

Appendix A

Computational Study CLSP Game

A.1 Computational Study: Lagrangean Relaxation Based Heuristic

Table A.1 CLSP game: average results Lagrangean relaxation based heuristic for a varying number of products

	$ N $	$ K $	$[\underline{c}_{ijk\tau}^l; \bar{c}_{ijk\tau}^l]$	Avg %- Gap(LB)	Avg %- Gap(UB)	Avg # iterations	Avg CPU time [s]
h1	4	3	[0;0]	14.61%	0.01%	238.93	26.20
	4	3	[0;5]	8.46%	0.03%	255.20	29.11
	4	3	[0;15]	4.13%	0.04%	242.00	27.49
	4	3	[0;50]	3.30%	0.15%	237.93	26.48
	4	3	[5000;5000]	4.19%	0.13%	255.53	28.29
	4	15	[0;0]	1.98%	0.11%	255.07	138.03
	4	15	[0;5]	0.98%	0.08%	282.33	153.62
	4	15	[0;15]	0.38%	0.06%	282.00	149.90
	4	15	[0;50]	0.29%	0.06%	388.20	204.36
h3	4	15	[5000;5000]	0.73%	0.05%	545.27	302.06
	4	3	[0;0]	14.64%	0.48%	229.73	18.67
	4	3	[0;5]	8.46%	0.34%	257.07	21.05
	4	3	[0;15]	4.13%	0.26%	241.47	19.50
	4	3	[0;50]	3.31%	0.32%	237.07	19.25
	4	3	[5000;5000]	4.22%	0.36%	264.47	21.28
	4	15	[0;0]	1.97%	0.28%	262.13	120.87
	4	15	[0;5]	0.97%	0.15%	250.73	115.40
	4	15	[0;15]	0.37%	0.11%	254.73	117.97
h6	4	15	[0;50]	0.28%	0.07%	333.00	153.54
	4	15	[5000;5000]	0.73%	0.11%	441.13	222.21
	4	3	[0;0]	14.66%	9.53%	250.73	26.01
	4	3	[0;5]	8.49%	12.80%	255.73	26.93
	4	3	[0;15]	4.13%	19.90%	236.00	24.54
	4	3	[0;50]	3.22%	17.58%	235.00	24.64
	4	3	[5000;5000]	4.17%	10.29%	226.80	23.44
	4	15	[0;0]	1.94%	4.94%	254.60	138.21
	4	15	[0;5]	0.94%	13.66%	236.33	131.12
h6	4	15	[0;15]	0.36%	20.04%	231.27	127.23
	4	15	[0;50]	0.27%	18.33%	226.47	123.51
	4	15	[5000;5000]	0.64%	11.42%	266.87	145.27

Table A.2 CLSP game: average results Lagrangean relaxation based heuristic variant h1 for varying transportation cost coefficients and for a varying number of players

$ N $	$ K $	$[\underline{c}_{ijkt}^t; \bar{c}_{ijkt}^t]$	Avg %- Gap(LB)	Avg %- Gap(UB)	Avg # iterations	Avg CPU time [s]
3	1	[0;0]	35.63%	0.00%	242.20	12.71
3	1	[0;5]	27.96%	0.00%	248.93	14.19
3	1	[0;15]	20.30%	0.00%	237.40	13.15
3	1	[0;50]	14.40%	0.00%	231.07	12.53
3	1	[5000;5000]	13.30%	0.00%	227.27	11.95
3	3	[0;0]	11.44%	0.04%	242.93	25.79
3	3	[0;5]	6.84%	0.07%	229.60	24.72
3	3	[0;15]	3.51%	0.04%	221.60	23.45
3	3	[0;50]	3.28%	0.01%	253.53	26.34
3	3	[5000;5000]	5.78%	0.10%	245.40	25.64
5	3	[0;0]	16.18%	0.03%	264.20	33.60
5	3	[0;5]	9.67%	0.00%	285.00	39.05
5	3	[0;15]	5.08%	0.05%	255.80	34.93
5	3	[0;50]	3.26%	0.06%	250.80	32.44
5	3	[5000;5000]	5.09%	0.03%	263.67	33.00
10	3	[0;0]	27.81%	0.00%	314.67	51.37
10	3	[0;5]	17.30%	0.00%	311.33	63.49
10	3	[0;15]	7.70%	0.02%	295.27	65.06
10	3	[0;50]	3.21%	0.10%	291.33	56.65
10	3	[5000;5000]	4.57%	0.10%	275.73	43.96
15	3	[0;0]	32.52%	0.00%	341.80	70.23
15	3	[0;5]	24.26%	0.00%	361.13	89.31
15	3	[0;15]	11.25%	0.04%	307.00	102.78
15	3	[0;50]	4.17%	0.08%	293.80	79.39
15	3	[5000;5000]	4.86%	0.13%	302.00	68.74

