This appendix contains additional technical notes regarding the data collection, data coding, and statistical analysis.

**Data Collection and Coding Procedure**

The data is assembled from publications of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, and from interviews with foreign policy elites. The following volumes were used: *Polityka i chas* [Politics and Time (Ukrainian)] 1990–1997; *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn* [International Affairs (Russian)] 1990–1997; *Diplomaticeskii vestnik* [Diplomatic Courier (Russian)] 1993, 1995, 1997. Interviews were conducted by the author in 1997 and early 1998.

Five Ukrainian interviewees were sufficiently senior to include in the data set: Vitold Fokin—prime minister; Roman Shpek—deputy prime minister; economics minister; Vadim Hetman—central bank head; Oleksandr Razumkov—presidential adviser; first-deputy security council secretary; and Viacheslav Chornovil—opposition (*Rukh*) leader.

No assumptions are made about the importance of the frequency of usage of various analogies. Even if the same analogy is used more than once in a given text, it is counted once only. And each text can have only one value for each type of analogy and for policy preferences. If there is an apparent contradiction, the coder is instructed to consider the statements together and use his or her judgment to resolve the conflict. In practice, some analogies and analogy types occurred more than once in a given article, but it was rare that these seemed contradictory. There was a strict rule that conflicts over values assigned to one variable could not be resolved by reference to another variable.

**Intercoder Reliability**

There was complete agreement among coders about the categorization of analogies as either “direct” or “observed” and either “success” or “failure.” Not surprisingly, coding analogies and policy preferences along the five-point scale proved more difficult. Scott’s *pi* statistic for intercoder reliability involves calculating both the rate of complete agreement between coders, and the rate of agreement expected by chance given the number of categories and their overall frequency of use (Holsti 1969, 140; Scott 1955). For the five-point scale, chance would produce 39 percent agreement, while the coders’ judgments were in total agreement 60 percent of the time. Using 15
observations coded by both myself and another coder hired for this project, I have calculated Scott’s $p_i$ as 0.32. It is also worth noting that in only three instances, out of 75 total pair of coding decisions tested, was the difference between the coding for any given analogy or policy preferences greater than 1.

Holsti (1969, 142) argues that as coding complexity increases, the results may be both “more useful and less reliable.” In the present context, the achievement of complete agreement in three fifths of the coding is a fair result, significantly higher than expected by chance; although a higher rate of agreement is of course desirable. The data are not perfect, but complete agreement is not a necessary condition for inclusion in the analysis.

One reason for using multiple coders is simply to expand the size of the data set. For this, maximum agreement is the only important criterion. Another reason, however, is to guard against coder bias. I have separated summary statistics of each coder’s data to determine whether there are any systematic differences (table A.1). Nearly 70 percent of the observations coded by the hired coder were Ukrainian elites, while data coded by me included an even division of Russian and Ukrainian observations. This largely explains why the average values assigned for foreign policy preference, Observed Success, and Direct Success were consistently closer to the negative pole of the scale in my coding. For the hired coder, the mean score for Russian elites is $-0.0000$ while that for Ukrainians is $0.4000$. Similarly, in the data I coded, the mean scores are $-0.0862$ and $0.0909$, respectively. The Ukrainians are more intuitive realist than the Russians in both coders’ data. But, when a variable for “coder” is included in equation 6, it is insignificant ($p = 0.945$) and does not change the significance or direction of any other variable. Finally, if equation 6 is run without the hired coder’s data, the results are similar to those in table 4.2. Even though the sample size is reduced, Direct Failure: Liberal, Observed Success: Liberal, and Observed Failure: Mixed retain significance. Observed Failure: Realist ($p = 0.354$) and state ($p = 0.153$) do not, but no other variables become significant either.

In sum, while coding complexity may lead to noise in the data, and decrease the statistical significance of the results, it does not appear to bias the analysis.

Below I give further details of the coding process, but first I discuss some aspects of the quantitative analysis.

**Quantitative Analysis**

**Ordered Probit**

The primary statistical method used to analyze the quantitative data is ordinal or ordered probit, a form of maximum likelihood estimation. Ordered probit is

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<th>Table A.1</th>
<th>Characteristics of data by coder</th>
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<td>N=</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coder 0 (BG)</td>
<td>119</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coder 1 (CD)</td>
<td>29</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
appropriate for my data set because the dependent variable is represented by ordinal categorical rather than continuous data. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is not appropriate with such data because the dependent variable cannot be assumed to plausibly take on any possible value, nor can it be assumed to be interval data in which the values assigned measure the distance between points on a consistent scale (Aldrich and Nelson 1984, 11–12; Long 1997, 114–115). Maximum likelihood estimation techniques such as ordered probit involve determining the probability that the dependent variable takes on a certain value, given values of the independent variables (Aldrich and Nelson 1984, chapter three). For samples with 100 or more degrees of freedom, maximum likelihood estimation approximates the properties of OLS as an unbiased, efficient estimator with normal distribution of errors (53). This is important for the reliability of hypothesis testing.

Ordered probit analysis rests on several assumptions about the data. Long (1997, 119) discusses these in detail. Among these are an assumption of some relationship between exogenous and endogenous variables, although not necessarily a linear one, independence of observations, and the normal distribution of residuals. There is no indication that data used in the analyses violate these assumptions.

