internal conditions in the explanation of changes in how things-as-encountered appear has been shown above in Section 1. Gurwitsch does not emphasize the noetic, and hence does not exploit the descriptive potential of the category of attitude as much as Husserl did. This may be because, for Husserl, attitudes pertain to the I, whereas for Gurwitsch, there is no I who performs acts of consciousness. Nevertheless, it would be easy to show that the following classification is implicit in his work.

First, there are practical, aesthetic or valuational, and cognitive or theoretical attitudes. Second, the theoretical attitudes are either straightforward or reflective. Third, the reflective attitudes include those of the natural attitude (for example, in psychology) and those of the transcendental attitude of phenomenological philosophy. In addition, there are attitudes specific to the species and particulars of the cultural as well as the naturalistic sciences within the natural or mundane theoretical attitude. And then there is the contrast between empirical—or, better, factual—and eidetic attitudes, a contrast that holds good in all the disciplines mentioned.

Thus far the taxonomy does not include the attitudes of science-based practical disciplines such as education, engineering, nursing, psychiatry, and psychotherapy. Furthermore, it should be recognized that one can be professionally trained in various theoretical as well as practical attitudes, so that they are habitually assumed in appropriate situations. Finally, there are, on Gurwitschean grounds, different thematic fields correlative to each of the many attitudes or contextual consciousnesses stated or implied in such classifications. After all, disciplines are often alternatively called "fields" and the way issues, data, theories, etc. are included and excluded from the scope of a discipline can be understood in terms of Gurwitsch's theory of relevancy. Much can be done with this

category concerning the noematically oriented phenomenology of science and the practical professions.

Then there is a paragraph in Gurwitsch that can be related to attitudes as well as to what he says about the somatopsychic self elsewhere, including his study of Sartre's non-egological conception of consciousness, and it might have implications for cognitive science:

To be sure, to account for the Ego, one must allow for permanent dispositions, such as attitudes of love, admiration, esteem, hatred, etc., which one person adopts with regard to another person, and for the no less permanent qualities of character and temper, such as likings and dislikings, tendencies, interests, gifts, talents, etc. Both dispositions and qualities have in common that they may be said to exist permanently, although none manifests itself uninterruptedly. When I feel admiration for a certain person or have a certain leaning, this does not mean that thoughts concerning the admired person or mental states related to the leaning in question exist at every moment in my conscious life. Both dispositions and qualities designate psychic constants, i.e., regularities of experience, action, reaction, behavior, etc., rather than mental facts which themselves fall under direct experience. The logical status of these concepts is much the same as that of physical constants such as index of refraction, electrical and thermal conductivity, specific gravity, etc. Both classes of concepts denote systematic unifications of experienced facts rather than these facts themselves; the unity in both cases is causal and not phenomenological. Concepts of both classes express systematizations and causal unifications of experienced facts through certain mental processes, and it is to these processes and procedures of mind that one must look for an ultimate clarification of the concepts in question. In the last analysis, we are led back to the facts given in immediate experience as materials to be unified and systematized. (MC, 15-16)

It seems plausible that the origins of some, at least, of these dispositions and qualities are to be explained in terms of the causal model presented above in Section I. For example, I did not feel admiration for Aron Gurwitsch before I studied with him but then it became permanent in me. Whether this passage contributes to the aetiology of such conditions as schizophrenia and to accounts in developmental psychology is well beyond my competence, and hence for colleagues such as Louis Sass and John Barresi to ponder.

(2) As a rule, I prepare a paper that I can present if somebody drops out at the last minute from a research symposium. In this case it was doubly fortunate that nobody did, because I did not complete my preparation. But I can say something here about the topic I had originally envisaged in case somebody wishes to take it up before I can get back to it. Earlier, I followed Schutz in pondering whether others make up a fourth constant in at least marginal consciousness.¹⁵ More recently, I have begun to wonder whether ideal objects, and especially universal essences or *eidē*, might not also be ontological constants usually in the margin of the field of consciousness.

