FOREWORD

1. The Pentagon had the same initial view of the NATO deployment; like Kissinger, they thought Bosnia would resemble the two Koreas or divided Cyprus. Of course, the concept of the negotiating team was exactly the opposite: we wanted no NATO troops dividing the two sides, but rather as much integration as possible of the two entities. This is, in fact, what has happened. NATO troops never patrolled the “inter-ethnic boundary line,” and today, people move, interact, and drive freely across all of Bosnia without incident or interference.

2. In the Senate, the policy got what the press accurately called “lukewarm support”; by a strong 69 to 30 vote, the Senate approved the troop deployment, but on support of the policy itself, the vote was a narrow 52 to 47 in favor.

3. Among the most important exceptions: Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole, who complained endlessly about the details of the policy because he wanted a more vigorous and earlier involvement, but who supported the deployment; and Senator John McCain, whose initial support was later tempered by his fury at the Administration’s ill-conceived and unrealistic pledge to bring the troops home after one year.

PROLOGUE


1 **OVER THE WATERFALL: MAY–JULY 1995**

1. Don Kerrick interview, July 15, 1996; see also “Key Bosnia Meeting/Event chronology” (White House paper prepared for media backgrounders on U.S. policy toward Bosnia, August 1995); and Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, pp. 87–88.
3. Chaired by National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, the Principals Committee met in the White House Situation Room and included Cabinet-level officials (or in their absence, their deputies) from the State Department, the Defense
Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CIA, the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Office of the Vice President, and NSC staff. The PC would often work from conclusions that had already been reached by their deputies in the Deputies Committee, or the “DC.”

4. See memorandum from Richard Holbrooke (EUR) to Secretary Christopher, “Principals Committee Meeting, May 23,” May 22, 1995; and “Summary of Conclusions of Principals Meeting on Bosnia,” May 23, 1995, NSC memorandum.


6. See Memorandum of Telephone Conversations between Secretary Christopher and French Foreign Minister de Charette, May 24, 1995 (Cable, State 129348); May 26, 1995 (Cable, State 130130); and May 27, 1995 (Cable, State 13144).


20. Peter Tarnoff interview, October 23, 1996; Jim Steinberg interview, August 20, 1996.
24. See “Elements of a New Strategy,” fax to Albright from Jamie Rubin, June 21, 1995; and Albright, Madam Secretary, p. 186.
25. Albright interview; Daalder, Getting to Dayton, pp. 92–93.
27. Harris, The Survivor, p. 117; Talbott personal files.
32. Memorandum for the President from Secretary Christopher, “Night Note,” July 6, 1995.
33. Vershbow interview, July 23, 1996; Bass interview.
34. Talbott note to Christopher, June 16, 1995, Talbott personal files.
36. Talbott personal files.
37. See July 6, “Night Note”; and Christopher interview, October 22, 1996.
38. In a note to Christopher, Talbott suggested that on 40104, he emphasize the danger—which he wrote was “acutely on the President’s mind”—that the plan may result in a large number of casualties and a possible quagmire. See note to the Secretary from Talbott, no date, cover of draft memo. Despite the President’s interest, there is no evidence that the Pentagon began to explore other planning options; however, Christopher later noted that the memo “may have been a spur to energize [the President] to try to find a different strategy.” See Christopher interview, October 22, 1996; Daalder, Getting to Dayton, p. 98.
40. Clinton, My Life, p. 666.


48. Atop the State Department’s copy of the Lake draft is Talbott’s handscribbled notation: “Sec, Perry, Shali don’t like, Tony and Mad do.” See Talbott interview, July 30, 1996.


52. Perry interview; Vershbow interview, September 26, 1996.


56. “Memorandum of the President’s Conversation with President Chirac, July 20, 1995,” NSC memorandum, July 21, 1995. Clinton had also talked with Bosnian President Izetbegovic, to whom he reassured that the United States would work hard at London to secure an agreement on airstrikes and elimination of the dual key. See “Presidential Telephone Call with Bosnian President Izetbegovic, July 20, 1990,” Cable, State 180778, July 28, 1995.


59. See Tarnoff interview; for Major’s statement, see “International Meeting on Bosnia, Lancaster House, London, Friday, 21 July 1995: Chairman’s Statement.”

60. Perry interview; Perry memorandum to the President, July 21, 1995; Christopher, *In the Stream of History*, p. 348.

61. See Perry memorandum to the President, July 21, 1995.
2 Through the Window of Opportunity: The Endgame Strategy


2. See Vershbow interview, September 26, 1996; Albright interview; and Christopher interview, October 22, 1996.


5. The specific NAC planning decisions concerning these options were based on plans made in August 1993. See Fax from Bob Clarke (USNATO) to George Glass (EUR/RPM), July 28, 1995, enclosing NAC decision for the July 25, 1995 meeting; and “Operational Options for Air Strikes in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” Memorandum of the NAC Military Committee to the NATO Secretary General, August 8, 1993.


12. See Hunter interview.

13. See “Follow-up to Secretary’s Call with Silajdzie,” Cable, State 179135, July 27, 1995. The decision still left unresolved, however, the question of who could authorize Option Three bombing. On August 10, UNPROFOR Force Commander Janvier and NATO Commander Admiral Leighton Smith agreed that launching Option Three strikes would be “subject to political approval.” See “August 1 NAC- Texts, Agreed Decisions and IAU on the Safe Areas of Sarajevo, Bihac and Tuzla,” Cable, USNATO 3107, August 1, 1995; and “Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Between CINCSOUTH and FC UNPF Pursuant to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) Decisions of 25 July 1995 and 1 August 1995 and the Direction of the UN Secretary General,” August 10, 1995.


19. The United States had some knowledge of Croatia’s rearming, although it remains unclear whether it actively helped. See, for example, Cable, Zagreb 2758 for reports of artillery shipments from Turkey for Croatia. Also, former U.S. military personnel, working as independent contractors, were hired by the Croatian government to help reformulate their military strategy. See “MPRI Back to Zagreb,” Memorandum to Holbrooke from Chris Hoh (EUR/SCE), August 25, 1995; and Roger Cohen, “U.S. Cooling Ties to Croatia after Winking at its Buildup,” *New York Times*, October 28, 1995.


