NOTES

Introduction

2. María Rosa Menocal, in the “Prologue” to *Writing in Dante’s Cult of Truth: From Borges to Boccaccio* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), provides one of the more eloquent expositions of the problem of scholarly introduction. Although “the material at the beginning neatly ‘restores’ the harmony of diachrony that the writing process itself radically undermines,” nonetheless “literary history is itself not diachronic but rather synchronistic: time is all jumbled up everywhere, authors from different centuries and different universes sit one next to another and shape each others’ work, both proleptically and retrospectively, as well as in the ‘normal’ diachronic ways we are used to expecting and analyzing” (pp. 2, 3).
3. This book has, accordingly, a lot in common with Timothy Bewes’s eloquent exposition of the religious in Kierkegaard: “Only the religious is both spiritual and material, worldly and otherworldly, timeless and rooted in the historical moment.” See *Reification, or The Anxiety of Late Capitalism* (London: Verso, 2002), p. 233.
10. Anne Carson emphasizes the edginess of eros in several chapters of *Eros the Bittersweet*, where she notes its connection to writing: “As eros insists upon
the edges of human beings and of the spaces between them, the written consonant imposes edge on the sounds of human speech and insists on the reality of that edge, although it has its origin in the reading and writing imagination” (p. 55). The implications of this can be extended to larger syntactic acts, most importantly (here) literary history.

11. See *Phaedrus* 255D, where the new lover is described, in the translation of Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995) as follows: “It is as if he had caught an eye disease from someone else, but could not identify the cause. . .” (p. 46).


16. See “Participation: Here,” the penultimate section of chapter 1, for the “greater density, beyond all contrasts of density and lightness,” to which a poetics of participation is fundamentally committed.


20. Thomas of Celano, as summarized by Jeryldene M. Wood, describes Clare’s escape from her family to the Porziuncula with attention to “her miraculous exit through an unused, sealed-up, and very heavy door” whose genital resonance, particularly given the Marian tone of this *vita*, could hardly be stronger (Wood, *Women, Art, and Spirituality*, p. 20).

**Chapter 1  The Edge of Enclosure**


3. See *De doctrina christiana* III.10–12. Indeed, Augustine is not of one mind on the issue, arguing against believers who seek to explain away disturbing bits of Scripture while simultaneously urging a stringent contextualization of such upsetting phenomena as nakedness. In the translation of D. W. Robertson, Jr., *On Christian Doctrine* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Macmillan, 1958), Augustine notes, “If it is shameful to strip
the body of clothing at the banquets of the drunken and lascivious, it is
not on this account shameful to be naked in the baths. Careful attention
is therefore to be paid to what is proper to places, times, and persons lest
we condemn the shameful too hastily” (III.12.18–19; pp. 90–91). The
baths are far from innocent, as amply demonstrated by Augustine’s own
experience in Confessions 2.3, trans. Pine-Coffin, p. 45: “One day at the
public baths he [Augustine’s father] saw the signs of active virility coming
to life in me.”

4. Allen J. Frantzen, Before the Closet: Same-Sex Love from Beowulf to Angels in

5. Frantzen, Before the Closet, p. 20.

6. Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, In 1926: Living at the Edge of Time (Cambridge,

7. Louise Fradenburg and Carla Freccero, “Introduction,” Premodern

8. This is Betty Radice’s translation. See The Letters of Abelard and Heloise

9. Rafael Campo, “The Failure of Empathy on Center Street,” in Diva

10. In the preface to his exposé of the restaurant business, Kitchen Confidential
my little memoir/rant to reflect the somewhat claustrophobic worldview
of the professional cook—that slightly paranoid, fiercely territorial mix of
pride and resignation that allows so many of us to get up every morning
and do the things we do” (p. xii). Here too claustrophobia is “territorial,”
and thus implicitly desirous of the enclosure it fears.

11. This is a gross simplification of the thrust of early queer theory, especially in
the vein of Eve Sedgwick’s Between Men (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1985) and The Epistemology of the Closet (Berkeley: University of

12. Michael P. Brown writes, in Closet Space: Geographies of Metaphor from the
Body to the Globe (London: Routledge, 2000), that “gay venues actively
participate in the production of the closet because it is economically rational
to do so” (p. 80).

13. Geoffrey Galt Harpham, Shadows of Ethics: Criticism and the Just Society
discusses here are J. Hillis Miller and Martha Nussbaum.

14. These are described, in relation to Franciscan scholasticism, by Scott
Matthews in Reason, Community and Religious Tradition: Anselm’s Argument

15. See, on this note, my discussion of Catherine Brown’s delicate assessment of
the middles of medievalism at the end of chapter 5.

16. This ambivalence, and its attendant anxiety, is staged in a 2001 video
installation by the artist Andrea Contin “consisting of a model house inside of
which has been placed a closed-circuit videocamera transmitting to a TV
positioned next to it. The model room is empty. But it is the realistic effect of
the video, in contrast with the dimensions of the room (those of a guinea pig’s
cage), that transforms the game into a test of the anxiety produced by the two
together, useful for measuring our index of claustrophilia.” (My translation
from Raffaele Gavarro’s Italian at http://www.colomboarte.com/it/
artisti/enolaplay/cataloghi/cataloghi.htm.)

17. “Desfoutue,” as Simon Gaunt points out in his chapter on the fabliau in
Gender and genre (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), would
more literally be rendered “unfucked” (p. 258), but the reversal here doesn’t
undo so much as do damage: to be unfucked is to be fucked over. See
“Celle qui fu foutue et desfoutue por une grue,” in Luciano Rossi and
Richard Straub, eds., Fabliaux érotiques (Paris: Livre de Poche, 1992),
pp. 185–97. All line references are to this edition.

18. All references are to Maria Jolas’s translation, The Poetics of Space (New
York: Orion Press, 1964), followed by the French text of La poétique de


20. For the notion of “shelter” as opposed to a (presumably Heideggerian)
understanding of thrownness, see the first chapter of Poetics.


22. Bachelard, Poetics, p. xxxii; Poétique, pp. 17–18.

23. Bachelard, Poetics, p. 229; Poétique, p. 205: “Often it is from the very fact of
concentration in the most restricted intimate space that the dialectics of
inside and outside draws its strength” (C’est souvent par la concentration
mêmes dans l’espace intime le plus réduit que la dialectique du dedans et du
dehors prend toute sa force).


