Notes

1 Methodology and case selection

1. These theories suggest that the larger dominant economic units wield considerable influence over the well-being of the locality as a whole, as they provide the employment and other benefits on which a given city depends.

2. Institutional analyses have been a particular growth industry for scholarship of post-communist states, considering the variable implications of different institutional choices for their prospects of democratic consolidation (Offe 1996). The literature on post-communist institutional choices, however, has largely dealt with national-level institutions. Local government has received much less extensive treatment aside from the many descriptive or policy prescriptive studies.

3. He drew the concept from the work of James Coleman (1990).


5. One possibility is the approach that Robert Dahl used in his classic study of New Haven. Dahl chose to study policies arguably most salient for the local citizenry, namely urban redevelopment and public education, as well as political nominations. A classic study of Birmingham by Kenneth Newton focused on three issue areas: housing, education and race relations (1976). These issue areas are important, concern large numbers of people and involve substantial sums (Judge 1995: 22). Dahl’s focus on these fields has been criticised on the grounds that other important issue areas were left out of the research because they were turned into ‘non-issues’ by certain business or other interests in the city (Judge 1995: 17). Numerous other methodological complexities of evaluating local performance exist (Clark et al. 1981; Clark and Ferguson 1981).

6. For an overview of the impact of decentralization on social policy in Hungary, see also Kremer et al. (2002).

7. Other studies provide further evidence of this practice (Kopányi et al. 1999: 9, 21).

8. As of 1989, 16.9 per cent people lived in cities of up to 50,000 people (considered to be small); 11.8 per cent in cities of 50–99,000 people (medium); and 71.3 per cent in cities of over 100,000 people (large cities).


2 Local government performance in social policy

1. According to the head of the department of social work, ‘before 1989, the Czechoslovak social system rather resembled a health care system. The system was focused on stationary centres for elderly people, most social workers were nurses, and these homes for elderly people looked like hospitals where residents were expected to die soon.’ Personal interview with Helena Herbstova, May 2002.


4. This despite the fact that Ústí is similar to the other towns surveyed in terms of personnel shortages. With a total number of 77 employees, the Ústí social administration appears to be very lean compared to other Czech towns of similar size. For example, the number of social administration staff in the town of Liberec is 92; in Olomouc, the town social administration has 109 staff.


6. For example, between 2000 and 2002, Spirála successfully applied for funding in the amount of 2,262,400 Czech crowns, or over 75,000 euros, from the national government. Information provided by the Ministry of Social Affairs.

7. According to the plan of communal care, in 2000 the local government advertised a grant to initiate the founding of the Centre. Moreover, the head of the Centre told us that the local government supported the Centre in its search for an appropriate building. Personal interview, January 2003. For details see http://www.volny.cz/spirala.cki/dotace.htm (accessed 30 January 2003).

8. In 2000, the facility’s budget amounted to over two million Czech crowns (roughly 70,000 euros).

9. These projects relate to various segments of local society, such as elderly people, hospitals or the unemployed, http://dcul.cz (accessed 30 January 2003).

10. For more details, see the DC’s annual reports at http://dcul.cz (accessed 30 January 2003).


16. Personal interview, 22 January 2002. Another of Kirillov’s innovations is to create a unified system of childcare that would replace the current system, which divides responsibilities over childcare between education, health and police institutions.


21. In 1995, Karviná registered 1911 people who, due to insufficient income, were eligible for social benefits. By the end of 2001, the number had risen to 4673. Sociální problematika–rozsah poskytované podpory z prostředků státu a města, služby sociální péče pro občany města (Karviná: Město Karviná, odbor sociálních věcí a zdravotnictví, March 2000); Sociální problematika–rozsah poskytované podpory z prostředků státu a města, služby sociální péče pro občany města (Karviná: Město Karviná, odbor sociálních věcí a zdravotnictví, February 2002). We would like to thank Blanka Dadoková for making these materials available to us.