23. On August 6, Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic told Galbraith that Croatia and Bosnia would cooperate militarily, as Croatia would “supplement” Bosnian troops that could create conditions for a peace agreement—“the new realities in Bosnia could mean an end to the war by the fall.” See “Foreign Minister Says GOC and GOBH Cooperation Will End the Bosnian War by Fall,” Cable, Zagreb 2989, August 6, 1995.


210 Notes


34. See “Talking Points for the Secretary’s Conversation with the President on ex-Yugoslavia,” no date, Steinberg S/P files; Christopher hand-written notes for meeting with the President, August 13, 1995, Secretary’s August 1995 out-box files/Bosnia.

35. For details, see Tarnoff interview.

36. For quotes, see Woodward, The Choice, pp. 265–266; Stephanopoulos, All Too Human, p. 383; Albright, Madam Secretary, p. 190.


40. Holbrooke, To End a War, pp. 73–74.

41. See Christopher, Chances of a Lifetime, p. 256; Holbrooke interview with author, September 19, 1996 (notes); and Albright interview.

42. See “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President and British Prime Minister Major; French President Jacques Chirac; and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, August 7, 1995,” NSC Memoranda (3 separate telcons), August 8, 1995. Christopher also cabled his counterparts in Europe to inform them of the mission, see “Secretary’s Letter to Counterparts, RE: Lake Trip,” Cable, State 190102, August 10, 1995.


45. Bass interview; Christopher interview, October 22, 1996; Tarnoff interview; Woodward, The Choice, p. 267; Daalder, Getting to Dayton, p. 111.

46. As the Lake team brought the initiative to Europe, officials in Washington continued high-level contacts with both the Croats and the Bosnians, urging them not to allow the military conflict to escalate. While their military successes had
helped open the window, U.S. officials remained concerned that the Croats and Bosnians might overplay their hand. In calls to Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and Defense Minister Gojko Susak, Vice President Gore and Defense Secretary Perry asked that the Croats cease further military actions, so as “not to lose all the positive benefits of the last week.” See “Telephone Conversation: Secretary of Defense Perry and Croatian Defense Minister Susak,” DoD memorandum, August 11, 1995; “Vice Presidential Telephone Call: Vice President Gore, Croatian President Tudjman,” State Department Operations Center Telcon, August 12, 1995; “Vice-Presidential Telephone Call: Vice President Gore and President Izetbegovic of Bosnia,” State Department Operations Center Telcon, August 13, 1995.


3 Tragedy as Turning Point: The First Shuttle, Mt. Igman, and Operation Deliberate Force


4. “Granic Accepts Main Points of U.S. Regional Peace Proposal,” Cable, Zagreb 3150, August 17, 1995; and Galbraith Diplomatic Diary, p. 42.
9. Details from Perina interview; Holbrooke, To End a War, pp. 4–5.
11. See Holbrooke’s report, “The Road to Sarajevo,” undated document, EUR files; “The Road to Sarajevo”; and To End a War, pp. 5–7; Notes of Frasure phone call with Kornblum, “Report on Holbrooke meeting with Milosevic, August 18, 1995, 9:00am.”
13. Clinton, My Life, p. 667; Holbrooke, To End a War, p. 72.
19. Christopher interview, October 22, 1996; Owen interview, September 11, 1996; Owen/Holbrooke interview; Steinberg interview; Sapiro/O’Brien interview.
20. See Holbrooke, To End a War, pp. 85–86.
21. Lloyd Cutler interview, October 8, 1996; Owen interview, September 11, 1995; Kornblum interview, July 26, 1996; Sapiro/O’Brien interview; Price interview.
22. The group usually comprised Cutler; Sapiro; James O’Brien, an Albright aide in the State Department’s UN office; Tim Ramish of the Legal Advisor’s office; with the assistance of Laurel Miller, an associate with Covington and Burling; and either Chris Hoh, Phil Goldberg, or John Burley, the State Department desk officers for Croatia, Bosnia, or Yugoslavia, respectively.
24. Holbrooke, To End a War, p. 88; Albright interview.
25. Leon Fuerth interview, October 23, 1996; Memorandum from Holbrooke to Christopher, “Principals Committee Meeting on the Balkans Crisis,” August 22, 1995; Holbrooke, To End a War, p. 88.
26. See Fuerth interview; Holbrooke, To End a War, p. 88.
27. The Bosnian Serb problem was best illustrated by an August 22 meeting between British Lt. General Rupert Smith, the UNPROFOR head, and Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic. Smith reported that Mladic clearly “had little understanding


29. Holbrooke interview, July 10, 1996; Holbrooke interview with author (notes), October 18, 1996; Holbrooke, *To End a War*, pp. 91–92; Clark interview, Owen interview; Talbott interview. According to State Department Operations Center Telephone Logs, Holbrooke called Talbott at 7:44 A.M., only 90 minutes after initial reports of the shelling. See Shift I, August 28, 1995; Perry interview; Bass interview.


33. Holbrooke, *To End a War*, pp. 103–104.

34. Clark interview, July 15, 1996; Holbrooke comment, Dayton History Seminar; and “Official-Informal” (Message from Kornblum to Holbrooke), Cable, State 198023, August 19, 1995.


36. See “August 29 NATO Political Committee Meeting—former Yugoslavia,” Cable, USNATO 3409, August 29, 1995; fax from Charles Skinner (USUN Brussels) to George Glass at the State Department (EUR/RPM), August 31, 1995; and Hunter interview.


38. The first wave of NATO planes left Aviano Air Force Base in Italy at 8 P.M. EDT August 29 (2 A.M., August 30 Paris/Belgrade time), hitting radar, artillery, and C3 targets. In addition to the U.S., Italy, France, The Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, and the UK all contributed aircraft to these initial strikes. Augmenting the air campaign, French RRF heavy artillery launched a 90-minute barrage from atop Mt. Igman, hitting ammunition bunkers and weapons. See State Department Operations Center Spot Reports, “NATO Action in Bosnia,” 0300 EDT and 0600 EDT, August 30, 1995.