It is fairly clear in the earlier writings that Gurwitsch at best considered *eidē* marginal when they had been previously thematized. In his last writings, however, he was increasingly interested in how the typical is encountered and how thematization was then required to separate the *eidōs* and the instance that exemplifies it. (Analytical philosophers seem to speak of “type” and “token” in this connection.) Prior to such thematization, one experiences, so to speak, “another car,” which is neither “automobile in general” nor this unique particular seen moving down the street. The question is twofold: On the one hand, and philologically, what was Gurwitsch’s final position concerning whether the *eidē* exemplified were always already marginal, contextual, or something else prior to such thematization; and, on the other hand, and phenomenologically, how do the things themselves stand in this respect?

(3) Where eideation is also concerned, I had expected that somebody would examine and advance Gurwitsch’s work on Goldstein and others where the brain-injured and their difficulties with the categorial and concrete attitudes are concerned. This is discussed to some extent in Gallagher’s chapter, but much more can be done. Had somebody taken that topic, I was prepared to report not only that Gurwitsch knew “Schneider,” whom some call the hero of the novel entitled *Phénoménologie de la perception*, but also that an archivist at Frankfurt had recently told me that Goldstein’s work was challenged by younger psychiatric colleagues after the war; that Goldstein recontacted Schneider, who had, with his wife’s help, become the mayor of a small town in Germany; and that that he was able to replicate his results from the 1920s. But, again, I suggest that more can be done by going beyond Gurwitsch’s reflections on Gelb-Goldstein.¹⁶

(4) Another aspect of Gurwitsch that remains untouched has to do with other so to speak “non-normal” subjects, i.e., in comparative psychology (SPP, 67). After all, most of his analyses pertain to civilized, adult, and healthy humans. Probably they are also typically middle or upper class, Western, and masculine. I have pondered how he would have reacted to the suggestion that there were

¹⁵ Cf. Editor’s Introduction to MC, pp. xxxvi.

¹⁶ I can report, however, that an essay entitled “Gurwitsch, Goldstein, Merleau-Ponty. Analyse d’une droit relation” has been prepared by Profa Maria Luz Pintos at Santiago de Compostela and is forthcoming in *Chiasmi*.

differences in how things and other subjects are encountered according to class, ethnicity, and gender, which involve acquired attitudes, and have come to suspect that he would have been resistant at first, but would finally have accepted what research has shown. His friend Schutz recognized such factors already in the 1950s. In any event, there are interesting remarks about so-called primitives (Gurwitsch knew Lucien Lévy-Bruhl and appreciated his work highly), about children as investigated by Koffka and Piaget, and about chimpanzees whose behavior resembles human behavior in the practical attitude; in fact, Gurwitsch seems the first constitutive phenomenologist to publish remarks on non-human animals (SPP, Ch. 5).

(5) Finally, it may well be that, in order maximally to benefit from cooperation, colleagues researching in the multidiscipline of cognitive science avoid or marginalize metaphysical questions. These could have come up in the discussion of Smith's paper, for example, but did not. Afterwards, some individuals did mention to me that they were physicalists or naturalists. The possibility that both conscious and unconscious "representations" are essentially neurological has been mentioned above. Other colleagues, who consider consciousness to be something that is not physical but rather something mental that can have a non-worldly status would disagree, with the consequence that much of what is said in cognitive science is deeply equivocal. This should be of interest to philosophers *per se*, but, again, may be usefully overlooked in the multidiscipline, i.e., left marginal rather than made thematic or relevant.

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In sum, a sampling of cognitive scientists and phenomenological as well as analytical philosophers has found Aron Gurwitsch's work relevant for the themes they are interested in and thus added it to their scientific fields. But more can still be done. I again thank the participants for their contributions to our project.¹⁷

¹⁷ I thank Dr. Elizabeth Behnke for corrections of the form of this essay.