22. Information provided by Blanka Dadoková, Head of the Social Department. Personal interview, January 2003.

23. With 27 per cent, the neighbouring town of Havířov, another coal-mining town, ranked second. Information provided by Milan Lipner, Moravian-Silesian Institute for Social Analysis, personal interview, January 2003.


26. They may live there for up to two years.

27. In 2001, the local government spent 2,627,000 Czech crowns (over 87,500 euros) for the operation of the DMD. In recent years, this sum has slightly increased. Sociální problematika–rozsah poskytované podpory (Karviná: Město Karviná, odbor sociálních věcí a zdravotnictví, February 2002), 10. The DMD also applies for financial support from the Ministry of Social Affairs. For instance, in 1998 the DMD received over 155,000 Czech crowns (roughly 5200 euros). In 2000, it obtained 25,000 crowns (800 euros). Sociální problematika–rozsah poskytované podpory z prostředků státu a města, služby sociální péče pro občany města (Karviná: Město Karviná, odbor sociálních věcí a zdravotnictví, 1999, 2001).
28. In the last two years, the Ministry has provided SARA with over 2.5 million crowns, or roughly one third of its budget. (Information provided by the Ministry of Social Affairs, Prague.) Regional and local authorities also support the facility financially. For the first time, in 2001 the local government contributed 50,000 crowns (over 1600 euros) to the budget of over 3.1 million (roughly 105,000 euros). Ibid., 11.

29. Personal interview, April 2002.

30. For more detailed information see the Centre's website at www.sweb.cz/ pppkarvina/ (accessed 30 January 2003).


33. *Sytuacja rodzin jeleniogórskich* (Jelenia Góra: Specjalistyczny Ośrodek Pracy Socjalnej w Jeleniej Górze: Biuletyn SOPS Nr. 8/1999), 39. We would like to thank Barbara Wielichowska for making this study available to us.

34. Ibid., 31. This assessment was given in the district unemployment office report (*Powiatowy Urząd Pracy*), which was included in the study mentioned above, 62.

35. Ibid., 96

36. The local MOPS has 59 employees which is lower than in Ústí, where there are 77 social staff members, although the two towns have similar population sizes.


39. According to the law, the sale of alcohol is strictly licensed, with all three tiers of self-government participating in the licence fees levied from shop owners and food stores. *Ustawa z dnia 26 października 1982 r., o wychowaniu w trzeźwości i przeciwdziałaniu alkoholizmowi* (Law on the Prevention of Alcoholism, first adopted in 1982).


42. Apart from the two institutions, there are four stationary facilities for children operated by the *powiat grodzki*: two foster homes and two institutions for married couples.


44. Personal interview with Elżbieta Hamer, December 2002.

45. For example, the Catholic Church runs at least three youth centres for children. *Budżet miasta na prawach powiatu na 2002 rok* (Jelenia Góra: Urząd Miasta, 2002), 51–3.