39. As expressed by Pardew in his August 29 update to Slocombe.
4  The Way to Geneva: The Patriarch Letter and NATO Bombing

1. Kerrick interview; Perina interview; Holbrooke interview, June 18, 1996; Owen interview, September 11, 1996.
5. Holbrooke interview, September 30, 1996; Pardew interview, July 26, 1996; and Holbrooke, To End a War, pp. 105–106.
7. See “Acting Secretary Talbott and Bosnian Foreign Minister Sacirbey, September 1, 1995” Cable, State 209772, September 5, 1995.
10. Details from Holbrooke/Hill comments, Dayton History Seminar; Hill interview with author (notes), December 19, 1996.
11. See “Two Hours with Gligorov; 12 with Milosevic,” Pardew report to Slocombe, September 1, 1995; Pardew interview, July 31, 1996; and comments by Holbrooke, Hill, and Pardew, Dayton History Seminar.
12. Pardew report to Slocombe, September 1, 1995; Clark interview, July 15, 1996; Holbrooke, To End a War, pp. 113–115.
13. Pardew report, September 1, 1995; Owen/Holbrooke interview.
17. Holbrooke, To End a War, p. 117; Bildt, Peace Journey, p. 96.
18. Holbrooke, To End a War, pp. 83–84.
19. Clark interview; passim comments, Dayton History Seminar.
20. See memorandum to Christopher from Holbrooke, “The Contact Group,” August 1995; and Holbrooke, To End a War, pp. 84–85.
22. See Clark interview, July 15, 1996; Holbrooke interview (notes), September 30, 1996; and Holbrooke, To End a War, pp. 118–119.
23. See “Assistant Secretary Holbrooke Briefs NAC on Peace Negotiations,” Cable, USNATO 3457, September 4, 1995; and Holbrooke interview (notes), September 30, 1996.
24. Holbrooke, To End a War, p. 119.
25. See “NAC Press Statement,” UK Cable, Telno 343, September 3, 1995; and “NAC Conclusions,” UK Cable, Telno 345, September 3, 1995; “Proposed NATO/NAC Statement,” September 2, 1995 (no author, located in Pardew notebook, Shuttle II; Book II); and Holbrooke comment, Dayton History Seminar.


29. See Holbrooke, To End a War, pp. 129–130.

30. See Holbrooke, Hill, Owen, and Zetkulic comments, Dayton History Seminar.

31. Owen interview, June 18, 1996; Holbrooke, Owen, Hill comments, Dayton History Seminar; Holbrooke, To End a War, pp. 130–131.

32. See Holbrooke, Owen, Hill, Clark comments, Dayton History Seminar; “A/S Holbrooke’s meeting with Turkish Prime Minister Ciller,” Cable, Ankara 10444, September 12, 1995.

33. See Holbrooke, To End a War, p. 131.


37. Average from calls patched through the State Department Operations Center during August 28–September 8, 1995. Additional calls likely were made, although through direct dialing.

38. Holbrooke interview, October 18, 1996; Holbrooke, To End a War, p 83.

39. According to members of EUR staff, officials in Washington were confused by Hill and Pardew’s Skopje trip—not sure who went or why. As a result, the European Bureau had to place a staffer in the Operations Center whose sole responsibility was to keep track of the delegation’s whereabouts.

40. Holbrooke interview with author (notes), October 17, 1996; Christopher interview, October 30, 1996; Holbrooke, To End a War, p. 171.

41. See Holbrooke interview with author (notes), October 17, 1996; Pardew interview, June 27, 1996; and Holbrooke, To End a War, p. 111.

42. See “Summary of Conclusions of DC meeting on Bosnia,” August 18, 1995; and “Summary of Conclusions for NSC Deputies Committee Meeting, August 28, 1995,” NSC memorandum, August 31, 1995.

44. See “Implementing a Balkan Peace Settlement,” Department of Defense memo-
randum, revision 30, September 1, 1995. See also “NATO Implementation
Force (IFOR),” Pardew report to Slocombe, September 3, 1995; and Cable,
USNATO 3457.
45. See “Summary of Conclusions for NSC Principals Committee Meeting,
September 5, 1995,” NSC memorandum, September 11, 1995; Memorandum
to Deputy Secretary Talbott from John Kornblum (EUR), “Principals
Committee Meeting, September 5, 1995,” no date; and Veshbow interview,
September 18, 1996.
46. Veshbow interview, September 18, 1996.
47. “The Secretary’s Conversation with Bosnian President Izetbegovic, September 8,
1995.” Cable, State 213439, September 8, 1995; “Secretary’s Conversation with
Bosnian PM Silajdzic, September 8, 1995,” Cable, State 213441, September 8,
1995.
48. See “September 8 Meeting Between the Contact Group and the Foreign
Ministers of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and FRY,” Cable (draft), Geneva
6808, September 11, 1995; Holbrooke comments, Dayton History Seminar; and
Holbrooke interview with author (notes), October 17, 1996; and Holbrooke,
To End a War, pp. 137–141.
49. See “‘Agreed Basic Principles’ For a Peace Settlement for Bosnia-Herzegovina:
An Analysis,” memorandum drafted by John Kornblum and Jack Zetkonic
(EUR), September 8, 1995.
50. Pardew report to Perry and Slocombe, “Balkan Peace Initiative: Round II,”

