Notes

Prelims

1. The first stage is the functional connection between the forces of production and the relations of production that comprise the economic structure.

Chapter 1


3. This is, for example, a criticism of Althusser’s (1969) concept of ‘ideological state apparatuses’.

4. Conversely, the superstructure, which includes parts of the state, is explained functionally as comprising all those non-economic phenomena whose effect is to stabilise the economic structure. The question is to what extent these are phenomena of the state, i.e. specific state institutions and/or policies.

5. Of course it does not, and cannot, do this completely. But it asserts or claims a monopoly of physical force and seeks to allow the use of physical force by private agents in civil society only within limits prescribed by state authority (i.e. typically in law).

6. It should be noted that Weber does not provide a simple narrow concept of the state in which the naked use of coercion is all. Rather he points to coercion clothed in legitimacy, and also emphasises that coercion is not the normal, everyday, means of the state.

7. Economic power operates in all societies, but it is only in class societies that economic power is embodied in production relations giving rise to a conflict of interests between a dominant class and a class of subordinate producers. Marxism, as a politics of emancipation, is chiefly concerned with socialism, but the theory of history is chiefly concerned with the sequence of class societies through which humankind progresses towards it.

8. Wright (1993) distinguishes three ‘nodes’ of Marxism, adding ‘Marxism as class emancipation’ to the ‘class analysis’ and ‘theory of history’ nodes. The class analysis node constitutes ‘independent-variable Marxism’ in which ‘Marxists can study virtually anything’ (p. 18). That is not to say that ‘virtually anything’ can be explained, for it will be the case that ‘class is not very important for certain problems’ (p. 18). However its explanatory ambit will be much wider than ‘dependent-variable Marxism’ constituted by the theory of history. Here the specific focus is ‘the inherent
tendencies of historical change to follow a particular trajectory with a specific kind of directionality’ (p. 18). See also Wright, Levine and Sober, 1992, pp. 179–191.

9. For important early statements of a state-centred view see Skocpol (1979 and 1985). On the ‘organisational realist approach’ see Barrow (1993), and on statism and new institutionalism see Cammack (1990).

10. In this approach the potential autonomy of the state is real. The theory has to show how, despite this, state actions are functionally explained by the needs of capital. In other words the theory demonstrates how the real (potential) autonomy of the state is constrained. This is in contrast to the argument that the state must have a degree of autonomy in order to serve capitalist interests – this being, in effect, a kind of pseudo-autonomy.


12. This is, in other words, a general claim about the relationship between the nature of the economic structure and certain non-economic phenomena (including important aspects of the state) in capitalist society.

Chapter 2

3. Miliband’s ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ may be plausible as interpretation of what Marx said (and many other commentators make the same contrast), but the distinction is still unsound.
5. Callinicos (1991) also characterises historical materialism as a general theory.
6. The parentheses are important here, indicating that, because of the distinction between base and superstructure, the claim is not that Marx provides a single theory or explanation of the state as such. Aspects of the state that are non-superstructural are beyond the reach of the theory of history. Following a distinction that Cohen, following Wright, makes between the theory of history and Marxist sociology, this does not mean that they are beyond the reach of Marxism, though some may be.
7. Marxist sociology involves economic determination but it might not make use of functional explanation. For example, the argument that the car industry is able to use its economic power to secure favourable political decisions is a form of economic determination but need not be a functional explanation. The favourable decisions might not contribute to securing the functional requirements of the economic structure.
8. That is, again, of the superstructural attributes or elements of the state. This might be referred to as a ‘structural-functional’ explanation.
9. It is worth noting that an instrumental view is compatible with differing, and non-Marxist, answers to the questions who controls the state?, and in whose interests? The state could be conceived as an instrument (in a liberal view) of society as a whole and the common good or (in a feminist view) men. Note also that Marx’s ‘instrumentalism’ is not as simple as it may
appear. The formula ‘the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie’ implies that there are particular interests of fractions of the class. This then suggests a conception of the capitalist class as potentially fractured rather than monolithic. Elsewhere Marx makes the idea of class fractions central to his analysis (1979, pp. 99–197). The concept of common affairs is compatible with that of ‘needs of capital’ or functional requirements. Although the reference to the exclusive political sway of the bourgeoisie seems to allow no possibility of other classes or social forces influencing the state, it should also be noted that some effect of ‘pressure from below’ is compatible with the state successfully managing the bourgeoisie’s common affairs. An example of this is Marx’s analysis of the Factory Acts in volume 1 of Capital.

10. Though note that in later writing, Marx takes the view that the working class cannot simply lay hold of the existing state apparatus and use it for their own purpose (Marx, 1986). This idea is taken up in Lenin’s argument, in The State and Revolution, that it is necessary to smash rather than capture the state (1917, in Collected Works, vol. 25).

11. That is, a more expansive understanding of what is required for the ‘stabilisation’ of the economic structure.


14. As already noted, two distinctions are conflated in this primary-secondary contrast. Specifically, instrumentalism is conflated with a reductionist view of the state. But instrumentalist theory can be non-reductionist. And reductionist theory can be non-instrumentalist.

15. There is some inconsistency in Elster’s discussion of autonomy. First, the absence of class interest explanation is conflated with the more precise absence of explanation by the interest of the dominant class. Second, this sense of autonomy, in either case, is different from the sense associated with the analysis of Bonapartism since in the latter, but not the former, autonomy means specifically the ability of the state to assert itself.

16. The forces of production constitute the third component of the model but do not comprise a structure in the sense that is being used here. Rather the productive forces are embraced by relations of production that constitute the economic structure.

17. That is, those aspects of the state that are included in the superstructure.

Chapter 3


2. This formulation is derived from Norman Geras. In response to Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) rejection of relative autonomy Geras argues that ‘between explaining everything and determining nothing, there are real determinants able merely to account for a great deal’ (1987, p. 50; also Laclau and Mouffe 1987, Geras 1988). See also Wetherly (2001, 2002).

3. Though this does not imply that Miliband’s analysis is reducible to the instrumentalist approach.

4. Although there has been a ‘vast inflation’ of the state’s activity in advanced capitalist societies as Miliband notes, the modern state has
always been a powerful instrument in virtue of its claimed monopoly of coercion.

5. Though there may be limits to the ends or purposes that may be pursued by a particular form of state. In other words the state may be, to use Jessop’s term, ‘strategically selective’.

6. However, Miliband also characterises the relationship between corporate power and state power as a ‘partnership’ (1989, p. 32).