Table A.3 CLSP game: average results Lagrangean relaxation based heuristic variant h3 for varying transportation cost coefficients and for a varying number of players

$ N $	$ K $	$[\underline{c}_{ijkt}^l; \bar{c}_{ijkt}^l]$	Avg %- Gap(LB)	Avg %- Gap(UB)	Avg # iterations	Avg CPU time [s]
3	1	[0;0]	35.69%	0.12%	240.67	6.75
3	1	[0;5]	27.94%	0.00%	247.33	7.52
3	1	[0;15]	20.30%	0.00%	240.00	7.20
3	1	[0;50]	14.39%	0.07%	227.93	6.70
3	1	[5000;5000]	13.23%	0.09%	220.27	6.10
3	3	[0;0]	11.48%	0.36%	239.07	18.59
3	3	[0;5]	6.86%	0.18%	236.93	18.30
3	3	[0;15]	3.50%	0.27%	226.00	17.60
3	3	[0;50]	3.30%	0.26%	256.87	20.06
3	3	[5000;5000]	5.79%	0.22%	241.20	18.89
5	3	[0;0]	16.81%	0.30%	267.13	23.74
5	3	[0;5]	9.69%	0.34%	251.87	23.65
5	3	[0;15]	5.08%	0.22%	266.87	24.44
5	3	[0;50]	3.24%	0.31%	270.13	25.73
5	3	[5000;5000]	5.11%	0.23%	271.47	24.70
10	3	[0;0]	27.77%	0.23%	309.93	32.35
10	3	[0;5]	17.33%	0.17%	296.87	32.73
10	3	[0;15]	7.72%	0.16%	289.60	33.63
10	3	[0;50]	3.22%	0.31%	286.13	30.48
10	3	[5000;5000]	4.54%	0.36%	275.13	30.47
15	3	[0;0]	32.45%	0.20%	352.67	48.06
15	3	[0;5]	24.20%	0.14%	343.67	55.53
15	3	[0;15]	11.24%	0.21%	311.13	75.54
15	3	[0;50]	4.19%	0.32%	289.93	51.35
15	3	[5000;5000]	4.86%	0.31%	273.67	43.10

Table A.4 CLSP game: average results Lagrangean relaxation based heuristic variant h6 for varying transportation cost coefficients and for a varying number of players

$ N $	$ K $	$[\underline{c}_{ijkt}^l; \overline{c}_{ijkt}^l]$	Avg %- Gap(LB)	Avg %- Gap(UB)	Avg # iterations	Avg CPU time [s]
3	1	[0;0]	35.95%	6.46%	253.87	12.60
3	1	[0;5]	28.18%	8.05%	259.47	13.59
3	1	[0;15]	20.30%	8.61%	238.00	12.16
3	1	[0;50]	14.38%	7.69%	235.07	12.10
3	1	[5000;5000]	13.18%	5.04%	240.93	11.85
3	3	[0;0]	11.48%	9.99%	231.40	23.20
3	3	[0;5]	6.87%	13.89%	231.13	23.28
3	3	[0;15]	3.47%	17.71%	223.00	22.24
3	3	[0;50]	3.26%	15.42%	227.80	22.69
3	3	[5000;5000]	5.67%	8.66%	241.60	23.95
5	3	[0;0]	16.82%	10.79%	264.93	30.50
5	3	[0;5]	9.62%	15.03%	262.87	30.83
5	3	[0;15]	4.99%	21.40%	257.87	30.55
5	3	[0;50]	3.21%	20.23%	253.47	29.69
5	3	[5000;5000]	5.00%	10.75%	242.00	27.84
10	3	[0;0]	27.91%	11.61%	310.73	38.17
10	3	[0;5]	17.38%	15.68%	310.00	42.05
10	3	[0;15]	7.75%	20.88%	290.20	41.83
10	3	[0;50]	3.20%	26.07%	269.80	36.75
10	3	[5000;5000]	4.45%	11.97%	254.00	33.86
15	3	[0;0]	32.74%	12.36%	355.33	58.13
15	3	[0;5]	24.44%	14.31%	344.80	66.74
15	3	[0;15]	11.26%	20.39%	306.60	82.67
15	3	[0;50]	4.14%	25.12%	280.80	62.19
15	3	[5000;5000]	4.75%	11.28%	273.53	51.11