27. In Gaston Bachelard: Critic of Science and the Imagination (London: Routledge,
2001), Christina Chimisso observes that “for Bachelard, knowledge gained
in solitude had no scientific value. When Bachelard’s rationalist retreats into
solitude, he is no longer a rationalist, but rather a dreamer, a poet, or a
human being on holiday” (p. 41).


30. Bachelard, Poetics, p. 32; Poétique, p. 46.

31. See Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Poetry as Experience, trans. Andrea Tarnowski
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 34. All citations are made in
reference to this translation, followed by the French text as it appears in La


33. Lacoue-Labarthe, Poetry, p. 38; Poésie, p. 57.

34. Bachelard, Poetics, p. 229; Poétique, p. 205.

35. The hermit-saint’s refusal is indeed a topos of the hagiographic tradition.
Abba Arsenius, in Abelard’s citation from the Lives of the Desert Fathers,
responds to a woman who has come to visit him, “I pray God to wipe the

37. Lacoue-Labarthe, Poetry, p. 94; Poésie, p. 133.
38. Lacoue-Labarthe, Poetry, p. 94; Poésie, p. 133.
42. See, however, the discussion of hands as quintessentially human, and their relationship to genitalia, in “Hand to Mouth,” the third section of chapter 2.
44. Agamben, L’aperto, p. 58: “L’ente, per l’animale, è aperto ma non accessibile.”
45. Agamben, L’aperto, p. 77.
46. In “The Sublime Body of the Martyr: Violence in Early Romance Saints’ Lives,” in Richard W. Kaeuper, ed., Violence in Medieval Society (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2000), Sarah Kay describes a parallel structure in the medieval lives of virgin martyrs, where the ambivalence in question has to do not with ethics but with embodiment. “The martyred philosophers [in the Old French life of St. Catherine] have ‘sublime bodies’ through which the violence addressed to them might become capable of indefinite prolongation (they could remain in their perfect state for ever, apparently) but which also ‘embody’ their belief in an immortality against which mere physical violence is powerless; the ‘sublime body’ both expresses, and resists, the destructive urge to which it is subject” (pp. 8–9). I would add merely that, in Jehan’s life, this “destructive urge” is not so much independent of, or external to, the saint as constitutive of, and internal to, him—a question that again sets in motion the disclosive/enclosive intensification discussed above.
50. For Zizek, in Totalitarianism, “the properly modern post- or meta-tragic situation occurs when a higher necessity compels me to betray the very ethical substance of my being” (p. 14). Yet the examples he
gives—Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac, and an enigmatic “Christian” who sacrifices his soul for “God’s glory”—suggest that “modern” does not primarily designate a specific historical moment so much as a resistance to the inexorable logic of classical fatalism and its fetishism of the unknown crime. See the related discussion of fatalistic circularity in chapter 2.

54. Euripides, Tauris, p. 15.
55. Euripides, Tauris, p. 15.
56. Euripides, Tauris, p. 16.
57. Euripides, Tauris, p. 53.
58. Euripides, Tauris, pp. 54, 56.
59. For the distinction between “presence effects” and “meaning effects,” see Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, The Production of Presence (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).
61. Euripides, Tauris, p. 56.
70. “A moment arrives when one can no longer feel anything but anger, an absolute anger, against so many discourses, so many texts that have no other care than to make a little more sense, to redo or to perfect delicate works of signification.” See Jean-Luc Nancy, The Birth to Presence (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 6.
73. Sigmund Freud, “Fetishism,” in the Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, trans. James Strachey (London: Hogarth, 1961), vol. 21, p. 154. This particular mode of the fetish radicalizes, as well, its historicity: whereas for William Pietz, the fetish “is above all a ‘historical’ object, the enduring material form and force of an unrepeatable event,” I would add that the fetishized objet petit a endures only inasmuch as it defers, or, in more spatial terms, takes up the intervening space that it

74. Indeed, the story of Medusa’s head is fundamentally about a look that will not let go. This is what I take to be the insight of Zizek’s observation that “the object that fascinates [the spectator] becomes the gaze itself” (*Totalitarianism*, p. 80). The spectacle of the Gorgon is petrifying, in other words, because there is something petrifying about the way she is looked at: phallic immobility, hypostasized in the appropriative gaze, produces only itself. To drop one’s eyes, here, would be to refuse to freeze the Gorgon into the knowable embodiment of the unknowable, the (disclosed) masculine frame around an (enclosed) feminized absence. It would be to ask, what does the Gorgon see? Thus, it would be to assent, first and foremost, to being seen; and thereby to emerge continually from this gaze, instead of freezing it with one’s own. This would amount to a new, dynamic dialectic of disclosure and enclosure, beyond the stasis imposed by fetishism.

79. Pickstock, *After Writing*, p. 49: “Without eternity, space must be made absolute and the uncertainty of time’s source and end must be suppressed.” See also p. 123: “The abandonment of participation in Being encouraged the establishment of contractual relations between the creature and God. . . This was combined with an increased emphasis upon the sovereignty of God’s will.”