7. Whether power is ‘decisive’ can only really be reckoned in relation to particular interests or purposes, e.g. the interests of the capitalist class or ‘needs of capital’.

8. Poggi doesn’t distinguish very clearly between groups who deploy power resources and forms of power. Groups seem to be identified with specific forms of power that they have ‘built up’. Barrow, in contrast, focuses more sharply on rivalry between groups rather than forms of power. And while groups are defined in terms of particular power resources, groups may also control a portfolio of power resources. ‘Relative amounts of power are indicated by the degree to which those who control a particular resource (e.g., wealth) are able to monopolise (1) the control of that key resource which defines them as a social group, and (2) the control of other key resources that potentially supply other groups with competing sources of power’ (1993, p. 14). Poggi emphasises the relational aspect of power while Barrow seems to conceive it more in terms of a quantum. A combination of these approaches is needed. Power should be conceived in relational terms between groups, each of which controls a quantum of power resources which may comprise a portfolio of different forms of power.

9. An instrumental theory of the state is thus, more specifically, an instrumental theory of power with a particular focus on the state as one among other institutional ‘power containers’.

10. This means that the ‘instrumentalist’ conception of power has a ‘structural’ dimension.

11. The added clause is in italic (Barrow, 1993, p. 14).

12. A number of familiar, though contentious, examples may be given. First, individual police officers internalising the racist ‘canteen culture’ of the police force: what may be referred to as institutional racism. Second, women entering male-dominated professions or occupations and internalising or exhibiting masculine behavioural norms to get by or get on: institutional sexism. Third, the conservative outlook or bias of top civil servants: ‘the knowledge which civil servants have of what is expected, indeed required, in ideological and political terms is likely to be more than sufficient to ensure that those of them who might be tempted to stray from the narrow path they are expected to tread will subdue and suppress the temptation’ (Miliband, 1969, p. 124). This might be called institutional conservatism. In all these cases individuals or agents conform to what is expected or required of them within particular institutional roles.

13. The connection with voluntarism is that instrumentalism relies on ‘conscious historical agency to explain state policies’ (Barrow, 1993, p. 45). At the extreme ‘theories of agency view individual action in terms of unconstrained choice. Individuals have the ability to act, or not to act, as they wish, dependent largely on their own volition’ (Luger, 2000, p. 26). In this
form they may be ‘closely associated with the notions of indeterminacy, contingency, voluntarism, and, above all, methodological individualism’ (Hay, 1995, p. 195).

14. In terms of Cohen’s interpretation of Marx we have: a) occupants of economic roles are divided into ‘classes bearing antagonistic interests’, b) the ‘ideas [of persons] are more or less determined by their economic roles’ and c) their ‘actions are inspired by their ideas’ (1988, p. 46). This is a rough definition of the Marxist concept of class consciousness.

15. This is not to deny an element of choice. To the extent that there is recruitment into the capitalist class individuals may choose, or not, to (try to) join it. And individuals who are members of the capitalist class can conceivably choose to leave it, and to forsake the lure of the profit motive. It might then be argued that the reproduction of the capitalist system is to be explained, in voluntarist fashion, by the fact that a sufficient number of individuals do choose to become and remain capitalists. And, from this, that the system would grind to a halt if an insufficient number made this choice. Yet the longevity of capitalism suggests that its reproduction cannot be explained as the contingent result of individual choices. If these choices could have been different why haven’t they been? That longevity lends weight to the claim that those choices reflect interests and purposes that are systemic.

16. More accurately, the superstructure comprises non-economic phenomena (Cohen, 1988).

17. Carling argues that ‘one should not expect capitalism as a consequence of its basic principles of operation to uphold or to favour moral principles of any kind, beyond those strictly required for the maintenance of private property relationships’ (1999, p. 223).

18. Thus Block suggests that divisions within the business community ‘impede the process of developing common interests and common programs’ (1987, p. 9).

19. ‘Class interests’ and ‘needs of capital’ are analysed in chapter 6.

20. Though note that the whole explanatory burden does not fall on the instrumental account insofar as it is combined with a structural view.

21. The concept of accumulation strategy is employed extensively in Bob Jessop’s work on state theory (Jessop, 1990; 2002).

22. This formulation is repeated at p. 160 but the important qualification registered by the word ‘wholly’ is omitted: ‘Interests are not pre-given but must be defined within the context of specific accumulation strategies’.

23. Also the ‘interconnected elements of the value-form define the parameters in which accumulation can occur … [but] … the value-form itself does not fully determine the course of capital accumulation’ (Jessop, 1990, p. 197). Thus accumulation occurs within the parameters of the circuit of capital and this in turn depends on certain external conditions. But the constraint imposed on accumulation by the value-form and the needs of capital is a minor theme in Jessop whose major theme is the contingency of competition between alternative possible accumulation strategies.

24. ‘Despite all … [the] vagaries [of the course of accumulation] … capital continues to circulate. It seems as if, whatever happens to particular capitals, capital in general somehow or other survives’ (Jessop, 1990, p. 152).
survival of capital in general may be attributed largely to the functional relationship between the needs of capital and accumulation strategies.

25. The point that there are fundamental class interests in terms of the needs of capital and that these constitute parameters within which specific interpretations of class interests in terms of rival accumulation strategies operate can be made in a more general way. Thus Miliband notes that ‘there are of course innumerable differences and disputes over specific items of policy and strategy which arise between members of dominant classes. But however sharp these may be, they do not seriously impair an underlying consensus about the essential goodness and viability of the system itself’ (1989, p. 34).

26. On this see Cohen’s discussion of ‘Restricted and Inclusive Historical Materialism’ (1988) and the corresponding distinction between the theory of history and Marxist sociology in the same article.

27. It is clear that the micro- and macro- levels of analysis are closely interconnected. Thus although Luger’s analysis of the power of the automobile industry is ostensibly conducted at the micro level insofar as it is not overtly concerned with the interests of capital in general, such an analysis could be located within the wider framework of Fordism as an accumulation strategy (Luger, 2000).

28. Some of the categories cut across the state-civil society (or public-private) distinction e.g. engineers, sociologists.

29. This is the idea of a principal-agent relationship rejected by Miliband, or the idea of the process of representation of interests as an automatic transmission belt rejected by Jessop.

30. In effect Jessop thus ignores the effect of the institutional separation of state and civil society.


33. This does not mean that the middle class is closed off to recruitment from below. But the limits of this upward mobility should be emphasised together with the processes of selection and socialisation (e.g. see Miliband, 1969, pp. 64–5).