**INDEPENDENCE OF OBSERVATIONS**

Because 91 observations are articles, speeches, or statements by the 27 individuals represented more than once, the assumption of the independence of observations is challenged (Long 1997, 119). An ordered probit estimation (table A.2) for lagged foreign policy preferences (in the most recent prior observation for that individual) shows that the relationship is statistically insignificant.

**DATA CODING: DETAILED EXPLANATION AND EXAMPLES**

The data are coded based on the analogies and preferences they contain. I have drawn on the content analysis literature for guidance in developing and implementing the coding scheme (e.g., Krippendorf 1980). Content analysis is defined by Holsti (1969, 14; see also Weber 1990, 82n1) as “any technique for making inferences by and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages.” Axelrod (1976) employs procedures similar to content analysis in order to determine “cognitive maps” of decision makers. In the present context, Axelrod’s seminal study is especially informative in that his focus was on decision-makers’ perceptions of causal relationships and how these maps (similar to schemata) are used to interpret new information.

In my study, the unit of analysis for coding purposes is the individual article, policy statement, or interview. The type of content to be coded is a selection of text that either indicates a foreign policy preference (dependent variable) or a foreign policy relevant analogy (independent variable). All preferences and analogies relevant to

<table>
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<th>Table A.2 Ordered probit estimation of lagged preferences effects on preferences</th>
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<td><strong>Variable</strong></td>
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foreign policy in the articles, statements, or interviews are used. There are four possible types of analogies that must be coded, as well as the foreign policy preferences expressed in each observation unit. The analogy types are Direct Success, Direct Failure, Observed Success, and Observed Failure.

The implications of the analogies must be assessed to determine coding. The coder must ascertain not only which of the four types of analogy is being used, but also what the stated or implied meaning of the analogy is for foreign policy. This necessitates some knowledge and judgment. Coding preference is more straightforward and involves identifying statements of what should be done or what is correct to do. Examples are given below of how preferences and analogies are coded along the five-point scale (figure 3.3).

No assumptions are made about the importance of the frequency of usage of various analogies. Even if the same analogy is used more than once in a given text, it is counted once only. If there is an apparent contradiction between two statements of preferences, or the same type of analogy (e.g., observed failure) or the same analogy used more than once, the coder is instructed to consider the statements together and use his or her judgment to resolve the conflict. In other words, there is a rule that each text can have only one value for each type of analogy and for preferences. In practice, many analogies and analogy types occurred more than once in a given unit, but it was fairly rare that these were contradictory. It was especially rare that the same analogy or analogy type was coded as both negative and positive within the same unit. Coding contradictions usually involved differences of a value of one on the five-point scale, and were resolved as the individual coder saw fit based on his or her knowledge of the context of each analogy (for a discussion of coding techniques in general see Weber 1990, 21–40).

The coding task here involves a certain degree of judgment as well as language skills and some knowledge of Russian and/or Ukrainian politics. Use of a degree of judgment is necessary because, as noted by Morrow, preferences are not directly observable, and success and failure must be understood as subjective assessments of events by the foreign policy elites. Although judgment is a necessary part of coding, objectivity can be preserved if the personal beliefs of coders are not expected to influence coding outcomes (Shapiro 1997). The coding rules alone must determine scores. In the case of observations coded by the author (80 percent of the total), in order to avoid bias due to my preexisting beliefs about the views of individual elites and knowledge of the content of their writings, I first recorded all statements indicating policy preference, then I separated the statements from reference to their authors in order to code them. Analogical references (the independent variables) were coded in the same way. In this way, I was coding “blind,” unaware of whose statements I was coding and the corresponding analogies/preferences.

A five-point scale represents ordinal points ranging from pure absolute gains preferences to mixed preferences to pure relative gains preferences. It incorporates preferences for interdependence, political cooperation, and autarky, treating these as the poles and mid-point of a continuum of possible preference rankings. As discussed in the main text, this definition of the dependent variable in the study of foreign policy is intended to allow for the analysis of “foreign policy” as a single object of study. Regardless of the validity of my particular continuum, if it is not possible to think about foreign policy as a single variable, I would argue that the term itself really has no analytical meaning and should be abandoned by students of politics and international relations.

How do coders determine the value of a particular analogy or preference on this scale? I have relied as much as possible on existing international relations literature
for coding instructions. Examples from well-known works served as prototypes for coding. In this way, I hoped to maximize the chance that the coding reflects generally accepted categories of foreign policy types.

The discussion of intercoder reliability above indicates an acceptable level of reliability in the data. The validity of the coding scheme is more difficult to assess than its reliability. Does my coding measure what it is intended to, “lessons” and “preferences”? The empirical analysis in the main text is one test of whether my data as coded have what Weber (1990, 18–21) calls hypothesis validity and predictive validity. The former requires that analysis establish relationships between variables as expected by theory; the latter that events outside of the data correspond to expectations established in the study. Although these criteria for validity clearly are not definitive, this is a function of the fact that this is the first application of my coding scheme. There is no external prior standard with which the coding here can be compared. In the absence of such a measure of validity, I briefly discuss the variables and present several examples of coding of preferences and analogies from the data set.

