Notes

Preface

1. For an excellent discussion of why cultures qua cultures ought not to be treated as indivisible wholes, see Michele Moody-Adams, *Fieldwork in Familiar Places: Morality, Culture and Philosophy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997) 41, 43, 78, 80, 209–211.


Chapter 1

1. For a magisterial work in moral psychology on the virtues of getting along see Jonathan Haidt, *The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2012). Haidt’s study deals with the origins of morality. But it is more than that. His primary goal, he states, is that his study will make conversations about morality, politics and religion more common, more civil and more fun. About his research he writes: “My hope is that it will help us to get along,” xii. The book is ultimately about why it is hard for us, meaning human beings, to get along. Haidt’s very needed goal is not necessarily the opposite of mine. His starting point, though, is. His is a study of the origins of disagreements: primarily because moral intuitions arise automatically and almost instantaneously, long before moral reasoning has had a chance to get started. The intuitions drive the reasoning, which only comes later. My work should therefore be seen as one among many processes of moral reasoning at work.

2. In *Just Love: Transforming Civic Virtue*, Anne Mongoven rigorously provides the reasoning for how transcending impartiality and mere tolerance and embracing an ethic of “disciplined vulnerability” can allow us to maintain civic cohesion even in the midst of moral adversity. See Anne Mongoven, *Just Love: Transforming Civic Virtue* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009).
3. David Kelly, *The Evidence of the Senses: A Realist Theory of Perception* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1986). See in particular Chapter 7, “Perceptual Judgments.” Kelly, while not explicitly addressing competing moral dilemmas, gives us the epistemological means for adjudicating among such dilemmas. We learn how to evaluate moral conflicts according to objective criteria that take into consideration such factors as intentions, consistency of behavior, consequences of moral harms done and the differences between errors of evasion and errors of knowledge.


5. For a thorough theoretical explication of the development of a radical and strong cosmopolitan theory of the self, of culture and of a cosmopolitan posthumanity capable of shedding light on contentious contemporary and historical moral and political problems, see Jason D. Dill, *Beyond Blood Identities: Post-Humanity in the 21st Century* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009); Jason D. Hill, *Becoming a Cosmopolitan: What It Means to Be a Human Being in the New Millennium* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishing Group, 2000). Hill articulates a theory both of the self and of human authenticity as well as the outlines of a strong cosmopolitan moral personality. Martha Nussbaum while concerned with the moral antecedents and historical trajectories of cosmopolitanism offers solid discussions of the cosmopolitan identity in Martha Nussbaum, *For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1996). In *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation*, edited by Phen Cheah and Bruce Robins (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1998). The contributors apply what we have come to understand as political cosmopolitanism to specific empirical problems in the contemporary world such as nationalism, justice and loyalty, flexible citizenship and Chinese identity, the borders of Europe and applying universal cosmopolitanism to local cultures and “local problems.” Also see Robert. J. Holton, *Cosmopolitanism: New Thinking and New Directions* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). Holton offers an exhaustive account of cross-cultural approaches to cosmopolitanism(s)—he locates the theory within complex sociological domains of pluralistic accounts that span broad swathes of legalistic and historical sociological accounts of this contested term. Holton is critical of cosmopolitans in their universalistic attempts to span multiple empirical and disciplinary boundaries by employing the term ‘cosmopolitanism’ to solving the sociological conundrums of contemporary life. The positions adopted by Hill and Nussbaum, who are universal cosmopolitans, stand in stark contrast to this more piecemeal approach in addressing the seemingly often irreconcilable tensions between the disciplinary and empirical foundations of these problems. Holton often seems to conflate globalization within strands of cosmopolitanism. Ulrich Beck in his *Cosmopolitan Vision* (London: Polity
Press, 2009) seems also guilty of analytically and conceptually conflating processes of globalization with cosmopolitanism. Beck, though, like strong or radical cosmopolitans seems committed to the idea that cosmopolitanism can only be a coherent and politically efficacious doctrine if it confronts basic issues of social inequality.


