NOTES

INTRODUCTION: COOL HEADS AND WARM HEARTS

2. Ibid., 155–156.
3. Ibid., 323–346.
4. Ibid., 324.
6. Most recently, Jennifer Ruth’s Novel Professions argues that “the novel attempted to ‘theorize’ the professional, trying to do what nonfiction failed to do” (4). Jennifer Cognard-Black’s illuminating study on Narrative in the Professional Age looks to the final third of the century for articulations of professional self-construction in women writers. Her analysis of the public and private writing of three women writers in the 1870s and after explores their negotiation of professional tropes to create a space for a feminine professional ideal based on aesthetics, which she terms “strong femininity” (14). John Kucich, in Power of Lies, has considered relations between professionals and the antibourgeois in Anthony Trollope and Wilkie Collins. Bruce Robbins’s well-known work on Bleak House (“Telescopic Philanthropy”) and Lauren M. E. Goodlad’s recent work on Dickens in Victorian Literature have contributed to our understanding of professional issues in Victorian fiction, as has Monica Cohen’s Professional Domesticity in the Victorian Novel. Nicholas Dames, in “Trollope and the Career,” examines professional issues in Trollope’s Palliser novels. Robert Butterworth, “Professional Adrift,” and Antonia Losano, “Professionalization of the Woman Artist,” have done the same for Anne Brontë’s fiction. See also
Laura Fasick, *Professional Men and Domesticity in the Mid-Victorian Novel.*

7. Duman, “Creation and Diffusion of a Professional Ideology,” 120. See also Rosemary O’Day, “Clerical Renaissance,” which argues that the professional ideals that altered the clergy in mid-century were not reactions to developments in the secular professions. Rather, the Victorian clergy’s recourse to early modern paradigms of clerical function more likely provided the model followed by the secular professions.

8. Duman says that “the developing professional ideal . . . was promoted by writers who were by and large drawn from the professional classes” (“Creation and Diffusion of a Professional Ideology,” 127). Duman draws on Austen, Trollope, and Dickens, the last of whom he sees as an unequivocal critic of professionalism.


10. But see Goodlad’s more nuanced account of the highly contested implementation of the New Poor Law, a contest in which professional and aristocratic biases also played a major role in moderating the law’s Benthamite apparatus (*Victorian Literature*, esp. 32–36).


12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., 258.


15. Ibid., 321.


18. Ibid., esp. 57–63.


22. Haber, *Quest for Authority and Honor*, ix.


24. Haber, *Quest for Authority and Honor*, ix.


27. Ibid., 80

28. Ibid., 15, 20, 32.


30. This idea is most prominently argued in Goodlad, “Middle Class.”

31. Goodlad, *Victorian Literature*, 22. Goodlad continues, “By *worldviews* I refer to sets of beliefs that, for all their preponderance, were fluctuating and contested (rather than statically dominant), and more palpable and plain than underlying epistemological questions (however inextricable from them)” (22, emphasis in original). On the
relationship between idealism and materialism, see also Pettitt, *Patent Inventions*, esp. 8 and 12. Pettitt describes the “irreconcilable tensions” between the “stereotypes” of the author-as-romantic creator and the author-as-middle-class professional. My view differs from Pettitt’s in that I see the professional type itself as exemplifying the coexistence of the romantic and materialistic rationalities.

33. Ibid., 37.
34. Ibid., 22.
35. Ibid., 18. In stating this argument, Goodlad cites critiques of Foucault offered by Edward Said (“Foucault”); Christopher Norris (“‘What Is Enlightenment?’”); Anderson (“Temptations”); and Christopher Lane (Burdens of Intimacy). Norris tellingly notes the incapacity of genealogical methodology to handle “substantive ethical or socio-political questions” (qtd. in *Victorian Literture*, 18).
38. Ibid., 112–114.
39. Ibid., 16.
41. Priti Joshi, for example, evinces this assumption in “Edwin Chadwick’s Self-Fashioning.” Joshi’s detailed and sympathetic treatment of Chadwick’s project of constructing and justifying himself as a professional in his *Sanitary Report* regards Chadwick’s professional ambitions of scientific expertise as indistinct from his bureaucratic impulses and “entrepreneurial spirit” (366).
42. Freedman, *Professions of Taste*, 52.
44. The concept of disaggregation and competing rationalities I borrow from Poovey, *Making a Social Body*, esp. 5–15. Institutions in emergent domains always betray on some level their relative autonomy: that is, they operate according to their own rationality yet, in contradictory ways, remain subject to the rationalities of the residual domains out of which they disaggregated.
47. A notable exception is Henrika Kuklick’s “Professional Status and the Moral Order.” Kuklick acknowledges “clear disparities between professionals’ claims and the realities of social life,” but she nevertheless persuasively documents that “the professional creed of a century ago was not merely the self-serving ideology of a would-be elite” (128, 137). Although her study pertains to fin de siècle social scientists in America, Kuklick’s reconsideration of the claims of altruism reinforces my own similar consideration of the ideality that formed an important part of professional consciousness in Victorian Britain.
49. Trollope, Barchester Towers, 2:259.
50. This study, unlike some influential accounts of middle-class formation, does not find gender to be the salient category. Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall in Family Fortunes, and Nancy Armstrong in Desire and Domestic Fiction, to give two examples, maintain that the gender binary fundamentally constituted the English bourgeoisie. Armstrong’s Foucauldian thesis further argues that the novel performs the cultural work of naturalizing state surveillance as domestic management. However, in “Middle Class,” Goodlad argues that the Foucauldian treatment of gender subjectivity and surveillance oversimplifies British subject formation into the categories of male and female. Specifically, she shows that in some cases the categories of expertise, competency, and autonomy are more important social categories than gender, and that the former categories as well as the latter bear a definitive relationship to domesticity (152–157).
51. Escaping the anachronistic binary of “sameness” and “difference” feminism, Caine instead focuses on the complex relationship between Victorian feminism and various idealist strains of domestic ideology, as well as the equally ambivalent relationship between Victorian feminism and liberalism.
52. I have in mind accounts such as Julia Swindells’s Victorian Writing and Working Women and, to a lesser extent, Anne Witz’s Professions and Patriarchy.

Chapter 1 Brains More Precious than Blood, or the Professional Logic of the Young England Trilogy

1. Monypenny and Buckle, Life of Benjamin Disraeli, 1:28–29. Disraeli wrote that he did, however, hear lectures on Plato.
3. Disraeli, Vindication, 66.
5. For example, Morris Edmund Speare, in Political Novel, writes about an uncomplicated notion of “a rejuvenated aristocracy,” following Carlylean ideas of the heroic, in Disraeli’s novels (170). Michael Flavin, in Benjamin Disraeli, similarly assumes that Disraeli’s allegiances were thoroughly aristocratic in every significant way. Rosemarie Bodenheimer, in Politics of Story, is aware of the hybridity I find in Disraeli’s idealized professional/aristocratic figures: “Disraeli has to have it both ways. The genealogical satires assert that the fake aristocrats can be measured against some ‘real’ genealogy that traces an unbroken line back to a legitimate origin. At the same time Disraeli must allow for an aristocracy of talent
coming from nowhere, in order to justify his own claim to renew English politics” (173).