Dependent Variable

My dependent variable is foreign policy preferences. To measure these, I use elite statements of goals or policy priorities. There are several reasons why it is possible to consider elite statements representative of actual foreign policy preferences. First, there is some evidence of continuity between public and private statements of foreign policy elites (Khong 1992). Second, there is evidence that prevarication in public statements on foreign policy is rare (Axelrod and Zimmerman 1981). Third, most of the statements used here are better seen as inter-elite communication than as “public” statements. The journals of the Russian and Ukrainian foreign ministries are simply not widely read. The audience is a narrow group of practitioners and specialists. Statements by foreign policy elites in these journals are likely to be seen as statements of official policies or intentions by those executing the foreign policy of each state. Declaring basic foreign policy preferences at odds with actual goals or strategy would likely be counterproductive in these fora.

Examples of Preference Coding from the Data Set

_Coded as “−1”: Andrei Kozyrev, Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, *International Affairs* 3–4, 1992, Speaking at a February 1992 conference of the Ministry. “The drastic changes in internal development that we are living through today, possibly for the first time in Russian history, are taking place not in a hostile environment, as was the case in the past, but in an overall favorable external environment. And this substantially eases reformist activities, giving an added chance for democracy. Now there is really no source of danger for Russia whatsoever. There are no potential enemies, or the military threats to Russian interests associated with them” (93). “The goal is a broad one: the thorough economization of our policy and diplomacy. . . . The most important criterion here is achievement of an organic commonality with the world economy, speedy entry into the IMF and other institutions.” (97)_

Kozyrev’s comments are coded as “−1”—a moderate preference for economic interdependence. The selection indicates no perception of foreign threat or immediate
concern with relative gains, and the primacy of economic integration with the rest of the world. References to international support for political development, and the goal of membership in an international organization, indicate that political cooperation is expected to accompany economic cooperation, thus moderating his seemingly categorical "trading state" views.

**Coded as “0”:** Leonid Kuchma, Ukrainian President, former Prime Minister, speaking to the General Assembly of the UN, November 21, 1994, *Politics and Time* 12, 1994. “In particular, the attempt to form a viable Agenda for Development is today the highest priority not only for Ukraine, but certainly for all member states of the United Nations. . . . Among these tasks, as we understand them in Ukraine, is the guarantee of a strong peace and political stability through socio-economic reform and development in the interests of man” (3). “We have a firm intention to . . . eventually join the GATT/WTO system. We hope that the system’s activity will encourage the creation of an open, transparent trade system and create additional opportunities to expand the access to the world market of export products from states with transition economies, including Ukraine” (6); “We propose . . . a ‘Partnership for Development’. . . . for stable economic growth . . . , to declare solidarity in the task of strengthening of international security, justice, and equal rights, to voice the importance of creating real partnership and equal rights in all areas of international life.” (7)

Kuchma’s comments are coded as “0”—a preference for negotiation and political cooperation. It is political cooperation, likely through an international organization, that will promote a range of goals including peace, stability, growth, equality, justice, and access to markets. The political values of international solidarity and partnerships are primary, implied necessary conditions for favorable outcomes in economic and military areas.

**Coded as “1”:** Iurii Skokov, chair of the National Council of the Congress of Russian Communities, former Secretary of the Russian Security Council; *International Affairs* 11–12, 1995. “Russia needs to undertake a strong foreign policy based primarily on national interests and on the interests of global stability. We must clearly define the priorities of Russian foreign policy. Naturally, one of the most important priorities is relations with the former Soviet Republics. Here, unquestionably, a course toward integration and cooperation is necessary. Nevertheless we must decisively, harshly [*zhestko*] defend the interests of millions of our compatriots, who have become foreigners by the will of fate in what used to be a single country.” (13)

Skokov’s preference is coded as “1”—a moderate preference for military security. The emphasis in his comments is on protecting Russia from implied threats, and the need to defend national interests unilaterally. Cooperation within the former Soviet space is not a goal in itself, but a means for defending interests, including integration of territories previously ruled from Moscow and possible harsh measures in defense of Russians’ or Russophones’ rights outside of Russia. Neither political nor economic cooperation is a priority, but there is no direct mention of imminent military threat to Russian “national interests,” so this statement is coded as a moderate leaning toward the primacy of force.
Independent Variables

The variables Direct Success (DS), Direct Failure (DF), Observed Success (OS), and Observed Failure (OF) correspond to the four possible types of analogy I have identified. These are coded according to their content using the five-point scale in figure 3.3. Using the same scale for dependent and independent variables is theoretically appropriate because the meaning of an analogy is assumed to be literally “analogous” to whatever foreign policy issue the decision maker is grappling with. Examples are provided to illustrate how coders judged the content of these analogies and assigned each a value on the scale.

Examples of Independent Variable Coding

Direct Success

Coded as “1”: Evgenii Primakov, Russian Foreign Minister, speaking to the Argentine Council on Foreign Relations, November 24, 1997, Diplomatic Courier 12, 1997. “Life has shown clearly that Russia has moved along the path of market economics and democracy, and is becoming an increasingly attractive partner. There has been a major privatization program, inflation has been controlled . . . , production has stabilized, the Russian ruble feels confident. The Russian economy is weathering the test connected with the international financial . . . turbulence. The government and the parliament are taking even more measures aimed at creating attractive conditions for . . . investment” (33).