7. For two classic texts on the history of cosmopolitanism in Western political and moral thought see Derek Heater, World Citizenship and Government: Cosmopolitan Ideas in the History of Western Political Thought (London: MacMillan Press, LTD, 1996); and Thomas J. Schlereth, The Cosmopolitan Ideal in Enlightenment Thought: Its Form and Function in the Ideas of Franklin, Hume and Voltaire, 1694–1790 (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977). These texts, in this writer’s view, achieve both interpretational and exegetical excellence in unpacking the cosmopolitan ideas we find, for example, in the birth of modern science and science’s openness to all persons regardless of ethnic or national or racial background to the new and exciting formulations of scientific paradigms. In this way, readers are allowed to witness the unprecedented nature of human scientific and moral thought that is cosmopolitan in nature because their universalistic underpinnings have never discriminated on morally neutral and irrelevant arbitrary criteria like race and ethnic identity formation.

8. For a subtle and compelling distinction between cosmopolitanism, pluralism and multiculturalism, see Timothy C. Earle and George T. Cvetkovich, Social Trust: Towards a Cosmopolitan Society (West Point, CT: Praeger, 1996), 102. They write: “To contribute usefully to the solution of social problems, however, we have to learn how to move from pluralistic social trust, with its rigid, defensive solitudes, toward cosmopolitan social trust, with its fluid, inclusive interweaving. We have to learn how to move into futures that we can’t describe because we have liberated them from the ties to our pasts,” 102. Also see David Hollinger, “Post Ethnic America,” Contention 2, no. 1 (Fall 1982):83. Hollinger notes that cosmopolitanism is against the idea that identity is unegotiable in the strong sense—unlike pluralism and multiculturalism. Hollinger writes that cosmopolitanism is based on recognition, acceptance and eager exploration of diversity. Cosmopolitanism urges each polity and each individual to absorb as much experience as it can while retaining its capacity to function as a unit. Cosmopolitanism is to assist in the creation of new affiliations and is more oriented toward the individual, whom it is likely to understand as a member of different communities simultaneously. It is suspicious of the potential for conformist pressures within communities celebrated by pluralists. Although pluralism might defend varied ways of life and an environment in which a multiplicity of cross-cultural groups can coexist, it is still suspicious of the ways in which any cross-cultural value pollination may upset group identity. It is, above all, intent on preserving the demarcations of group identities., Earle and Cvetkovich have even gone as far as to say that pluralism
stands in contrast to cosmopolitanism because pluralism favors the maintenance of rigid, tight group identities. It supports tight and separate communities and a unitary self within traditional cultural limits.

9. For a thorough discussion and defense of strong laissez-faire, unmediated cosmopolitanism, see Hill, *Becoming a Cosmopolitan and Beyond Blood Identities*. See in particular Chapter 5 of *Beyond Blood Identities*, “Theorizing Post-Humanity.”


13. Ibid., 69–75.


16. Recent debates recovering the moral and epistemological grammar of foundationalism are making inroads once more in analytic philosophy. A phalanx of thinkers such as Alvin Plantinga, Richard Fumerton and John L. Pollock have argued for the epistemic coherence of this well-established tradition. For an audacious and philosophically rigorous attempt to reestablish the principles and coherence of foundationalism, see *Resurrecting Old-Fashioned Foundationalism* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000) ed. Michael De Paul.

Chapter 2


2. For a thoroughgoing discussion of values that ultimately have their foundation in Aristotelian metaphysics and ethics see Tara Smith, *Ayn Rand’s Normative Ethics: The Virtuous Egoist* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2006). For the specific connection of Rand’s Aristotelian heritage see pages 50–52. See also chapters 1 and 2. For a concise connection between values and human well-being in the Aristotelian sense, see also Ayn Rand, *The Virtue of Selfishness: A New Concept of Egoism* (New York: New American Library, 1964), 1–34.