Chapter 2  The Verge of the Visible

2. For example, in the 1995 “Retrospect” to *The Sexuality of Christ in Renaissance Art and in Modern Oblivion*, second edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), Steinberg shows how for the Greek tradition, the life of Adam and Eve before the fall (i.e., before desire) was also pregenital: “Had disobedience not intervened, they would have lived out their days in untroubled virginity, neither female nor male” (p. 230). For Augustine, however, and for the Latin tradition after him, “the First Couple were
indeed sexed,” and procreation would have occurred as it does for postlap-
sarian life, except without desire (p. 231).
4. For “formal austerity,” see Steinberg, Sexuality, p. 41; for “licentiousness,”
Steinberg, Sexuality, p. 17.
5. The Rule of Saint Benedict, trans. Abbot Parry OSB (Leominster: Gracewing,
6. Henry Chadwick finds the wandering monk “an irresponsible, disturbing
element” as early as the fourth century: see The Early Church (Harmondsworth:
7. Virginia Burrus observes, in “Begotten, Not Made”: Conceiving Manhood in
Late Antiquity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), that in Athanasius
of Alexandria’s fourth-century life of Antony, “topos—place itself—mediates
between the cultivated body and civic culture of man” (p. 77). Benedict’s
anxieties are to be understood within this tradition.
8. Aelred of Rievaulx, Rule of Life for a Recluse, trans. Mary Paul MacPherson,
in Aelred of Rievaulx: Treatises and Pastoral Prayer (Kalamazoo: Cistercian,
10. John Cassian, De institutis coenobiorum 10.2, in Giorgio Agamben, Stanzas,
trans. Ronald L. Martinez (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
that “the dull sadness of monasteries wore an emptiness into the soul of the
monks, known in the Middle Ages as acedia . . .It is a loathing not of God but
in him” (p. 86).
11. Bonaventure, Brevisloquium 3.9; see Morton W. Bloomfield, The Seven
12. The citation is from Ezekiel 16:49. See Bella Millet and Jocelyn Wogan-
Browne eds., Medieval English Prose for Women (Oxford: Oxford University
13. Peter F. Dsembowski, La vie de Sainte Marie l’Egyptienne: Versions en ancien et
en moyen français (Geneva: Droz, 1977), p. 21. All references within my text
will be to the line numbers of version T, pp. 33–66; the translations (and all
errors therein) are entirely mine.
14. The description of Mary’s pre-repentance life of prostitution as “hyper-
bolique” and “perverse” is from Brigitte Cazelles, “Modèle ou mirage: Marie
15. Notice, too, how Marie is the object of luxuria, which grabs her: she is, as it
were, the vice’s passive agent. On the use of luxuria in a homoerotic con-
text, with an emphasis on the difficulty of defining it, see Mark D. Jordan’s
The Invention of Sodomy in Christian Theology (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1997). Albert the Great, according to Jordan’s reading,
argues that luxuria consists in the misuse of the “generative power” (p. 128);
though a restriction of most twelfth-century notions of the vice, it resonates
deeply with the argument I develop about Jehan Bouche d’Or later in this chapter.


21. It is possible, however, to conceive of a less charitable version of this community, one in which heteronormative masculinity would take shape through the shared spectacle of the female body. Such a reading might find echoes in Linda Williams’s eloquent reading of stag film in *Hard Core: Power, Pleasure, and the Frenzy of the Visible*, second edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 58–92. In a characteristic passage, Williams writes, “The visual pleasure of the stag film might thus be described as a prolonged oscillation between two poles of pleasure. The first is inherited from, but more extensive than, the striptease: it is the pleasure of the collective male group expressing its heterosexual desire for the bodies of women on display. In this pleasure the woman’s body mediates the achievement of masculine identity. The second pole of pleasure [sic] consists in moving toward, but never fully achieving, identification with a male protagonist who performs sexual acts with the female body that shows itself to the viewer” (p. 80).


23. Here I want to mark my appreciation for Virginia Burrus’ recent eroticized engagement (of a very different order from Uitti’s) with the corpus of late antique lives of “holy harlots.” At one point in *The Sex Lives of Saints* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003), Burrus observes, “We have, perhaps, been unwilling to surrender to the power of the unabashed (possibly even unrepentant) pleasure that inheres in these texts. For what is conversion itself, if not a form of seduction—a conquest matched by an acquiescence to conquest, whether by a man or a God? Are the asymmetrical relations of power effected by seduction not, furthermore, peculiarly reversible? (Is the saint not marked equally by her seductiveness and her seducibility?)” (p. 131). My comments, in what follows, are merely
intended to flesh out phenomenologically and spatially the account of seduction that Burrus begins to give in her book.

24. Michel de Certeau, “Une variante: l’édification hagio-graphique,” in *L’Écriture de l’histoire* (Paris: Gallimard, 1975), p. 282. Certeau’s thesis also seems to articulate in narrative terms something akin to the way in which, in Leo Steinberg’s reading, Christ’s infant body is “at all times the Incarnation—very man, very God” (p. 10), as well as the repeated visual connections between the first and last wounds of the Circumcision and Passion. (These connections are corroborated textually in the *Legenda Aurea* and elsewhere: see Steinberg, *Sexuality*, p. 57.) There is no real process of becoming between Circumcision and Passion, unless it is a becoming-apparent.


27. That a bodily turn might mark a new mode of saintly visibility is also suggested by Hubert Damisch’s account of the frescoes attributed to Giotto in the church of San Francesco at Assisi, in *A Theory of /Cloud/: Toward a History of Painting*, trans. Janet Lloyd (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002). We know that Francis appears to the monks in the Arles chapter house in an extraordinary way (i.e., as an apparition, an inflection of the sensible beyond conventional materiality) because he enters the frame from the right, when the entire narrative sequence of the frescoes has been oriented from the left: “When he does turn back in this fashion, thereby contradicting the general orientation of the cycle, the movement is clearly designed to signify a break with the past: the march of history proceeds from left to right” (p. 96).


33. All references here are made to Paris MS Arsenal 3516, as transcribed by Brigitte Cazelles.

34. Ellen Swanberg, “*Oraisons* and Liaisons: Romanesque Didacticism in *La Vie de Sainte Marie l’Egyptienne*,” *Romance Notes* 23.1 (Fall 1982): 70.


37. A similar link between repetition and idleness can be found in the closing lines of the thirteenth-century Italian poet Iacopone da Todi’s laud 21, “La Bontà’tenfinita vòl enfinito amore,” in which the lyric voice practically stutters, “O time, time, time, in how much evil is he submerged who does not govern you wisely, spending you in idleness!” (O tempo, tempo, tempo, en quanto mal sumerge / a chi non te correge, passano te ozïato;

38. See, too, the discussion of Iacopone’s tongue, the papal anus, and the intervening page in chapter 3, “Tongues and Tails.”


41. John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock write, citing Summa contra Gentiles IV.41 (7), (11), (12), that “a hand [as opposed to an axe, which would be an ‘entirely accidental instrument of the soul’] is rather an ‘organic’ instrument of the soul,” and “‘the tongue is the intellect’s own organ.’” See Truth in Aquinas (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 71.

42. Milbank and Pickstock, Truth, p. 83: “There are certain hints that the ontological reversal accomplished by the Incarnation pivots about touch. We have already seen that the absolutely new ontological possibility realized by the hypostatic union is compared by [Aquinas] to the conjoining of a hand to a person as his ‘proper instrument’ of touch and formation. As a ‘proper accident’, this hand is involved in the event and events of touching, which are contingent and yet fully belong to the person who touches. Likewise the human nature comes, in time, to inhere in the Logos, yet now existentially belongs to it, in the most absolute sense.”