34. In this work, separated from The State in Capitalist Society by a period of twenty years, Miliband makes no explicit reference to colonization.

35. ‘... a dominant class may be so designated by virtue of the effectiveness and cohesion it possesses in the control of the three main sources of domination: ... the main means of economic activity ...; ... the means of state administration and coercion; and ... the means of communication and persuasion. The dominant class of advanced capitalist societies, and notably their power elites, do have the requisite effectiveness and cohesion’ (Miliband, 1989, p. 27).

36. Though the exercise of hegemony may normally require material concessions.

37. The special interest process is obviously closely related to the policy planning process. And the mechanisms of collective representation cited here could be incorporated within the concept of a corporate policy-planning network. However it useful to retain the distinction between the insider status of capital in the policy planning process and the additional capacity to exert pressure and influence outside of this process.
38. The investment strike also features in structural explanations of the political power of capital. E.g. see Jessop, 1990, p. 146.

39. On the other hand they must not be so independent that they become detached. Of course there may be many in these categories who are detached from, or even hostile to, capitalist interests. But, again, the theory requires only a sufficient degree of attachment.

40. If Jessop is correct this ‘making itself heard’ could not amount to putting forward a viable accumulation strategy. It could take the primordial form of a claim of importance and demand for recognition as in ‘a strong economy requires a healthy manufacturing sector’. Or it could take the pre-strategic form of the assertion of particular interests and demand for particular policies, e.g. a demand for exchange rate devaluation or protectionist measures to aid manufactured exports. An obvious problem here might be the possibility of the organic intellectuals being captured by a specific fraction and articulating its particularistic interests.

Chapter 4

1. There is, says Barrow, ‘reliance on conscious historical agency to explain state policies’ in the power structure methodology (1993, p. 45).


3. Though Marsh suggests that ‘there is a tendency throughout the social sciences for authors to favour structural or agency explanations’ (Marsh, 1999, p. 14). Against such ‘simplistic’ approaches Marsh argues that ‘the relationship between structure and agency is dialectical’ (p. 14). See also, in the same volume, Kerr’s and Marsh’s argument for a ‘multidimensional approach’ to explaining Thatcherism incorporating ‘an appreciation of the importance of both … structural and intentional factors’ (Kerr & Marsh, 1999, p. 175); and the similar approach in Marsh 1995.

4. Social structure is merely a term for aggregate social phenomena. Where social structures appear to exert causal powers, e.g. in constraining feasible actions, in fact the constraint is always reducible to ‘other individuals’ (King, 1999, p. 217). ‘In principle’ means that we may speak of social structure having a causal effect only in a holding operation when individualist explanations have not yet been supplied. Thus although King rejects the concept of structure in principle in favour of ‘the reduction of society to individuals’, it is not always going to be possible to reduce society in this way because of practical constraints on the research process and so ‘practically, a heuristic concept of structure can be usefully maintained’ (1999, pp. 222–3).

5. Methodological collectivism, in Elster’s definition, ‘assumes that there are supra-individual entities that are prior to individuals in the explanatory order. Explanation proceeds from the laws either of self regulation or of development of these larger entities, while individual actions are derived from the aggregate pattern’ (1985, p. 125).

6. Thus rejecting methodological individualism (MI) does not entail embracing methodological collectivism (MC) in Elster’s senses of these terms. As Callinicos argues, ‘all those who deny MI are not ipso facto methodological collectivists. All that the opponent of MI has to say is that social structures
have explanatory autonomy ... [i.e.] ... that they cannot be eliminated from the explanation of social events’ (1989, p. 83). In fact Elster’s MI approach allows for the causal efficacy of social structure. Specifically, ‘rational-choice explanation ... must be supplemented by an account of how preferences and beliefs emerge from within the social structure’ (Elster, 1985, p. 28). Yet this concession appears inconsistent with the MI claim that individuals are prior to social structure in the explanatory order (Wetherly, 1992a, pp. 121–31).

7. For example, Archer’s ‘morphogenetic sequence’ is based on an ontological distinction or separation between structure and agency (Archer, 1995; for discussion see McAnulla, 2002 & Hay, 2002).

8. The three approaches can be seen as advancing different ontological claims. In the first approach reality consists only of structures or only of agents. In the second both structures and agents are real. In the third ‘neither agents nor structures are real, since neither has an existence in isolation from the other’ (Hay, 2002, p. 127). The second view is based on an ontological, and the third a merely analytical, distinction between structure and agency.

9. This definition is contrasted with an alternative view according to which ‘institution’ is synonymous with ‘organisation’.

10. Thus, in distinction from Jessop, structure does not include practices. In other words, Cohen distinguishes between the ‘occupation’ and ‘performance’ of a role.

11. The material or physical environment obviously influences behaviour, not least through its implications for the feasible set of possible actions.

12. The point here is that determinism is not synonymous with structuralism. Even if determinism is defensible this indicates that structuralism isn’t since some non-structural elements of the social are likely to exert causal effects.

13. The idea that some elements of social life fall outside of ‘structures’ can also be seen in slightly different form in Jessop’s distinction between a ‘self-organizing ecology of instituted systems’ (such as the economic and political systems) and ‘a rich and complex lifeworld ... which is irreducible to such systems and their logics’ (2002, p. 8). Similarly, Scott makes a distinction between ‘structures of domination [that] rest upon the organised positions or locations that people occupy in institutional and relational structures, [and] patterns of interpersonal power [that] derive from the personal characteristics and attributes that people have’ (2001, p. 135).

14. The theory of history seems to rely on an objective idea of scarcity whose historical purchase continues right up to (and perhaps through) the threshold of massive surplus achievable within socialism. Against this claim it might be argued that scarcity, at least for much of this historical span, reflects a cultural norm more than an objective situation.