3. See Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics* (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1999). Translated by Terence Irwin. My account of values is deeply influenced by the account of the virtues as the supreme value in life offered by Aristotle.
4. See Naomi Zack, *The Ethics and Mores of Race: Equality After the History of Philosophy* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2011). Zack analytically distinguishes among mores, morals and norms. She is careful to point out the elision that occurs when careful attention is not paid to the distinctions among these seemingly synonymous concepts.

5. This egoistic conception of friendship is one we find in Books VIII–X of *The Nicomachean Ethics*.


8. Kayley Vernallis argues that since bisexuality is a sexual orientation in which a person finds meaningful relationships and experiences deep quality of life with individuals of both sexes then bisexual marriage involving two female bisexuals and two male bisexuals is a tenable state of affairs. She argues that if two central ideals of marriage are to allow the full expression of the sexuality of the spouses and to also encourage sexual fidelity then foursome marriages should be an option. Furthermore, she argues that neither opposite-sex marriage rights nor same-sex marriage rights guarantee the equal treatment of gender-specific bisexuals who desire to maintain concurrent relationships with both sexes or genders. See Kayley Vernallis, “Bisexual Marriage,” in *The Philosophy of Sex*, ed. Nicholas Power, Raja Halwani and Alan Soble (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2013), 215–232.

**Chapter 3**


2. Thomas Nagel has made an interesting argument in his essay “Sexual Perversion,” that the absence of reciprocal arousal is one criterion of sexual perversion. Sexual perversions are deviations from what he calls “interpersonal reciprocity.” Where there is no reciprocal arousal between oneself and another there is an arrestation of development of sex to higher levels—such is the case of sex with animals, children and inert objects. When one partner can never derive a sense of self-enhancement by sexual interaction with the other we witness the instantiation of a perversion. See Thomas Nagel, “Sexual Perversion,” in *Philosophy and Sex*, ed.
Robert B. Baker and Kathleen Wininger (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2009), 256–267. I draw the analogy only to show that in a society where reciprocal emotional and nonsexual arousal interest is denied one that it resembles a perverted social space because it sabotages the potential for civil, warm and ordinary human exchanges.

3. Jean-Paul Paul Sartre, “Existentialism Is a Humanism,” in Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: New American Library, 1975), 348. Grounding the constitutionality of humaneness in a paradigmatic ontology of indeterminacy and contingency, Sartre argues that the choices that we make have normative import to them. Lacking the imprimatur of metaphysical absolutism human reality is really social reality. Sartre does not deny a biological human nature but denies the idea of a metaphysical conception of human nature. Human nature is made by the choices and actions that we effect in the world. In the absence of a God to grant an a priori significance and determinate meaning to human nature, the individual makes her own nature by her freely chosen life plans, values and actions. Meanings and life purposes are heuristic and open-ended and compete with other meanings for salience in the social world. My meaning as conjured up by my commitments and actions jockey for resonance with the conscience and consciousness of others. Choices that we make, therefore, carry the weight of moral responsibility that ought to make us, according to Sartre, feel anguish. They will appeal to the sensibilities of others and make others susceptible to adopting our choices and commitments.

4. This is the position of Judith Butler who seems bent on elevating isolated incidents of mistreatment of Muslims to the level of an international catastrophe. She goes further, accusing the United States of amorphous racism that is rationalized by the claim of “self-defense.” Butler asserts that under the administration of George W. Bush every member of the US population was asked to become a “foot soldier” in Bush’s army. She claims that as a matter of policy that after the terrorist attacks by Islamic fundamentalists on September 11, 2001, that a population of Islamic peoples had become targeted by the government’s mandate to be on heightened alert. They were, in effect, rounded up, stared down, watched, hounded and monitored by a group of citizens who understood themselves as “foot soldiers” in the war against terrorism. See Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (London: Verso, 2004), 39, 77. Speaking as a social democrat, I suspect that Butler, like many who perceive themselves as possessing a great deal of social capital, is suffering from “white man’s burden,” and, like so many American intellectuals, harbors an intense dislike of the United States. I submit that no policy mandating each and every American to be a “foot soldier” in the war against terrorism exists or has ever existed. In point of fact, vigilantism was cautioned against, which is the chief reason we did not witness wholesale acts of vengeance against Muslims in the wake of the attacks—a state of affairs that would not have been reciprocated had a reversal of the scenario taken place in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Pakistan (to name but a few countries) by Christians against Muslims.

