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# Index<sup>1</sup>

## A

accidental generalizations, 67  
Anger, E., 87–8  
Arrow, K., 3, 186–9  
asymmetry in causation, 111

## C

capacities, 6, 68, 70, 81–4, 86, 88–9,  
91–3, 95n7, 111–18, 124, 126,  
126n3, 127n8, 127n9, 142–3,  
148–9, 155, 161, 196–7  
Cartwright, N., 3, 6, 8, 20, 37,  
67–70, 73, 80–4, 86, 88–9,  
91–3, 94n7, 102, 104,  
112–18, 121, 124, 126,  
126n3, 127n7, 127n8, 127n9,  
136, 140, 143–7, 149, 151,  
155, 158, 161, 163n12, 180

causal explanations, 6, 37, 99–128,  
162n8, 175–7, 179, 186, 190  
causal mechanisms, 68, 110,  
128n15, 140, 185  
causal relata, 105–6, 126n2  
causation  
    probability lowering, 109  
    token level, 6–7, 110, 124–5, 197  
    type level, 6–7, 109–10, 124–5,  
    197  
causation and econometrics, 122–5  
causation in economics, 99–102, 124  
ceteris paribus, 79–86  
    absentibus, 2, 134, 184  
    laws, 5, 56, 64, 79–86, 114, 146–7  
    neglectis, 134  
classical economics, 1, 5, 9n6,  
    11–12, 47, 63, 195  
Condorcet, M. de, 24–6, 29, 38, 90

<sup>1</sup>Note: Locators with 'n' denote notes.

constructivism in modelling, 135  
 critical realism, 17  
 critique of economics, 80, 154

## D

Debreu, G., 3, 30, 186–9  
 deductive-nomological model of  
   explanation, 3, 106, 146–7  
 distinctively mathematical  
   explanations, 7, 64, 94n1, 161,  
   170–9, 183–6, 190–1n3, 197

## E

econometrics, 6, 99, 101–2, 122–5,  
   126n1, 154, 164n19, 179  
 economic laws and models, 2, 4–5,  
   7, 11–57, 79–80, 90–3, 94n6,  
   117, 133–64, 169, 170,  
   180–1, 185–7, 189, 196  
 economics and philosophy  
   dogmatism, 8, 197–8  
   humility, 54, 197  
   physics, 3, 13–14, 19, 51–2, 54,  
   75–6, 78, 80, 89, 94n4, 121,  
   128n16, 143, 146, 162n1,  
   171–6, 180, 190–1n3, 198  
   realism, 17, 103, 111, 134, 172,  
   190n1  
   as social science, 3, 13, 14, 38, 49,  
   83, 88, 121, 164n17, 171  
 explanatory paradox, 136, 156–60

## F

Fisher, I., 6, 74–8, 94n4, 99, 136  
 Fisher's (1911) model, 6, 74–8, 136

## G

general equilibrium framework, 3,  
   163n13, 186–7  
 Giere, R., 66, 71–3, 147  
 Granger causality, 123–4  
 Guala, F., 135–6, 152

## H

Hicks, J.R., 101  
 history of economics, 196  
 history of formalization of  
   economics, 74  
 Hume, D., 1, 19–20, 26–7, 66, 70,  
   75, 99–103, 125

## I

INUS condition, 111  
 invariance of laws, 65, 70,  
   104  
 isolationism in modelling, 135

## K

Kořakowski, L., 5, 198

## L

Lange, M., 7, 31, 65, 69–70, 104,  
   169, 172–4, 176–8, 186, 188,  
   190–1n3  
 laws of nature, 2–6, 8, 8n2, 12, 49,  
   55–6, 63–72, 79, 85–90,  
   93–4, 94n1, 95n7, 101,  
   103–4, 106, 113–14, 149,  
   174, 176, 196, 198  
 Lawson, T., 134, 152, 163n16

## M

- Marshall, A., 2–3, 5, 9n6, 11–57,  
63, 81, 89–90, 92–3, 195
- mathematical explanation, 7–8, 64,  
94n1, 161, 170–9, 183–6,  
190–1n3, 197
- mathematics  
and formalization of economics,  
7–8, 29, 38, 94n4, 161, 169,  
171–2, 174–6, 178–83,  
185–90, 190–1n3, 197
- mathematization of economics, 179
- Mäki, U., 19, 111, 133–4, 157–60,  
162–4
- mechanisms, 6–7, 16–18, 21–4,  
33–4, 49, 64, 68, 72, 75, 83,  
101, 104, 110, 112, 116–18,  
120, 127n14, 127n15, 135–7,  
139–43, 145, 147–55,  
157–61, 163n16, 164n17,  
164n23, 185
- metaphysics of causation, 102
- Mill, J.S., 2–3, 5, 11, 13, 31, 34–47,  
52, 54–6, 57n10, 57n13, 63,  
79–81, 83, 90–3, 94n6,  
115–16, 127n9, 150, 162n3,  
162n9, 196
- models in economics  
as believable worlds, 7, 126,  
133–64  
as constructions, 46, 73–4, 78–9,  
133–64  
as credible worlds, 136, 155–6,  
160  
as isolations, 13, 35, 52, 83,  
133–64, 180
- models of phenomena  
data, 153–4, 180

- mechanisms, 64  
as producers of laws, 93  
theory, 73–4

- moral natural laws, 5–6, 8n2, 86–7
- Morgan, M., 32–3, 73–6, 136, 147

## N

- natural laws tradition, 8n2, 63–4,  
79, 85–90, 94, 196
- neoclassical economics, 4, 9n6, 47,  
88, 143–4, 146, 178
- Newton, I., 1, 11, 13–14, 19, 46,  
67, 76, 89, 189n3
- normic laws, 81, 83–4, 93

## P

- philosophical approaches to  
causation, 6, 99–128
- powers, 6, 13, 15, 25, 38–9, 42, 68,  
70, 76–7, 82–3, 88–9, 92–3,  
100–4, 107, 111–18, 126n4,  
149, 157, 163n16, 196–7
- profit maximization, 144–5, 185–6

## R

- Reiss, J., 156–160
- Ricardo, D., 3, 5, 11, 13, 32–6, 47, 51,  
55, 57n8, 57n9, 63, 90–3, 99

## S

- Schelling's model, 136, 180–1,  
183–4, 186
- Schelling, T., 155, 182–3, 191n7
- Schurz, G., 81–4

semantic view of theories, 73–4, 135,  
147  
singular causation, 124  
Smith, A., 1, 3, 5, 11–57, 63, 90–1, 93  
spurious correlations, 107  
structural realism, 111, 134  
Sugden, R., 134, 136, 138, 155,  
181, 184  
syntactic view of theories, 71–3

**T**

theory of causation  
  Humean, 101, 103–4, 107, 118  
  interventionist, 13, 101, 105,  
  118–22, 127n13, 196  
  probabilistic, 107–11, 118  
  process theory, 118–22, 191n5  
  regularity, 6, 101–7, 106, 111,  
  117–18

tractability assumptions, 23, 138,  
144, 180  
truth in economics, 5, 7, 157

**U**

utility maximization, 144, 180

**V**

vacuous laws, 66, 69  
Varian, H., 136–45  
Varian's (1980) model, 7, 136–45,  
147, 154, 159, 181, 185

**W**

Weintraub, R., 178, 187, 188  
Woodward, J., 70, 118, 121,  
140–3