5 Bombs and Diplomacy: NATO’s
Campaign Ends, the Western
Offensive Continues

1. See “General Smith: What Does Holbrooke Want Us to Do?,” Cable, Sarajevo
555, September 10, 1995; Shawcross, Deliver Us from Evil, p. 181.
2. See Slocombe interview, January 6, 1997; Slocombe to Perry, “Trip Report:
3. See Eric schmitt, “NATO Shifts Focus of Its Air Attacks on Bosnian Serbs,”
Campaign Might Shift Bombing Targets,” New York Times, September 9,
1995.
4. See “Permreps Express Concern Over Possible Escalation in Air Strike Operation
With Use of Cruise Missiles,” Cable, USNATO 3555, September 11, 1995;
Perry interview.
5. See “Izetbegovic: ‘You Can Expect a Statement by Late Afternoon,’ ” Cable,
Sarajevo 554, September 10, 1995; Kit Roane, “Bosnian Muslims Said to Push
6. Talbott to Christopher, December 12, 1994; Talbott personal files.
7. See memorandum to Talbott from Toby Gati (INR), “Bosnia—How Mad
Are the Russians and What Can They Do?,” September 13, 1995; Memorandum
to Holbrooke from John Herbst (S/NIS), “Managing the Russian Side of our
Balkan Diplomacy,” August 26, 1995; and Clark, Waging Modern War, p. 57.
8. Holbrooke, To End a War, p. 117.
9. In President Clinton’s September 9 response to the Russian President, he largely side-stepped disagreements and thanked the Russians for their support. See Message from Clinton to Yeltsin, Cable, White House 92005, September 9, 1995; Talbott, *The Russia Hand*, p. 173.


11. Perry interview.


13. Tony Lake interview, November 5, 2001; Talbott to Christopher, September 15, 1995, Talbott personal files.

14. “Moscow Mission: September 14–15—Talking While Bombing,” EUR/RPM files, September 1995. As a way to organize his own thoughts as well as set the agenda for his negotiations, Talbott frequently prepared by writing detailed, and lengthy, scripts. He would usually write them himself, with help from a few members of his inner circle. These scripts served two purposes: they helped Talbott prepare for the task at hand, and as written capsules of the policy goals and red-lines, they became vehicles to coalesce policy around which, to a certain extent, helped discipline and drive the bureaucracy.


18. Talbott memo to Berger, September 10, 1995; Talbott personal files.


21. For example, in a letter to Christopher on September 8, British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind doubted that getting further NAC approval would be possible. See cable, State 951710, September 20, 1995.

22. See Holbrooke, “The Road to Sarajevo,” *The New Yorker*, October 21 and 26, 1996; and Holbrooke, *To End a War*, p. 145. Admiral Owens had been in contact with the General Perisic, the Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav (Serbian) Army. In a phone call at 4 P.M. September 11 (a half-hour before the White House PC meeting), Owens and Perisic discussed the course of the bombing campaign. Perisic said that the “further dimension of the TLAMs (Tomahawks) further exacerbated the situation and that it is imperative to the overall peace process that we achieve a cease-fire.” See “Owens-Perisic Telcon,” Cable, VCJCS Washington 111853, September 11, 1995; Pardew memorandum to Perry and Slocombe, September 10, 1995.


24. Vershbow interview, December 17, 1996; Holbrooke/Owen interview; Holbrooke, Owen, Hill, Clark, Kerrick comments, Dayton History Seminar; and Holbrooke, *To End a War*, p. 145.


30. Owen had discussed this approach during a September 12 meeting in Washington with Kornblum and the legal working group. See handwritten notes from September 12 meeting between Kornblum and Owen, EUR files.

31. See Clark CJCS/VCJSC report, September 14, 1995; Holbrooke phone report (EUR files), September 14, 1995; Kerrick notes, September 14, 1995; Owen interview, June 18, 1996; and Hill interview.

32. Holbrooke/Hill interview.

33. See Hill interview; Owen/Kornblum interview. For the version of the principles that came out of the Hill/Owen talks in Sarajevo, see “Eyes Only” fax to Secretary Christopher from Owen, September 16, 1995.

34. See Kerrick notes, September 15, 1995; “September 15 Contact Group Meeting,” Cable, Geneva 7052, September 15, 1995; Holbrooke/Hill interview; and Holbrooke, *To End a War*, pp. 155–156.

35. See Galbraith Diplomatic Diary, pp. 55–56; Holbrooke interview with author (notes), December 20, 1996; and Holbrooke, *To End a War*, pp. 158–162; p. 73.


38. See “Meeting: Croatian Minister of Defense Susak with LTG Clark, BG Kerrick and Mr. Pardew; 17 September 1995; Croatian MOD, Zagreb,” Typed meeting


40. See Pardew report to Slocombe, “Sarajevo,” Clark CJCS/VCJCS September 17 update; Kerrick notes, September 17, 1995; Holbrooke/Hill interview; Holbrooke, Hill, Pardew, Clark comments, Dayton History Seminar; Holbrooke, To End a War, p. 163.

41. See Pardew report to Slocombe, “Three More Hours with Milosevic,” September 17, 1995; Clark CJCS/VCJSC September 17 update; Kerrick notes, September 17, 1995.

42. See Galbraith Diplomatic Diary, p. 57. For reports on UN peacekeepers, see “Two Danish Peacekeepers in Croatia Killed, Eight Wounded, By Serb Shelling,” Cable, Copenhagen 4856, September 19, 1995; and “More Danish Casualties in Croatia: Serbs Attack Again, Danes Soldier On, Defmin Angry at UN,” Cable, Copenhagen 3843, September 20, 1995.

43. See Holbrooke/Hill interview; Holbrooke, Hill, Clark, Kerrick, Pardew comments, Dayton History Seminar; Kerrick notes, September 19, 1995; Galbraith Diplomatic Diary, pp. 57–58; and Holbrooke, To End a War, pp. 164–166.

44. See press statement from meeting in Pardew notebook, Shuttle III; Galbraith Diplomatic Diary, pp. 56–57.


46. This message was faxed to Christopher on September 19. Holbrooke phone interview with author, September 17, 1996; Christopher interview, October 30, 1996; and Holbrooke, To End a War, pp. 167–168.

47. Holbrooke, Clark comment, Dayton History Seminar.


52. Message from Holbrooke to Kornblum, “Official-Informal,” Cable, Zagreb 3622, September 17, 1995; Holbrooke, To End a War, p. 171.