15. It should be added that social theory is also concerned with the effects or outcomes of action or conduct, involving the interaction between individuals. Elster refers to this as ‘causal explanation of aggregate phenomena’ (1985, p. 4). In Archer’s morphogenetic sequence this is the final stage (which is also the first phase of a new cycle) of ‘structural elaboration’ (Archer, 1995). The circuit of capital can also be analysed in terms of the effect of the ‘interaction’ between capitalists and workers in reproducing or modifying the economic structure.
16. Archer (1995) argues, along these lines, for an ontological distinction between structure and agency.
17. Numbering has been added.
18. Or that it really involves a more structuralist starting point.
19. Jessop also defines the strategic-relational approach in terms of its ‘radical “methodological relationalism”, that is, its insistence on treating social phenomena in terms of social relations’ (2001, p. 1223).
20. Though this statement may be qualified by the recognition that some behaviour occurs outside of, and/or is not oriented to, any structural context.
21. The notion of ‘strategy’ is, in effect, the mutual element in the ‘mutual constitution’ of agency and structure.
22. Jessop suggests that ‘structured coherence’ may arise from ‘a structurally inscribed strategic selectivity that rewards actions that are compatible with the recursive reproduction of the structure(s) in question’ (2001, p. 1225). But such reward will depend largely on position within the structure, e.g. for exploiters rather than the exploited.
23. Indeed, ‘the strategic-relational approach ... argues that subjects have no free will’ (Jessop, 1990, p. 266).
24. This is distinguished from Hay’s definition of structuralism as ‘explanation ... exclusively in terms of structural or contextual factors’ (2002, p. 102). Thus a structuralist explanation need not involve the claim that explanation can be given exclusively in terms of structural constraint.
25. This does not mean that the structuralist explanation makes no reference to the conduct of politicians, officials and other members of the state elite, or the ways they respond to structural constraints, just that the existence of the constraints is independent of the particular individuals who comprise the state elite.
27. These other purposes may even be motivated by hostility towards capitalist interests. Thus Meynaud, quoted by Miliband, claims that ‘the concept of the “bias of the system” makes it ... possible to understand that ... measures taken to remedy the derelictions, shortcomings and abuses of capitalism result ultimately ... in the consolidation of the regime. It matters little in this respect that these measures should have been undertaken by men sympathetic or hostile to capitalist interests ...’ (1969, p. 79).
28. The other two answers, or mechanisms, being the character of the state's leading personnel and the pressures exercised by the capitalist class (1977, p. 73).
29. According to Miliband ‘whatever the state does ... has to run the gauntlet of the economic imperatives dictated by the requirements of the system’ (1977, p. 97). However he does not explain the nature of these requirements.
30. In other words, a structuralist explanation does not entail a concept of functional requirement.
31. ‘[T]here is no single best solution to to the regularization of capital accumulation’ (Jessop, 2002, p. 22).
32. Where ‘a is a function of b’ means something like ‘the occurrence of b causes, contributes to or is favourable for the occurrence of a’. So, the
prosperity of capitalist enterprise is favourable for the strategic capacity of the state (1), and state actions contribute to the prosperity of capitalist enterprise (2).

33. In other words ‘the more ... etc.’ the stronger is the structural thesis, whereas ‘the less ... etc.’ the weaker is the structural thesis. 1) and 2) both must be true to some degree for the structuralist thesis to have any strength. A further dimension of the constraint involves the inducement for policy-makers to avoid policies that may be damaging to accumulation, and here we need to take account of how resilient the accumulation process is to such potentially harmful policies. Thus, the more dependent is accumulation on positive state actions and the less resilient to negative actions, the stronger the constraint faced by the state.

34. We can make sense of this in terms of the distinction between holding (structure) and exercising (agency) power. ‘An agent who has this capacity to affect others [holds power] may, however, be able to achieve this without actually having to do anything at all [exercising power]. This occurs when others anticipate their intentions and their likely actions and act in relation to these’ (Scott, 2001, p. 4).

35. Anybody can threaten an investment strike but to be plausible such a threat must be backed up by control over investment. And although such a threat involves a choice, such a choice is always related to the interests generated by the role of control of investment.

36. ‘Structural power’ may be defined as ‘unconscious power’. Gough and Farnsworth quote this characterisation from Strange (1996). But some of their own formulations tend to blur the structure-agency distinction, for example the claim that ‘capital disposes of structural power’ (p. 81) seems to equate capital with an actor and the operation of structural power with a decision.

37. In each case mobility is relative to the scale of analysis.

38. The structural power of capital over labour is seen in the limits to trade unionism. E.g. see Coates (1975, 1980).

39. See also Goldblatt et al. (1997).

40. These two cases are interrelated insofar as the second explains the existence of private property rights that reinforce the power of capital over labour described in the first, i.e. bases need superstructures.

41. The subordination of the worker to the capitalist occurs because ‘he can ensure his survival only by contracting with a capitalist whose bargaining position enables him to impose terms which effect the worker’s subordination’ (Cohen, 1978, p. 70).

42. The performance of labour can be secured through forms of repression and coercion, but this is not the normal case. A range of worker rights and benefits have been more or less institutionalised within welfare states, and in part this reflects the ‘structural power’ of labour.

43. Of course, it would pose a challenge to the structural argument if state managers have an interest in cutting budgets and rolling back the state.

44. The agency-structure distinction is misleading when it is seen as synonymous with the instrumental-structural distinction. The problem with that usage is not the distinction between agency and structure but the equation or conflation of each term with a specific type of explanation. For instru-
mentalism, as a species of structural explanation, is not synonymous with agency. Both instrumentalism and structuralism emphasise causal influences that operate at the level of social structure. A better approach is to see structure and agency as chronically implicated in the explanation of behaviour, so that explanation always involves some combination of these influences (and others besides, such as non-structural social influences, or human nature). Thus pressure is not simply a phenomenon of agency but also involves a critical structural dimension. Likewise, constraint is not simply a phenomenon of structure but also involves a dimension of agency.

45. For example property rights are functionally explained by their making legitimate, and so stabilising, basic powers. But this functional explanation does not stipulate every detail of property rights. These details can and do vary, and this variation may be due to a range of causal influences.

46. This follows Cohen’s important discussion of ‘Restricted and Inclusive Historical Materialism’ (1988).

47. Scott characterises pressure as a form of ‘counteraction’ undertaken by those who are ‘members of the political system, but not of the state itself’ (2001, p. 26). Pressure is classed as counteraction because it is a ‘demand to be heard’ from those who are subject to the power of command exercised by members of the state. Yet pressure does not always come from groups who in other respects are subordinate or weak in society. It can be a mechanism for powerful groups to defend and reinforce their privilege.

48. Thus ‘the [economic] structure may be seen not only as a set of relations but also as a set of roles’ (Cohen, 1978, p. 36) and the occupants of roles may be said to bear interests (Cohen, 1988, p. 46). Cohen adds that ‘for Marx, a person’s social being is the economic role he occupies’ (1988, p. 45), and thus the phrase ‘economic role’ may be substituted for ‘social being’ in the claim that ‘social being determines consciousness’. This claim means that the beliefs people have about society are ‘more or less determined by their economic roles’ (Cohen, 1988, p. 46).

49. Agency is not the only other factor here. The economic structure should be seen in the context of other causal influences.