46. This is a result of a comparative study conducted in 2000 by the Association of Polish towns. *Pomoc społeczna w Białej Podlaskiej na tle innych miast członkowskich Związku Miast Polskich*. We would like to thank Maria Parafiniuk for making this study available to us. See also *Raport z monitorowania problemów alkoholowych w gminie miejskiej Białą Podlaska 2001* (Biała Podlaska: Urząd Miasta Białą Podlaska, Pełnomocnik ds. Zdrowia i Patologii
47. Personal interview, December 2002.
50. Ibid. The de facto figure may be even higher considering that there are social taboos on reporting family abuse.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
54. While 22,000 złoty came from the regular powiat budget, 12,000 złoty were added from the local Alcohol Prevention Programme.
55. *Działalność organizacji pozarządowych na rzecz ofiar przemocy w rodzinie* (Biała Podlaska: Urząd Miasta Biała Podlaska, Pełnomocnik ds. Zdrowia i Patologii Społecznych, 2002). In 2001, the local government supported the facility with 17,520 złoty (roughly 4,400 euros).
57. Personal interview with the Director of Dziupla, December 2002.
58. This figure was given in a questionnaire distributed among all local governments by the Państwowa Agencja Rozwiązywania Problemów Alkoholowych (State Agency For Alcohol-Related Problems), PARPA. *Roczne Sprawozdanie z działalności samorządów gminnych w zakresie profilaktyki i rozwiązywania problemów alkoholowych w 2001 roku* (Biała Podlaska: Urząd Miasta Biała Podlaska, March 2002), 8; *Sprawozdanie z Realizacji Programu Profilaktyki Rozwiązywania Problemów Alkoholowych Gminy Miejskiej Biała Podlaska w 2001 roku* (Biała Podlaska: Biuro Pełnomocnika ds Zdrowia i Patologii Społecznych, Komisja Rozwiązywania Problemów Alkoholowych, March 2002), 15.
60. Personal interview with Teréz Sütő, Head of Social Department, Sopron, 11 February 2003.
63. According to the Head of the Social Department, after 2006 it will be mandatory for county ranking towns to maintain special/professional child welfare services.
64. Says the Director of the family shelter: ‘This [legislation] made us very sad because we would like to help these people. And this decree is a problem because there are many people in Sopron who come from the surrounding small settlements or from the Great Plain and they have been living here for years. They work, or they are in the process of looking for a job but they don’t have a permanent address because the authorities don’t let them have it. And when they get into a difficult situation, we cannot help them. The local government is trying to protect the institute by saying that this is only for people from Sopron.’ Personal interview with Rita Palotai, Director of Temporary Family Shelter, Sopron, 13 February 2003.

65. An example given by the shelter staff member illustrates this point: ‘We cannot take these families in because of the decree. We had one case where a young mother was brought up in a foster-home in Sopron and then moved to Kaposvár. When she got into crisis, she called her teachers here in Sopron and came here for help. We could take her in for only three days because she didn’t have a permanent address in town. I almost had to evict her from here. But then here is an example of how well cooperation can work sometimes: the foster home got in contact with us and they gave her a permanent address there, so she could stay here with us. She stayed here for three or four months and then moved back to Kaposvár.’ Ibid.

66. Personal interview with Teréz Sütő, Head of the Social Department, Sopron, 11 February 2003.

67. Personal interview with Mrs Ferenc Berki, Head of the Social Department, Szolnok, 6 February 2003.

68. The centre, whose work is regulated both by the 1993 family legislation and the 1997 law on child welfare, coordinates its work with CWS and the Court of Guardians.

69. Personal interview with Ilona Bozsó, Head of the Child and Youth Protection Institute, Szolnok, 6 February 2003.

3 Local government performance in economic promotion

1. The following information is based on personal interviews and the following documents: Průmyslová zóna Karviná-Nové Pole. Informativní zpráva k 31.12. 2001 (Karviná: Město Karviná, odbor majetkoprávní a rozvoje, January 2002); Strategický plan ekonomického rozvoje města Karviné–vyhodnocení k, 31.3. 2002 (Karviná: Město Karviná, April 2002).


3. Shimano (Japan), Mölnlycke (Sweden) and Belfort (Belgium).


6. In 1992, the Czech Ministry of Industry and Trade set up a network of Regional Advisory and Information Centres (RPICs). These centres provide SMEs with advisory services concerning economic and legal questions, national and international support programmes and access to foreign markets. Although in many cases these RPICs are private, for-profit companies, ministerial subsidies allow SMEs to make use of the relevant services for relatively small fees. For detailed information about the RPIC system, see Agentura pro rozvoj podnikání, www.arp.cz (accessed 30 January 2003).


8. A project called Infobusiness aims at setting up an information network of Czech and Polish SMEs on both sides of the border. In another project, businesses located in Karviná are offered the opportunity to have their own website integrated into the local business information system. Strategický plan–vyhodnocení k 31.3.2002, 22; personal interview with Martina Zbožíková, January 2003.