54. See “Summary of Conclusions for SVTS Meeting of the Deputies Committee,” NSC memorandum, September 15, 1995; “U.S.-French Talks on Bosnian Settlement Implementation Planning, September 18,” Cable, State 227479, September 23, 1995; and memorandum for Albright and Ambassador Rick

56. See memorandum for Secretary Christopher from Kornblum, “Principals Committee Meeting, September 21, 1995,” with attached paper on “Implementation Structure in a Bosnian Settlement,” September 20, 1995; and Slocombe memorandum, “Notes for PC on Bosnia, 21 Sept 95.”


58. Details from Vershbow interview, December 17, 1996; and Holbrooke, To End a War, pp. 172–173.

6 INCHING FORWARD: The New York Agreement and a Ceasefire


2. See Hill/Holbrooke interview; Holbrooke, To End a War, p. 176.


5. See Kerrick comment, Dayton History Seminar; Vershbow interview, December 17, 1996; and Kerrick notes, September 24, 1995.


7. Hill/Holbrooke interview.


12. Holbrooke/Hill interview; Fax to State Department Operations Center (to be passed to Embassy Belgrade and Sarajevo) from Holbrooke, September 25, 1995, 9:40 P.M. EST.

13. Holbrooke comment, Dayton History Seminar; Holbrooke/Hill interview; Holbrooke fax to Perina/Menzies, September 25, 1995; and Holbrooke, To End a War, pp. 180–181.


19. Philip Goldberg interview, October 31, 1996; Holbrooke interview with author (notes), December 20, 1996.1


30. See, for example, “September 8 Trilateral Meeting at NATO on Bosnia Peace Plan Implementation,” Cable, USNATO 3525, September 8, 1995.

31. Details from this meeting from Pardew phone call to KC Brown, OSD (Dale Waters [EUR/RPM] notes), September 29, 1995; and Kerrick notes, September 29, 1995.

32. Memorandum to CJCS/VCJSC from Clark, “Daily Negotiations Update, 29 Sept,” October 2, 1995. Unless otherwise noted, all references below are from this document.


34. See Pardew memorandum to Holbrooke, September 28, 1995.

35. See Galbraith Diplomatic Diary, p. 65; Holbrooke, *To End a War*, p. 191.

36. Holbrooke comment, Dayton History Seminar; and Holbrooke, *To End a War*, pp. 191–193. According to State Department Operations Center Phone Logs
(Shift III), Talbott and Holbrooke talked at 1748 EST. Later that evening (2218 EST; 4:18 A.M. in Sofia), Holbrooke called Christopher’s Chief of Staff Tom Donilon.

37. See “October 3 Principals Committee Meeting,” Cable, Sarajevo 637, October 2, 1995.


39. See Vershbow interview, December 17, 1996 (Vershbow was the only notetaker at this meeting); Christopher interview, October 22, 1996; Berger interview; Holbrooke comment, Dayton History Seminar; and Kerrick notes, “PC debrief: From TL (Tony Lake).”


41. See Vershbow interview, December 17, 1996; Holbrooke interview with author (notes), December 20, 1996; Hill interview with author (notes), December 19, 1996; memorandum for Christopher from Kornblum, “October 3 Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia,” October 3, 1995; and October 4 “Summary of Conclusions.”

42. See Kornblum to Christopher, October 3, 1995.

43. See Kerrick notes, October 2, 1995.

44. See Kerrick notes, October 3, 1995; Vershbow interview, December 17, 1996.


46. See Holbrooke Comment, Dayton History Seminar; Holbrooke interview, July 10, 1996; Kerrick interview; Kerrick notes, October 4, 1995; Holbrooke, To End a War, p. 194.

47. According to State Department Operations Center Phone Logs, Holbrooke informed both Christopher and Lake of his progress in Sarajevo that day including two conference calls with both (743 and 2022 EDT). See “Read-out from Sarajevo: October 4, 1995, 1:55am,” memorandum from EUR/SCE files; Kerrick notes, October 4, 1995; and Holbrooke, To End a War, pp. 196–198.

48. Holbrooke faxed the latest texts of both the cease-fire and proximity talks agreements early the morning of October 5 (7 A.M. Belgrade time). See handwritten note to Secretary Christopher and Tony Lake (apparently also delivered to Talbott, Tarnoff, and Kornblum) from Holbrooke, October 5, 1995.

49. Pardew interview, July 31, 1996.


7 Preparing for Peace: A Deal with Russia, A Decision on IFOR

10. See memorandum for Deputy Secretary Talbott and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Tarnoff from Andrew Weiss (S/P), “Engaging the Russians on Bosnia Settlement Implementation,” September 13, 1995; Talbott interview, July 30, 1996.
13. Talbott memo to Christopher, September 15, 1995; Talbott personal files.
14. Perry interview; Slocombe interview with author, December 6, 2001; Talbott interview.
15. Perry interview; Talbott interview; Slocombe interview; Ashton Carter and William Perry, Preventive Defense (Brookings, 1999), p. 33.


21. Talbott “private” letter to Christopher, attached to Perry October 8 trip report. See also Talbott, *The Russia Hand*, pp. 175–176.


24. See “Deputy Secretary Talbott and Under Secretary Slocombe Brief the NAC on Talks in Moscow,” Cable, USNATO 4171, October 25, 1995; Clark report to CJSC/VCJSC, October 17, 1995.


27. See Pardew report, October 19, 1995; Kerrick notes, October 17–18, 1995; and Belgrade 5122.


30. See “The Acting Secretary and German Foreign Ministry Political Director Ischinger,” Cable, State 253723, October 27, 1995.


35. See Perry interview; Talbott interview; “The Deputy Secretary and Russian FM Kozyrev, October 27, 1995” Cable, State 256907, October 31, 1995; Carter and Perry, *Preventive Defense*, p. 43.