50. Similarly, Cohen suggests that actions are ‘inspired by’ ideas that are ‘more or less determined’ by roles. This allows that the strong connection between roles-ideas-actions is not such that ideas and actions are merely reducible to roles. Similarly ‘production relations do not mechanically determine class consciousness’. However this is consistent with production relations strongly determining consciousness.

51. This merges two of Jessop’s five dimensions that contribute to the ‘ecological dominance’ of capitalism.

Chapter 5

1. This explanation presupposes a distinction between base and superstructure. Cohen distinguishes between base and superstructure on the basis of a distinction between powers and rights, such that ‘to have a right over some productive force is to stand in a superstructural relation of law, to have a power over some productive force is to stand in a basic relation of production’
(1988, p. 34). And Cohen shows, against criticism from Lukes (1983), that this distinction is compatible with recognition that, in general, rights are indispensable to powers.

2. Or, more generally, non-economic phenomena. For ‘when we think about the superstructure, our fundamental concept should be of a superstructural fact or phenomenon, rather than a superstructural institution, the latter idea being insufficiently general and insufficiently abstract’ (Cohen, 1988, p. 178).

3. Although it is not clear whether the accumulation of confirming instances can establish the truth of the general claim, or how many confirming instances are needed. Capitalism might be a confirming instance, but without evidence from other types of society it could, for all we know, be historically peculiar in displaying this relationship between base and superstructure. To the extent that the record of history is consistent with the truth of the development thesis then it can be argued that economic structures must have been transformed to suit the developing forces and, by extension, that superstructures must have changed to stabilise the changing structures.

4. In other words it is the performance and not just the occupancy of the roles that must be stabilised.

5. However labour power is better conceptualised as a ‘fictitious commodity’. This means that it ‘has the form of a commodity (in other words, that can be bought and sold) but is not itself created in a profit-oriented labour process’ (Jessop, 2002, p. 13). In other words labour power is not (re)produced within the circuit of capital, and this fact has important implications for the ‘stabilisation’ of the circuit. Jessop identifies three other categories of fictitious commodity: land (or nature), money and knowledge (ibid.).

6. Conceivably this exchange could take the form of proletarians hiring means of production from capitalists or capitalists hiring labour power from proletarians, but of these the latter is clearly the historically dominant or ‘normal’ form and the one with which we will be concerned.

7. Thus, ‘the formal subordination of “commodified” labour-power to capital through the emergence of the market for wage-labour was reinforced historically when the exercise of labour-power in production was brought directly under capitalist control through machine-pacing in the factory system’ (Jessop, 2002, p. 15).

8. They might, on this argument, be Marxist sociological explanations.

9. Though, of course, this does not mean all aspects of the economy.

10. Assuming commodities sell at their full values.

11. Though the extraction of surplus labour is not a sufficient condition for the achievement of a satisfactory rate of profit, which also depends on realisation conditions.


13. The circuit can be analysed from the perspective of any of the three forms of capital, but for our purpose it is convenient to analyse it in terms of the circuit of money capital, that is, beginning and ending with money.

14. As opposed to being caused by exogenous ‘shocks’.
15. The circuit also expands spatially – see the discussion of globalisation in chapter 9.

16. In other words, ‘Individual persons, whether capitalists or workers, are pressed by the “dull compulsion of economic forces” to undertake actions which result in the [dynamic] tendencies [of the system]’ (Gough, 1979, p. 29). Better to say ‘compulsion of economic relations’.

17. And largely outside the ambit of the theory of history.

Chapter 6

1. Or, we might say, its disposition to be stabilised by superstructural phenomena of that type.

2. Another term that could be used here is ‘system needs’. The needs of capital are system needs of a capitalist economy.

3. Doyal and Gough’s (1991) theory of human need not only provides a catalogue of basic and intermediate needs but also specifies a standard of need satisfaction – a concept of ‘optimum’ levels of health and autonomy. However this aspect of the theory is problematic (Wetherly, 1996). The theory of the needs of capital will focus on the qualitative dimension.


5. In functional explanations it seems that system needs will usually figure as first- or second-order goals, i.e. as ends in themselves or means to ends. It is difficult to see how functional explanations can work through the unintended and/or unrecognised consequences of actions, since the satisfaction of needs would then be fortuitous. For example, a person could consume food for pleasure without intending or recognising the contribution its nutritional value makes to the satisfaction of her basic need for physical health. But in that case the need plays no role in explaining the behaviour that leads to its satisfaction, which is purely fortuitous.

6. For discussion of models of capitalism see Coates (2000).

7. The need to regulate competition is an example of the potential conflict between the interests of capital in general and particular capitals.

8. The rationale for this move is that from the standpoint of capital the wage is a reproduction cost.

9. The same point applies to other fictitious commodities that enter into the circuit of capital: land, money and knowledge (Jessop, 2002).

10. Although housewives may sometimes be treated as part of the reserve, the distinction between potential and reserve segments mirrors the conventional distinction between economically inactive and economically active.

Chapter 7


2. Though ‘stabilisation’ may cover a range of specific functional requirements.

3. In other words it is the non-self-stabilising nature of the economic structure that functionally explains the character of the superstructure – it is the
structure’s need for stabilisation, and its disposition to be stabilised, by certain non-economic phenomena that explains their occurrence.

4. A wider conception is ‘the absence of explanation by the nature of the economic structure’ or, more simply, ‘the absence of economic explanation’.

5. Since ‘the state’ is too vague as an object of explanation we should refer to specific aspects of the form and functions of the state.

6. Or, at least, that the relative unity of the state system is achievable.

7. Cohen does not accept (though does not reject) the determinist label. In a footnote (1978, p. 147, n1) he says ‘Technological determinism is, presumably, two things: it is technological, and it is determinist. … Our version of historical materialism may be called technological, but the issue of determinism will not be discussed in this book’.

8. In effect Jessop rejects the idea of a ‘superstructure’ since no general statements that certain non-economic phenomena are explained by the nature of the economic structure are admissible.

9. For further discussion see Wetherly 2001 and 2002.

10. Freedom arguably presupposes autonomy: freedom to determine the means to ends that are not truly my own may be felt to be so restricted as not to count as true freedom.

Chapter 8

1. Which does not mean, of course, that state power is simply reducible to the decisions and actions of this elite.

2. It is claimed that ‘the long-established, career-oriented British Civil Service, together with a powerful Treasury, provides a relatively centralised instrument for formulating and implementing longer-term class-based policies’ (Gough, 1979, pp. 63–4).

