

Appendix I (to Sections I–III): <For the 1910/11 Lecture.
Concluding Remarks and Plans>¹

...To what extent can all that be conveyed to beginners? I can probably only give them a faint idea of what is to be accomplished and probably possible here. The concepts of a priori and a posteriori must be thoroughly discussed precisely in the introduction, while the difference between analytic and synthetic, what is merely formally and materially a priori valid is to be given in addition to formal logic.

5) The next step would probably at first lead back to formal logic and from there on to the formally restricted noetic theory of norms (and methodology) and from there to the idea of an a priori founded noetic theory of norms and methodology in general that makes use of all a priori ontologies and axiologies and, when these are complete, would also have to provide all complete methods—and all in any way possible.

6) Is anything still missing? Now the critique of reason would come. Can one seriously distinguish the critique of reason from noetics? In the lectures, I distinguish between a noetics of what is superficial and a noetics of what is profound, the latter the genuine theory of knowledge. Is this distinction to be implemented? In any event, a theory of justification of knowledge can be drafted up to a certain degree without becoming involved in the ultimate epistemological difficulties.

¹Probably beginning of 1911. (Editor's note)

The foregoing pages were used a great deal for the lectures, namely, for the Winter Lectures 1910/11 (Logic–Theory of Knowledge).

The investigation was not completed in the lecture. So many things remain in abeyance. The difference in the position of the formal disciplines of axiology—which however occupy another position vis-à-vis formal analytics—and of the ontology of nature, which is not however a formal discipline in the genuine sense, has not become completely clear to me.

334 All the pages on theory of science must be reworked, and everything judgment-theoretical that has been mixed in there must be eliminated. Does that not yield a treatise in its own right?

Plans: Introduction to theory of science as “classification of sciences”; as theory of the domains and regions of possible knowledge in general: theory of categories. Whether the writings of Jonas Cohn and Emil Lask should be able to help somewhat there?

General clarification of the Ideas “meaning”, “judgment” etc., within the context of a general theory of consciousness. That is the most burning desideratum. And I shall have to go into that first. From there <on out> transition to a systematic phenomenology of consciousness with all the fundamental distinctions: impression and idea, etc.

To begin with, however, I have to attend to the printing of the second edition of the *Logical Investigations*. That will give me a good bit of work. The theory of meaning ought to remain unchanged in the process.

Appendix II (to §1) <Logic as Philosophical Science of Knowledge, as First Philosophy>¹

For scientific specialists who have devoted their lives to the systematic examination of logic, it is now and then truly entertaining to observe how unsuspectingly even well-established masters of theoretical science take no notice of the genuine problems and deeper lying difficulties when they indulge inclinations to philosophical reflection, but disdain to derive the benefit of the scientific work of thousands of years in this field. In our time, newly

¹From the lecture course of 1910/11 WS. (Editor’s note)

awakened philosophical interests are indeed very popular in all sciences, and not the least in highly developed natural scientific science-theoretical reflections. For the most part, they are unfortunately of a very naïve kind. There is thus quite the same gap between them and the heights of true science as, for instance, between the practically wise peasant's observations of nature and the theoretical natural knowledge of physicists or astronomers. I believe I may state this judgment without exaggeration, although it is certain that the science or set of sciences pertaining to the understanding has not remotely attained the degree of theoretical sophistication that modern mathematics, the modern natural sciences, and not least also the philosophical-historical disciplines of the modern era honors so gloriously. In spite of all the efforts that the greatest minds have applied to the analytic elucidation of the sphere of understanding over thousands of years, the number of firmly secured insights and theories there is disgracefully small in comparison, in particular, to the younger and so very successful disciplines I have just named. But, for that reason, what I maintained earlier however holds good.