6. Mill writes: “Having said that individuality is the same thing as development, and that it is only the cultivation of individuality which produces, or can produce, well-developed human beings, I might here close the argument: for what more or better can be said of any condition of human affairs, that it brings human beings themselves nearer to the best they can be? Or what worse can be said of any obstruction to good, than that it prevents this? See John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty and Utilitarianism* (New York: Bantam Books, 1993), 73.

7. This is a position held by many Islamic feminists who argue that pious submission to God and modesty before men challenge the conventional wisdom of Western liberalism regarding female agency and well-being. See Saba Mahmood, *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005). Saba Mahmood, an anthropologist, offers an in-depth exploration and quite impressive study of the women’s mosque movement in Egypt who form part of the Islamic revival in Egypt. These groups of pious women reject emancipatory philosophies of the liberal West on the grounds that they presuppose an inner liberal subject external to the one who wears the veil and cultivates the virtues of piety and submission. They are not interested in subverting the prevailing norms or even dismantling the status quo. Self-realization and autonomy are not to be located in transgression but rather in obedience and submission to God. The veil, piety, modesty and submission are all inextricably linked. But the issue is larger than this. The focus of the book is about centering male monopoly on the teaching of Islamic doctrine and pedagogy. The women in the mosque hold public meetings and share views on Islamic teachings. The book is a good case study in a solidaristic ethos among pious Egyptian Muslim women who are more known for the deployment of a strategy vis-à-vis the construction of their pious identities that avoids the vocabularies of resistance usually associated with emancipatory movements. These women are not interested in an a priori emancipatory agenda usually associated with feminism. In point of fact, a close reading of the text renders an interpretation that is at once not surprising and startling. They seem to be less concerned with a feminist reading of “the will of God” and submission and obedience to religious norms as inimical to their agency and more attuned to showing that piety, submission and obedience are expressions of freedom in the life of a person and not at all inimical to autonomy and agency. In one sense then, their manner of navigating themselves in their male-dominated patriarchal society is reactionary: reactionary against the idea of a liberal subject deconstructing and undermining the gendered social mores and norms that transmit a message of female decorum, piety and obedience to authority. Depending on one’s political commitments these women then are no different from female Orthodox Jews who assume their rightful place in the synagogues or Christian Evangelists who adhere to a script about woman’s rightful place in the world in relation to men. On one stark reading such individuals are uncritical participants in culture. On Mahmood’s reading, though,
I think the message is that there are competing desires and aspirations and capabilities that properly qualify as candidates for female identity and agency other than those advocated by the liberal subject and the emancipatory resources associated with liberalism.

Chapter 4


6. The Ominous Parallels, 65.

7. Mary C. Waters, *Ethnic Options* remains, arguably, the best study in the genealogy of European-American identity in quite some time. What is singularly most important about this text for our purposes, however, is the psychological reaction of the majority of ethnic groups to revelations that they had mixed ancestry. The study reveals how several Americans of European extract came to think of themselves as dirt balls when they found out that they were mixed with other ethnicities that in their minds had “low prestige” value. For many, having any semblance of a “low prestige” ethnicity was sufficient to lower their self-esteem and de-stabilize their erstwhile impressions of who they thought they were. Interestingly, the case studies reveal that the more ethnic mixtures people came to realize they had, the more they viewed themselves as “dirtballs,” a mishmash of contradictions. Almost without exception, persons involved in the studies relied on a single metric of ethnic purity to bolster a positive image of themselves. Many of the individuals in the study attributed moral characteristics to ethnic identities. Some groups thought Italians were loud and vulgar; others associated being German with productivity and efficiency, while persons having Slavic identities were thought to be backward. Each ethnic group assigned to itself traits thought to be unique to the
group. Waters argues, however, that the self-signifying traits each group had about itself, such as cleanliness, hard-working, love of education and honesty were, in the end, universal middle-class values. A sense of specialness and distinctness rested on illusions about moral properties affixed to ethnic categories. See Mary C. Waters, Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America (Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990). 18, 23, 45, 66–67, 91, 131–134, 142.