Coded as “1”: Iurii Shcherbak, Ukrainian Ambassador to the U.S., Politics and Time 11, 1996. “In the mass media of the USA in 1992 and 1993 there appeared a series . . . of openly anti-Ukrainian publications, often originating from enemies of Ukraine in foreign propaganda centers. . . . [I]f the excess and noise of this black propaganda campaign is disregarded, it was easy to identify two points of criticism. (1). Nuclear disarmament (non-disarmament) of Ukraine. (2). The absence of detectable economic reforms, the conservation in Ukraine of a series of characteristics of the Communist-Soviet regime. . . . Today it is possible to note with pride that young Ukraine’s diplomacy honorably resisted the ‘onslaught and pressure’ from the USA and Russia, played the ‘nuclear card’ brilliantly, and received the maximum possible political profit from ‘denuclearization.’ ” (6–7)

Direct Failure

Coded as “0”: Anatolii Zlenko, Ukrainian Foreign Minister, International Affairs 11, 1990. “The skins, as they say, are old, but the wine is new. We have no doubt that a full use of their constitutional rights [1978 USSR Constitution] by all of the Union Republics from the very start would not only not have contradicted the interests of the Soviet Union in the past, but would have saved it many difficulties today” (6). “We have studied the experience of Ukrainian foreign relations of 1917–1922, the proposals of the USSR [Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic] 1922–1923 for the organization of a joint foreign political service of the USSR [Union of Soviet Socialist Republics], which would have incorporated the interests of Ukraine. . . . Aren’t we working on the same problems today?” (13)
Observed Success

*Coded as “+1”*: Henadii Udovenko, Ukrainian Foreign Minister, “Priorities of Foreign Policy Speech of H. Y. Udovenko at the Session of the Supreme Rada of Ukraine 15, September [1994].” *Politics and Time* 10 1994. “There has been some movement . . . the recent economic agreements with Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, based on the principles of GATT. That is, there is a basis for development of normal, civilized relations.” (4)

Observed Failure

*Coded as “−1”*: Roman Shpek, Minister, Head of the Ukrainian Agency for Reconstruction and Development, former Deputy Prime Minister, former Minister of the Economy, former Finance Minister, Interview November 28, 1997. “For us instructive today is the experience of Northern Korea, Cuba, this is the memory of our past . . . we were building socialism for 75 years . . . millions of people died . . . nobody saw socialism, as they called it, ‘with a human face’ ” (question 7).
Appendix B: List of Interviews

UKRAINE

Top-Level Elites Included in the Data Set


Mid- and Low-Level Elites

[Senior Researcher, ISEMV]

Haran, Oleksiy Vas’lovych. Kyiv, 4/17/97.
[Head of the Center for Political Analysis, newspaper Den]

Hrach, Leonid Ivanovich. Yalta, 6/20/97.
[Head, Communist Party organization, Crimea.]

[President, The Atlantic Council of Ukraine; and Chief of the Military Experts Group, Ukrainian Center of Economic and Political Research; former positions: 1994–1996—Assistant to the President of Ukraine for Military Questions; 1993–1996 Deputy Minister of Defense for Military Policy and Deputy Director of the National Center of Disarmament; 1991–1993—Head of the Center for Operations and Strategic Research, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine]

[Head, Information Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs]

[Leading Researcher, ISEMV; former position: 1993–1996, Minister-Counsellor in Embassy in China]

Myroshnychenko, Viacheslav Iuriyovych. Kyiv, 4/14/97.
[Assistant to the Minister of Information, Head of the Secretariat of the Ministry]

[President, Ukrainian Perspective; former position: Rukh Secretariat and Tsentr Provodu NRU until 1995].

[Director of ISEMV; adviser to the President of Ukraine]
[Deputy Head for Multilateral Economic Ties. Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade]

[Director, Kiev Center for Political Research and Conflict Studies]

[Director, Ukrainian Center for Peace, Conversion and Conflict Resolution Studies; Professor, Institute of Sociology, Acad. of Sciences of Ukraine; former position: Head, USA and Canada section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, 1993–1994]

[Rada deputy, Head of Rada fraction “Reforma”; vice-chair of privatization committee].

[People’s Deputy of Ukraine, member of Foreign Affairs Commissions; former position: Member of orgkomitet of Rukh during founding, second, third congresses, and was member of Secretariat of the Kyiv NRU]

**RUSSIA**

**Mid- and Low-Level elites**

Kortunov, Andrei, Moscow, 2/12/98.
[President, Moscow Social Science Foundation.]

Prokhanov, Aleksandr. Moscow, 2/4/98.
[Editor, Zavtra newspaper; considered the father of post-Soviet Russian nationalism.]

Trenin, Dmitrii V. Moscow, 2/11/98.
[Carnegie Center, Moscow.]
Appendix C: Interview Questionnaires

English

Ben Goldsmith
Ph. D Candidate
Department of Political Science
University of Michigan
Draft Questionnaire - English

Ukrainian/Russian Foreign Policy

I am conducting research on Ukrainian/Russian foreign policy after the fall of the Soviet Union. I am especially interested in the reasons for continuity or change in policy. I have 7 questions. In order not to take up too much of your time, I propose that your answers be limited to 4-6 sentences. My goal is to learn your real opinions. If you would prefer that I not make reference to you, of course will agree. I will also have a few demographic questions after the interview.

1) Independent Ukraine/The Russian Federation has been conducting relations with other sovereign states for over 5 years now. In your opinion, what is the major positive experience of Ukrainian/Russian foreign policy changed during this time? Why?

2) How has your personal approach to foreign affairs changed in these years? Why?