9. Since 1997, the Silesian University has annually published a report called Sborník výzkumných práci Ústavu malého a středního podnikání. Moreover, in recent years, the University has conducted several polls concerning the local quality of life.

10. In 2002, the town was awarded a national prize for its tourism promotion materials; personal interview with Ingrid Szczypková, January 2003.


13. Ibid., 31.

14. Lidmila Janečková et al., Kvalita života ve městě Karviné, příloha 1 (Karviná: Městský úřad, 2000), 11.

15. All information provided in this paragraph is based on: Strategia Rozwoju Jeleniej Góry (Jelenia Góra: Urząd Miejski w Jeleniej Górze, 1998).


17. Strategia Rozwoju Jeleniej Góry, 14, 15.

18. Figure contained in the monitoring report of April 2002, 8. It should be noted, however, that this sum also includes financial contributions from the state, as well as loans. Realizacja Strategii Rozwoju Jeleniej Góry (Jelenia Góra: Urząd Miasta, 2002).

19. We would like to thank Barbara Chrebor for making the list of public investment activities available to us.
20. Personal interview with Barbara Chrebor, Head of the Department of Economic Development, December 2002. PHARE stands for Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies. It was subsequently expanded to include other pre-accession countries.


23. For more details, see www.karr.pl (accessed 11 July 2003).


27. Realizacja Strategii, 8.


29. Strategia Rozwoju Jeleniej Góry, 54, 55.

30. Realizacja Strategii, 36.

31. Ibid., 51.


33. Personal interview with Václav Fridrich, Head of Economic Department, Ústí nad Labem, May 2002.

34. Altogether, the financial support from the Czech government and the EU amounted to 1.27 million euros. Information provided by the local government’s official spokesman, Právo, 19 November 2002.


37. The Chamber is institutionally and financially independent of the local government. It is funded by company membership fees.

38. Concretely, these aims and measures were to facilitate access to capital by supporting restructuring, providing subsidies and establishing a guarantee fund; to support and provide advisory and training services; to foster cooperation between SMEs and larger companies; to assist the introduction of modern technology and management; and to stir technological innovation. Komplexní projekt rozvoje malých a středních podniků (Ústí nad Labem: Okresní hospodářská komora, November 1999).

39. The first round of selection of the RPICs was conducted in 1992. It is unclear why, at that time, the then management of the OHK did not apply for the status of RPIC. In 2000, the Ministry of Industry and Trade advertised a further opportunity for private as well as public institutions to obtain the status of RPIC. Interview with Jiří Kalach, Managing Director of the OHK, January 2003. In 2002, 94 local SMEs were provided with 800 hours of advisory services. Moreover, the OHK organised two seminars with information on programmes of financial support. Zpráva o činnosti 2002 (Ústí nad Labem: Okresní hospodářská komora, 2002), 8.

40. Ibid., 9.
41. In January 2003, during personal interviews with local economic and political actors, several interviewees indicated that they suspected that the local government did not handle public tenders in a transparent way.


43. Personal interview, January 2003.


45. Between 1998 and 2001, the local council discussed the possibility of purchasing a small castle, located above the river that, after 1989, had been sold by the state to a private owner, who had neglected it. Although in April 2001 the local council decided to buy the castle for roughly 67,000 euros and to take over at least part of the cost of restoring it, during the election campaign of 2002, photos of the rundown castle tower were used by the opposition parties to challenge the ruling government’s political legitimacy. In the summer of 2002, a similar situation occurred with regard to a baroque monastery located in the town centre, when the local government did not respond to pleas from local politicians to purchase the building in order to prevent it from ‘becoming another disco or gambling house’. Mladá Fronta Dnes, 30 August 2001; Právo, 5 April 2002; Právo, 8 July 2002. In an opinion poll conducted in January 2001 by the Gallup Organization Česká republika, out of 194 respondents, 135 said the outward appearance of the town was a reason for dissatisfaction with the local government, and 59 respondents praised the town hall for having brought about an improvement in this respect. Některé výsledky projektu ‘Region a Politika’, Část Ústí nad Labem pro tiskovou konferenci na FSE UJEP Ústí nad Labem, 5 April 2001 (Ústí nad Labem: Gallup Organization Česká republika, April 2001). In January 2002, high-ranking representatives of the opposition Social Democrats started a debate on whether Ústí is an ‘ugly town’ or not. Právo, 12 January 2002, 25 January 2002.