6. R. Blake, Disraeli, 70.
8. Ibid., 140.
12. Disraeli, Coningsby, 149. Subsequent page references to this text will be given in parentheses.
13. John Holloway, in The Victorian Sage, takes this passage as evidence that “the aristocracy which Disraeli admires is one of quality, not lineage,” and identifies the same ethos in Sybil (96).
14. Disraeli, Sybil, 65–66. Subsequent page references to this text will be given in parentheses.
15. Patrick Brantlinger first pointed out that the idea of England as two nations is proved to Sybil to be a “dangerous illusion,” and that the “diversity of the class system is a refutation of ‘the two nations theory’ ” (“Tory Radicalism,” 16–17; and Spirit of Reform, 102–103). Many other critics have followed this line, noticing that Morley’s ideas are thoroughly discredited by his dishonorable and even criminal behavior. According to Robert O’Kell’s reading, for example, Morley’s “utilitarian frame of mind” and “materialist conception of human nature” render him untrustworthy and distance him absolutely from Disraeli’s own values (“Two Nations, or One?” 226), a view that coincides with that of Daniel Schwartz (Disraeli’s Fiction, 120–121). The novel therefore ultimately insists that although England appears to be divided into two nations, the interests of rich and poor are, when rightly understood, coterminus. Gary Handwerk, “Beyond Sybil’s Veil,” gets closer to an adequately-nuanced account of Morley’s role in the book by observing that Disraeli focuses his attention on the failure of communication between the two nations, not the income disparity that fosters that failure. Parama Roy, in “Sybil,” sees a contradiction in Disraeli’s treatment of this issue: “the ‘two nations’ formula, first broached in all seriousness by Morley, and later exposed as simplistic, is finally reaffirmed by the trajectory of the plot” (69).
18. This view was probably first advanced by Monckton Milnes in his 1847 review of the trilogy (R. Blake, Disraeli, 206). See also Thom Braun, Disraeli the Novelist, 101; and Daniel Bivona, “Disraeli’s Political Trilogy,” 316–317.
19. Williams, Culture and Society, 100.
20. Sampson, “Sybil, or the Two Monarchs.”
27. Gallagher, Industrial Reformation, 212.
28. Ibid., 215.
29. Bodenheimer, in Politics of Story, argues that the novel exhibits a pattern of elaborating the past and future while skipping over the present (186–187).
30. Braun’s objection, in Disraeli the Novelist, that this impulse to violence is unconvincingly imposed on Gerard for reasons of narrative expediency, is easily overcome by looking at Gerard as a representative of the aristocratic ideal.
31. See Kristina Deffenbacher, “Designing Progress,” for analysis of the Puginesque social meanings of architecture as explored in Disraeli’s fiction.
32. See Alice Chandler’s study of Disraeli’s medievalism in Dream of Order, in which she finds marked affinities between the social philosophy of William Cobbett and Disraeli (179).
33. To a limited extent the working-class ideal corresponds with the aristocratic: “the rights of labor [are] as sacred as those of property,” as Egremont boldly tells his Parliamentary colleagues (291). But he no less boldly tells Sybil that the people can never be trusted with political power (276).
34. On Disraeli’s attitude toward the commercial middle class, see Smith, Disraeli: A Brief Life, 69–70.
35. With respect to the passages of revisionist Tory history in the novel, Susan Zlotnick, Women, Writing, and Industrial Revolution, sees Disraeli in Hatton, the exegete of the past who capitalizes on his unique ability to discern authenticity as well as to manufacture the appearance of authenticity. Bodenheimer, in Politics of Story, argues that Morley is Disraeli the politician and Hatton is Disraeli the novelist, with “talent coming from nowhere,” who “reverses the past but uses it to create the fictions of the present” (185). She notes that the illegal activities of Morley and Hatton allow Egremont to benefit from historical discontinuities without soiling his own hands. Handwerk similarly emphasizes that Morley and Hatton are ultimately and ironically “responsible for the political promise at the end of the novel, for [the] restoration of legitimacy and sympathetic openness to the British politics” (“Beyond Sybil’s Veil,” 338).
36. See Albert Pionke, “Combining the Two Nations,” for the historical sources of this scene. This oath is verbatim from the 1838 Report on Select Committee on Combinations, except for the second phrase, in which three of the Parliamentary words are found. Disraeli therefore
seems to have revised the oath to emphasize an imaginative connection between trade unions and Parliament.

37. Smith’s comment is that “the social problem is not resolved but eluded by abruptly elevating a few of the Many as a sort of payment on account,” specifically Sybil, Dandy Mick, and Devilsdust (Disraeli: A Brief Life, 73).

38. R. Blake, Disraeli, 214. See also Todd M. Endelman, ‘Hebrew to the End,’ esp. 126–127; and Frietzsche, Disraeli’s Religion.

39. Race figured prominently in the first two books of the trilogy as well, but in Tancred it becomes the central and almost exclusive determiner of value. See the discussion of race as the unifying theme in the trilogy in R. A. Levine, Benjamin Disraeli. See also Brantlinger, Rule of Darkness, 149–157. Rolf Lessenich, “Synagogue, Church, and Young England,” shows that the trilogy argues for the need of England to apprentice itself to the superior Semitic race. Also of interest is Bernard Glassman, Benjamin Disraeli, which examines Disraeli’s “fabricated” Jewishness, fabricated both by Disraeli himself and others.

40. See Brantlinger, “Disraeli and Orientalism,” for a thorough analysis of Disraeli’s self-conscious racial “self-fashioning.” See also Smith, Disraeli: A Brief Life, for a reading of the novels that emphasizes Disraeli’s strategies of self-definition (esp. 64–69, 92–93).

41. Disraeli, Tancred, 62. Subsequent page references to this text will be given in parentheses.

42. For an unironic presentation of this sentiment, see 99–101.

43. Qtd. in Monypenny and Buckle, Life of Benjamin Disraeli, 3:49.


46. Disraeli, Coningsby, 420.

47. Lord Eskdale is given this epithet frequently. See, for example, 27, 80, and 107.

48. Flavin, Benjamin Disraeli, 134.


50. Monypenny and Buckle, Life of Benjamin Disraeli, 3:55.

Chapter 2 “Manly Independence”: Autonomy in The Warden and Barchester Towers

1. See Nicholas Dames, “Trollope and the Career,” for a reading of the Palliser novels in terms of political and imperial career. See also Elsie B. Michie, “Buying Brains,” on economy and human capital in The Last Chronicle of Barset. Christopher Harvie, in Centre of Things, is the only critic I have found who discusses the early Barsetshire novels in even slightly political terms (87–88), although Joseph Ellis Baker goes so far as to say, without examining the implications of the statement,
that “Trollope’s Church . . . is a bureau of state” (Novel and the Oxford Movement, 141).
2. See Baker, Novel and the Oxford Movement, 140; and Andrew Drummond, Churches in English Fiction. As will be apparent from the following, I cannot agree with Drummond that “ecclesiastical issues” go unexamined in the novels (80).
3. Trollope, Barchester Towers, 1:46.
4. For a survey of critiques of Trollope’s political novels as insufficiently political, see John Halperin, Trollope and Politics, 5.
5. Trollope, Barchester Towers, 2:259.
6. See Bertha Keveson Hertz, “Trollope’s Racial Bias against Disraeli.” See also Michael Ragussis, Figures of Conversion, for a detailed reading of the disgust and virtual paranoia in Trollope’s Jewish novels (234–260). Trollope and Disraeli were of course competitors in the formation of the political novel, and the qualitative comparison seems irresistible to many who write about either figure. In early studies of the political novel, Disraeli received high accolades, while Trollope’s political novels were denigrated as vastly inferior to Disraeli’s. See, for example, Morris Edmund Speare, Political Novel; and H. A. L. Fisher, “Political Novel” (excerpted in R. W. Stewart, Disraeli’s Novels Reviewed, 67–71). Disraeli’s biographer Robert Blake predictably agrees with the disparagement of Trollope’s political novels in comparison with those of Disraeli (Disraeli, 217). Halperin, in contrast, writes in Trollope and Politics, “Unlike Disraeli, Trollope was a novelist, not a pamphleteer” (5). For some other parallels, see Harvie, Centre of Things, 84.
7. Trollope, New Zealander, 13. It will be apparent why I regard Halperin’s comment that “[t]his is certainly plain enough,” as shortsighted (Trollope and Politics, 14).
8. Trollope, New Zealander, 13. Trollope goes on to say that the enjoyment of hereditary status is contingent upon the performance of duty: “The aristocracy of pleasure only is quickly becoming sufficiently unaristocratic . . . . [B]e their titles what they may, they are ceasing to be in any way the rulers of the people” (17).
9. Durey, Trollope and the Church, 106.
10. Divergent readings of the novels’ implicit morality, particularly the tensions involved in the application of abstract principles to concrete situations, can be found in Ruth apRoberts, Moral Trollope; James Kincaid, “Anthony Trollope”; Shirley Robin Letwin, Gentleman in Trollope; and Jane Nardin, Trollope and Victorian Moral Philosophy. See also Ilana Blumberg, “‘Unnatural Self-Sacrifice,’ ” which analyzes how Trollope escapes a rigid binary of praiseworthy self-sacrifice and blameworthy personal benefit.
11. Bledstein, Culture of Professionalism, 92.
12. One definition of a profession is an occupation in which the cognitive activity of the practitioner is relatively high in indeterminacy and
relatively low in technicality. See Magali Sarfatti Larson, *Rise of Professionalism*, 41, for a discussion of this definition posed by H. Jamous and B. Peliolle. Technicality refers to knowledge that can be rendered as rules, and indetermination refers to knowledge that resists rule making.