43. Milbank and Pickstock, Truth, p. 71.

44. For Aquinas all sensation is a kind of touch. See Milbank and Pickstock, Truth, p. 77.


46. Duby, Private Life, p. 520.


49. Certeau, Mystic Fable, p. 70; Fable mystique, p. 97. His emphasis.


51. Certeau, Mystic Fable 82; Fable mystique, p. 110.

52. Duby remarks, cursorily but significantly, that “idleness was particularly dangerous for such feeble creatures [as women]” (Private Life, p. 79).

53. Indeed, what is “retraite” here is as much (etymologically, as “re-trahere”) a drawing as a drag, not just the hinge between the obscene and the sacred, but the point at which they smear. See chapter 4.


55. All the same, its enclosed and enclosive dimension distinguishes this extension from what Catherine Pickstock describes as the “new [Cartesian] construal of material reality as extensio, an homogeneous quantity divided into degrees
of motion and mechanical causes, and grasped fully in its givenness” (After Writing, p. 63). The pregnant princess amply demonstrates the fallacy of any attempt to grasp fully and immediately an only quantitatively differentiated given.


58. In contrast, in the Old French life of Saint Euphrosine, another transvestite monk, it is the (female) saint’s masculinity—as the product of “clothes, language, gestures”—which is desired by the monastic community. In Simon Gaunt’s reading, “It is less her body that is desired, than an image of masculinity that turns out to be performative. Not only is the monks’ desire homosexual, but for Euphrosine’s body to be desirable to them, it needs to be dressed in men’s clothes.” If Euphrosine’s fellow monks are content to look at her, not through her, the same could be said of Marina; and yet it is precisely the surface which is so troubling (and so temporally and spatially ambivalent) here. It is not a question of stripping off the masculine accident to arrive at a (temporally lost but eternally recuperated) feminine substance; rather, Marina’s genital ‘e’ marks her femininity as between accident and substance, utterly contingent yet integral to her bodily specificity. Her genital display, this complex superficial show, is thus far more radical than queer performativity. See Gaunt, “Straight Minds / ‘Queer Wishes’ in Old French Hagiography: La vie de Sainte Euphrosine,” in Carla Freccero and Louise Fradenburg, eds., Premodern Sexualities (New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 165 [155–73].

59. See my discussion of Nancy’s Sense of the World at the end of chapter 3.


63. Lacoue-Labarthe, Poetry, p. 96; Poésie, p. 136.


66. See my discussion of intimate immensity in the final section of chapter 4.

67. This occurs, for example, at line 869 in Jehan’s life.

en effet... l’image spéculaire semble être le seuil du monde visible, si nous nous fions à la disposition en miroir que présente dans l’hallucination et dans le rêve l’imago du corps propre..."

Chapter 3 Spaced Out


2. For Ernesto Menestò, also the editor of the existing medieval lives of Iacopone, he is a “uomo emblematico del suo secolo”; see “La figura di Iacopone da Todi,” in *Iacopone da Todi: Atti del XXXVII Convegno storico internazionale, Todi, 8–11 ottobre 2000* (Spoleto: Centro italiano di studi sull’alto medioevo, 2001), p. 3 [3–19].


11. This symmetry of the senses is in marked contrast to the way in which Iacopone inscribes a conflict between vision and sound at the heart of mystical sensation: see “Close to the Knives,” later in this chapter.

13. Iacopone, in fact, speaks of mortifying his body as “marcerar meo aseno” at 43.40, according to the numbering of Franco Mancini, ed., Laude (Bari: Laterza, 1974).


15. Jean Leclercq notes, in the context of Romuald’s importance for Damian, that “As in the times of the Desert Fathers and the companions of St Francis, and each time that a powerful movement of religious fervor appears, an array of unexpected, paradoxical situations present themselves, which couldn’t have been imagined if they hadn’t been born of the [saint’s] life itself. Those which Peter Damian brings out are marked by the austerities proper to the milieu to which he testifies. [Comme au temps des Pères du désert et des compagnons de saint François, et chaque fois qu’apparaît un puissant mouvement de ferveur, une foule de situations inattendues, paradoxaux, se présentent, qu’on n’aurait pu imaginer si la vie même ne les avait fait naître. Celles que rapporte Pierre Damien sont marquées par les austérités propres au milieu dont il est le témoin.]” See Saint Pierre Damien: Hermite et Homme d’Église (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1960), p. 204.


18. On the extent to which speech and (at times sexual) violence were intertwined in medieval pedagogy, see the essays by Jody Enders and Marjorie Curry Woods, in Rita Copeland, ed., Criticism and Dissent in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996).


20. Although Leyser is translating from Tabacco’s 1957 critical edition, I am citing (given its relative accessibility) the Latin of PL 144: 469 (O995A–0995B).

NOTES


25. The church as body and building thus bears a strong resemblance to the park landscape enclosed by sky in Tillman’s *Haunted Houses*: “Everything in the park seemed sharp, crisp, enclosed by the cold blue sky. The landscape was a jigsaw puzzle whose pieces could all break apart if touched” (p. 36). The difference lies, of course, in Damian’s disavowal: the enclosure is abject inasmuch as it is thought to be unbroken.


27. Damian thus provides a striking premodern example of what Lee Edelman describes, in *Homographesis: Essays in Gay Literary and Cultural Theory* (New York: Routledge, 1994), as the “double operation” (or what I would call the ambivalence) of homographesis as both a regulatory inscription of sexuality and the difference internal to this inscription. “Invoking, in this way, the aleatory collocations of metonymy to call into question metaphor’s claim for the correspondence of essences or positive qualities present in themselves, homographesis (as it articulates the [differential] logic of the homograph) works to deconstruct homographesis (as it designates the marking of a distinct and legible homosexual identity)” (p. 13).

28. Bill Burgwinkle summarizes Peter’s obsession with total visibility as follows: “Peter claims the ability to see what cannot be seen (omnia visibilia et invisibilia), to see what others must wait until death to see, even to see what the sinner cannot see in himself.” See his essay, “Visible and Invisible Bodies and Subjects in Peter Damian,” in Emma Campbell and Robert Mills, eds., *Troubled Vision* (New York: Palgrave, 2004), p. 48 [47–62].

29. Despite their radically different aims, Damian’s logic here is similar to that of Alarcón’s “cerradura,” as described at the end of chapter 1.

30. Bruno Roy alleges, provocatively if ambiguously, that for medieval culture “obscenity was not moral, but rhetorical” (p. 317).