47. On average, guests stayed for 2.9 nights, while the regional average was 3.5. Figures are taken from Statistická ročenka Ústeckého kraje 2002 (Ústí nad Labem: Český statistický úřad, Krajská reprezentace Ústí nad Labem, 2003), 182.


50. Since 2002, this department has been directly accountable to the mayor.

51. Uchwała.


56. Personal interview, December 2002.

57. Strategia Rozwoju, 16, 17.


4 Socioeconomic contexts


3. These disparities are to a large extent the product of the federation’s hyper-decentralisation in the 1990s, whereby the regions were able to retain authority over the taxation of the immobile, but high-yielding resources, such as oil or gas. Public finance theorists suggest that these resources should be the preserve of central government in order to enable redistribution of the relevant yields to poorer areas not endowed with resources (Hanson 2004).


8. Figure taken from *Prague Business Journal*, City Invest Czech 2001, Prague 2001, 188.


14. Personal interview with Tomáš Krejčí, general director of the Komunitní nádace Ústí nad Labem, January 2003.


16. Based on the EU regional policy template, the Czech Republic is divided into eight units corresponding to the NUTS-2 level. In this framework, the Ústí region, together with the Karlsbad region, forms the NUTS-2 Northwest unit, whereas the region of Moravia-Silesia is a separate NUTS-2 unit.

17. Program regionální podpory malého a středního podnikání; Program Region 2; Regiozáruka 2.


5 **Intergovernmental setting and local performance**

1. Apart from political disagreements on the concrete shape of the regions, the main factor hampering reform was the former Prime Minister Klaus’s reluctance to share political power with regional governments before the political and economic transition was completed (Vodička 1997).

2. This section is based on Ustawa z dnia 8 marca 1990 r. o samorządzie gminnym, amended several times (Poland); Act. No. LXV 1990 on Local Government, amended (Hungary); federal Law on General Principles of Local Self-Government in the Russian Federation (28 August 1995); Zákon č. 128/2000 Sb. o obcích, amended several times (Czech Republic).


6. Personal interview with Ivana Šťastná, Head of the Social Department in Ústí nad Labem, May 2002.


8. According to earlier versions of the law, the wojewoda’s competences depended on whether the local decree in question referred to the realm of municipal competences proper or to state-delegated tasks (Wollmann and Lankina 2003: 114).

9. Ustawa z dnia 11 kwietnia 2001 r. o zmianie ustaw: o samorządzie gminnym, o samorządzie powiatowym, o samorządzie województwa, o administracji rządowej w województwie oraz o zmianie niektórych innych ustaw.


12. During the process of drafting and passing the new legislation, the national Association of Towns and Municipalities (Svaz Měst a Obcí) lobbied against transferring the responsibility for legal review from the state to the regions, arguing that this would establish a hierarchy between the two tiers of self-government. Personal interview with Jaromír Jech, Deputy President of SMOČR, 16 May 2002.


16. Corruption and nepotism are also widespread with investigations revealing that organisations and enterprises in a number of municipalities had been exempt from payment of taxes and fees to local budgets for no lawful reason (Kourliandskaia, Nikolayenko and Golovanova 2001: 214).

17. Personal interview with Miroslaw Radecki, local councillor, December 2002.


22. For the Czech case, Ondřej Brdičko, Deputy Mayor of Karviná, reported on the distribution of money within the former districts. Personal interview, January 2003.