15. Thomson, *Choice of a Profession*, 41. This disciplined system of public school education, however, is distinguished from the “semi-military” French *gymnase*, in which boys are “[p]ushed, crammed, overtaught, overworked, drilled, and disciplined,” yet are left “quite unable to teach themselves anything” and “entirely without self-guidance and self-control” (43). Thomson ranks this system as even less appropriate for professionals-in-training than a permissive home education or private seminary.


19. For example, in Larson’s view, the profession corporately requires individual sacrifices of professionals, such as providing reduced-rate services to the poor, in order to uphold the fiction of a service ethic, which would then help the individual practitioner and the profession in general in the long run by creating a market that has to be maintained at state expense (*Rise of Professionalism*, 58–59).

20. See, for example, Dicey, “Legal Etiquette,” 176.
24. Ibid., 190.
25. Trollope, *Barchester Towers*, 2:50. Subsequent references to this text will be given in parentheses.
27. Victoria Glendinning says that Trollope’s “lack of servility” and “marked insubordination” posed problems for him in the London Post Office (Trollope, 110). See also N. John Hall, *Trollope: A Biography*, 81–85. Of course many factors were involved in Trollope’s improved prospects in Ireland, but increased autonomy may well have been one of them.

29. Ibid., 23–24. See also Trollope, “Civil Service as a Profession,” which formed chapter 12 in the first edition of *The Three Clerks*.
32. Trollope’s 1858 novel *The Three Clerks* contains his clearest fictional statement of these opinions. The torturous exams caricatured in that novel of course do not evaluate the skills or knowledge connected to the position at stake, but that is not the worst of their evils. The unscrupulous but charming Alaric Tudor succeeds, chiefly because he is the examiner’s favorite, and senior and more worthy candidates are denied the opportunity of advancement and forced to regard him as their superior. Trollope indicates that the absurdly-administered examination process all but guarantees that the worst man will get the promotion rather than the best. Moreover, the examination contributes to enmity between colleagues and strains office relations. See Cathy Shuman’s analysis of *The Three Clerks* in *Pedagogical Economies* and Jennifer Ruth’s in *Novel Professions*.

33. My views largely accord with those of John Kucich, who describes the novels “not as a study of old-fashioned aristocratic culture but as an example of its appropriation by the middle class” (*Power of Lies*, 54). Kucich avers that “[f]rom roughly 1855 to 1865, Palmerston’s appointments transformed the clergy’s desire for independence from the state to the more pathetic goal of independence from its own bishops” (52–53). I am more interested than Kucich in distinguishing the entrepreneurial and professional strains in the “middle-class ideology” that displaces “upper-class life and institutions” in the novels and in analyzing the tensions those competing strains generate (51).

34. Goodlad, *Victorian Literature*, 137.
35. H. Perkin, *Origins of Modern English Society*, 362. See also Rosemary O’Day, “Clerical Renaissance.” O’Day argues convincingly that what I am calling the professionalization of the clergy in the nineteenth century was not a reaction to the emerging paradigms of secular professions, but rather the intensification of long-standing ideals within the clerical profession. O’Day’s argument may not be fully compatible with H. Perkin’s view of the professionalization of the clergy, but it is compatible with my reading of Trollope. I will show that Trollope’s resolution to the problem of autonomy in the clerical profession is realized in the discovery that the traditional ideals of the clergy are actually its most professional resources.

38. Thompson, *Bureaucracy and Church Reform*, 68–70.
42. Bowen in fact indicates a direct causal relationship between Wilberforce’s managerial strategy and his relative success in deflecting lay control of the Church: “This liberty was granted because the labours of prelates like Blomfield and Wilberforce persuaded statesmen like Peel and Russell that the long slumber of the Church was over, that a new sense of mission had arrived” (Ibid., 38).

43. Trollope, Warden, 21.

44. Ibid., 22.

45. Trollope, Four Lectures, 11; and Trollope, Autobiography, 78.

46. Trollope, Warden, 121. It is certainly true, as Dames has written, that the world of The Warden, in comparison to that of the Palliser novels, is characterized by stable factions inhabited by stable personalities (“Trollope and the Career,” 265–266). However, Harding’s action shows that the factions are not absolutely stable; Harding’s own exercise of autonomy in resistance to his faction is what shows him to be morally sound.

47. Not so the university reforms, which, passed in 1854 and 1856, still sting Barchester sensibilities.

48. H. Perkin, Origins of Modern English Society, 287. “Religion apart, nothing could have been more puritanical than the education of John Stuart Mill, and if labouring in one’s vocation, seriousness of mind, the exclusion of all but intellectual pleasures, the consciousness of being of the elect, compulsive preaching to potential converts, and coercion of the stubbornly unenlightened, are marks of the puritan, the Benthamites were puritans to a man” (287). See also Thompson’s description of the affinity between Evangelicalism and Benthamism in Bureaucracy and Church Reform, 15–18.

49. Trollope, Warden, 124.

50. Trollope betrays some uneasiness concerning the shift in Dr. Grantly’s characterization, prefacing his “revision” of Grantly’s character with the comment, “And here we can hardly fail to draw a comparison between the archdeacon and your new private chaplain; and despite the manifold faults of the former, one can hardly fail to make it much to his advantage” (1:230).

51. In “The Civil Service as a Profession,” Trollope observed that overbearing supervisors are usually also servile to those above them: “[O]ne meanness will accompany the other. When I see that Smith wants to make a machine of Jones, I know that Smith is a machine ready to the hands of Brown” (16).

52. Again, “The Civil Service as a Profession” sheds light on Trollope’s reasoning behind this incident. “It may be imagined that there is partiality of selection, but it is not imagined that men are selected without reference to their competence. The selector may judge badly, and may possibly have allowed himself to be influenced by his likings; but he no longer dares to throw all judgment to the winds. The clamor would be too great” (17).
53. See Nardin, *He Knew She Was Right*.
55. Ibid., 273. While I agree with Blumberg’s analysis in “‘Unnatural Self-Sacrifice’” of the unity of interests between Harding and the bedesmen, I cannot assent to her conclusion that Harding’s resignation is morally ambivalent, not to say blameworthy. Blumberg holds that his resignation, rather than being a personal sacrifice on Harding’s part, actually sacrifices the well-being of the bedesmen to Harding’s overly fastidious conscience (538). However, the “harmony” enjoyed by the bedesmen and their warden is broken not by his resignation, but by their litigation; his remaining in his post could not have restored it.

**Chapter 3 Professional Frontiers in Elizabeth Gaskell’s *My Lady Ludlow***

1. Gaskell was a friend of the Nightingale family and was well aware of Florence’s paradigm-shifting efforts to professionalize nursing, in part by idealizing it. Gaskell’s daughter Meta appears to have considered nursing as a possible career, and Gaskell encouraged her to seek proper training for it. See Gaskell, *Letters*, Letter 217, p. 320. See Kristine Swenson’s study of the relationship of Gaskell’s fiction to the Nightingale nursing campaign in *Medical Women and Victorian Fiction*.

2. Gaskell outlined this ending to her publisher, George Smith, in a letter of December 1863. She clearly preferred this ending to the rapid conclusion that was published, saying, “I think it will be a pity to cut it short,” and “I shall be sorry [to end it abruptly] for it is, at present, such a complete fragment” (*Further Letters*, 259–260).

3. Edgar Wright, “*My Lady Ludlow*,” observes that Gaskell “reveal[s] by illustration how the transition to changed social attitudes is achieved over a period of time, while recollection and explanation extend the time presented” (37). Angus Easson, in *Elizabeth Gaskell*, offers a conventional assessment of the novel’s “clash between the old aristocratic ways of Lady Ludlow and the new evangelicalism of the clergyman Mr. Gray” (214). Jenny Uglow, in *Habit of Stories*, argues that within the novel’s span “[w]e recognize a fundamental change—in [Lady Ludlow] and in the society. Nothing, and everything, has happened” (470).

discussion of Gaskell in the latter work shows the limitations of mapping a male/female binary onto a commercial/domestic binary, when the experience of the actors described obviously spanned both sides. A characteristic example is the slip between page 2, where we find that “in the nineteenth century to become a professional writer was to enter a territory implicitly defined as masculine,” and page 94, where we are told that “the terrain of professional writing may have been seen as generally feminized.” My approach instead emphasizes, with Hilary Schor, the “tension between these visions of what the Victorian novelist was to be; how she was to write; how she could read and be read by those around her” (Scheherezade in the Marketplace, 5).