The greatest philosophers, who for the most part were also the creative minds of the beginnings in the exact sciences, did not succeed in gaining as steady a foothold and in ultimately conquering vast areas in the field of philosophy as in the other sciences. So, the 335
endless efforts did not, however, remain misspent. In order just to close in on the problems, it was in particular necessary for them to circumscribe them into groups, to test the major points for their possible solution, and to develop the unique methods that the incomparable uniqueness of these problems precisely requires. The temple of philosophy dwelt, as it were, on steep, distant far-off heights. We must first struggle to scale them before we can set foot in it and fathom its secrets. Many, and great, things have now been accomplished by way of preparatory work, and the number of solving and really compelling theories not much greater than in the specialized sciences erected upon a more accessible basis. So the gap between what has already been accomplished in forms of science and what is to see and grasp in the naïve standpoint is in fact not less, indeed, undoubtedly actually greater than, for instance, that between the sciences of nature and the empirical life of the spirit.

My task will then have to be to raise you above this naïve standpoint and show you the way to the mysterious solitudes in which one day the sphinx of knowledge must unveil its riddle. I could also call it the way to the “mothers” of knowledge, to the essence-principles of knowledge in terms of its ultimate origins.

Regarding these mothers, I love to turn to Mephistopheles’ words, “Enthroned sublime in solitude are goddesses. Around them is no place, still less any time.” And unfortunately, it is stated no less significantly, “To speak of them is embarrassment.” As you will remember, Mephistopheles is keen to dissuade the aspirant from taking the way “into the untrodden—the not to be trodden” and paints the solitudes in a ghastly enough way, “Nothing will you see in interminably empty farness, the step you take, you will not hear, nothing firm find where you rest.” We must, though, not allow ourselves to be frightened, and with Faust answer, “Just keep on, we want to fathom it. In your nothing, I hope to find the universe.”¹

It will naturally also be my task to clarify for you the meaning of the problems arising here for all human knowledge, so that you understand that in the case of logic as philosophical science of knowledge, it is not a matter of subordinate specialized fields in the realm of manmade sciences, which like any others find their enthusiasts, which though someone aspiring to deeper learning could very well do without. Ultimately, learning really cannot look for its goal in learning about anything and everything, but only in what is ultimately meaningful, what is deepening, indeed enabling, understanding of self and the world.

It will, however, become apparent that nothing is to be expected of an ultimate understanding of the world as long as one has not raised oneself up to the set of problems of the analysis of the understanding and reason and adopted a position with regard to them. If, therefore, philosophy is the word for the loftiest goals of knowledge and the sciences directly oriented toward them, then the discipline we want to devote ourselves to here is to be labelled first philosophy in the most concise sense of the word, for it is a
 336 matter of investigations that must go before and must be attended to before further philosophizing can seriously be contemplated.

¹ Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Faust*, Section II, Act I. (Translator’s note)

The imperfect state of our knowledge of the understanding therefore also sufficiently explains the imperfect development of philosophy in general and in turn explains why a dogmatic-didactic presentation of philosophy that ought to be able to lay claim to scientificity provisionally yields nothing and cannot yield anything. Kant already loved to say: One cannot learn philosophy, but only to philosophize.¹ One can learn mechanics. One can learn acoustics, optics, chemistry, geometry, and so all branches of exact and well-developed sciences. Of course, none of these disciplines, as marvelous as the things they have been able to do are, is finalized. Everywhere there is an abundance of unsolved problems. Their horizon is infinite. It recedes with each step and remains infinite. But, within the sphere of explored and surveyable finitude, we have found our bearings on all sides. The facts are established through observation and experimentation, through various expertly developed methods precisely suited to the different fields. In terms of laws, everything is in order, brought under verified theories. And, these facts and theories are then expounded dogmatically in systematically ordered coherency. One can and must learn them. So, dogmatic expositions are never lacking in philosophy. But, their execution and meaning are different there. There is indeed no question of there being as soundly, thoroughly formed and securely founded descriptions and theories as, for instance, in physics. And, consequently, they are at most significant as rough drafts, as theoretical possibilities which one never accepts as confirmed truth and which, above all, one must not let influence one simply didactically unless one wants to engage in dogmatic theorizing in a bad, scientifically objectionable sense. Therefore, one cannot learn philosophy.