23. Helena Bogoczová, Head of the Economic Department, Karviná; and Blanka Dadoková, Head of the Social Department. Personal interviews, January 2003.
24. It should be noted that, in 1999, the share of non-tax revenues in local budgets was extraordinarily high with many municipalities selling their shares in gas and electricity companies (Nadvorníková 2002).


29. Our doubts as to the impartiality of this commission were resolved during a personal interview with Helena Herbstová, head of the Ústí department of social work. She maintained she was not aware of the names of people who sat on the commission, and so she would not know who to turn to in order to lobby for projects from Ústí. Personal interview, January 2003.

30. For more details, see the website of the Czech Ministry of Local Development, www.mmr.cz.

31. Ustawa z dnia 10 grudnia 1993 r. o finansowaniu gmin, Art. 4. See also the website of the Hungarian government, www.kormanyportal.hu; OECD Country Report, Czech Republic: Fiscal Design across Levels of Government, 25. In contrast to Poland, the Czech Republic does not have a special law on municipal finances. In 1999 and 2000, a draft law outlined by the Czech government was repeatedly rejected by the Czech parliament.

32. For the Czech Republic, see OECD, p. 26; Poland: OECD, p. 31; Hungary: OECD, p. 42.

33. Data based on OECD report, p. 42.

34. In Hungary, the distribution of revenues from the tax on motor vehicles and on property is regulated by special laws. The most important type of shared taxes, that is, personal income tax, is determined in the annual state budget.

35. See also OECD report.

36. Local governments whose per capita personal income tax revenues fall short of 90 per cent of the national average are entitled to compensation payments, while local governments with tax revenues above the national average are not equalised down.

37. OECD, pp.18–19.

38. This list included VAT, PIT, enterprise profit tax, tax share regions received from federal taxes, enterprise profit tax, forest tax, education tax and sales tax.


40. OECD, p. 47.

41. This criticism concerned several aspects of the law. While, according to the Association of Czech Towns and Municipalities (SMOČR), some paragraphs of the law remained so unclear as to make it impossible to apply it in practice, local governments objected to the idea of the central government interfering with their financial tasks (Vedral 2002).

42. The only innovation that survived the renegotiation of the law is the provision whereby local governments are not allowed to issue guarantees for loans other than those raised by municipality-owned businesses.
43. Examples are bank loans which are often gained only through disadvantageous side-payments. Many governments reportedly provide ‘friendly’ banks with additional benefits such as tax exemptions, preferential access to municipal real estate, and so on. The *vekseli* are an infringement upon existing laws. These are promissory notes that, though legally banned in 1996, in the late 1990s continued to be issued by regional as well as local governments (Freinkman, Treisman and Titov 1999: 41–2).

44. Data for Sopron not available. Data for BP are for 2001. Own calculation based on German Statistical Office information. These figures do not reflect purchasing power as of 2002, but as of August 2003. Moreover, all data concerning PPP refer to the *capital* cities, which generally have price levels significantly exceeding the national average.

45. Own calculation based on figures provided in OECD (2001), pp. 17, 23, 30.

46. Own calculation based on figures provided in OECD (2001), pp. 17, 23, 30.

47. Saratov field research material.


49. Information provided by the Czech Ministry of Social Affairs.


51. Figures include expenditure for economic promotion, road maintenance, transport, tourism and the restoration of tourist attractions.

52. Figures include investment in technical infrastructure.

53. Saratov material.

6 Parties and the politics of local performance

1. While Hungary has an estimated party survival rate of 90 per cent, and Poland close to 72 per cent, in Russia it is as low as 53 per cent (Golosov 1998: 511–12).

2. The new law mandates the setting up of uniform local structures throughout the federation.

3. Number of parties which either lost representation or, for the first time, won mandates in the council as a percentage of all parties that were represented in either of the councils.


10. For other aspects of Russian party development at the regional level, see also (Golosov 1999; Brown 1998).

11. The region was recently made to change this provision under pressure from federal government because of its ostensible violation of federal legislation (Petro 2004).