5. Anderson, Powers of Distance, 35.
6. The recent spate of books on women in the publishing and periodical fields includes Hilary Fraser, Stephanie Green, and Judith Johnston, Gender and the Victorian Periodical; Alexis Easley, First-Person Anonymous; and Barbara Onslow, Women of the Press in Nineteenth-Century Britain. On women’s entrance to medicine, see Alison Bashford, Purity and Pollution; Catriona Blake, Charge of the Parasols; and Beatrice Levin, Women and Medicine. The story of women’s efforts to secure equal pay and equal access to all grades of the Civil Service is told in Hilda Martindale, Women Servants of the State 1870–1938; and in Barbara Bagilhole, Women, Work, and Equal Opportunity. Women’s progress in the legal profession is covered in Christine Alice Corcos, Portia Goes to Parliament. Notable studies historicizing women’s admission to the Anglican clergy include Sean Gill, Women and the Church of England; and Brain Heeney, Women’s Movement in the Church of England. See also Bronwyn Rivers, Women at Work in the Victorian Novel. For a rare attempt at synthesis across the professions, which remains inadequate in many ways, see Nellie Alden Franz, English Women Enter the Professions. See also Karen Michalson, Victorian Fantasy Literature, which makes the argument in passing that women first made significant inroads into professions in the colonies, where gender roles became a casualty of the increased pressure for survival and the general shortage of labor (177–185). For American women’s responses to professional ideology, see Fransceca Sawaya, Modern Women, Modern Work.

8. See, for example, Sophia Jex-Blake, Medical Women, 135; and C. R. Drysdale, “Medicine as a Profession for Women,” 4.
10. Ibid., 18.
11. Ibid., 94.
12. Jex-Blake, Medical Women, 93, emphasis in original.
14. C. Blake, Charge of the Parasols, 141; and Swenson, Medical Women and Victorian Fiction, 88.
15. John Sharps, in *Mrs. Gaskell’s Observation and Invention*, is very critical of what he perceives to be the structural flaws and disorganization of the novel: “The chief and most obvious structural fault is the long digression, told by Lady Ludlow for the flimsiest of reasons, which occupies nearly a third of the work. This tale within a tale . . . has every appearance of having been included solely to draw out the weekly numbers” (276). Arthur Pollard, in *Mrs. Gaskell*, similarly complained of the novel’s haphazard structure: “My Lady Ludlow would not suffer for the excision of the whole of the Créquy incident in revolutionary Paris” (178).

16. See E. Wright, “My Lady Ludlow”; and Elizabeth Leaver, “What Will This World Come to?” Christine Krueger, “‘Female Paternalist’ as Historian,” offers a feminist defense of the novel’s unusual structure, finding that the text’s representation of a “female paternalist” uses heterogeneous narrators and narratives to “examine the narratives’ varied genealogies and to multiply the forms of resistance to hegemonic historical discourse” (166). See also Krueger’s expanded argument about Gaskell’s social discourse in *Reader’s Repentance*, 157–233. Other feminist readings of *My Lady Ludlow* are offered by Ruth McDowell Cook, “Women’s Work”; Shirley Foster, *Elizabeth Gaskell: A Literary Life*; and Aina Rubenius, *Woman Question*. My own reading will suggest a thematic intention for the nested narratives that comprise the book; namely, I will show that the stories told by Lady Ludlow and Miss Galindo, and later renarrated by Margaret Dawson to Miss Greatorex, comprise a pre-professional variety of female storytelling that informs Miss Greatorex’s presumed arrival at professional status. Thus while the de Créquy narrative is not an explicit part of my argument, I do see its inclusion as germane to Gaskell’s commentary on women and professionalism.

17. For example, in her introduction Charlotte Mitchell cites “the shift of power from the landed to the manufacturing interest” (xx), in spite of the fact that manufacturing interests are rarely and obliquely referred to in the novel.

18. Gaskell, *Round the Sofa*, 277. Subsequent references to this text will be given parenthetically.

19. See Terence Wright’s discussion of the “gracious accommodating love which my lady stands for” (*Elizabeth Gaskell “We Are Not Angels,”* 124).

20. One overeducated young girl is dismissed with the injunction to “beware of French principles, which had led the French to cut off their king’s and queen’s heads” (152).

21. This attitude is explained by the fact that she has been a longtime widow, and more so by the fact that she was her father’s only child and he consequently “had given her a training which was thought unusual in those days” (262).
22. Probably because of this eccentricity Miss Galindo has been dismissed by some critics as an unsavory portrait of a working woman that “almost betrays the cause as it is so much of a caricature to rob the subject of much of its seriousness” (P. Beer, Reader, I Married Him, 170). Most critics have been more laudatory of Miss Galindo. Notably, Cook, “Women’s Work,” emphasizes the nurturing ethic that pervades Miss Galindo’s work and the sturdy autonomy that gives her the power to resist not only the male work culture but also the failing aristocratic code of Lady Ludlow. In a similar vein, Foster has said that Miss Galindo and Lady Ludlow both model autonomous work: “With both these women, Gaskell shows us that she has faith, albeit cautious faith, in the capacities of female independence” (Victorian Women, 166). Miss Galindo “seems a proto-feminist in a world which she largely accepts because she does not see it as restricting” (Foster, Elizabeth Gaskell: A Literary Life, 91). Among those sharing this more optimistic assessment of Miss Galindo are T. Wright, Elizabeth Gaskell “We Are Not Angels,” 123; Françoise Basch, Relative Creatures, 179–180; Rubenius, Woman Question, 126–128; and Uglow, Habit of Stories, 471–472. Krueger, “‘Female Paternalist’ as Historian,” privileges Miss Galindo’s role as “the recording angel, the historian of everyday life” (179).


26. Foster, Victorian Women’s Fiction, 166.

27. See E. Wright, “My Lady Ludlow,” 29–30; Winifred Gérin, Elizabeth Gaskell: A Biography, 206. Although Mitchell makes a case for the appropriateness of reading the text and frame as important to each other, she does not draw any specific conclusions about how they illuminate each other. Krueger, “‘Female Paternalist’ as Historian,” takes the frame seriously as part of Gaskell’s project “to show how women might use and discard a variety of literary forms to represent their experience, and write their histories” (171). She notes one similarity between Margaret Dawson and Miss Greatorex: both experience an infirmity which “figures forth the simultaneously abnormal and privileged position of the female author and her intimate relationships with her audience of sororal sufferers” (172).

28. Foster, in Elizabeth Gaskell: A Literary Life, argues that My Lady Ludlow “not only resists the formal shaping of history as ‘story’ but also seems to represent a feminine mode of writing, expressing a Kristevan female cyclical temporality” (90). Similarly, Krueger finds that the narrative form in My Lady Ludlow “suggest[s] the diversity of
female desire and practice in the production of historical narrative” (“Female Paternalist’ as Historian,” 180).

29. The similarity in the wallpaper pattern is pointed out by Sharps, *Mrs. Gaskell’s Observation and Invention*, 311.


31. See Josie Billington’s observation that “Gaskell’s was a form of vision so bravely subtle as to have positively risked the danger of being underrated” (“Watching a Writer Write,” 225).

**CHAPTER 4 È VERO OR È FALSO? THE PASTOR AS MENTOR IN ROMOLA**

1. Bonaparte, *Triptych and the Cross*, observes, “Never, of course, did Eliot disappoint us as utterly as she did in *Romola*, the book that contemporary reviewers greeted, as George Henry Lewes reports, ‘with a universal howl of discontent,’ and that, in the hundred years since, escaped our censure only when it secured our neglect” (1). See, for example, Joan Bennett’s firm conclusion that “the book is... a failure” (*George Eliot*, 140).