39. See Sapiro/O’Brien interview; and Sapiro, O’Brien, Ramish comments, October 31
   group interview. For the Holbrooke team’s response, see “The Wisdom of
   Holbrooke,” O’Brien computer e-mail, October 18, 1995; “Official-Informal,”
   Cable, State 245826, October 17, 1995.
40. Slocombe interview; Sapiro/O’Brien interview; Kornblum interview, July 26,
   1996.
41. Berger interview.
42. See “Memo for the Record: Notes from briefing of IFOR preliminary planning
   to Sec. Christopher,” no author, October 13, 1995, D files.
43. Holbrooke, To End a War, pp. 215–216; Daalder, Getting to Dayton, pp. 145–146.
44. See “Summary of Conclusions for October 18 Deputies Committee on Bosnia,”
   NSC memorandum, October 26, 1995; NSC memorandum, “Revised List
   IFOR/Unresolved Issues (draft),” drafted by John Feeley, no date; JCS
   “Information Paper” on Bosnia, October 20, 1995, drafted by John Roberti; and
   State paper, attached to memorandum to Talbott from Kornblum, “Deputies
45. See “Summary of Conclusion for October 20 Meeting of the Deputies
   Committee,” NSC memorandum, November 3, 1995; Memorandum to Talbott
   from Kornblum, “Deputies Committee Meeting, October 24, 1995,” October
   23, 1995; and “Summary of Conclusions for October 24 Meeting of the NSC
   Deputies Committee,” NSC memorandum, November 2, 1995.
46. See Memorandum for Principals from Sandy Berger, “IFOR Issues,” October 24,
   1995.
47. See “Summary of Conclusions for October 25 Meeting of the NSC Principals
   Committee,” NSC Memorandum, November 9, 1995.
48. See memorandum to Secretary Perry and Slocombe from Pardew, “IFOR Issues
49. See “Summary of Conclusions for October 27 Principals Committee Meeting
   on Bosnia”; Berger interview; Holbrooke, To End a War, p. 211; Daalder,
   Getting to Dayton, pp. 149–153.
50. Clark, Waging Modern War, pp. 58–59; Holbrooke To End a War, p. 223.
51. See “Summary of Conclusions for October 27 Principals Committee Meeting
   on Bosnia”; Berger interview; Holbrooke, To End a War, p. 211; Daalder, Getting
   to Dayton, pp. 149–153.
52. See Letter from Milosevic to Christopher, October 19, 1995.
53. See Kornblum to Christopher, “Principals Committee Meeting, October 27,
   1995,” October 26, 1995; and attached “Sanctions Relief Talking Points.”
54. See Albright interview; Fuerth interview.
55. See “Reimposition Mechanisms,” State Department paper drafted by E. Bloom
   (L), October 26, 1995; “Options for Suspension of Sanctions on Serbia-
   Montenegro,” State Department Sanctions Task Force paper drafted by Angel
   Rabasa (no date), and “Sanctions Relief,” NSC memorandum, October 24, 1995.
56. See Vershbow interview, December 17, 1996; “Summary of Conclusions” from
   October 27 PC; Elaine Sciolino, “Administration Rejects Call to Lift Serbia
57. See memorandum to Christopher from Holbrooke, “Bosnia Off-Site:
   An Annotated Agenda,” October 24, 1995. See also Gallucci interview;
   Vershbow interview, December 17, 1996; John Price interview.
58. Vershbow interview, December 17, 1996.
59. See Menzies interview; and “EU Prepared to Help Bosnians on Constitution,”
   Cable, Brussels 10438, October 6, 1995.
60. Holbrooke interview with author (notes), November 26, 1996; Holbrooke, *To End a War*, p. 224.
64. For details, see Pardew interview, June 26, 1996; Kornblum interviews; Sapiro/O’Brien interview; Hoh, Goldberg, O’Brien comments, October 31, 1996 interview; Vershbow interview, December 17, 1996; Bildt interview; and Bildt, *Peace Journey*, p. 118.

**8 A SLOW START: DAYTON, NOVEMBER 1–10**

1. This draft was in the hands of John Price of the State Department’s European Bureau, who was the “backstop” for the talks from Washington. He would receive periodic updates to the annexes by phone, and annotate the changes on his copy. See Price interview.
2. See Christopher interview, October 22, 1996.
3. As further evidence of Dayton’s autonomy, the State Department arranged for the facility to be able to receive and send classified cables to Washington or embassy posts abroad. A new locator line was created temporarily for such cable traffic—“U.S. Office Proximity Talks.”
7. See memorandum to Christopher from John Kornblum, “Your Meeting with Croatian President Tudjman at the Proximity Talks, Wright-Patterson AFB, November 1, 1995,” October 31, 1995.
8. See talking points, “Meeting with Tudjman,” Pardew notebook from Dayton, no date.
10. See memorandum to Christopher from Kornblum, “Your Meeting with Serbian President Milosevic at the Proximity Talks, Wright-Patterson AFB, November 1, 1995,” October 31, 1995; and “Bosnian Serbs Lay Down Markers For Dayton,” Cable, Belgrade 5331, October 27, 1995.
14. See memorandum to Christopher from Kornblum, “Your Meeting with Bosnian President Izetbegovic at the Proximity Peace Talks, Wright Patterson AFB, November 1, 1995,” October 31, 1995; also see Sarajevo 733.
15. Holbrooke interview with author (notes), December 20, 1996.
17. See memorandum and talking points to Christopher from Kornblum, “Your Meeting with Contact Group Representatives at the Proximity Talks, Wright-Patterson AFB, November 1, 1995,” October 31, 1995.
18. Christopher interview, October 22, 1996.
22. See Kerrick to Lake, “Dayton SITREP #1, November 2, 1995, 9:00pm.”
24. See Shattuck interview; Galbraith Diplomatic Diary, p. 78.
26. See Galbraith Diplomatic Diary, pp. 78–79; and Galbraith interview, October 2, 1996.
27. Holbrooke interview with author (notes), December 20, 1996; Hill interview with author (notes), December 5, 1996.
28. Holbrooke comment; Dayton History Seminar.
29. See Kerrick SITREP #1; Pardew November 2 report to Perry.
33. See Kerrick notes and “November 3 Dayton Update.”
35. Kerrick to Lake, “Dayton SITREP #2.”
37. See Kerrick SITREP #2; Menzies interview; “Pale Rejects U.S. Terms For Attending Meeting Re Journalist David Rohde,” Cable, Sarajevo 745, November 4, 1995; Holbrooke, _To End a War_, pp. 246–247.