3) There are various opinions on the degree of interdependence between foreign economic relations and state security. Some specialists believe that a country can engage in open trade and investment, even with a country which is a possible military threat. Other specialists believe that there should be a policy of minimizing economic interaction with such a country. In your view, what should be Ukraine’s/Russia’s approach to foreign economic relations with a country which is a possible military threat?

4) At times, international norms or rules can conflict with the laws or interests of individual states. Some specialists believe that international norms should have precedence over laws or interests of individual countries. Other specialists believe that the laws or interests of each country, or in other words sovereignty, should have precedence. In your opinion, is it worth it to infringe Ukraine’s/Russia’s sovereignty in some way for the sake of international norms or rules? In other words, is it worth it for Ukraine to relinquish some part of its sovereignty in order to take part in international organizations?

5) This is a question about priorities for Ukraine/Russia today. Should Ukraine/Russia place more importance on the goal of full political participation in European and other international organizations, or should Ukraine/Russia consider increasing international trade and investment to be more important?

6) In your opinion, which experience in international affairs has been the most important, that is instructive, for Ukraine/Russia. Give 2-3 examples if possible.

7) Someone said that a wise person studies the experience of others. In your opinion, which experiences of foreign countries might be especially useful for the young Ukrainian/Russian state?
Зовнішня Політика України

Мое дослідження стосується української зовнішньої політики після розпаду Радянського Союзу. Зокрема мене цікавить причини безперервності або змінюваності політики. У мене до вас 7 запитань. Щоб не гати вашого часу, я пропонував би, щоб відповіді не були більші, ніж 3-4 хвилини. Моя мета - узнати ваші справжні думки. Якщо ви хочете, щоб я не посилався на вас, я звичайно був би згоден. У мене також буде декілька асмографічних запитань на прикінці інтер'ю.

1. Незалежна Україна вже понад 5 років веде відносини з іншими суверенними країнами. На вашу думку, який головний позитивний досвід української зовнішньої політики в цей час? Чому Ви так уважаєте?

2. Як змінювався ваш особистий підхід до закордонних справ у ці роки? Чому?

3. Є різні думки про ступінь взаємозалежності між зовнішніми економічними зв'язками та державною безпекою. Одні співробітники вважають, що можна вільно торгувати, а також вкладати та приймати інвестиції, навіть якщо якася країна становить потенційну воєнну загрозу для держави. Інші співробітники вважають, що економічні стосунки з тією країною краще зводити до мінімуму. Як вважаєте ви, якщо якася країна становить потенційну воєнну загрозу для України, якими повинні бути економічні стосунки з цією країною?

4. Інколи буває суперечність між законами чи інтересами якоїсь країни та міжнародними нормами чи правилами. Одні специалісти вважають, що міжнародні норми повинні переважати над законами чи інтересами окремих країн. Інші спеціалісти вважають, що повинні переважати закони чи інтереси що країни, тобто принцип суверенітету. На вашу думку, чи варто обмежувати суверенітет України заради міжнародних норм та правил? Іншими словами, чи варто віддавати частину суверенітету, щоб брати участь у міжнародних організаціях?

5. Це означає запитання про пріоритети. Що найважливіше для України сьогодні: політична участь у європейських та інших міжнародних організаціях чи дальший розвиток економічних відносин з європейськими та іншими країнами?

6. На вашою думку, який досвід у міжнародному житті є для України важливим, тобто повчальним? Наведіть 2-3 приклади, будь ласка.

7. Хтось казав, що мудра людина вчиться на досвіді інших. Який досвід зовнішніх країн, на вашу думку, може бути особливо корисним для молодої української держави?
Внешняя политика России

Мое исследование касается российской внешней политики после распада Советского Союза. Меня особенно интересуют причины стабильности или изменений этой политики. У меня к Вам 7 вопросов. Чтобы не тратить ваше время, я предлагаю, на ответы не больше чем 2-3 минуты. Моя цель - узнать ваши настоящие взгляды. Если Вы предпочитаете, чтобы я не ссыпался на Вас, я конечно был бы согласен. У меня тоже будет несколько демографических вопросов.

1. Российская Федерация уже более чем 6 лет ведет отношения с другими странами в контексте пост-советского мира. На ваш взгляд, какой главный позитивный опыт российской внешней политики за это время? Почему?

2. Как изменился ваш личный подход к междупнародным делам за это время? Почему?

3. Есть разные мнения о степени взаимозависимости между внешними экономическими связями и государственною безопасностью. Одни специалисты считают, что можно свободно торговать, а также класть и принимать инвестиции, даже если какая-то страна становится потенциальной военной угрозой для государства. Другие специалисты считают, что экономические отношения с этой страной лучше держать до минимума. Как считаете Вы, если какая-то страна становится потенциальной военной угрозой для России, какими должны быть экономические отношения с этой страной?

4. Иногда бывает противоречие между законами или интересами какой-то страны и международными нормами или правилами. Одни специалисты считают, что международные нормы должны стоять над законами или интересами отдельных стран. Другие специалисты считают, что законы и интересы каждой страны должны стоять над международными нормами, то есть принцип суверенитета. На ваш взгляд, стоит ли ограничить суверенитет России во имя международных норм и правил? Другими словами, стоит ли отдать какую-то часть суверенитета чтобы принимать участие в международных организациях?

5. Еще один вопрос о приоритетах. Что важнее для России сегодня: политическое участие в европейских и других международных организациях или дальнейшее развитие экономических отношений с европейскими и другими странами?