8. For a detailed treatment of the moral complexities of cultures and the philosophical untenability of treating cultures like indivisible wholes, see Fieldwork in Familiar Places: Morality Culture, and Philosophy, 41, 43, 78, 80, 209–11. See also Becoming a Cosmopolitan and Beyond Blood Identities.

Chapter 5

1. There have been a spate of books attesting to this fact, most of them written by Muslim women who themselves have been victims of beatings, attempted murder and, in the cases of those murdered, by investigative journalists and academics who try to understand the root cause of this phenomenon. See Nicole Pope, Honor Killings in the 21st Century (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011). This far-reaching book documents the thousands of women murdered every year by close relatives for allegedly violating religious norms and social codes. The author notes its prevalence not only in Turkey and Pakistan but also in European nations. See also Unni Wikan, In Honor of Fadime: Murder and Shame (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2008). Of notable interest is a harrowing first-person account of one woman’s survival of attempted murder by family. See Rana Husseini, Murder in the Name of Honor: The True Story of One Woman’s Fight Against an Unspeakable Crime (London: One World, 2011).

2. Islamic scholar Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im writes that Sharia as a universal system of law and ethics purports to regulate every aspect of public and private life. It influences individual and collective behavior in Muslim countries through its role in the socialization process of such nations regardless of its status in their formal legal systems. It forms an integral part of the socialization of every Muslim child and is one of the primary forces behind the institutions and customs of the vast majority of Muslim societies. He notes that most Muslim countries have experienced mounting demands for the application of Sharia as the sole or at least primary legal system of the land. Such movements have either succeeded in gaining complete control, as in Iran, or achieved significant success in having aspects of Sharia introduced into the legal system, as in Pakistan and the Sudan. Governments of Muslim countries generally find it difficult to resist such demands out of fear of being condemned by their own populations as anti-Islamic. He states that it is likely that Islamic fundamentalism will achieve further success in Muslim countries. He also writes that the claim that Sharia is fully consistent with and has always protected human rights is problematic both as a theoretical and as a practical matter. He emphasizes that the concept of human rights as rights to which every human being is entitled by virtue of being a human
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being was unknown to Islamic jurisprudence or social philosophy until the last few decades and that it does not exist in Sharia. Many aspects of Sharia discriminate against women and violate their fundamental human rights, he states. To this day the institution of slavery still remains lawful under Sharia. Of particular concern to human rights is the Sharia law of apostasy. According to Sharia, a Muslim who repudiates his faith in Islam, whether directly or indirectly, is guilty of a capital offense punishable by death. He writes that this aspect of Sharia is in complete conflict with the fundamental human right of freedom of conscience and religion. The Sharia law of apostasy can be applied to restrict other human rights such as freedom of expression. A person may be liable to the death penalty for expressing views held by the authorities to contravene the official view of the tenets of Islam. The law is not just a theoretical construct but has been applied in several cases.

The other conflict between Sharia and human rights relates to the status and rights of non-Muslims. In modern terms, Muslims are the only full citizens of an Islamic state, enjoying all the rights and freedoms granted by Sharia and subject only to the limitations and restrictions imposed on women. In the same article, writing on Sharia and human rights of women, Ahmed An-Na‘îm observes that the notion of *qawama* has its origin in verse 4:34 of the Koran, which states that men have guardianship and authority over women because of the advantage the former have over the latter and because they spend their property in supporting them. According to Sharia’s interpretation of this verse men as a group are the guardians of and superior to women as a group. The notion of *qawama* has had far-reaching consequences for the status and rights of women in both the private and public domains. Here are a few examples he offers: Sharia provides that women be disqualified from holding general public office, which involves the exercise of authority over men because in keeping with verse 4:34 of the Koran, men are entitled to exercise authority over women and not the reverse.