38. See Kerrick notes, November 5, 1995; “Agreed Principles on Sarajevo,” November 6, 1995 draft, Pardew Dayton notebook.

39. Chris Hill interview with author (notes), December 19, 1996; Chris Hoh comments to author, passim.

40. Details of this discussion from Pardew report to Perry, “Dayton Talks—Implementation Forces in Croatia/Map,” November 5, 1995; Holbrooke interview with author (notes), December 20, 1996.


43. See “A Grain-for-Oil Swap,” memorandum drafted by Leon Feurth, November 5, 1995 (faxed to Dayton on November 6); and Kerrick to Talbott, November 7, 1995.

44. See Kerrick notes, November 6, 1995; and “Sanctions Update,” paper prepared by Chris Hoh, November 6, 1995, 2:00 P.M.


46. See Kerrick to Talbott, November 7, 1995; Talbott personal notes, November 10, 1995; Talbott interview; Kerrick interview; and Holbrooke interview with author (notes), December 20, 1996.


49. See Kerrick report to Lake, “Dayton SITREP #3; November 7, 1995, 9:00am,” and unidentified notes, no date, attached to Kerrick report to Talbott, November 7, 1995.

50. Kerrick SITREP #3; Bildt interview.

51. During his visit to Dayton the previous day, Talbott had urged Holbrooke to provide Washington with a one-page report each night. See Kerrick SITREP #4; November 4, 1995, 1:00 A.M.

52. See Holbrooke report to Principals and Deputies, “Dayton Update: Tuesday, November 7, 1995, 11:50pm”; and Kerrick SITREP’s #3 and #4.


57. Review from Holbrooke report, November 7, 1995; Holbrooke interview with author (notes), December 20, 1996; Holbrooke, To End a War, pp. 251–252; Bildt, Peace Journey, pp. 132–133.

58. See “Arrest Case of Christian Science Monitor Journalist David Rohde; Consular Visit In Bijelina,” Cable, Sarajevo 751, November 6, 1995.


61. See Holbrooke report to Principals and Deputies, “Dayton Update: Wednesday, November 8, 1995, 10:00pm.”


63. Holbrooke interview with author (notes), December 20, 1996; Holbrooke report, November 8, 1995; Kerrick notes, November 8, 1995; Kerrick report to Lake, “Dayton SITREP #5, November 9, 1995, 2:00am,” and Holbrooke, To End a War, p. 255.

64. See, respectively, Pardew report to Perry, November 8, 1995; Holbrooke report, November 8, 1995; and Kerrick SITREP #4.


68. See Kornblum interview, July 26, 1996; Pardew interview, June 27, 1996.

69. See Kerrick SITREP #6; Clark, Waging Modern War, pp. 62–63.


73. See Kerrick notes, November 9, 1995; Kerrick SITREP #6; Holbrooke, To End a War, p. 259.

74. Kerrick SITREP #6; Holbrooke, To End a War, p. 259–260.

75. See Christopher’s talking points, “Points for Tudjman,” Pardew Dayton Notebook; and Kerrick report to Lake, “Dayton SITREP #7; November 11, 1995, 9:10am.”
76. Kerrick SITREP #7.
77. See Christopher's talking points, “Points for Izetbegovic,” Pardew Dayton Notebook; Holbrooke interview with author (notes), December 20, 1996; Holbrooke, To End a War, p. 261.
79. See Christopher interview, October 22, 1996; Hill interview with author (notes), December 5, 1996; Holbrooke interview with author (notes), December 20, 1996; Holbrooke, To End a War, pp. 264–265.
80. Kerrick SITREP #7; Christopher, Chances of a Lifetime, pp. 261–262; Holbrooke, To End a War, p. 266.

9 Endgame: Dayton, November 11–21

1. Kerrick SITREP #7.
4. See Neville-Jones, “Dayton, IFOR, and Alliance Relations in Bosnia,” p. 48; Bildt interview.
5. Gallucci interview, October 2, 1996.
7. See Holbrooke interview with author (notes), November 26, 1996; Kornblum/Owen interview, June 18, 1996; Kornblum interview, July 26, 1996; Zetkulic interview, July 19, 1996; Gallucci interview; Bildt interview; Holbrooke, To End a War, p. 265; Bildt, Peace Journey, p. 147.
10. Holbrooke and Hill comments, Dayton History Seminar; Menzies interview; Holbrooke interview with author (notes), November 26, 1996; Holbrooke, To End a War, pp. 271–272.
11. See memorandum to Christopher from Holbrooke; and Kerrick report to Lake, “Dayton SITREP #9, November 14, 1995, 1:10am.”
12. Kerrick SITREP#9; and Holbrooke, To End a War, pp. 272–273.
15. Pardew interview, June 27, 1996; Holbrooke interview with author (notes), October 19, 1996; Slocombe interview; Holbrooke, To End a War, pp. 270–271.


18. Ibid. For a similar assessment, also see Kerrick report to Lake, “Dayton SITREP #10; November 14, 1995, 11:10pm.”


20. Christopher to Clinton, “Night Note.”

21. Christopher to Clinton, “Night Note”; Christopher interview, October 22, 1996; Holbrooke, To End a War, pp. 274–275; Bildt interview.


23. See Christopher to Clinton, “Night Note.”


26. See “Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, November 16, 1995 (misdated: November 15, 1995)” NSC memorandum, November 18, 1995; Holbrooke, To End a War, p. 278.

27. See Gallucci interview.


29. Menzies interview; Holbrooke interview, November 18, 1996.


31. See Holbrooke interview, November 18, 1996; Hill phone interview with author (notes), December 5, 1996; Holbrooke, To End a War, p. 280.

32. See Menzies interview; Holbrooke, Hill, Pauli comments, Dayton History Seminar; Holbrooke, To End a War, pp. 280–281.