5. Ibid., 51. The phrase is taken from George Combe’s phrenological assessment of George Eliot’s head in 1844.

6. See Catherine Gallagher’s commentary on “Authorship” in “George Eliot and *Daniel Deronda*.” Gallagher notes Eliot’s distinction between a writer, whose private productions are not properly a “social activity,” and an author, who is paid for his or her work, and concludes, “‘social’ here means, first of all, economic” (45). But Eliot’s principal distinction is not between authors as paid producers of text and unpaid ones, but rather between producers of text who do their work with a social conscience and those who do it out of baser motives. The category of “social activity” for Eliot is more ethical than it is economic: “Let it be taken as admitted that all legitimate social activity must be beneficial to others besides the agent” (“Authorship,” 357).


8. Ibid., 358.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., 359.

11. To see how Eliot’s sentiments fit into a broader context of the professionalization and dignification of authorship, see the discussion of Eliot and of “Authorship” in Clare Pettit’s *Patent Inventions*.

12. See this book’s introduction (10–11) for an explanation of pastorship.


16. Bardo, Tito, and Savonarola are usually taken as representatives of competing worldviews counterpoised in Renaissance Florence: classical stoicism, hedonism, and medieval Catholicism. The novel can thus be read as an epic survey of Western civilization (symbolized in Romola) at a historical crossroads. See Bonaparte, *Triptych and the Cross*, 34–72; and Joseph Wiesenfarth, *George Eliot’s Mythmaking*, 146–169, for classic formulations of this position.

17. But see Anna Nardo’s contentions that “[t]he encounter between Savonarola and Romola outside the Florentine walls is the most erotic scene in the novel” and that “[t]he energy that redirects Romola’s ardent love from father and husband to service to Florence is sublimated sexuality” (*George Eliot’s Dialogue with John Milton*, 76).


20. Caroline Levine, in “The Prophetic Fallacy,” is right to describe Romola’s epistemological development as a movement toward autonomous empirical judgment, verified by personal experience, and away from received conventions, but Levine underrates the importance of Romola’s mentors’ contributions to this shift (136–137). These mentors serve not just as figures of authority for her to reject but rather as influences significantly forming her resources for interpreting the lived experience out of which she draws her conclusions.

21. Tom Winnifrith, in “Renaissance and Risorgimento in *Romola*,” discusses the particular historical connections between Romola’s Florence and Eliot’s England, as well as the perceptions of such connections by Eliot’s contemporary reviewers.


23. Adams, *Our Lady of Victorian Feminism*, 70. Susan M. Greenstein’s article, “Question of Vocation” explores the novel’s preoccupation with vocational issues. While Greenstein’s study makes valuable connections between Romola’s vocational anxieties and the transitional significance of the novel in Eliot’s career, I take exception to her conclusion that Romola’s dilemmas receive an unearned, magical resolution which falls short of a real vocation such as Dorothea achieves vicariously through Ladislaw.

24. The association of authority and hermeneutics in the novel is widely granted. For example, Caroline Levine and Mark Turner’s introduction to *From Author to Text* makes mention of the novel’s contest over “interpretive authority” (8).

25. Bonaparte observes as much by saying that Romola’s benefit from her classical education is not a scholarly career but the “clear critical
intelligence . . . that was, in Eliot’s view, the highest gift of the ancients” (Triptych and the Cross, 42). Similarly, Mary Gosselink De Jong maintains that Romola’s education “does enable her to question authority, to see through specious arguments” (“Romola—A Bildungsroman for Feminists?” 81).

26. Eliot, Romola, 18. Subsequent page references to this text will be given in parentheses.


28. This is a curiously similar dynamic to that explored in the most recent collection of Romola criticism, From Author to Text, edited by Levine and Turner. In their introduction, the editors explicitly advocate “theoretical pluralism,” which they describe as the use of distinct but overlapping and sometimes contradictory theoretical approaches to a single text. In their words, “Arguing for the simultaneity of critical arguments is not to suggest that all readings of a text are equally valid, for such an approach leads ultimately to an uncritical relativism. Rather, it is through attention to intersections and departures across critical approaches that political readings become dialectical, dynamic and generative rather than fixed and programmatic” (7). Further, “if the essays collected here convince the reader of the legitimacy and compatibility of these variations, fixing ‘authority’ authoritatively emerges as impossible. [In the critical readings assembled here], authority turns out to be not univocal, rigid and complete, but rather multiple and productive” (8).


30. According to Alison Booth, the narrator enacts this very awareness of contingency, though in the historical rather than moral mode: “Eliot’s narrator . . . does not insist on his own absolute authority. Indeed, he emphasizes changing perspectives and selective evidence, conceding the interpretive accidents of historiography without questioning the reality of a ‘universal history’ to which all historians refer” (Greatness Engendered, 179).

31. See Lesley Gordon, “Greek Scholarship,” on the Florentine fascination with Greek scholarship.


34. Eliot is in fact slightly mistaken. Savonarola entered the monastery on April 24, 1475, a few months before his twenty-third birthday on September 21. See Pasquale Villari, Life and Times of Girolamo Savonarola, 16–17. Perhaps Eliot was thinking of his age when his novitiate ended and he took his Dominican vows, or perhaps she had an artistic reason for this unusual inaccuracy (see 117, below).

35. See Beryl Gray, “Power and Persuasion,” for an analysis of the rhetoric of this sermon and its effect on its hearers, including Romola and
Baldassarre. See also Christine Krueger, *Reader’s Repentance*, on Eliot’s use of the inheritance of women’s sermonic discourse. Krueger argues that Eliot makes Romola a “preaching icon,” or nondiscursive evangelist, in order to “construct a model of female evangelism that is meant to surpass the historical limitations of preaching” (265).


38. Ibid., 32–36. This is notwithstanding the fact that at least some of the impetus behind the elimination of usury was anti-Semitic.

39. I do not intend to diminish Eliot’s admiration of some of Savonarola’s moral reforms by thus emphasizing his material charity. The two are, in fact, indistinguishable. The material relief of the poor and the reform of the well-to-do toward the practice of charity are two sides of the same project.

40. Barbara Hardy, in *Novels of George Eliot*, refers to Savonarola as “an ambivalent moral quantity, at one time reinforcing Romola’s altruism, at another running parallel to Tito” (118). Recognition of Eliot’s ambivalence toward Savonarola’s influence over Florence and Romola is the only way to do justice to Eliot’s complex treatment of the character. Mann argues that the “real effect he has had on Romola individually and on various Florentine citizens collectively” consoles the reader in the face of his devastating fall (*Language That Makes George Eliot’s Fiction*, 82–83). Deirdre David pointedly disagrees, seeing Savonarola’s influence over Romola as disciplinary and therefore negative (*Intellectual Women and Victorian Patriarchy*, 253, note 14). I maintain that Eliot is fully conscious of both beneficial and detrimental outcomes of Savonarola’s activities, and that such ambivalence is fundamental to her representation of Savonarola and of the problem of mentoring this chapter examines.

41. William Myers, in *Teaching of George Eliot*, points out that, by involving himself in political affairs, Savonarola repeats the same papal practices against which he inveighed and eventually rebelled (62–63).

42. Adams, in *Our Lady of Victorian Feminism*, hints at a relationship between Romola’s experience in the valley and Savonarola’s experience in Florence, though she emphasizes rather the positive and distinctly feminist difference of Romola’s “style of leadership” (175).

43. Booth, in *Greatness Engendered*, sees this textual moment as evidence that Romola has thoroughly “abandoned self-interest in a grand cause” (193). Conversely, but also mistakenly, Victor Neufeldt, in “Madonna and the Gypsy,” regards it as evidence of Romola’s incomplete renunciation, which he imagines that Eliot disapproved (45). On the contrary, I see it as evidence that Romola understands that self-interest cannot be annihilated, and that earnest attempts to do so can only result in either Dino’s pathological condition or Savonarola’s self-deception. Rather, after seeing the spectacular errors of both Dino and Savonarola, Romola comes to realize that self-interest and
altruism must be frankly acknowledged as implicated in each other, an understanding that Eliot approves.

44. David Carroll, in *Conflict of Interpretations*, points out that this exercise is analogous to the gospel hermeneutics of German Higher Criticism, in which Eliot participated as a translator (197). See also Nardo, *George Eliot’s Dialogue with John Milton*, for a description of Romola’s hermeneutic process (81).


