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Index

A

Adicity, 57, 111, 112, 158–160
Alexander, S., 9
Alston, W., 73
Analogy, 65, 66
Analysis ‘problem’ no. 19, 114
Argument analysis of Bradley’s regress, 151
Aristotle, 4
Armstrong, D. M., 2, 3, 8–11, 14–16, 23, 24, 31, 33, 35, 36, 44, 47, 48, 59, 69–71, 75, 77, 79, 80, 84–89, 92, 94–98, 101–103, 107–110, 112, 113, 116, 120, 126–129, 135–137, 148, 153, 157–159
Armstrongian, 88, 107
Armstrong’s suggestions for the location of relations, 120
Austin, J. L., 2
Axiom of difference, 76
Axiom of localisation, 120, 123

B

Bareness, 69, 71–74
Bare particular, 1, 42, 49, 69, 70–79, 111
Barker, R., 71, 72
Basic trope theory, 39, 41, 44, 46, 47, 49–51
Baxter, D., 136
Beebee, H., 24
Bennett, J., 102
Bergmann, G., 11, 75, 134, 141, 150
Betti, A., 7, 8, 13–16, 136, 144
Bigelow, J., 26, 94
Bigelow’s principle, 26
Black, M., 75, 76
Blanshard, B., 9, 140
Bolzano, B., 27

Bonino, B., 148
Bradley, F. H., 142
Bradley’s regress, 8–10, 47, 61, 74, 136–138, 140–142, 145, 147–156, 159
Bundle version, 46–50, 61
Butchvarov, P., 8, 105, 127
Butchvarov’s phenomenological argument against relations, 106, 107
Bynoe, W., 8, 10

C

Campbell, K., 39, 72
Candlish, S., 154
Casullo, A., 98
Category-mistake, 123–125, 128, 129
Classic internalism, 139, 141, 142, 150, 151, 156, 157
Co-location, 121, 127
Comprencence, 39, 47, 48, 50, 51
Concrete universals, 76, 120–122, 125–127
Conjunctive universals
 in Armstrong, 97, 98
 Mellor’s argument from Ramsey’s test, 95–96
Contingent predication, 51
Contingent states of affairs, 6, 29, 111
Cross, C., 110
Cumpa, J., 9

D

Daly, C., 46, 47
Davidson, D., 2
Davis, R. B., 74
Denkel, A., 50, 51, 77
Disjunctive and negative properties, 85, 86, 94

- Disjunctive truths, 5, 31
Dodd, J., 23–25, 48, 137, 148
- E**
Ehring, D., 39, 121, 126
Ehring's argument from local external relations, 121
Externalist regress, 149, 150, 153
External relation, 47, 61, 101
- F**
Fine, K., 107, 111
Fisk, M., 135, 137, 148
Foundationism, 4, 57, 104, 105
Frege, G., 2, 9
- G**
Garrett, B. J., 115
Gaskin, R., 136, 149, 153
Generalization argument, 79
Goodman, N., 15, 110
Gracia, J. J. E., 89–91
Griffith, A. M., 34
Grossmann, R., 107, 108, 120, 135, 140, 150
Gull, R., 139, 142
- H**
Haldane, J., 114
Higher-order states of affairs, 1, 77, 80
Hochberg, H., 43, 76, 136
Hochberg's objection from standard spatial and temporal 'laws', 124
Hochberg's principle, 43
Hoffman, J., 65, 119
Hoffman, R., 76, 124
Horwich, P., 23
- I**
Identity conditions for states of affairs, 111
Indiscernibles, 75, 76, 125
Individuation of universals, 91, 92
Infinite regress, 42, 47, 60, 116, 152, 155
Instantiation, 1, 4–6, 9–11, 25, 35, 46, 49, 56, 69, 70–73, 75, 77–81, 84, 86–88, 90–92, 94, 96, 102, 104, 106, 108, 111, 114, 120–124, 128, 133, 135–137, 140, 143, 144, 152, 154, 158
Intermedianism, 23, 24, 26, 28, 33
Intermediate particulars, 80, 81
Internalist regress, 149
- J**
Jago, M., 33
Johansson, I., 102, 103
Jørgensen, J., 113, 157
- K**
Kattsoff, L. O., 113
Kirkham, R., 27
- L**
LaBossiere, M., 70
Lewis, D., 5, 7, 25, 84, 102
Lewis's Razor, 5, 31, 32, 36, 58, 60, 87, 96, 153, 158
Locke, J., 69
Lombard, L. B., 102
Loux, M. J., 40, 70, 72
Lowe, E. J., 111
- M**
MacBride, F., 107–109, 128
Macdonald, C., 70
Magalhães, E., 128
Martin, C. B., 39, 47
Maurin, A. S., 39, 147
McTaggart, J. McT. E., 88, 153
Meinong, A., 2
Melia, J., 96
Mellor, D. H., 6, 35, 85, 95, 97, 98
Mertz, D. W., 36, 45, 61, 62, 64, 72, 74, 93, 105
Mertz's argument from change, 93
Minimalism, 23–26
Moderate realism, 6, 7, 12, 21, 29, 56–58, 60–65
Molecular truths, 31
Molnar, G., 23, 24
Moore, G. E., 90
Moreland, J. P., 42, 73, 75, 76, 125
Moreland's objection, 42, 75, 76
Morton, A., 153
Mulligan, K., 12, 31, 32, 46, 102
Multiple location, 120, 122, 127
- N**
Naive internalism, 135, 137, 138, 143, 148, 150, 155, 156
Naturalism, 4, 87, 88, 119–121, 123, 126
Negative truths and conjunctive truths, 11, 23–25, 28, 29, 33, 88, 94
Newman, A., 136