32. See Carolyn Dinshaw on kissing and the disavowed homoerotics of the gift in *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight*: “A Kiss Is Just a Kiss,” *Diacritics* 24.2–3 (Summer/Fall 1994): 205–26. Michael Camille similarly writes, in “Gothic Signs and the Surplus: The Kiss on the Cathedral,” in Daniel Poirion and Nancy Freeman Regalado, eds., *Contexts: Style and Values in Medieval Art and Literature*, special edition of *Yale French Studies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), p. 151 [151–70], “During the Middle Ages the kiss was paradigmatic of the rich potentiality of the sign since it always led directly to something else.” Damian’s mouth-to-mouth metonymy shows that what the kiss leads to is always mixed up in where it is led from: in the
kiss, my mouth is dragged into yours. See the exposition of this sense of drag in the first section of chapter 4, “Dragging the Song.”

33. See Jordan, Sodomy, pp. 60–61.

34. See Phaedrus, trans. Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995). At 255d, Socrates announces, “Then the boy is in love, but has no idea what he loves. He does not understand, and cannot explain, what has happened to him. It is as if he had caught an eye disease from someone else, but could not identify the cause; he does not realize that he is seeing himself in the lover as in a mirror” (p. 46). So too does Damian’s cleric risk seeing his reflection in the ostensible object of vision.

35. See Jehan’s “hand and mouth” problem in chapter 2.

36. Indeed, he saw it in flames (“vidit”): Damian, Life, p. 310; Damian, Vita, PL 49.470.0995C.


38. Benedict, Regula, PL 66.38.245B–46A.

39. These four versions can be found side by side in The Complete Parallel Bible (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).


41. The translation is mine, inasmuch as this episode is not included in the published version of Leyser’s translation.

42. Chapter 61 of Damian, Vita, PL 49.476.1001C-D.

43. Rhetorica 4.32.43, trans. Caplan, p. 337. The examples given are, first, calling Italians “Italy” and Greeks “Greece”; second, calling wealth “gold or silver or ivory.”


45. See Milbank and Pickstock, Truth, pp. 61–63.


47. What I am suggesting here is not far from Denys Turner’s claim, in The Darkness of God: Negativity in Christian Mysticism (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 7, that “in the classical period of medieval theology, the metaphors of negativity are interpenetrated by a high Neoplatonic dialectics of negativity.” Metonymy, in my analysis, functions as the point at which metaphor and neoplatonic dialectics (of participation) meet.

48. All references to Iacopone’s poems cite laud and verse according to Mancini’s edition. The translations are mine. An English version of the Laude nonetheless exists (trans. Serge and Elizabeth Hughes; New York: Paulist, 1982), which captures Iacopone’s spirit while remaining too free for close textual scrutiny.


50. After all, Briareus’s “volto,” literally what has been turned, is the specific locus of the ferocity denied here to the pilgrim’s vision.
51. This is also an anti-dualistic gesture, and thus fully in the Augustinian tradition from which Bonaventure also draws heavily.


56. See the discussion of Wojnarowicz at the end of this chapter.

57. “Quindi, se mezura è senza dubbio un elemento direttivo del sistema cortese, essa va presa in quel che ha di sociale, di erotico, di etico, di estetico, non di filosofico.” Among other things, he is warning here against taking too strictly the vaguely Augustinian provenance of this love of moderation. Ivos Margoni, Fin’amors, mezura e cortezia: Saggio sulla lirica provenzale del XII secolo (Milan: Cisalpino, 1965), p. 141.

58. Francis, in Bonaventure’s account, is almost always seen either on the road or in a monastic enclosure. The importance of unexpected movement across the enclosure’s threshold, akin to what we see in the French hagiographies discussed above, becomes evident in an episode from Chapter 11 of the Legenda Maior: “Another time it happened that two friars came from a distance to the hermitage of Greccio to see the man of God and to receive his blessing which they had desired for a long time. When they came and did not find him, because he had already withdrawn and gone to his cell, they went away quite desolate. And behold, as they were leaving, although he could not have known anything of their arrival or departure through any human perception, he came out of his cell contrary to his custom, shouted after them and blessed them in Christ’s name with the sign of the cross, just as they had desired.” The Life of St. Francis, in Bonaventure, The Soul’s Journey into God, The Tree of Life, The Life of St. Francis, trans. Ewert Cousins (New York: Paulist, 1982), pp. 288–89 [177–327].

59. Damisch, Cloud, p. 108.

60. Indeed, Damisch’s argument hinges upon the extent to which Renaissance perspectivism would reduce “both the forms distributed within that [pictorial] space and the intervals between them to an interplay of identifiable and substitutable elements” (p. 123). The discontinuity that enclosure—or, here, cloud—introduces would thus make room for what defies representation, for the singularity of an event that linear perspective would seek to fix in an infinitely and indifferently replicable matrix. See my remarks on the
implications of this for contemporary literary studies in the afterword, “In Closing.”

61. See Turner, The Darkness of God, pp. 102–34. Hierarchy here is understood in its Dionysian sense, as a dynamic chain of degrees of participation in created reality.

62. “. . . si alluderà alla possibilità di accedere, senza riprovazione, a prelature e a posti di mondana responsabilità.” See the entry under “pertuso” in the glossary to the critical edition (p. 786).

63. See Laud 55 (p. 176) in their translation: “With all my asslicking around the Roman Court, / I’ve gotten myself thrown into prison.”

64. I cannot resist pointing out that, to this day, the anus and surrounding flesh of a turkey can be referred to as the “pope’s nose.” I am indebted to my grandmother, Winifred Pounds, for this insight.


66. The reference appears amid a list of vicious loves in Laud 66: “O submerged land, Sodom and Gomorrah, let he who accepts your friendship run to your side!” (o somersa contrata, Sogdoma e Gomorra, / en tua schera se 'n curra chi prende tua amistate!: 66.13–14).

67. See, in this light, Ross Chambers’s discussion of the extended, cancerous tongue on the cover of Eric Michaels’s AIDS diary in Facing It: AIDS Diaries and the Death of the Author (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998). Iacopone’s irony similarly seeks to spur his readers to action through its inscription of ambivalence at the heart of the apparently nonproblematic, disclosive text.