17. Personal interview with József Kéri, Head of the Economic Department, Szolnok, 6 February 2003.
18. Personal interview with Mrs Ferenc Berki, Head of the Social Department, Szolnok, 6 February 2003.
20. Personal interview with József Hruby, Deputy Mayor responsible for economic development, Sopron, 12 February 2003.
21. Personal interview with Gyula Varga, member of the Social Committee and President of the Town Development Committee, Sopron, 12 February 2003.
22. Evans and Whitefield found that the salience of economic ideology was low in voter preferences, while ethnic issues and the fate of the Hungarian diaspora were high. This might partly explain high volatility, since there is no clear social basis for party divisions (1995).
23. In general scholars have noted the high volatility of Hungarian citizens’ voting preferences, which likewise points to the instrumental, rather than ideological, nature of their vote (Tókab 1999: 155, 169).
24. As a Hungarian public administration expert put it, here ‘political difference is not between the local and the central, political difference is between the parties and the big groups in the society’. Personal interview with László Vass, Institute of Communications, Budapest, 18 March 2002.
29. For the importance of the sub-national level in exploring post-communist elites, see the article by James Hughes (1997).
30. As was the case in Russian regions (Hughes 1997).
32. Personal interview with Tamás Horváth, Institute of Public Administration, Budapest, 14 March 2002; and with Gábor Péteri, Open Society Institute, Budapest, 14 March 2002.
33. For a discussion of FIDESZ, see Kiss.
34. Ön-Önkormányzat 11, no. 12 (2001), 15.
35. Ön-Önkormányzat 11, no. 12 (2001), 16.
36. Personal interview with József Kéri, Head of the Economic Department, Szolnok, 6 February 2003.
37. Szolnok received 545,000 forints for its waste disposal facility, while Sopron received 587,000 forints for a water project. Ön-Önkormányzat 11, no. 12 (2001).

39. As a result of administrative delays, Ústí was unable to participate in external funding programmes set up in 1998. According to Tomáš Krejčí, Managing Director of the Komunitní nadace in Ústí, the most important incentive for the Aktivní politika was the realisation by the local government that it had not made use of 80 million euros provided by the CBC PHARE programme. Personal interview with Anneke Hudalla, January 2003.

40. Assessment by Miloslav Šašek, Head of the Institute for Regional and Local Development at Ústí University. Personal interview with Anneke Hudalla, January 2003.

41. Personal interview with János Lipóczki, Director of Tisza Hotel Ltd, Szolnok, 6 February 2003.

42. Ibid.

43. Personal interview with Attila Agócs, Financial Director, GİTR, Szolnok, 6 February 2003.


45. Personal interview with the Head of the Economic Department, Balashov, January 2003.


47. The apparent lack of a vibrant civil society in Szolnok is likely to foster conflictual rather than accommodative and consensual decision-making. As scholars of party politics in other settings maintain, cleavages that ‘entail multiple and neutralising loyalties’ may reduce the likelihood of party political polarisation (Sani and Sartori 1983: 331).


50. As one local entrepreneur declared: ‘I think those who are present at these events truly believe in these things. [Charity events] for nurseries, hospitals, institutions, foundations for children with cancer, Rotary Club balls. … I can go on and on. These are annual events and we all believe that we are doing a good thing and the money gets to the right place. For good causes local entrepreneurs get together and they truly do something.’ Personal interview with Tibor Josan, Director, GYSEV railway company 11 February 2003.

51. Civic education classes are taught in schools, and historical records of Novgorod’s political institutions, such as those related to district self-government, are studied in an effort to look for models for the present. Nicolai Petro, the authority on the region, argues that these efforts have borne fruit. Novgorod now boasts one of the most active NGO communities compared to other Russian regions, while surveys have revealed that regional residents also score higher on such democratic values as trust and interest in public affairs compared to the national average (Petro 2004).

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