6. Как вы считаете, какой опыт в международной жизни является для России значительным, то есть поучительным? Приведите 2-3 примера, пожалуйста.

7. Кто-то сказал, что мудрый человек изучает опыт других. Какой опыт других стран, по вашему мнению, может быть особенно полезным для Российской Федерации сегодня?
Appendix D: The Data Set

2. Frieden (1999, 66–75) reviews other approaches to deducing states’ international economic preferences.


5. In the social psychological literature, there are distinctions made between “imitation,” “identification,” and “modeling.” Bandura’s (1986, 48) preferred term, “modeling,” incorporates both imitation and identification. I have chosen to use the term imitation because it has gained some currency in the study of international politics (Waltz 1979) and its meaning is readily grasped by those unaware of the psychological terminology.


7. While Eckstein’s logic informs my case selection, I do not believe that case studies can be valid tests of theories (Achen and Snidal 1989). A single case, or even a small-N comparative case study, cannot provide sufficiently generalizable evidence to justify discarding a theory or accepting it as a general proposition. However, in the search for provisional support, indications of possibly significant independent variables, and illustration of hypothesized causal effects, “crucial case” methodology is appropriate.

8. But it should be stressed that such an interpretation of Russian history, while perhaps common, is certainly open to question. And my argument and case selection don’t hinge on it.

9. A study of the U.S. Security Council for the explicit purpose of learning from its structure and operation is found in the journal of the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Baranovs’ky 1995).

10. In explaining the new (1997) Russian strategic doctrine, Ivan Rybkin, then head of the Russian Security Council, went so far as to cite the English language terms “first-use” and “first-strike” and say that Russian policy was now equivalent to the former, not the latter—just like American policy. Russian ORT news, February 1997.
11. Another example is the Ukrainian government’s study of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission as well as similar bodies in major European states. The chair of the then-newly formed State Commission of Ukraine for Securities and the Stock Market wrote: “Similar organs, regulating the stock market, exist in many countries of the world. In the creation of the Commission the experience of the analogous body in the USA was used. . . . However, there is no need to worry that, having taken the American example, Ukraine might not gain entry to the European stock market system: there is little substantive difference between the American Commission and . . . the French, German, English, and others . . .” (Mozgovoi 1997).

12. At the time of the interviews, Markevych was Director of the Canada-Ukraine Partners Office in Kyiv and Waschuk was Counselor at the Canadian Embassy there.

2 Choice, Learning, and Foreign Policy

1. Reiter (1996) perhaps comes closest, but recognizes that his framework applies with difficulty, if at all, to major powers or to complex choices.

2. “Utility” and “preference” are used interchangeably in formal decision theory (Pratt, Raiffà, and Schlaifer 1995, xvi–xvii).

3. Kimura and Welch (1998, 214) equate “interests” with “preferences-over-outcomes” within specific issues; although they distinguish between such single-issue preferences and a more general understanding of preferences, this distinction seems to me to be one of degree, rather than kind. Any issue-specific preferences involve trade-offs with other values, as they recognize in claiming that Japan suffers opportunity costs due to its policy on the Northern Territories. Their study and its conclusions are open to at least two basic criticisms. First, they do not attempt to develop a theory of interests which might guide them in understanding their case. Second, they base their conclusions about interests as a general concept on a single case study. If N = 1, there can be little confidence in the general nature of the result.

4. The difficulty of defining the term apparently stems from the difficulty of finding criteria which are not related to behavior. For example, a text on learning, Hilgard and Bower’s Theories of Learning, warns “learning must always remain an inference from performance, and only confusion results if performance and learning are identified” (20). But three pages earlier these same authors present their definition of the term “Learning refers to the change in a subject’s behavior to a given situation brought about by his repeated experiences in that situation, provided that the behavior change cannot be explained on the basis of native response tendencies, maturation, or temporary states of the subject (e.g., fatigue, drugs, etc.)” (17). This definition is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, it commits the error of defining learning as a change in behavior which the authors themselves warn against. Excluding changes in behavior which can be understood as products of some other causes does not solve the problem, it simply defines learning as all changed behavior which we can’t otherwise explain. Second, it fails to distinguish between simple memory (e.g., learning the alphabet) and insight or understanding of causal linkages (e.g., learning that studying more helps students get better grades).
5. For example, Lloyd Etheridge (1985, viii, see also 66) defines learning as “a record of increasing intelligence and effectiveness across return engagements.” He continues, “Often, however, such government learning has not occurred. . . .” His goal is not to explain a phenomenon called foreign policy learning, but rather to explain “blocked learning” (ix) caused by the dominance of cognitive factors over rational or analytical decision making. It is curious that by Etheridge’s definition learning and cognition are antithetical. Other works which take the same normatively-based approach to learning include Breslauer 1991, 830; Larson 1991, 351, 362, 390; Thies 1991, p. 187 (all in Breslauer and Tetlock, eds. 1991). In a review of the organizational learning literature, Huber (1991, 125–126) discusses the problems associated with narrowly defining organizational learning in terms of “effectiveness” or intentionality.