69. “Homo-ness” alludes to Leo Bersani’s assertion, in Homos (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), that “Lack, then, may not be inherent in desire; desire in homo-ness is desire to repeat, to expand, to intensify the same” (p. 149). In this way, Iacopone’s anal poetics does not seek to incorporate what it lacks; rather, it repeats, expands, and intensifies what it has, but what it never has purely or alone. The papal hole abides in and is intensified by Iacopone’s speech, much like Paolo’s body next to Francesca (see afterword, “In Closing”).

70. In Eros and Allegory (Kalamazoo: Cistercian, 1995), Denys Turner has described some of the precedents for Iacopone’s account of negativity in mystical eros, among them the association of affectivity with negation by Thomas Gallus in his thirteenth-century commentary on the Song of Songs (p. 54).

71. Turner, Darkness, p. 35.


74. The five senses here compete to see which of them can most thoroughly renounce itself: “their frivolous delight / each one must abbreviate” (la loro delettanza leve / ciascheun brig’ abriviare; 19.3–19.4).

75. Iacopone declares that he has “abbreviated” the seven “figures” of the cross shown to Saint Francis “in order to count them”: “.iole abbreviate / per poterle contare” (40.9–40.10).

76. “O Measureless one, reduced to such brevity; / to see all of heaven and earth in one little vessel!” (O esmesuranza en breve redutta, / cel, terra tutta veder ’nn un vasello; 44.57–44.58).

77. In this light, the explicitly abbreviating effect of dwelling close to the knives in laud 43 could be read as the knives’ own entrance into discourse, participating in the speaking soul.

78. See, in this regard, the account of immediacy in chapter 5.


82. Angela, Memorial, pp. 205–06.

83. See Oliver Davies’s account of Eckhart in “Later Medieval Mystics,” The Medieval Theologians, ed. G. R. Evans (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), pp. 226–27 [221–32]. Iacopone may not be unique among male mystics in using the language of childbirth to speak of mystical union, but his emphasis on ecstatic generation does break with what Caroline Bynum has described as the Cistercian preference for the nurturing aspect of motherhood (see “The Cistercian Conception of Community,” p. 150). Bynum’s reading remains useful in mapping the differences between the Cistercian tradition and the later affective literature, especially Franciscan, inspired by it. On the Franciscan debt to the white monks, specifically in their “devotion to the person of Jesus,” see R.W. Southern, Western Society and the Church in the Middle Ages (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970), p. 273.

85. Jesus is “stretched out” at the column to which he is bound when beaten, and then again at the cross, in chapters 35–37 of Margaret’s *Page of Meditations*.

86. Jennifer Fisk Rondeau cites a fourteenth-century *lauda* that reproduces many of these connections, even to the point of rhyming “parturisco” with “rapisco.” See “Conducting Gender,” p. 200.


89. Moore offers a disturbing complement to Bynum’s account of Jesus as mother in his study of Yahweh as bodybuilder. “So hypermasculine did he become that his body ceased to be merely male, and began to sprout female parts. Far from being assuaged, his insecurities about this masculinity now had something new to feed on—a pair of female breasts.” Stephen D. Moore, *God’s Gym: Divine Male Bodies of the Bible* (New York and London: Routledge, 1996), p. 100.

90. Santi has, of course, a more conservative notion of gender complementarity in mind: see pp. 58–59 of “La mistica di Iacopone da Todi.”


93. Similarly, Cioran argues, “The saints are not a-sexual but trans-sexual” (p. 19).

94. If, for Kaja Silverman (“Total Visibility”), we are fundamentally and irreconcilably “four, not two: seer, seen, touching, being touched,” Iacopone shows the extent to which these ontological modes may nonetheless miraculously participate in one another.


98. David Wojnarowicz demonstrates how such a spaced-out look mitigates against solipsism in *Close to the Knives: A Memoir of Disintegration* (New York: Serpent’s Tail, 1991), pp. 109–10: “These days I see the edge of mortality. The edge of death and dying is around everything like a warm halo of light sometimes dim sometimes irradiated. I see myself seeing death. It’s like a transparent celluloid image of myself is accompanying me everywhere I go. I see my friends and I see myself and I see breath coming from my lips and the plants are drinking it and I see breath coming from my chest and everything is fading, becoming a shadow that may disappear as the sun goes down.” We cannot forget that it is death, not God, that prompts Wojnarowicz to see and stretch this ontological threshold; nonetheless, there is no nihilism here. Death participates in life, frames it for view: to see, however dimly and incompletely, with the eyes and words of the dead.
(among them Wojnarowicz himself) is the properly political challenge Wojnarowicz poses against the (homophobic, AIDS-collusive) cult of pure, unaborrowed vision and transparency.


**Chapter 4 Lyric Enclosures**

1. It is also worth noting that the miraculous oral ink of Jehan Bouche d’Or’s life appears in an instance of dragging, first of the pen from the saint’s mouth, and then of the saint’s hand before his eyes. See “Hand to Mouth,” the third section of chapter 2.
2. See chapter 3 for a more detailed engagement with *Ad Herennium* 4.32.43.
4. See chapter 3, especially “Holes in the Wall: Peter Damian.”
10. See my discussion of participation in the final pages of chapter 1, especially “Participation: here.”
15. For a further discussion of opposition, this time in relation to metonymy, see the final section of this chapter, “Entering Community.”

16. Likewise, in Fear and Trembling, one sees an antiphrastic fatherhood, which emerges (and fades) in the wake of the son’s disappearance. Kierkegaard speaks, as Johannes de Silentio, to Abraham: “you had to draw the knife before you kept Isaac,” but the point is not the keeping of Isaac but precisely the drawing of the knife. See the translation of Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 23.

17. See chapter 1, especially “The Miracle and the Fetish” and “Against and Above,” for a fuller discussion of how metonymic participation undoes the distinction between the monstrous and the miraculous, against (and above) fetishism.

18. “‘Articulation’ means, in some way, ‘writing,’ which is to say, the inscription of a meaning whose transcendence or presence is indefinitely and constitutionally deferred.” See Jean-Luc Nancy, “Literary Communism,” in The Inoperative Community (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), p. 80.


21. My translation; Italian text from Goldin, German and Italian Lyrics, pp. 294–95.

22. See chapter 1, “Ambivalence.”

23. Nancy, Inoperative Community, p. 79.


26. It is in this spirit that Sarah Spence describes troubadour lyric as “sing[ing] of the frustration of an orator who is not in control of his audience” in Rhetorics of Reason and Desire, p. 130. Indeed, in Guinizzelli, the audience sings ecstatically through the singer.

