

Part III

Anglo-American Rivalries and Coalitions, 1898–1945

‘The paramount concern . . . of maritime strategy is to determine the mutual relations of your army and navy in a plan of war. When this is done, and not till then, naval strategy can begin to work out the manner in which the fleet can best discharge the function assigned to it.’—Sir Julian Corbett

At various times in the twentieth century, Britain and the United States have evolved maritime strategies that appeared to influence directly their roles as Great Powers. What has not been sufficiently appreciated, either by scholars or practitioners of politico-military affairs in either country, is the possibility that the strategies developed in peace-time might have been intellectual or analytical formulations rather than blueprints for national action. Another consideration is the fact that the merging of events and ideas, rather than being purposeful, may instead be so random that, in spite of the fact that a broad link might be found between strategy and policy, the conjunction may border on the purely fortuitous. In this section, one can see the continuing threads identified and one can note where cause and effect are linked or, alternatively, where cause led to irrelevance.