A.2 Computational Study: Fix-and-Optimize Heuristic

Table A.5 CLSP Game: results for fix-and-optimize heuristic for varying transportation cost coefficients and a varying number of players (plb+prb+tb, * response time more than 3 h)

$[c_{ijkt}^t; \bar{c}_{ijkt}^t]$	$ N $	$ K $	Avg %-			Avg CPU			Avg %-		
			Gap(UB)	iterations	time [s]	Gap(UB)	iterations	time [s]	Gap(UB)	iterations	time [s]
[0; 0]	3	1	0.00%	2.00	0.30	15	3	0.13%	2.73	1.57	
[0; 5]	3	1	0.00%	2.00	0.26	15	3	0.02%	3.27	2.22	
[0; 15]	3	1	0.00%	2.00	0.27	15	3	0.04%	2.80	1.92	
[0; 50]	3	1	0.00%	2.00	0.28	15	3	0.00%	2.87	2.11	
[5000; 5000]	3	1	0.00%	1.87	0.26	15	3	0.00%	2.00	1.91	
[0; 0]	3	3	0.14%	2.20	0.39	20	3	0.07%	2.67	1.90	
[0; 5]	3	3	0.04%	2.40	0.47	20	3	0.04%	3.13	2.79	
[0; 15]	3	3	0.21%	2.47	0.48	20	3	0.03%	2.73	2.54	
[0; 50]	3	3	0.02%	2.33	0.48	20	3	0.00%	2.87	2.92	
[5000; 5000]	3	3	0.00%	2.00	0.37	20	3	0.00%	2.00	37.99	
[0; 0]	4	15	0.08%	2.87	1.43	25	3	0.06%	2.87	2.66	
[0; 5]	4	15	0.04%	3.33	2.09	25	3	0.04%	2.67	2.93	
[0; 15]	4	15	0.02%	3.13	1.94	25	3	0.01%	3.13	3.89	
[0; 50]	4	15	0.02%	2.93	1.92	25	3	0.01%	3.07	4.56	
[5000; 5000]	4	15	0.00%	2.00	1.33	25	3	0.00%*	2.20*	140.07*	
[0; 0]	5	3	0.08%	2.53	0.53	50	3	0.03%	3.40	13.19	
[0; 5]	5	3	0.01%	2.60	0.64	50	3	0.04%	3.20	14.51	
[0; 15]	5	3	0.01%	2.33	0.58	50	3	0.01%	3.47	19.31	
[0; 50]	5	3	0.01%	2.27	0.65	50	3	0.00%	3.33	30.15	
[5000; 5000]	5	3	0.00%	2.00	0.50	50	3	-*	-*	-*	
[0; 0]	10	3	0.11%	2.47	0.86	100	3	0.02%	3.53	125.09	
[0; 5]	10	3	0.04%	2.60	1.12	100	3	0.02%	3.20	135.98	
[0; 15]	10	3	0.02%	2.40	1.06	100	3	0.02%	3.73	284.98	
[0; 50]	10	3	0.00%	2.47	1.17	100	3	-*	-*	-*	
[5000; 5000]	10	3	0.00%	2.07	1.02	100	3	-*	-*	-*	

Appendix B

Computational Study MLCLSP Game




Fig. B.1 MLCLSP game: supply network “wide1” with $|N| = 10$




Fig. B.2 MLCLSP game: supply network “wide2” with $|N| = 10$




Fig. B.3 MLCLSP game: supply network “wide3” with $|N| = 10$




Fig. B.4 MLCLSP game: supply network “long” with $|N| = 20$




Fig. B.5 MLCLSP game: supply network “wide1” with $|N| = 20$




Fig. B.6 MLCLSP game: supply network “wide2” with $|N| = 20$




Fig. B.7 MLCLSP game: supply network “wide3” with $|N| = 20$

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