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
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Duncan Pritchard

University of Edinburgh

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For Mandi, Alexander and Ethan

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Series Editor's Preface

It is not easy being a student of philosophy these days. All the different areas of philosophy are reaching ever increasing levels of complexity and sophistication, a fact which is reflected in the specialized literature and readership each branch of philosophy enjoys. And yet, anyone who studies philosophy is expected to have a solid grasp of the most current issues being debated in most, if not all, the other areas of philosophy. It is an understatement to say that students of philosophy today are faced with a Herculean task.

The books in this new book series by Palgrave are meant to help all philosophers, established and aspiring, to understand, appreciate and engage with the intricacies which characterize all the many faces of philosophy. They are also ideal teaching tools as textbooks for more advanced students. These books may not be meant primarily for those who have yet to read their first book of philosophy, but all students with a basic knowledge of philosophy will benefit greatly from reading these exciting and original works, which will enable anyone to engage with all the defining issues in contemporary philosophy.

There are three main aspects that make the Palgrave Philosophy Today series distinctive and attractive. First, each book is relatively short. Second, the books are commissioned from some of the best-known, established and upcoming international scholars in each area of philosophy. Third, while the primary purpose is to offer an informed assessment of opinion on a key area of philosophical study, each title presents a distinct interpretation from someone who is closely involved with current work in the field.

This book by Duncan Pritchard on *Knowledge* perfectly reflects the objectives and ambitions of the book series. In the last few years Duncan Pritchard has established himself as one of the most distinctive original voices in epistemology. His book on *Epistemic Luck* has been the subject of much discussion and unanimous praise, and he is currently playing a central role in defining the agenda in contemporary epistemology for the present generation of philosophers of knowledge.

Knowledge will make it possible for anyone with an interest in epistemology, novice or expert, to get a sense of where the action is. Covering a vast array of issues, including anti-luck epistemology, virtue epistemology, externalism and internalism about knowledge, radical skepticism and the value of knowledge, Pritchard does more than merely present a running commentary on the major and finer points in the current literature on knowledge; he also makes a distinctive contribution to these debates.

One of the great virtues of this book on *Knowledge* is that Pritchard is much more interested in philosophical *ideas* than in philosophical *figures*. That is the way it should be of course. One of the aims of the Palgrave Philosophy Today series is to remind our readers that in philosophy ideas ought to have centre stage.

Vittorio Bufacchi
University College Cork, Ireland