6. Jervis (1976) and Khong (1992) both discuss schemata and analyze the policy implications of different schemata held by policymakers. This is one straightforward way to “operationalize” learning. My approach does not contradict theirs, but I do want to define precisely how different schemata affect policy. Why focus on schemata? Khong (10) provides 6 functions which analogies may serve, but these do not include a specification of how an analogy leads to certain conclusions in the 6 “diagnostic tasks” he identifies. I seek here to make explicit what is implied in this approach analogies provide guidelines for arranging and rearranging preferences over strategies and/or outcomes.

7. This statement can be somewhat qualified. At least theoretically, it is possible that behavior can change by chance or as a side-effect of other events before it is learned to be preferable by the actor. In major policy decisions, I do not believe this is likely to be relevant.

8. Steinbruner’s concept of “cybernetic learning” (78–79) is much different.

9. Haas might not accept my characterization of his definition of learning. However, given that he sees learning as the triumph of “substantive rationality” and the construction of “new nested problem sets” based on new knowledge (3), and that such “analytic” thinking overcomes “[r]outines [which] seek to limit the complexity of the real world” (38), I assume that he associates learning with cognitive and organizational complexity, as he himself seems to recognize (193). He (1997, 16–17) maintains the “new knowledge” requirement for learning, and calls it “more complex” (56). Tetlock (1991, 34) also makes an explicit connection between accuracy and complexity in learning.

10. An extension of Wolfers’s theory is found in Zimmerman (1973, 1987). He links the variation in domestic political salience of various “issue areas” with variation in the character of foreign policy based on Wolfers’s poles of power and indifference.

11. For debate on the use of neorealism as a theory of foreign policy, see Elman (1996a and b) and Waltz (1996).

12. Huber (1996 [1991], 141–143) focuses on mechanisms of information distribution through which organizational learning may occur, and across which it may vary. In order to benefit from experience or observation, the relevant information must be available and members of an organization must know how to get it. For nation states, this may cause more open societies to learn differently than closed societies, which restrict information, often without even knowing the exact content of the information to which they are
denying themselves access. This is consistent with Reiter’s (1996, chapter 8) expectations about learning and political structure.

3 A THEORY OF IMITATION IN FOREIGN POLICY

1. The same can be said for Reiter and Meek (1999), even though they attempt to study three types of military strategy. In fact, the dependent variable is dichotomous, measuring whether or not a “maneuver” strategy was used. Also, in both Reiter (1996) and Reiter and Meek (1999), the “cognitive” factors noted below of prestige and similarity are not considered (they do measure policy success). I would argue that any test of vicarious learning excluding “prestige” in particular is likely to be inconclusive.

2. Reiter (1996, 64, 183) seems to use the terms “beliefs” and “preferences” interchangeably. See Morrow (1994) for a discussion of the distinction, such as it is, between these terms. Beliefs are considered assumptions about facts. Although many game theorists (see Lake and Powell 1999) attempt to draw clear distinctions between these terms, I believe the distinction is one of degree. What seems a fundamental preference in one situation (e.g., wealth) can be a belief in another context (e.g., the belief that wealth brings happiness). Trying to make qualitative distinctions between beliefs and preferences leads to a logical infinite regress. Any given “fundamental” preference can be transformed into a belief by proposing a prior assumed preference that justifies pursuit of the first. I “prefer” the term preference because it implies choice among competing options.

3. This is not a novel argument: see Aron 1967, 195; and Keohane and Nye 1977, 224. “Survival,” used by Waltz (1979) is perhaps the least vague. It can distinguish between offensive and defensive realists (Jervis 1999), although I think not between defensive realists and liberals. If offensive realists always expect expansion (not survival), the picture of a system full of revisionist states is simply too far from the reality we seek to explain. The theoretical vapidity of these assumptions becomes clear when their alternatives are considered. Could useful competing theories be built on assumed state preferences for extinction, national insecurity, or weakness? If not, then what meaningful insights follow from them?


5. Gowa and Mansfield 1993; Grieco 1988; Jervis 1988, Waltz 1979. This is not to say that all realists posit that states exclusively seek relative gains nor that all liberals assume that relative gains never matter. Jervis (1999) and Powell (1991) both point out that there may be varying degrees of concern for the two different types of outcomes. Glaser’s (1994/95) “contingent realism” recognizes the importance of relative gains, but he believes the relative gains concerns and thus the security dilemma can be mitigated without violating other realist assumptions. Relevant recent discussions of international relations theories and include Powell and Lake (1999), who argue that “micro-foundations” are underspecified, and Jervis (1999) and Martin and Simmons (1998) provide insightful recent surveys.
6. For example, Wittkopf’s (“MI/CI,” see chapter 2 and note 4 above) categories of hardliners and isolationists should correspond roughly to concern for relative gains, while his categories of accommodationists and internationalists should correspond roughly to absolute gains concerns. As preferences move toward the midpoint, various balances of the four values would be observed. The advantages of the scheme used here are that it is not restricted to security issues, it is theoretically rather than inductively developed, and it involves only one axis so it can be included in ordinal quantitative analysis.


8. I have included some prominent textbooks on the assumption that these provide more basic and consensual characterizations.


4 ARE ELITES INFLUENCED BY FOREIGN ANALOGIES?

1. Data collection and coding are discussed in greater detail in the appendix.

2. Since the topic addressed is always “what should our foreign policy be?” I assume that any substantive example from the international experience of one’s own state or another state used by an elite is considered relevant to, and an analogue for, foreign policy.