Another principle of Sharia that has broad implication for the status and rights of Muslim women is the notion of *al-hijab*, the veil. According to Sharia’s interpretation of verses 24:31, 33:33, 33:53, and 33:59 of the Koran, women are supposed to stay at home and not leave it except when required to by urgent necessity. When they are permitted to they must do so with their bodies and faces covered. *Al-hijab* tends to reinforce women’s ability to hold public office and restrict their access to public life. They are not supposed to participate in public life, because they must not mix with men even in public places. Other ways in which women’s rights are compromised appeals to Sharia’s mandate that women are incompetent to be witnesses in serious criminal cases, regardless of their individual character and knowledge of the facts. In civil cases where a woman’s testimony is accepted, it takes two women to make a single witness. Public law discrimination against women emphasizes their inferiority at home. Notions of women’s inferiority, he writes, are deeply embedded in the character and attitudes of both women and men from early childhood. See Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘îm, “Human Rights in the Muslim World,” in *The Philosophy*

3. For an historical survey of these and other themes such as “human well-being and illiberal society,” and “personal autonomy and well-being in modern pluralistic society,” see David Conway, Classical Liberalism: The Unvanquished Ideal (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 119–132.


9. For a rich discussion on reconciling liberalism with, say, colonialism, see Uday Sing Mehta, Liberalism and Empire: A Study in 19th Century British Liberal Thought (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999).


Chapter 6

1. For a rigorous analysis of the various forms of “multiculturalisms” to be encountered as theoretical constructs and as empirical levers in the world see Susan Haack, Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate (Chicago, IL: University of
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Chicago Press, 1998). See especially Chapter 5: “Multiculturalism and Objectivity,” 137–148, Haack distinguishes among social multiculturalism, pluralistic educational multiculturalism, particularistic educational multiculturalism, and philosophical multiculturalism. Social multiculturalism refers to the idea that the majority culture in a society ought not to impose unnecessarily on the sensibilities of minority culture(s); pluralistic educational multiculturalism refers to the idea that it is desirable for students to know something about cultures of others with whom they live; particularistic educational multiculturalism basically holds that students from minority groups in societies should be educated in their own culture—the strong form holds that students should be educated exclusively in their own culture; philosophical multiculturalism defends the tenet that the dominant culture should not be privileged——this is often expressed as the claim that “Western culture” should not be privileged. Haack notes that strong particularistic educational multiculturalism is wrong-headed not only in its presupposition that raising students’ self-esteem is a proximal goal of education but, more fundamentally, in its failure to acknowledge that a sense of self-worth is likely to be better founded on mastery of some difficult discipline than ethnic boosterism, and that students can be inspired to achievement by example of people of very difficult backgrounds from their own. As an example she cites W. E. B. Du Bois who testified to such a claim by reference to his education in the classics of European literature, 140.

2. For a reasonably different perspective on the normative aspirations of multiculturalism see Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).


8. Ibid., 141.

9. Ibid., 141–142.

10. Ibid., 144.

11. Ibid., 141.

12. Ibid., 144–145

13. Ibid., 146.

14. Ibid., 146.

15. In order not to appear to be contradicting myself about a statement made earlier about gay liberation not being a branch of identity politics I will need to make the
following point. When I speak of gay liberation I am speaking primarily of grassroots movements and the works of political activists and policymakers outside the academy. Queer studies practiced as an academic discipline is markedly different from the political and moral movements that came to be known as gay liberation. Gay liberation was anything but driven by a multicultural politics. Like the civil rights movement, it appealed and drew progressives from all strands of life, people who were first and foremost concerned with issues of justice and equality under the law for all.


21. The preceding five pages represent a partial treatment of the original statement of a version of posthuman cosmopolitanism developed in *Beyond Blood Identities*. See Chapter 5 of *Beyond Blood Identities* for particular reference.
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