

# Appendix

For the reader's convenience, this appendix records that the detenser sign, “#”, is first introduced at p. 30 and that the contextualization sign, “@”, is first introduced at p. 137 and then explained in §§ 5.3-5.4. Moreover, it provides an alphabetical list of the labels used in the text to identify some prominent propositions, with a reference to the page where each label first appears and is associated with its corresponding proposition.

A/N1:	p. 52.	HRC:	p. 174.	P4:	p. 143.
A/N2:	p. 52.	HRPP:	p. 185.	P5:	p. 143.
ADRB:	p. 205.	HRRC:	p. 174.	P6:	p. 143.
ADSB:	p. 206.	II:	p. 108.	PL.Df:	p. 173.
ASP:	p. 91.	ILT:	p. 124.	PNBN:	p. 154.
CDP:	p. 81.	INCA:	p. 187.	PNCA:	p. 151.
CO-REF:	p. 80.	INCB:	p. 171.	PNCB:	p. 151.
CSP1:	p. 96.	INL:	p. 170.	PNCC:	p. 156.
CSP2:	p. 96.	INPA:	p. 178.	PNCD:	p. 156.
DB:	p. 205.	INPB:	p. 171.	PNCDR:	p. 162.
DDCA:	p. 146.	IPP:	p. 176.	PNEN:	p. 155.
DDCB:	p. 146.	IPP*:	p. 247.	PNL:	p. 150.
DDL:	p. 146.	IRC:	p. 173.	PNPA:	p. 167.
DDPA:	p. 167.	ITRC:	p. 174.	PNPB:	p. 151.
DDPB:	p. 147.	IVA:	p. 124.	PP:	p. 129.
DDRB:	p. 205.	KDP:	p. 257.	PRR:	p. 203.
DDSB:	p. 206.	MDR:	p. 73.	PSR:	p. 203.
DP:	p. 205.	MDSR:	p. 73.	PT:	p. 257.
DPCA:	p. 69.	MSDM:	p. 129.	S/HE/ITPP:	p. 183.
DPCB:	p. 51.	NM:	p. 129.	SRC:	p. 174.
DPL:	p. 50.	NO-REF:	p. 91.	STCA:	p. 145.
DPPA:	p. 165.	NPP:	p. 200.	STCB:	p. 145.
DPPB:	p. 142.	NPPV:	p. 201.	STL:	p. 144.
DPRA:	p. 65.	NRC:	p. 199.	STPA:	p. 167.
DPST:	p. 56.	ONMP:	p. 203.	STPB:	p. 145.
FSPM:	p. 197.	P1:	p. 141.	STPP:	p. 194.
FSPP:	p. 197.	P2:	p. 141.	TDPP:	p. 202.
FTR:	p. 203.	P3:	p. 141.	TDRC:	p. 202.

TERC:	p. 174.	TRPP:	p. 187.	YESTERDAY.Df:	p. 201.
THPP:	p. 183.	TRRC:	p. 174.	YOU <sub>pl</sub> .Df:	p. 173.
TMRC:	p. 202.	TTRC:	p. 174.	YPP:	p. 177.
TODAY.Df:	p. 201.	TYPP:	p. 183.	YPPP:	p. 177.
TOMORROW.Df:	p. 202.	TYRC:	p. 174.	YPRC:	p. 173.
TORC:	p. 174.	WE.Df:	p. 173.	YRC:	p. 173.
TPP:	p. 182.	WPP:	p. 177.	YSRC:	p. 202.
TRC:	p. 174.	WRC:	p. 173.		

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