36. Talbott memo to Berger, November 12, 1995; Talbott personal files.


38. See Holbrooke to Christopher, November 17, 1995; Holbrooke interview with author (notes), December 20, 1996.

41. See Pardew report to Perry, November 16, 1995.
44. See Holbrooke to Christopher, November 17, 1995; Kerrick SITREP #13; and Holbrooke interview with author (notes), December 20, 1996.
49. Holbrooke comment, Dayton History Seminar; Holbrooke, *To End a War*, p. 293.
52. Chris Hill phone interview with author (notes), December 5, 1996.
54. See Tom Malinowski interview, October 30, 1996; and draft failure statement, no date (John Burley EUR/SCE files; Malinowski PA/S files; COS files); Holbrooke, *To End a War*, p. 298; Christopher, *In the Stream of History*, p. 356.
55. Holbrooke interview with author (notes), December 20, 1996; Christopher interview, October 22, 1996.
56. For details, see Holbrooke, Hill comments, Dayton History Seminar; Christopher interview, October 22, 1996; Hill interview, December 5, 1996; Holbrooke, *To End a War*, p. 300; Christopher, *Chances of a Lifetime*, p. 264.
58. See Christopher interview, October 22, 1995; Vershbow interview, December 17, 1996; Holbrooke interview with author (notes), December 20, 1996.
61. See Rosemarie Pauli notes, Dayton notebook 3; Christopher interview, October 30, 1996; Vershbow interview, December 17, 1996; and Holbrooke, *To End a War*, p. 304.

64. Holbrooke interview with author (notes), December 20, 1996; Holbrooke, *To End a War*, p. 305.

65. See draft “failure” statement, PA Malinowski files; for interim agreement, see “Draft Closure Statement,” Pardew Dayton notebook.

66. See Christopher interview, October 22, 1996; Holbrooke, Hill comments, Dayton History Seminar; and Holbrooke, *To End a War*, p. 305.


68. Christopher interview, October 22, 1996; and Christopher, *Chances of a Lifetime*, p. 266.

69. Holbrooke comment, Dayton History Seminar; Christopher interview October 22, 1996; Holbrooke, *To End a War*, pp. 307–308.

70. Christopher interview, October 22, 1996; Holbrooke comment, Dayton History Seminar; and Kornblum/Owen interview.


72. In 1999, Brcko was made into a special political district, with an appointed local government and an American supervisor with broad powers.


74. Holbrooke comment, Dayton History Seminar; Christopher interview October 22, 1996.


76. Christopher interview, October 22, 1995.


**EPILOGUE**

1. For example, Ivo Daalder gives his own five reasons for the Administration’s decision to engage: the prospect of UNPROFOR’s collapse; the threat to NATO; the possibility of U.S. troops entering Bosnia; congressional efforts to lift the arms embargo; and the political pressures around the upcoming 1996 presidential campaign. See Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, pp. 162–166.


3. Daalder explains that the Croatian offensive, Milosevic’s decision to speak for the Bosnian Serbs, and NATO’s air campaign changed the “strategic landscape” to make Dayton possible, yet he underemphasizes the extent to which the Americans manipulated these factors to their advantage. See Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, pp. 119–134.


7. See Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, pp. 120–127.
12. Ibid.
22. Pardew report, October 19, 1995; Belgrade 5122; and Belgrade 5030. For Holbrooke asking for the CIA document, see Holbrooke, *To End a War*, p. 212; and Bass, *Stay the Hand of Vengeance*, p. 236.
28. Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, p. 188.
Sources

Unless otherwise specified, all of the U.S. government documents cited in this book were collected and organized in 1996 by a special State Department initiative to create an archive of records concerning the Bosnia peace process. This collection includes, for example, all cables from the State Department’s central records management system concerning Bosnia and the Dayton negotiations; all relevant files from the State Department’s European Bureau (including internal e-mail and computer databases); Operations Center “Watch Reports” and telephone logs; “out-of-system” documents; State Department intelligence (INR) reports; and personal notes and memoranda of numerous senior officials. It also includes any records from other government agencies, such as the National Security Council, Department of Defense, or CIA, that were sent to the State Department originally (for example, the NSC’s “Summary of Conclusions” from Deputies or Principals Committee Meetings) or provided by individuals specifically for the archive (such as Jim Pardew’s memoranda to Secretary of Defense William Perry, or Ambassador Peter Galbraith’s daily “Diplomatic Diary”). While this archive regrettably remains unavailable to the public, the endnotes can be used to request documents through the Freedom of Information Act—a process that, working with Tom Blanton and Malcolm Byrne at the National Security Archive, I have initiated. And my hope is that the archive’s entire contents will be available soon so that it can become an invaluable resource for all scholars of this critical period in U.S. diplomatic history.

In addition to this substantial documentary collection—which fills more than ten file-drawers—this book includes information and insights from nearly 60 hours of interviews with over 40 officials involved in the negotiations. Most of these original interviews have been transcribed and are stored in this special archive, and they too are cited in the endnotes. Such interviews—most of which were conducted less than a year after the Dayton peace process—enabled me to bring the documents to life, identifying ones of particular importance and placing them in the context with which they were used or read. Notable among these interviews is a day-long, video-taped “Dayton History Seminar” held at the Foreign Service Institute on June 26, 1996, in which the core shuttle team—Clark, Hill, Holbrooke, Kerrick, Owen, Pardew, and Rosemarie Pauli—joined several other State Department officials to discuss the events leading to Dayton.

These original records have been supplemented by my recent interviews with Sandy Berger, Carl Bildt, General George Joulwan (retired), Anthony Lake, and Walter Slocombe, as well as the many hours I have spent discussing these events and issues informally with several participants, including Warren Christopher, Richard Holbrooke, Strobe Talbott, Chris Hill, Jim O’Brien, Peter Bass, and Phil Goldberg. I have also relied upon many public sources, such as newspaper accounts, memoirs by many of the key American and European participants—especially Madeleine Albright, Carl Bildt, Warren Christopher, General Wesley Clark, President Bill Clinton, Richard Holbrooke, Anthony Lake, William Perry, and Strobe Talbott—and other histories and analyses of the events described here. What follows are those that I found particularly useful.
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