Though they may have ever so much to say to scholars, dogmatic expositions are a danger for novices. They only too easily deaden their sense of genuine scientificity. They cover up the difficulties from them, like chasms covered over with greenery. If there is stuff of facts and theories firmly grounded only to the most modest extent here, then the sole justified pedagogical task only

¹Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, II. Transcendental Doctrine of Method, Chapter 3, The Architectonic of Pure Reason. (Translator's note)

lies in training novices to philosophize. That, however, happens through the essential meaning of thousand-year-long efforts having been laid bare to them in accordance with the state of things at the time and its insights, through their having been raised up to an understanding of the problems, goals, methods—and finally, through the deeper meaning of the theoretical attempts and rough drafts in which the greatness, grandeur, and force of philosophical science lies having been made accessible to them. And, this is the way in which I wish to introduce you to logic and critique of knowledge. You ought, as it were, to sense the inmost spirit of their intentions and be most inwardly concerned by the fact that the difficulties to be overcome here are not a question of some scientific sport, but are a serious matter for all those interested in ultimate truth and philosophy.

337 One experiences nothing of that through the usual expositions of logic accessible to beginners and intended for them. One is still far from having understood anything of logic if one has read such an exposition, and perhaps even if one has written it. If, however, you have been introduced to the inmost essence of work in logic and critique of knowledge, to the nature of their problems and methods, then you are sufficiently prepared to be able to derive benefit and excitement from reading the important expositions of the discipline.

That is therefore to say that these lectures seek to provide and will provide something entirely different from what you could learn from books, since I in general believe that lectures are not there for the purpose of replacing books, let alone that they ought to be spoken books or excerpts from books.

Appendix III (§6): <Distinction Between Explanatory Theory and Theory of Knowledge>¹

To begin with, I would like, however, to say a few words here to keep you from developing false expectations that the word theory might have awakened in you with respect to the theory of knowledge that is our subject. You should by no means think of the dis-

¹From the lecture course of WS 1910/11. (Editor's note)

cipline as a theoretical discipline in the sense familiar to you from your work with non-philosophical disciplines, with theoretical mathematics, theoretical physics, and so forth. It lies in the distinctive nature of philosophical knowledge as opposed to all other knowledge that its goal is in no way, and can in no way be, to provide “theories” in the usual sense of explanatory theories, and that for this reason it cannot conform to the expectations with which scientific beginners will come to it.

More precise explanation. Other sciences that do not fall under the heading of philosophy have their prescribed fields in which obvious factual cohesion reigns, and in reference to it, they everywhere set themselves the task of exploring the facts precisely in their factual contexts and in accordance with the laws prevailing in these. In a specific sense we call such sciences theoretical sciences, also nomological and nomologically explanatory sciences. The mathematical sciences and the sciences of physical and psychical nature therefore belong there. In all of them, the ideal is this: To carry out theory in the specific sense of explanatory theory, therefore, to accomplish something like what *Euclidean* geometry already has in the area of spatial configurations, or as recent physics is accomplishing in its exact mathematical disciplines as deductively explanatory theories.

Every field has its multiform conformity to laws. Everything singular, in nature every individual-concrete thing falls under what is universal, and the universality everywhere leads to conformity to laws. Nothing is isolated in the sphere of numbers, in the spatial sphere—in short, in any mathematical sphere. And in turn—in all of nature, no particular formation is isolated. Every particular formation of being is a formation conforming to laws. 338

And, then, the overall aim is that of reducing the vast abundance of particular formations to a smallest possible, and in any case finite, number of what are called basic laws by which those particularities can be explained as merely necessary consequences, hence, deductively. If the basic laws are given, then it is therefore a mere fact of purely deductive unfolding to derive, not only all already known particular laws in the form of ordered systems of inferences and proofs, but also a host of other, still unknown, ones. And, that is precisely what explanatory theories accomplish. In the

purely mathematical disciplines, these are based upon directly obvious, absolutely valid basic laws called axioms, only in the natural sciences, however, upon hypothetical and inductively obtained propositions that refer back to experience and only have probable validity. Such are the basic laws of mechanics, energetics, and so forth.