- Nolan, D., 153
 Non-mereological complexes, 7, 14, 21, 52, 110, 119, 134
 Non-mereological spatial part-whole relationship, 121
 Non-substantial change, 49–51
 Nuclear theory, 49–52
- O**
 Ockham's Razor, 5, 58, 153
 O'Leary-Hawthorne, J., 76
 Olson, K. R., 137
 Ontic predication, 56, 61–63, 136
 Orders of states of affairs, 1, 2, 6–8, 11, 13, 21, 24, 27–36
 Orilia, F., 109, 110, 136, 137, 149, 150, 153
- P**
 Pargetter, R., 94
 Parsons, J., 4
 Peacock, H., 154
 Perovic, K., 8, 69, 75, 136, 140
 Persson, J., 80
 Physical states of affairs, 6
 Pickavance, T., 73
 Predicates and Armstrong's tripartite division of properties, 84
 Principle of spatiotemporally homogeneous composition, 3, 4, 119, 121
 Principle of order invariance, 108, 123
 Principle of spatial divergence, 123, 125
 Principle of sufficient reason, 21, 22, 32, 144
 Problem of complexity, 15, 133, 134, 136
 Problem of individuation, 55, 62, 63, 69, 75–77
 Problem of unity, 1, 7–10, 13–16, 56, 62, 74, 75, 133–136, 138–141, 144, 147, 148, 150–153
 Problem of universals, 3, 5, 6, 12, 40–42, 55, 59, 62, 83, 85
 Proclus, 65
 Properties, 1, 3–5, 9–11, 13–15, 25, 28, 30, 31, 34, 35, 39–41, 43, 47–49, 56, 57, 60, 69, 71–75, 79–81, 83–89, 91–94, 98, 101, 103–107, 112, 121, 125, 134, 147
 Properties with at most one instance, 16, 89
- R**
 Ramsey, F. P., 25, 90
 Reflexive relations, 9, 112
 Reflexive states of affairs, 114
 Reflexivity, 113–115, 140, 157, 158
 Relation
 asymmetrical, 107, 125, 160
 direction, 73, 107, 109–111, 159
 external, 1, 52, 70, 73, 74, 102–104, 122, 128, 159
 grounded, 34, 52, 103, 104, 128
 internal, 6, 29, 35, 48, 50, 51, 74, 101–105, 128
 non-symmetrical, 91, 107–111, 160
 multigrade, 153, 158, 160
 reflexive, 11, 57, 108, 112–114, 157
 symmetrical, 107, 108, 110, 160
 Relational internalism, 14, 135–138, 140, 142, 148–153, 156, 157, 159
 Relation instances, 12, 55–65, 90, 93, 135
 Robinson, R., 76
 Rodriguez-Pereyra, G., 5
 Rosenkrantz, G., 65, 119
 Russell, B., 2, 4, 14, 27, 32, 39, 56, 57, 104, 108, 139, 150, 154
- S**
 Schaffer, J., 23, 34
 Schnieder, B., 13, 29, 153
 Self-relating, 142, 144, 148, 156–159
 Self-relating internalism, 143, 144, 156–158
 Simons, P., 4, 8, 10–12, 23, 26, 27, 28, 32, 33, 43, 44, 47, 49–51, 65, 72, 90, 121, 127
 Simpleness of tropes, 41
 Smith, B., 2, 29
 Sober, E., 111
 State of affairs ontology, 1, 3, 5–7, 9–14, 16, 21–23, 29, 36, 39, 40, 44, 46–49, 51, 52, 61, 69–71, 78, 94, 110, 111, 115, 124, 126, 127, 133, 135
 Stout, G. F., 39, 40
 Strawson, P. F., 2, 124, 141
 Substance-attribute version, 40, 46–48, 51
- T**
 Tegtmeier, E., 6, 14, 108, 125, 137, 142
 Tegtmeier's abstractist objection, 128, 129
 Thick particulars, 39, 41, 47, 69–71, 73, 75, 76, 79–81, 121
 Thick particulars as networks, 63
 TM-reducibility, 4, 16, 29, 34–36, 51, 57, 70, 72, 73, 74, 78, 84, 86, 89, 91, 103–105, 108, 110, 112, 113, 114, 116, 128, 157, 159
 Toy examples, 5
 Trope theory, 6, 12, 15, 21, 28, 29, 39–52, 59, 61, 63, 64, 127
 Truth-bearers, 22, 26, 43, 94, 95, 113

Truthmaker, 1, 5, 10–15, 21–24, 26–28, 30–36,
39, 43, 44, 46, 47, 51, 55, 66, 70, 78,
84–88, 91, 93–96, 102, 104, 105,
112–116, 159

Truthmaking, 11–16, 21–23, 26, 28–36, 40, 43,
46, 73, 86–88, 94–96, 104, 116, 140

Truthmaking and maximalism, 23–25, 28, 29

U

Unity, 2, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14, 40, 45, 47, 52, 56, 61,
75, 133, 134, 136, 139–141, 145, 147,
151

Universals of moderate realism, 59

U-relation, 70, 111, 129, 135, 137–140, 142,
148–153, 155–157

U*-relation, 143, 144, 148, 156, 158

V

Vallicella, W. F., 2, 7, 9, 13, 15, 16, 22, 66, 76,
136, 137, 142, 148

Van der Schaar, M., 15

Vicious circularity, 26, 33, 60, 92, 129

Vicious regress, 10, 42, 47, 60, 115, 116, 138,
147–155

W

Whitehead, A. N., 43

Wieland, J. W., 148, 153

Williams, D. C., 39

Williamson, T., 110

Wittgenstein, L., 2