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Preface


4. Defined as a ‘contraction of “global” and “local”,’ which ‘refers to the increasing entanglement of these two spheres’ – Mooney and Evans (2007).


1 Unpacking Intelligence and Liaison: Understanding basics, drivers and underlying mechanisms


4. MASINT is intelligence from ‘sensors that measure seismic, acoustic, chemical and biological signatures’, that is those emissions related to WMD (Dupont, 2003, p. 18; Richelson, 2001).


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31. Also a non-attributable source.


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34. ‘Friends like these’, JFR, 21 August 2003.


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3 Overview: From intelligence to globalized intelligence during an era of terror, crises, and organized crime


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89. See also ‘Liaison and Cooperation’ in CSIS, ‘Counter-Terrorism’, Backgrounder Series, 8, August 2002, p. 11.

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34. See also B. Hoffman, ‘We Can’t Win If We Don’t Know the Enemy’, *WP*, 25 March 2007.
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