27. See chapter 3, “The Threshold of Enclosure.”

28. In a sensitive recent study on Guinizzelli’s “restlessness,” Guido Guinizzelli: Stilnovo inquieto (Naples: Liguori, 2000), Pietro Pelosi reads Guinizzelli’s response to Bonagiunta as an elaboration, beyond a merely analogical neoplatonic hierarchy, of an “isomorphism” which connects various elements in this hierarchy into a homogeneous whole. Let me insist that this is not what I am proposing here. The metonymic dimension of restraint and drag does not reduce its constituent terms to what Pelosi calls “a constant,
homogeneous whole” (un tutto costante, omogeneo; p. 64). In fact, what I am calling belatedness is precisely what preserves aporia within the relation and saves it from immanence.


30. I want to insist upon the “no more or less” in Dante’s relationship to so-called minor authors, particularly inasmuch as I share Mark Doty’s discomfort with “masterpieces of a grand scale, the heroic gesture, the cosmological scheme.” See “Rooting for the Damned,” in Peter S. Hawkins and Rachel Jacoff, eds., *The Poets’ Dante* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001), p. 370. Yet whereas Doty chooses the quotidian Dante over the monumental Dante (although, to his credit, it’s as if he’d rather not have to choose Dante at all), I am more inclined to see the productivity of subordinating Dante to other texts, other arguments, negating the obviousness, the inevitability, which has come to be granted him: not to erase Dante altogether (thus effaced, his myth would only be reinforced) but basically to make him a footnote, an afterthought. In the process, it may become clear just what is at stake ideologically in his unquestioned and singular position for Italian medieval studies and Italian literary history more generally. After all, “the idea of the possible end of ideology,” in Zizek’s summary of Althusser, “is an ideological idea par excellence” (*Sublime Object* 2). It is precisely Dante’s obviousness that makes him ideologically suspect in this way. One clue to the ideological underpinnings of Dante’s status may lie in Curtius’s observation of the unprecedented number of scholars Dante assigns to heaven (p. 371). Perhaps contemporary academics are merely seeking to return the favor; perhaps, too, the very (fantastic) pleasure of an evaluation whose consequences are eternal is the dirty secret they and Dante share.

31. I am not unaware of the methodological implications of these readings, whose departure from the philological puritanism of much Italian medieval scholarship is prompted by a conviction along the lines of William Haver’s recent assertion that “if thinking accepts the ‘practical’ constraints of its institution and institutions, then thought is nothing more than the administration, or policing, of its disciplines; and in that case, we shall have not even begun to think what it is imperative to think in this time of AIDS.” My response to this imperative is much less rigorous than Haver’s, but a similar spirit animates it. See *The Body of This Death: Historicity and Sociality in the Time of AIDS* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), p. 180.


33. “Whatever” designates, for Agamben, “singularity. . .such as it is [la singolarità. . .tale qual’è].” See especially the first chapter of *La comunità che viene*, new edition (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2001), pp. 9–10.

35. Jean-Luc Nancy, *Birth to Presence*, p. 383: “Laughter is thus neither a presence nor an absence. It is the offering of a presence in its own disappearance. It is not given but offered: suspended on the limit of its own presentation.” Such suspense is saved from a Bhabha-esque “indeterminacy” by its own embeddedness in time: “laughter ‘itself’ is nothing—nothing at the center of the flower, and nothing but the blooming of the flower.” This blooming should be understood, in the context of the paragraphs that follow, as a precisely autumnal blooming: belated flower, emergence within fading.


42. In *Still Life*, pp. 21–22, Doty writes, of another still life, that “some lamp-shine of intimacy fires the whole thing, some sense of autumnal community, harvest-ripe and complete, the season moving to an ending.”


44. Huizinga speaks of the “spontaneous and passionate character” of political loyalty in the fifteenth century (*Waning*, p. 22).

45. Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, in an essay on fifteenth-century *cancioneros*, observes that literary historiography must “consider whether it wants to see—as Huizinga does—the context of ‘reception of the Middle Ages’ in Western Europe in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries as *still* late-medieval or *already* the beginning of the modern history of reception of medieval literature.” That the “still” (premodern) overlaps with the “already” (modern) is one particularly strong point of resonance between Gumbrecht’s argument and Doty’s autumnal poetics, challenging both linear historicism and sharp distinction between secondary ‘reception’ and primary textual generation, as well as (more importantly) dragging scholarship once more into song. See “Intertextuality and Autumn / Autumn and the Modern Reception of the Middle Ages,” in Marina S. Brownlee, Kevin Brownlee, and Stephen G. Nichols, eds., *The New Medievalism* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), p. 303 [301–30].


NOTES

59. Tim Dean’s article, “Strange Paradise: An Essay on Mark Doty,” http://www.english.uiuc.edu/maps/poets/a_f/doty/strange.htm, reminded me of Doty’s defiant manifesto from *Atlantis*, “Homo Will Not Inherit,” in which the speaker announces to the anonymous culprit of a homophobic poster, “. . .This city’s inescapable / gorgeous, and on fire. I have my kingdom.”
60. Haver, *Body*, p. 198. “Articulation” is to be understood, here, in Nancy’s sense: see footnote 18 to this chapter.
65. See Catherine Pickstock’s account of the “radical solipsism of the Cartesian subject,” characterized by a “written interiority,” in *After Writing*, p. 72.
66. Similarly, Ross Chambers describes how AIDS diaries “want their own insertion in a process that is open-ended and transformative.” See *Facing It*, p. 32.
67. Kaja Silverman speaks of the “good enough” as “a paradigm through which ideals can be simultaneously lived and deconstructed. To live an ideal in the mode of the ‘good enough’ is, first of all, to dissolve it into its tropes—to grasp its fundamentally figural status. Equally important, it is to understand that those tropes are only ever partially fulfillable. Finally, to embrace the principle of the ‘good enough’ is to realize that one’s partial and tropological approximation of the ideal counts most when circumstances most conspire against it.” Metonymic drag—just far enough, just late enough—is in this way just good enough. See *The Threshold of the Visible World*, pp. 4–5.
70. Mark Doty, “Lilacs in NYC,” *Sweet Machine*, p. 104. Similarly, when Doty sings, a few lines later, “You enter me / and it’s Macy’s, // some available version of infinity,” he spatializes “the infinite in finitude’s drag” as described earlier in this chapter.
Chapter 5  Nothing Between