3. Of course, governability is much more than merely a question of the current poll ratings and electoral prospects of existing Ministers.

4. State power must also reflect, to some degree, the scope for agency and choice, not reducible to either social origin or position within the state.

5. And similarly pressure from above may reinforce the state’s in-built structural selectivity.

6. The then conventional pluralist theory was Miliband’s target, but the theory also provides an alternative to Jessop’s pluralistic style of argument.


8. This flexibility extends, for example, to selecting from a range of potentially viable accumulation strategies. These rival strategies are functional alternatives.

Chapter 9

1. A review of the ever-growing globalisation debate is beyond the scope of this discussion. See Held et al. (1999), Hirst and Thompson (1996), Held and McGrew (2002).

2. There is some degree of consensus on the general idea of globalisation. Bromley suggests that the definition given here ‘is more or less common
ground’. Held et al. refer to ‘a general acknowledgement of a real or perceived intensification of global interconnectedness’ (1999, p. 2).

3. Goldblatt et al. define globalisation in terms of ‘growing global interconnectedness; a stretching of social relations across space ... such that day to day activities in one part of the globe are increasingly enmeshed with events happening on the other side’ (1997, p. 62).

4. Although Jessop sees globalisation as multi-temporal (2002, p. 113), this is compatible with speeding up on average.

5. In this vein Bromley refers to ‘the particular intensity of modern globalisation compared with the more general interaction across space that has characterised much of world history’ (1999, p. 280).

6. Sklair (2002) distinguishes between ‘the inter-national, the transnational, and the global ... The global signifies an already achieved state of globalisation but ... this is still fairly uncommon’ (p. 35).

7. Similarly, ownership of obsolete instruments of production would not confer a position in the economic structure (though whether instruments of production that are obsolete still count as instruments of production is questionable).

8. Against this, Cohen claims that ‘a portion of space may be more or less productively useful’ and that this is ‘more pertinent’ (1978, p. 51). One cause of variation in productive usefulness is location, and Cohen gives the example of a space adjoining a source of energy. But it would be, say, the coal that has productive power and not the space that adjoins it, any more than the space that contains it has productive power itself. Similarly, some times (of the day, of the year) are more productively useful than others, but this does not show that the temporal location of production has productive power. Any productive process takes place in time and space, and we may say that time and space are used in production. Further, some times and some spaces are certainly more productively useful than others. But time and space do not, on that account, constitute productive forces.

9. The criterion that ‘there is enough, and as good left in common for others’ comes from John Locke’s defence of property in whatever is removed from nature and has labour mixed with it (reproduced in Rosen and Wolff, 1999, p. 191).

10. The content of the space, e.g. the soil it contains, may be developed, but, as Cohen himself asserts, space is to be defined ‘in abstraction from whatever it contains’ (1978, p. 50).

11. There is, for example, no mention of globalisation or other concepts of spatial scale in the first (1978) edition of Karl Marx’s Theory of History. The second (2000) edition does include an additional chapter on ‘Marxism After the Collapse of the Soviet Union’ that considers a ‘global construal of historical materialism’ (p. 393), discussed in more detail below.

12. This distinction is taken from Lockwood (1964).

13. In the displacing of pre-capitalist economic systems ‘the concentrated force of the state [also] played a central role’ (Bromley, 1999, p. 288).

14. Cohen recognises that the existence of a large proletariat only goes part way to answering what is required to demonstrate that higher production relations have matured, and that ‘a complete answer to that question might be difficult to supply’ (1978, p. 390). This is, of course, a serious omission.
for a theory that purports to supply persuasive reasons why capitalism will be replaced by socialism.

15. Though this does not mean that the two conditions appear simultaneously. For example, the proletariat could be sufficiently developed before capitalism is fully developed.

16. Or, similarly, ‘the national struggles of the proletarians of the different countries’ (p. 497).

17. There are, of course, other rival conceptions of contemporary capitalism’s distinctive limits or contradictions. Prominent among these are: that capitalist globalisation inhibits rather than promotes productive development in poor countries and regions, tending to increase global inequality, and that capitalism’s output expansion bias is at the expense of a possible and desirable reduction of toil (Cohen, 1978, ch. XI). Both of these contradictions may bite before capitalism has exhausted its productive potential.

18. In other words, the theory of history deals not only with transformations of ‘the entire immense superstructure’ due to changes of the ‘economic foundation’ (e.g. from a feudal state to a capitalist state) but with transformations within, say, the capitalist type of state in compliance with the changing requirements of a developing capitalist economy.

19. This does not mean that globalisation moves ineluctably along a single path. On the contrary, there is more than one possible path of globalisation, and the forms, extent and speed of globalisation processes are contested. The point is that globalisation is a very strong tendency of capitalist production relations.

20. These are obviously very large and contentious claims, and they deserve greater scrutiny than they are given here.

21. This is different to Cohen’s approach. In his view ‘the economic structure is not a way of producing, but a framework of power in which producing occurs’ (1978, p. 79). Since the superstructure is restricted to those non-economic phenomena that are functionally explained by the nature of the economic structure, that is the need of the structure to be stabilised, this deprives the superstructure of any role in securing the conditions necessary for producing to occur. Yet it is only through ensuring that producing occurs that the productive forces are developed. Ensuring the stability of the framework of power is necessary but does not seem to be sufficient.