3. Strategies for overcoming the problems of listwise deletion are developed by King et al. (2001). I choose two specifications of the equation because I have theoretical reasons to expect nonusage of an analogy type is meaningful (i.e., H1–H3, H7) and values should not be imputed for these missing data.

4. Observed Failure: Liberal is dropped from the equation. It has almost no variation because this type of analogy was used only twice. The coding procedure for the dummy variables, using zero to indicate either a value in another category or nonusage of the analogy type greatly reduces the problem of collinearity among dummy variables for a single analogy type (e.g., Direct Success), so reference categories are not omitted and meaningful coefficients result. As a further check, if the “Mixed” category is dropped from each analogy type, all the analogy variables that were significant in equation 6 remain so, and no others gain significance; nor do the relative levels of significance change.

5. Discrepancies between the total number of observations using an analogy type and the total number included in equations 1–6 are caused by missing data. Some observations could not be coded for foreign policy preferences (6) or year of birth (10).

6. This assumes that rhetorical or instrumental analogy use is “noisier” than substantive analogy use. Analogies used for effect (perhaps as the “Hitler” analogy is sometimes used by U.S. leaders) should have less to do with actual preferences than analogies that really shape those preferences.

7. On Gaullist foreign policy see, for example, Van Oudenaren 2000, 37–38. For more on Dubinin’s own characterization of the Gaullist approach to
Europe, see his memoirs (1997, 152–153) in which he notes de Gaulle’s position against any “foreign interference” or “outside forces” being involved in Europe and his “policy of independence” for France with military forces directed “at all azimuths.”

8. All references to pre-1992 Soviet experiences are coded as “direct” experience for Russians and Ukrainians. All elites in the data set were Soviet citizens prior to 1992 and almost all were mid- to high-level Soviet political or diplomatic officials, and Communist Party members.

9. On the USSR and the CSCE see, for example, Donaldson and Nogee 1998, 83. Dubinin discusses his experience as a Soviet negotiator in the Helsinki process in great detail in his memoirs (1997, chapter 6). It is clear that he recognizes the necessity of including the United States in European security and that he believes a negotiated agreement is the best way to achieve Soviet goals. He recognizes persistent “contradictions” between East and West and Western European fears of the USSR in particular (214). He believes that building on what was achieved through negotiation and compromise would have been the best option for Soviet policy toward the West. If the large role Dubinin recognizes for the United States in Europe is considered, the contrast between the CSCE and Gaullist analogies is especially clear.

10. Here the prestige and issue-success factors may be convoluted. Sorting them out must remain a task for future inquiry. However, I think it would be difficult to argue that the creation of the European Community really shared much with, say, the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States. It is more likely that advocates of the CIS are attracted by the status of the EU today, rather than its actual similarity to their tasks. There also could be overlap between analogies to Central and East European states and the former Soviet Bloc when discussing H5 and H6.

5 State-Level Effects on Elite Imitation

1. It is important to note that this is not an artifact of differences between coders. If a binary variable for coder is introduced into the model for equation 6, the effect of differences between coders does not have a statistically significant effect on preferences (coefficient = 0.1247916, \( p = 0.694 \)). Intercoder reliability is discussed in the appendix.

6 Case Studies: Foreign Capital and “Strategic” Enterprise Privatization

1. Kubonowa and Gavrilenkov (1997) question the sustainability of this stabilization.

2. Due to the nature of the Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe database through which this source was accessed (see bibliography), it is not possible to cite page numbers for direct quotations. The full text of the source is searchable, however, for easy location of any referenced information, including quotations.

3. In 1994 some strategic enterprises were approved for privatization, “under tremendous pressure from the managers who wanted to privatize” (Boycko,

4. Chubais stated that it contained 3,000 enterprises and had the written consent of the president. Although previous references to the list had indicated that 3,054 enterprises were included, it is unclear whether 54 enterprises had actually been dropped from the list, or if Chubais was simply using a round figure for convenience. The latter appeared to be the case because the figure of 3,054 was subsequently referred to by government officials.

5. Some might argue there is no real threat to Russia from the United States or NATO, while Russia really did pose a threat to Ukraine. Such a view must be treated with skepticism, not least because the classic measure of threat—capabilities—clearly support’s the Russian perception. Western intentions also become highly suspect after NATO expansion—at least in Russian eyes. If we know nothing else about international relations, we know that states tend to underestimate the threat they pose to others and overestimate the threat others pose to them. This is the logic of the security dilemma.

7 Conclusions: Imitation and Transition in International Relations


2. Rosenthal and B. Zimmerman (1978, 77) give a similar description of how observational learning can manifest itself in individual behavior. “Three major effects of vicarious experience have been identified: inhibition-disinhibition, facilitation, and novel learning. Inhibition refers to suppression of a known response because vicarious experiences indicate that it will be punished.... Disinhibition refers to the manifestation by an observer of a formerly punished response because of the model’s fearless behavior.... Facilitation refers to vicarious instigation of a known but not punished response.... Finally, novel behavior can be vicariously acquired....” Socialization into a (changeable) social system is the logically expected result, I contend.

Appendix D: The Data Set

1. Shapiro (231) makes the point that computer coding is also vulnerable to problems of judgment and subjective bias because the coding program must be written by people. Subjectivity and judgment are necessary aspects of any coding procedure for “representative” information that intends to discern the meaning of statements, but not for “instrumental” information that is only concerned with describing an aspect of a text such as the frequency of occurrence of certain words (228).
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