46. See John Patrick Donnelly’s introduction to his Latin-English edition of Savonarola’s prison meditations, especially pages 20–23.

47. As Krueger puts it somewhat differently, “Romola succeeds where Savonarola failed because she never assumes the prophetic voice, the voice asserting absolute authority over its audience and a unique rather than universal vision” (*Reader’s Repentance*, 284).

48. Romola’s final phrase lends support to my argument that total suppression of egoism is not called for, but rather a balance of egoism and altruism. See Dorothea Barrett, *Vocation and Desire*, esp. 83–84.

49. Mary Wilson Carpenter, *George Eliot and the Landscape of Time*, emphasizes the indeterminacy of Romola’s and the novel’s reading of Savonarola, who becomes for Carpenter “an example of the ambiguity of prophesy and the unreliability of prophets” (102).

50. A few noteworthy examples will suffice. According to Margaret Homans, *Bearing the Word*, the epilogue shows Romola’s self-effacement of the feminine, her complicity in her exclusion from the world of history and scholarship (197). While I agree with Homans that most of the novel relates Romola’s successive devotion to a male authority, I disagree that this submission persists unchanged at the book’s end. David, *Intellectual Women and Victorian Patriarchy*, similarly indicts Eliot’s “active, necessary compliance with the patriarchal culture” (179). In David’s reading of the epilogue, what is salient is the devoted female worship of the male authority who “redirected her wish for ‘instructed’ independence into acceptance of benevolent subjugation” (*Intellectual Women and Victorian Patriarchy*, 195). Booth, in *Greatness Engendered*, grants Romola’s moral superiority at the novel’s end, but finds it a hollow pretense: “The futility of women’s rebellion lends them an appearance of selfless obedience, of moral superiority, though like men they may desire preeminence” (194).


Chapter 5  “One function in particular”: Specialization and the Service Ethic in “Janet’s Repentance” and Daniel Deronda

5. Duman, “Creation and Diffusion of a Professional Ideology.” A brief but clear analysis of the service ethic of professions is available in Robert MacIver, “Professional Groups and Cultural Norms.”
6. Qtd. in Collini, Public Moralists, 83. Collini further comments, “[I]t was because these assumptions were so widespread that his philosophy enjoyed the success it did” (83).
7. Eliot, Romola, 547, my emphasis.
8. Barrett, Vocation and Desire, 83–84. The tension Barrett describes had roots in Mary Anne Evans’s adolescent Evangelical fervor, when she eschewed pleasure in order to devote herself to Bible study, introspection, and works of charity. For detailed analysis of Mary Anne Evans’s early enthusiastic pursuit of self-denial and its connection to Evangelicalism, see Frederick R. Karl, George Eliot, 31–47; and Rosemarie Bodenheimer, Real Life of Mary Ann Evans, 57–84. See Helena Granlund, Paradox of Self-Love, for a review of previous critical studies examining the relationship of Eliot’s ethics to those of Christianity. For insight into the connections between Eliot’s moral philosophy and the idealistic altruism of Feuerbach and Comte, see the analysis provided in William Myers’s introduction to The Teaching of George Eliot. But see also Peter Charles Hodgson, Mystery Beneath the Real, for a critique of Myers’s and others’ reductive treatments of Eliot’s relationship to Feuerbach and Comte.
9. Jeanie Thomas, in Reading Middlemarch, calls this view “practically universal” (7). John Halperin, in Egoism and Self-Discovery, offers a typical reading of Eliot’s ethics: “[T]he moral process in her novels is from egoism through despair to objectivity” (125). K. M. Newton, in George Eliot: Romantic Humanist, deals at length with the tension between egoism and sublimation in defense of his thesis that Eliot’s Romanticism is of an organicist rather than egoistic strain. Newton
shows how Eliot’s admirable characters or “positive egos” experience a struggle between self-gratification and social ideals, and they eventually succeed in sublimating their egos to those ideals. Granlund’s *The Paradox of Self-Love* similarly explores Eliot’s treatment of the essentially Christian paradox that “the choice of self [as the highest good] leads to the destruction of self, whereas the choice of non-self leads to the fulfillment of self” (2). While these critics accurately describe the prevalent pattern in Eliot’s fiction, they miss the complex ways that Eliot questions the absolute good of self-denial in her most altruistic characters, Tryan and Deronda.

10. Barrett is one of these, as mentioned above. M. C. Henberg, “George Eliot’s Moral Realism,” identifies, but does not analyze, this problem in Eliot’s ethical philosophy. Noting that “altruism has its natural limits,” he cites Dinah Morris as exemplifying the “more subtle failing” of “excessive selflessness” (31–32). He theorizes “an acceptable egoism” that neither denigrates nor exalts the self and thereby makes true sympathy possible (31). A careful exploration of that phenomenon and how it might be represented, however, is not Henberg’s purpose. Other critics have addressed Eliot’s problematizing of sympathy, a concept related to but not coterminous with altruism as I use the term. Bodenheimer, in *Real Life of Mary Ann Evans*, argues that Eliot deconstructs sympathy, and with it the realist novel, in *Daniel Deronda* (259–265). Lisabeth During, in “Concept of Dread,” explores the sense in which “sympathy acts as an incentive to egoism, rather than as its corrective” (77). Thomas, in *Reading Middlemarch*, provides a good reading of the “complexity, limitation, compromise” of sympathy in *Middlemarch* (9). The treatment of sympathy in Heather Armstrong, *Character and Ethical Development*, emphasizes Eliot’s awareness of the potential misuse of sympathy as an instrument of power and appropriation. Leona Toker, “Vocation and Sympathy in *Daniel Deronda*,” builds on these readings to find that in that novel “the danger of excessive sympathy to its donor is emphasized at least as strongly as its positive effects on its recipient” (569).


12. For an interesting reading of this same problem in Anthony Trollope’s fiction, see Ilana Blumberg, “‘Unnatural Self-Sacrifice.’ ”


16. See also Robbins’s “Death and Vocation.” His brief reading of *Daniel Deronda* in this article makes note of Deronda’s specialization, which he refers to as the “exclusion” of the Alcharisi, of Gwendolen, and of Palestinians (44). Robbins adds, “With more space, I might certainly present Deronda as the anticipation of a certain professional hero” (45).

18. Eliot, “Janet’s Repentance,” 248–249. Subsequent page references to this text will be given in parentheses.


20. Thomas Noble, in *George Eliot’s Scenes of Clerical Life*, discusses the connection between Tryan’s self-denial and Eliot’s doctrine of fellow-feeling, but he misses the way in which the community’s (and the reader’s) suspicion of Tryan’s motives works in the text to complicate the issue of Tryan’s heroism. Katherine M. Sorenson, in “Daniel Deronda and George Eliot’s Ministers,” briefly addresses Tryan’s self-denial in the context of the historical phenomenon of the Methodist ministers on which Tryan is patterned, but she too ignores the paradox of Tryan’s self-destructiveness.

21. U. C. Knoepflmacher, in *George Eliot’s Early Novels*, sees this dual rejection as a “mixture of satire and hagiography” (82). The novella is hagiographic insofar as it rejects the cynicism of Tryan’s enemies and satirical insofar as it rejects the adulation of his friends. Elisabeth Jay, in *The Religion of the Heart*, notes that Eliot is trying to do two contradictory things with Tryan: on the one hand to “suggest that Evangelicalism was consistent with a good education and gentlemanly manners,” and on the other to portray what Eliot called “the real drama of Evangelicalism” (229–230). The former aim requires an ideal hero, the latter a complexly flawed human character. Jay finds that the result is a “pasteboard character” (230). I maintain that the lack of realist psychology in the characterization of Tryan is not so much an artistic failure as an index of the complexity of Eliot’s portrayal of the problems that inhere in professionalism’s claims to disinterest.


25. Ibid., 61.


27. See also Laura Fasick, *Professional Men and Domesticity in the Mid-Victorian Novel*, which argues that the sublimated sexuality of Tryan and Janet’s relationship bespeaks Eliot’s conception that men’s professional success is tied to their domestic success.

28. These and other parallels are elaborated by Sorenson, “Daniel Deronda and George Eliot’s Ministers.” Sorenson’s helpful analysis of Deronda as following the type of the Methodist minister identifies many similarities between the personalities and priorities of Deronda and Tryan as religious figures. My approach takes in both the continuity and discontinuity between them as professional figures. See also Oliver Lovesey, *Clerical Character in George Eliot’s Fiction*.