23. See Panitch (1994) for a more extensive analysis.

Works Cited


Index

accumulation, 55–7, 58–62, 119–20, 121–5, 188–9
as macroeconomic process, 89–90
Fine on, 121–2
Jessop on, 107–8, 168
legitimitisation and, 139
state and, 62, 147, 168
Altvater, E., 149
anti-globalisation, 218
Archer, M.S., 75
auto industry, 51, 65, 69–70
autonomy
as concept, 170
of state, 10–11, 19
economic determinism and, 26–7, 28–9, 162, 169, 174, 186, 188
relative, 8, 18, 25, 28, 157–8, 173, 182, 193, 215–6
Barrow, C., 10, 28, 30, 37, 38–40, 47, 61
on elite, 84
on corporate policy-planning network, 65–6
base/superstructure, 22, 23, 26, 164, 169–70
Cohen on, 43, 150
state and, 102–3, 109
Berki, R.N., 2
Bhaskar, R., 164, 165
Block, F., 24, 50, 53–4, 89, 101
on relative autonomy, 157
on ruling class consciousness, 90–4
Bobbio, N., 36
Bonapartism, 19, 21, 23–4
borders, 197, 200
Bottomore, T., 3
Brewer, A., 118
Bridges, A.B., 89
Bromley, S., 196
Burden, R., 122
Burnham, P., 2, 3
Campbell, M., 118, 121, 122
capital
as contradictory, 50–1
circuit of, 116, 118–20, 121, 126, 129, 136, 137, 139, 146, 153, 187, 192
common interests of, 128–9
interests of, 51–2, 55–8
mobility of, 96
needs of, 130–55, 214
power and, 69–70
social, 140–2
state and, 17
structural power of, 94–9
unable to reproduce labour-power, 145–6
capitalism
as shortsighted, 50
defined, 136–7
capitalists, 44–6
state and, 176
versus capital, 49
Carling, A., 9, 46, 203
Carnoy, M., 1, 14, 16, 19, 21, 28, 180, 184
Catephores, G., 118
children, 144–5
class consciousness, 53–4, 61, 90–4, 176, 188
class struggle, 7, 16, 23, 41, 42, 93, 124–5, 179, 207
Miliband on, 126
Coates, D., 114
coercion, 3, 5, 143, 148–9, 151, 170
Cohen, G.A., 41, 45, 46, 76–7, 98, 196
on agency, 107
on being, 42, 43, 134
on capitalists/workers, 75
on economic change, 123
on Elster, 133
on functional explanation, 164–5
on historical materialism, 6–7
on law, 6, 137, 149–51
on Marxist sociology, 109, 156
on Protestantism, 7
on relations of production, 111–3, 117
on reform, 210
on restricted historical materialism, 109–10, 156
on Soviet Union, 206–8
space and, 201–4, 210
on superstructure, 5–6, 163
on welfare, 127
Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence, 1, 12, 206, 210, 216
colonisation, 64–6, 69, 176
commodification
see labour power, as commodity
competition, 23, 42, 52, 137–8, 139, 141
Fine on, 120
regulation of, 155
versus reproduction of labour, 146
compliance, 148–51, 154
constraints, 171–2, 175
see also structural constraints
contingency, 47, 48
corporations, 37
crisis, 120–1, 140
ecological, 208
cultural motivation, 145, 148–9, 154
culture, 75
depressions, 93, 200
determinism
see economic determinism
dialectics, 73, 74, 78–80
Giddens and, 78–9
Hay on, 80
Diamond, J., 203
directorates, 61, 66
Domhoff, G.W., 177
Doyal, L., 136, 149, 151–2
on needs, 130–2, 135
Dunleavy, P., 2, 3

economic determinism/determination, ix, 8–9, 12, 27, 75–6, 102–3, 104, 109, 111, 156, 163, 168, 169, 199, 201
definition, 164–5

Lukes and, 172
as reductionist, 163–4
summary of, 194–5
state autonomy and, 25–6, 28, 162, 169, 174, 186, 188
Elster, J., 10, 18–19, 20, 21, 157–8, 176, 193
on individuals, 73
on mechanisms, 133
Engels, Friedrich, 127
Communist Manifesto (with Marx), 13, 18, 19–20, 21, 29, 127–8, 199–200, 205–6, 207–10, 214
Evans, M., 18, 20, 24
exploitation, 116–8, 138, 140, 146–7, 153
Gough on, 116
Factory Acts, 118
see also Ten Hours Bill
Farnsworth, K., 89, 94–8
Fine, B., 120, 123, 140
on circuit of capital, 116
on labour power, 112
flexibility, 90
Foley, D., 145
Fordism, 59
free market, 91, 94
free will, 76–7, 83, 103
freedom, 159
functional theory, ix–x, 163, 195

Gamble, A., 192
geography, 203
Geras, N., 173
Giddens, A., 81
as dialectician, 78–9
on system needs, 133–4
Gill, G., 198
Ginsburg, N., 179
globalisation, 97, 196–8
Marxist critique of, 215–6
nation-state and, 208–18
theory of history and, 210–8
Goldblatt, D., 209
Gough, I., 89, 94–8, 136, 149, 151–2, 218
on capital needs, 130–3, 135
on children, 144–5
Gough – continued
  on exploitation, 116
  on reform, 179
  on socialisation, 145
  on state, 176
  on structural constraints, 191
  on welfare state, 124, 127

government, 35–6
Gramsci, A., 2
  group conflict, 83

Hall, J.A., 2, 3, 4, 170–1
Hall, S., 3, 20
Harris, L., 123, 140
Hay, C., 2, 10, 15, 17, 163
  on agency, 103
  on dialectics, 80
  on strategic-relational approach,
    78–80, 81, 83
  on structure/agency, 72–4
Held, D., 17, 18, 24, 25, 151, 193,
  197, 201, 214, 215, 217
McGrew, A., 197, 201, 214, 215, 217
Hertz, N., 218
Hindness, B., 181
historical materialism, 163, 166–7
  human nature and, 76–7
  space and, 206–7
Hobsbawm, E.J., 200
Hoffman, J., 2
Holloway, J., 124, 148
Howard, M.C., 119–21, 123
human nature, 76–7, 201, 206

ideology, 68
Ikenberry, G.J., 2, 3, 4, 170–1
individuals, 45–6
  Marx on, 22, 42, 43, 44
institutions, 75
internationalism, 207–8
investment, 104
  social, 139
  strikes, 95–6, 105, 176
Jessop, B., 3, 5, 10, 15–6, 17, 25, 46,
  47, 48, 79–80, 158, 181
  on accumulation, 107–8, 168
  on asymmetrical effect of state
    form, 180–1
  on autonomous state, 158
on capital, 50
on contingent necessity, 166,
  168–70, 184
on corruption, 49
on crises, 120, 121
on determinism, 163
on extra-economic pre-conditions,
  122
on globalisation, 197–8
on institutions, 75–6, 82–3
on interests of capital, 56, 58–9
on labour as commodity, 114, 137,
  147
on law, 149
on reductionism, 164
on reform, 182–3
on stabilisation, 216
on state
  as instrument, 31–3
  as subject, 159–61, 162
  state power, 62–3
on strategic choice, 86, 88
on strategic-relational approach,
  80–3, 182–4
on structure, 81–2
on superstructure, 22