2. For an extended queer reading of *Guigemar*, and particularly of Marie’s use of the word “surplus” to account for the discursive, social, and ultimately heteronormative nature of what happens when Guigemar has sex with his lady, see Bill Burgwinkle’s chapter on Marie de France in *Sodomy, Masculinity, and Law in Medieval Literature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 138–69.
4. For a vivid description of anchoritic life, pieced together from Julian’s text, the thirteenth-century English *Ancrene Riwle*, and Aelred of Rievaulx’s twelfth-century rule for recluses, see Grace Jantzen’s account in “The Life of an Anchoress,” the third chapter of *Julian of Norwich* (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist, 2000 [1987]), pp. 28–50. In the broadest possible terms, an anchoress (or anchorite, if a man) lived a solitary life of prayer in a room or series of rooms, often attached to a church, which she never left. Jantzen stresses that an anchoress was not, however, entirely alone: “The solitude of the anchoress.. .was not absolute, for besides giving counsel to those who consulted her she had a domestic or two in her care. Nevertheless, her special hallmark was her strict enclosure. She never left her cell, and was regularly referred to as dead to the world, shut up with Christ in his tomb” (p. 33).
5. Frederick Christian Bauerschmidt, *Julian of Norwich and the Mystical Body Politic of Christ* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999), p. 107. I want to acknowledge, as well, the debt my argument owes to the particularly felicitous phrasing of Bauerschmidt’s observation, earlier in his book, that “to be embodied is to have boundaries, but to have boundaries is also to have thresholds, points of opening into which others may enter and from which new things may proceed. It is this possibility that Julian highlights” (p. 64). This chapter is a kind of meditation on how exactly “new things may proceed” from enclosed, spatially delimited bodies.
6. All references are to chapter and page in Marion Glasscoe’s edition of the long text: Julian of Norwich, *A Revelation of Love* (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1993 [1986]).
7. Jesus speaks in chapter 27 to remind Julian that “Synne is behovabil [Sin is necessary], but al shal be wel, and al shal be wel, and al manner of thyng shal be wele” (p. 38).
9. The notion that what exceeds our singular and singularly delimited bodies might be better thought of in terms of “beside” than “beyond” owes a great deal to Eve Sedgwick’s introductory remarks in *Touching Feeling* (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2003). See my discussion of this passage toward the end of “In Closing.”

10. Julian, in this way, offers a radical theological critique of Jean–Luc Nancy’s observation, in Being Singular Plural, trans. Robert D. Richardson (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), that creation ex nihilo “signifies two things: on the one hand, it signifies that the ‘creator’ itself is the nihil; on the other, it signifies that this nihil is . . . the very origin [provenance], and destination, of some thing in general and of everything” (p. 16). The French text, from Être singulier pluriel (Paris: Galilée, 1996), reads as follows: “Cela signifie bien plutôt . . . d’une part que le ‘créateur’ lui-même est le nihil, d’autre part que ce nihil n’est pas, logiquement, quelque chose ‘d’où’ le créé pourrait provenir, mais la provenance elle-même, et la destination, de quelque chose en général et de toute chose” (p. 35). That is, Nancy remains invested in a logic of synecdochic reduction to and from a univocal nothing, “ce nihil,” where Julian inscribes difference in the heart of this nothing.

11. This is Giorgio Agamben’s summary, as found in The Coming Community, trans. Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 94.

12. For an eloquent articulation of addition as a mode of the Incarnation, see Catherine Pickstock’s chapter on “Truth and touch” in Pickstock and Milbank, Truth in Aquinas, especially pp. 86–87: “Through the Incarnation, it is revealed that divine goodness is not simply subjective self-giving as displayed in creation. . . . not just the substantive relational gathering of the Logos which is the ground of creation, but also the constitution of the Logos through ‘assumed additions’ which are neither logically essential according to a given nature nor merely willed accidents.”


14. Thomas Aquinas makes a similar claim about the eucharist. At Summa Theologiae IIIa.75.1, he notes, “Christ’s body is not in this sacrament in the same way as a body is in a place, which by its dimensions is commensurate with the place; but in a special manner which is proper to this sacrament.”

15. See, for example, his observation that “there is an immediate equivalence between the orientation of the visual field and the awareness of one’s own body as the potentiality of that field,” in Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (1958; repr. New York and London: Routledge, 2002), p. 239.


20. See also the discussion of Mark Doty’s Choral Society in chapter 4, “Burning, belatedly.”

**In Closing**

4. In “Medieval/Postmodern: HIV/AIDS and the Temporality of Crisis,” in Steven F. Kruger and Glenn Burger, eds., *Queering the Middle Ages* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), pp. 252–83, Kruger employs the rhetoric of both contiguity and enclosure in his exposition of the temporal crisis provoked and embodied by HIV/AIDS and its implications for historicism: “What is needed is a different sort of historicism...where...phenomena in the present might be connected to both the past and the future without being thereby projected into a wholly alien moment” (p. 276); “doing history can mean a commitment not just to excavating the past but to considering how the past inheres in the present in such a way as to demand that the present, and thus the future, be thought otherwise” (p. 278).
7. “...sera donc celui qui, dans une situation donnée, garantira au mieux le fonctionnement de la mémoire, d’abord de l’orateur lui-même, puis de son auditoire.”
11. Edelman, *Homographesis*, p. 13: “Bearing no singular identity, the homograph...precipitates into meaning by virtue of its linear, its metonymic, relation to a context that seems to validate, which is to say, 'naturalize,' one denotation over another.”


13. Intense attenuation seems the best way of paraphrasing Ricco’s argument, itself a kind of Foucauldian reading of Nancy and Agamben, that “this attenuation [ascesis] is not a reduction or a suicidal renunciation of self, but rather an intense desubjectification, in which notions of individuality in the form of a subject, of intersubjectivity in the form of intimacy, and of collectivity in the form of community are rendered impossible” (p. 21). It should be clear from my reading of Augustine in chapter 4 that intimacy may have a mode beyond both intersubjectivity and nomadic anonymity: this mode would be that of the *intimior intimo meo*, one’s own excess of oneself.


16. See, for example, Ricco, *Lure*, p. 3.


19. This description of the immanent, quantifiable field owes a great deal to Frances Ferguson’s *Pornography, the Theory: What Utilitarianism Did to Action* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), which nonetheless does not just describe but, in its rigorously historicist method, enacts the kind of comparison I’ve sketched out here.


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