29. See, for example, Newton, *George Eliot: Romantic Humanist*, 193–197; Amanda Anderson, “George Eliot,” 47–52; Carroll,
Conflict of Interpretations, 287–294; and Tony Jackson, “George Eliot’s ‘New Evangel,’ ” 238–246. Jackson sees Mordecai as the force that saves Deronda from his amorphous excessive sympathy, or as the one who pulls Deronda into the “framework” of egoism in order to save him for realism (238). In helping Mordecai, however, Deronda is in much the same position he is in when helping Hans or even Gwendolen: there is no strong conflict with Mordecai that would force Deronda to choose between Mordecai and some other person or desire. Hence I maintain that the conflict Gwendolen occasions in Deronda, described below, is more definitive of his ego than is Mordecai’s influence.

30. See, for example, Menon, Austin, Eliot, Charlotte Brontë and the Mentor-Lover: “[I]t is difficult to discover what Daniel learns from his experience with Gwendolen that is of any benefit in the life he is to lead” (172). Newton, in George Eliot: Romantic Humanist, grants that Gwendolen has a meaningful role in Deronda’s education, but he attributes it to the limited observation that “in recognizing another’s need for a larger aim in life and in his efforts to make this clear to her, Deronda discovers a deeper emotional awareness of his own similar need” (197). Without disputing this basic claim, I contend that Gwendolen’s role is more complicated than Newton allows. Bodenheimer, in Real Life of Mary Ann Evans, does give attention to the education Gwendolen gives Deronda: in Bodenheimer’s reading, Deronda learns the personal and painful cost of being a mentor, something that Eliot also learned in the 1870s.

31. Eliot, Daniel Deronda, 163, my emphasis. Subsequent references to this text will be given in parentheses.

32. Newton, George Eliot: Romantic Humanist, 189–190. This difficulty is widely acknowledged and variously explained. For Newton, the problem is that Eliot is less interested in exploring Deronda’s psychological problem than in solving it. Carroll, Conflict of Interpretations, sees Deronda as more a “hypothesis” than a self, in that “Deronda is seeking to be born into the world without the original facts upon which to base a world-view” (285–286). For Moretti, Way of the World, the problem is that Deronda is not a man at all but a “functionary of abstract beliefs” (227). Anderson, in Powers of Distance, sees Deronda’s predicament as an “allegory” about “the instabilities of modern cosmopolitan life,” instabilities resulting from the tension between excessive and insufficient partiality (121). Another explanation is available in the theory of narratology put forward by Harpham in Ascetic Imperative in Culture and Criticism. Arguing that hagiography is the paradigmatic form of narrative, Harpham finds that the internal struggle of the hero against temptation, or between desire and denial, is the basis of narrative. Deronda does not experience such a struggle, and therefore cannot be a fully realized character, until Gwendolen’s own internal battle
with temptation, discussed below, becomes the occasion for a similar struggle in him.

33. Jackson, “George Eliot’s ‘New Evangel,’ ” 236. For Jackson, the consequence of this image is the self-destruction of realism, for egolessness is incompatible with the “nature of the self that her writing has all along presumed” (231).

34. The phrase is from Susan Ostrov Weisser, “Gwendolen’s Hidden Wound,” 6. David Marshall, in The Figure of Theatre, similarly finds that Deronda “seems ready to take another for a larger self, enclosing his self in another” (224).


36. Granlund, in Paradox of Self-Love, sees this narratorial background as evidence for Deronda’s being a pure “higher egoist,” a position of unqualified good (114). My position is that Eliot is using Deronda to explore how the good of self-disregard becomes qualified at its extremes and to probe the double paradox: not only that selflessness leads paradoxically to self-fulfillment, but also that unmitigated selflessness leads to self-destruction.

37. J. Beer, Providence and Love, 204.


40. The paradoxical nature of Deronda’s curiously dispassionate suffering may explain why, as Louise Penner observes, “Daniel’s psychic distress before the revelation of his parentage has gone relatively unnoticed in the novel’s criticism” (“ ‘Unmapped Country,’ ” 89). I contend that the sign of that psychic distress is the frustration of his vocational ambition by his inability to specialize.


42. See Anderson, Powers of Distance, for a discussion of Deronda’s “cultivated partiality” (121–124). Anderson reads Deronda as an exemplar of a species of Judaism that engages in dialogic and reflective encounter with multiple traditions; this is precisely the opposite of the legalistic and monologic tradition that oppressed Leonora.

43. Cohen, in Professional Domesticity in the Victorian Novel, elaborates how domestic plotlines, which often seem to be in competition with vocational plotlines for the ultimate loyalty of the hero, are better understood as allies of vocational fulfillment. My analysis similarly finds that Deronda’s desire for Mirah, far from distracting him from his vocation, actually helps him achieve the specialization required to achieve his vocation.

44. Henry, in George Eliot and the British Empire, is right to point out that “Deronda’s idea of helping the Jews who were already living in various Eastern countries is vague, and as much philanthropic as nationalistic” (117).
45. However advantageous this “iron will” may be for the furthering of social and political objectives, it takes a severe toll on dissident females, as the Alcharisi’s reminiscences of Charisi make clear. She too uses the phrase “iron will” to describe him (589). Deronda’s difference from his grandfather is therefore a positive value from the standpoint of how he is likely to treat his wife and daughters.

46. See Carole Stone, “George Eliot’s Daniel Deronda,” for a reading of the novel as a Freudian case history of Gwendolen’s hysterical symptoms with Deronda in the therapist role.

47. Cognard-Black, Narrative in the Professional Age, 100–101.

48. Ibid., 101. Cognard-Black goes on to show that the aesthetic economy ironically depends upon the reception of the commercial economy for its existence. Gwendolen turns out to be the ideal reader, the market that receives the socially beneficial interventions of the aesthetic professional, and without which the aesthetic professional could not exist. So ultimately “George Eliot’s own treatment of Gwendolen Harleth . . . reveals Deronda’s reliance on the very systems the book discredits, namely advertising, consumer culture, and the false professionalization of nineteenth-century authorship” (116).

49. Ibid., 107. See also the discussion in David, Fictions of Resolution, of Klesmer’s theory of creative genius, a theory David finds contradictory (188–189).

50. Menon, in Austin, Eliot, Charlotte Brontë and the Mentor-Lover, rightly observes that Gwendolen’s problems are opaque to Deronda (173, 176). They do not remain so, however, as I will show. I therefore disagree with her conclusion that Deronda is culpably impotent as a mentor. Deronda’s advice is basically sound (granting Eliot’s terms); Gwendolen’s inability to apply it, because of her psychic dividedness, can hardly be blamed on Deronda. Analogous to the Jewish law in St. Paul’s description (Romans 3), Deronda makes Gwendolen aware of her moral shortcomings, but his function is not to remove them. Significantly, St. Paul’s word for the function of the law is “tutor” or mentor (Galatians 3:24–25). Deronda is a “priest” (401), not a savior (but see Saleel Nurbhai and K. M. Newton’s contention that Deronda is a messianic figure [George Eliot, Judaism and the Novels, 171–180]). Menon’s outrage at Deronda’s abandonment of Gwendolen is similarly misplaced. The “enforced autonomy” Gwendolen is given is surely preferable to Savonarola’s ongoing denial of autonomy to Romola; in fact, this forced curtailment of Gwendolen’s desired submission ought to mitigate the distaste with which Menon regards Gwendolen’s “progress” toward childlike submission (175).

51. The explicitly hagiographic description of this conflict again suggests the applicability of Harpham’s narratology of ascesis. Gwendolen’s struggle between desire and denial is needed to involve Deronda in
such a struggle in order that he can become intelligible as a narrative character.