Kendall, G., 198
King, A., 76
King, R., 198
King, J.E., 119–21, 123

labour power
  as commodity, 112–5, 137, 143–4,
  147
  Marx on, 114
  reproduction of, 144–6
  reserve army of, 145, 147, 154
land, 202
  see also space
law, 149–51, 153–4, 212
legitimisation, 147–8, 154, 179
Lenin, V.I., 180–2
Luger, S., 35, 49, 107
  on auto industry, 51, 65, 59–70
Lukes, S., 159, 169–70, 171–2, 174–5,
  177, 186, 189–90, 192
Mandel, E., 84
Mann, M., 1, 2, 37
Index 245

market system, 137–8
Marsh, D., 163
Marx, K.
  as ambiguous, 25
  on crises, 120
  on human nature, 76–7
  on nation-state, 207
  on Russia, 206–7
  theory of history, 1, 5–8, 26, 76–7,
  156–7, 163, 166–8, 195, 197–8,
  201, 205–6, 210
  globalisation and, 196, 199,
  210–8
  see also historical materialism
on state, 10, 127, 180, 207
Capital, 22, 42
Communist Manifesto (with Engels),
  13, 18, 19–20, 21, 29, 127–8,
  199–200, 205–6, 207–10, 214
Preface to the Critique of Political
Economy, 11–12, 109–10
The Civil War in France, 15
The Eighteenth Brumaire, 10, 15, 18,
  19–20, 23
Marxist sociology, 7–8, 103, 109,
  156–7
McAnulla, S., 74–5
McLellan, D., 14
McLennan, G., 163
middle class, 68
Miliband, R., 3, 10, 13, 15, 17–18,
  23–4, 28, 35, 38, 40, 53, 68–9, 97,
  114, 126–7, 212
on classes, 67
on colonisation, 64–5
on democracy, 181–2
Poggi and, 34–6
Poulantzas and, 191
on relative autonomy, 157
ruling class, 51, 188–90
on state
  as capitalist, 173
  as instrument, 187, 189
  state elite, 84–5, 162, 176–7, 178,
  185–7
  state power, 63
on structural constraints, 189,
  190–1, 193
The State in Capitalist Society, 29–31,
  36, 85–6, 174–5
military expenditure, 100–1
Mills, C.W., 6, 39
minimum wage, 149
Mintz, B., 61
Mishra, R., 192
monopoly, 52–3
multiple determinants, 165–6, 168
nation-state, 196–7, 200
globalisation and, 208–18
Marx on, 207
see also state
national interest, 65, 69, 84, 86–7
capitalism and, 212
needs, 129–33, 152–3
see also system needs; capital,
  needs of
Nolan, P., 203
O'Connor, J., 147, 149
The Fiscal Crisis of the State, 138–42
Offe, C., 97, 142–5
  on cultural motivation, 145, 148–9,
  154
  on state, 192–3
  on labour as commodity, 147
O'Leary, B., 2, 3
organic intellectuals, 70–1
Jessop on, 60–3, 66
state power and, 63–8
organisations, 38–40
parliamentarism, 29, 31
Picciotto, S., 124, 148
Pierson, C., 2
planning, 65–6
Plant, R., 130
Poggi, G., 3–4, 7, 27, 30, 36–7, 184
  on political power, 170
  on state
    as instrument, 43–4
    theory of, 33–4
politics, 100, 167, 186
Poulantzas, N., 28, 181
Miliband and, 191
power, corporate
see corporations
power structure research, 37
private property, 52–3
see also public/private
profit, 137, 139–40, 153
profit motive, 42–3
proletarians, 143, 154, 205–6
  defined by Cohen, 113–4
  see also working-class
Protestantism, 7
Przeworski, A., 96
public/private, 3–5, 15

reductionism, 163–4
reform, 179, 218
reformism, 181, 210–1
  failure of, 191
relations of production, 110–1, 201
Renton, D., 199
revolution, 9, 124, 126–7
Ronge, V., 97
ruling class, 40–1, 47–8, 50, 51
  class consciousness of, 90–4, 176, 188
Runciman, W.G., 37

Sassoon, A.S., 2
Saville, J., 179
scarcity, 61, 77, 201, 206
Schwartz, M., 61
Scott, J., 39
  on capitalists and state, 104
  on constraints, 88–9, 99, 102
Shaikh, A., 120, 121
social mobility, 143
socialisation, 145
socialism, 124
sociology
  see Marxist sociology
Sorenson, G., 197, 198–9
Soviet Union, 206
space, 202–4
specific satisfiers, 152, 167
spiritual phenomena, 7
stabilisation (of the economic structure), 130, 156, 201, 205, 210–1, 213–6
state elite, 176–8
  Miliband on, 84–5, 162, 176–7, 178, 185–7
state
  autonomy of, 18, 91, 93, 156–9
  as balance of class forces, 21
coercive, 13–14, 16–7, 30
contradictory, 210
definitions of, 2
government and, 35–6
as instrument, 31–6, 187
legitimacy of, 90
liberal theory of, 16
Marx on, 10, 127, 180, 207
Monopoly of rule-making/coercion, 170–1
non-capitalist, 211
O’Connor on, 139–40
organisation of, 182
as power container, 30, 36, 158, 161–2
self-interested, 15–16, 158
as set of institutions, 3
as subject, 159
superstructure and, 102–3, 109
theory of, 5
see also nation-state
state power
  Jessop on, 62
  Miliband on, 63
Stokman, F., 61
Strange, S., 209
structural constraints, 87–9, 101, 106–7, 189–93
structuralist explanation, 83–5
structure/agency
definitions of, 74
Hay on, 72–4, 76, 103–4
superstructure, 6
  base and
    see base/superstructure
  Cohen on, 163
surplus value, 41, 116–9, 146–7, 153, 154
social capital and, 140–1
Sweezy on, 117, 119
Sweezy, P., 123
  on profit, 140
  on technical change, 124
system needs, 133–4
taxation, 89–90, 91, 94, 100, 101, 140, 218
Taylor-Gooby, P., 192
Ten Hours Bill, 20
  see also Factory Acts
trade unions, 57, 98, 114, 209
unemployment, 147, 190
Van Creveld, M., 209
violence, 3, 5
wages, 124, 146
  minimum wage, 149
  wage control, 147
  wage labour, 144
Wallace, W., 209
Wallerstein, M., 96
war, 93, 200
Weber, M., 2, 3, 4, 30
  compared to Marx, 14–15
  on state, 31
welfare state, 4–5, 6, 124, 127, 143,
  149, 179–80, 218
  crisis of, 192
  globalisation and, 211
  Gough on, 136
Wetherly, P., 10, 21, 46, 124, 166, 208
women, 145
working class, 44–6, 93, 179
  groups within, 145
  see also class struggle; exploitation;
    labour power; proletarians;
    trade unions; unemployment;
    wages
Wright, E.O., 181