52. The fact that Deronda’s discovery of his Jewishness accompanies the development of self-interest would seem to chime with Marx’s equation of Judaism with “huckstering,” that is, capitalistic self-interest, and with European anti-Semitic stereotypes generally. See Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” 48. This fact may form part of the narrative logic that leads Meyer to assert that the novel is fundamentally anti-Semitic, a conclusion she bases in part on the rapacity exhibited by the “vulgar” Jewish characters (“Safely to Their Own Borders,” 745). However, it is worth noting that Sir Hugo, in his own way, is as prone as Ezra Cohen to determine all difficult questions in terms of his own monetary interest. “I find the rule of the pocket the best guide,” Sir Hugo says (388). Deronda’s nascent self-interest is actually in opposition to a market rationality that prevails in English drawing rooms as much as in Jewish pawnshops (see David, Fictions of Resolution, 162–163). This point is made clearer when we reflect that even the implied contrast between Daniel, the schoolboy who refuses to “swop for his own advantage,” and Jacob Cohen, who aggressively negotiates a “shwop” of knives with Deronda, attributes nothing worse to Jacob than that degree of self-interest that is considered normative by Eton schoolboys and their masters as well.


54. See Kathleen Blake, Love and the Woman Question in Victorian Literature, for a discussion of the tension between love and art in character of the Alcharisi.


56. Menon, Austin, Eliot, Charlotte Bronte and the Mentor-Lover, 175.

57. See Linda Babcock and Sara Laschever, Women Don’t Ask.

Chapter 6 “A Kind of Manager Not Hitherto Existing”: Octavia Hill and the Professional Philanthropist

1. See, for example, Anthony S. Wohl’s chapter on Hill, titled “Benevolent Despotism,” in The Eternal Slum. See Marion Brion, Women in the Housing Service, for a summary of reactions to Hill prior to 1995. Brion argues that partisan politics and misogyny are at the root of much of the often acerbic and emotive criticism of Hill (14–22). Jane Lewis’s chapter on Hill in Women and Social Action provides a balanced account of the views that make Hill unpopular today and the mitigating effect of her genuine and energetic concern for individuals in need. Since then, notable studies have included Diana Maltz, “Beauty at Home or Not?”; and George K. Behlmer,
“Character Building,” which includes an account of the relationship between COS paradigms and social casework.

2. An early example is found in the conservative British Social Work in the Nineteenth Century by A. F. Young and E. T. Ashton. More recent examples include Robert Whelan, Octavia Hill and the Social Housing Debate; James L. Payne, Befriending Leader; and George W. Liebmann, Six Lost Leaders. It is to such as these that we owe the only modern reprints of Hill’s work; unfortunately the small collections of Hill’s essays edited by Whelan and Payne emphasize the political agendas of their editors in such a way as to obscure much of Hill’s complexity. In this chapter and in the bibliography, these editions of Hill’s essays are referred to by the editors’ names, in that the titles and contents of the collections are very much reflective of the editors’ priorities. For similar reasons, and in keeping with convention, Hill’s letters are cited by the names of their editors. The first collection of her letters was edited by her brother-in-law Charles Edmund Maurice, and the second by Hill’s sister and C. E. Maurice’s wife, Emily Southwood Maurice.


4. In addition to Prochaska and Summers, see Roy Lubove, Professional Altruist, on professionalized social work in the United States, and Young and Ashton, British Social Work in the Nineteenth Century, on its development in Britain.

5. I will include a few references to Hill’s later public and private writing as well, a decision justified by the fact that her opinions remained largely consistent throughout her life. In fact, when her later writings are read in the light of her earlier work they seem far more intelligible. Though she lived well into the Edwardian period, she continued to think along the lines normative in her mid-Victorian youth.


8. Hill, Our Common Land, 64.


10. See, for example, Hill, Our Common Land, 54–56, 59, and 61–62.


12. Hill, Homes of the London Poor, 23.

13. Hill, Our Common Land, 43.

14. Ibid., 53, my emphasis. See Behlmer, “Character Building,” on the centrality of character to the COS.


16. Whelan, Octavia Hill and the Social Housing Debate, 82.

17. Hill, Homes of the London Poor, 67.

18. Like the Peabody Trust and the Society for Improving the Condition of the Labouring Classes, Hill targeted five percent as the appropriate return on the owners’ investment in a house. Unscrupulous slum
landlords could profit by as much as twelve to fifteen percent. See John Nelson Tarn, *Five Per Cent Philanthropy*, 34–35.


20. Goodlad, in “Character and Pastorship,” shows that the COS’s critique of the Fabians in the late nineteenth century centered on the state’s purported “incapab[ility] either of understanding or relating to the family and the personal questions of character that sustain it” (244).

21. The essays and letters included in Whelan’s volume *Octavia Hill and the Social Housing Debate* emphasize these themes. See esp. 94–113.


26. Ibid., 33.


32. Ibid., 104.

33. Ibid., 154.

34. E. S. Maurice, *Octavia Hill: Early Ideals*, 43.


37. Ibid., 21

38. Ibid., 27.

39. Seth Koven, *Slumming*, describes a similar phenomenon in the Oxford House Settlement. The settlers espoused democratic governance of institutions by their working-class members, yet continued to exert effective control of the men’s club, sometimes against the will of the local working men (see especially 276–281).


42. Darley, *Octavia Hill*, 150.

43. Qtd. in Ibid., 149.


49. Qtd. in Darley, *Octavia Hill*, 146. In another context, Hill wrote, “But visitors would be incomparably more useful if they would train themselves to undertake the management of houses . . . . It may be
more difficult work: it will be much more thorough.” Whelan, Octavia Hill and the Social Housing Debate, 103.

50. Qtd. in Darley, Octavia Hill, 277.

51. Behlmer, Friends of the Family, 41.

52. Ibid., 40.


54. Hill, Homes of the London Poor, 34.

55. Webb, My Apprenticeship, 252.

56. Qtd. in Darley, Octavia Hill, 143.

57. Hill, Homes of the London Poor, 52.


59. C. E. Maurice, Life of Octavia Hill, 246.

60. Hill, Our Common Land, 88–89.

61. Darley, Octavia Hill, 34.


63. Ibid., 310.

64. E. S. Maurice, Octavia Hill: Early Ideals, 105–106.

65. Darley, Octavia Hill, 320.

66. Whelan, Octavia Hill and the Social Housing Debate, 84. At times the offers of money to purchase houses outstripped the supply of prepared workers to manage the houses, in which case Hill declined the money until she had a suitable manager available. Ibid., 125, 150, 277.

67. Darley, Octavia Hill, 276.

68. Hill, Homes of the London Poor, 65.

69. Searle, Morality and the Market, 188.

70. See Hill, Our Common Land, 6.


72. Ibid., 370–371.

73. Qtd. in Darley, Octavia Hill, 276, my emphasis.

74. This program became the School of Sociology in 1903 and then in 1912 joined with the London School of Economics to form the Department of Social Science and Administration. See Kathleen Woodroofe, From Charity to Social Work, 54.


76. Within a generation or so, these publicly employed women managers had given way to male employees. See Brion, Women in the Housing Service, on the fate of women housing managers in the decades following Hill’s death.

77. E. S. Maurice, Octavia Hill: Early Ideals, 93.

78. I borrow this phrase from Stefan Collini, Public Moralists.

79. Whelan, Octavia Hill and the Social Housing Debate, 86.

80. Hill, Homes of the London Poor, 67.

81. E. S. Maurice, Octavia Hill: Early Ideals, 123–24.

82. Ibid., 156.

83. Ibid., 169, emphasis in original.

84. Ibid., 95–96.
85. Ibid., 215.
88. E. S. Maurice, *Octavia Hill: Early Ideals*, 163. It is typical of Ruskin’s attitude toward his protégé in the later years of her employment with him that he would urge her to follow her instincts for social work and continue to receive a salary from him. He seems to have realized well before she did that she was better suited for (and more interested in) social work, and he apparently regarded it as his responsibility to nourish and enable her talent with people just as he initially planned to do her artistic talent. The enigmatic speech she reports on this occasion, that the salary was intended “to enable her partly to do, and partly not to do, the work,” is comprehensible in light of Hill’s belief that the best workers among the poor were those with other responsibilities and interests (163). Ruskin may have meant that the regular supply of money would enable her to do the work among the poor, and also that a sense of obligation to do some painting for him would keep her from being wholly engrossed in that work.
89. Ibid., 163.
90. See, for example, Hill, *Homes of the London Poor*, 20. Carlyle’s critique is most famously expressed in *Past and Present*; Ruskin’s in *Unto This Last*.
92. Ibid.
93. Qtd. in Darley, *Octavia Hill*, 277.

**Epilogue**

5. Robbins, “Village of the Liberal Managerial Class.”
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