One ordinarily distinguishes between concrete and abstract natural sciences and calls the former descriptive, the others explanatory. But, upon close inspection, both are explanatory, each in its manner. Concrete sciences like geology, mineralogy, and so on, first aim at the description of individual and typical individualizations of earthly and heavenly existence. In them, however, the goal is ultimately to bring the particular under the law-concepts of what are called the abstract sciences precisely for purposes of explanation. These abstract sciences are no longer concerned with what is concrete, but exclusively with existential formations that conform to laws. What is concrete is only used as an example and only as a springboard in order to make general findings. Physics and chemistry do not deal with the earth, with specific heavenly bodies, not with kinds of minerals, but in general ways with the qualities of matter in general that conform to laws. They then, however, further try to bring the various laws that they find under a theory, to investigate in terms of primitive properties and primitive basic laws out of which the vast abundance of physical laws, as every particular physical theorem states them, can be explained deductively as necessary particularities. If abstract natural science is therefore there and developed to a great enough extent, then all aiming at explanation has attained its goal in the field of the concrete, therefore, of the concrete natural sciences, whenever observation—and perhaps experimental analysis—of what is concrete suffices for subsumption of the concrete under the relevant law-concepts of the abstract sciences. With that, the general theory becomes applicable to the concrete case, and thus the concrete becomes explainable. It becomes understandable from the abstract laws. Theoretical physics and chemistry become, for example, applicable to everything occurring in the area of mineralogy precisely if the minerals are exactly analyzed and described in accordance with physical-chemical methods. Abstract science is the field

of pure theory, concrete science the field of what is individual and concrete that is explained by means of this theory.

(The word explanation naturally has a twofold meaning if on one occasion one speaks of explanation with regard to what is concrete and its subsumption under the concepts of the abstract sciences, and on the other hand, says in the abstract sciences themselves within the context of the theory that through subsumption of the particular laws under the basic laws, the former receive their explanation, as for example *Kepler's* Laws receive their explanation from the basic law of universal gravitation and the basic laws of mechanics. On the other hand, the one is connected with the other in easily understandable ways, for the drive to conceive of the concrete as not merely factual, but necessarily valid, leads us to the universal and laws, requires the development of pure sciences of laws, and within these, we in turn see ourselves led upward in the hierarchical structure of the law-governed dependencies to the basic laws upon which all full, ultimate explanation is based, therefore, for example, to the basic laws of mechanics, the basic laws of energetics.)

What has been discussed above probably suffices to make the meaning of explanatory theory and theoretically explanatory science clear to you. I now ask: Must then every science of the type described, each one, be oriented toward theoretical explanation? Perhaps, precisely philosophy, and especially the philosophical theory of knowledge, is a discipline, which by its very nature cannot at all be oriented toward theorization in the sense described (deductive theorization from basic laws). And, perhaps, just reflections of the kind we have undertaken for marking pure logic off from the empirical theory of the art of knowledge and from cognitive psychology then constitute a main thing for them. Obviously, systematic investigations, the point of which is to separate on grounds of principle clusters of problems which pertain to the Idea of the understanding, and which consequently also seek to mark off the scientific disciplines required by this Idea on grounds of principle, are also scientific in nature, actually belong together in their own discipline. And yet, what is to be accomplished here is not theoretical explanation in the sense of mathematics and mathematical physics.

These reflections ought to convey the right approach to you. They must not by any means let the feeling grow in you that has perhaps already crept over you that we would, however, spend too much of our time on complicated preparations for things that should always come first. Why not begin right away with the things themselves?

Exclusive concern with theoretically explanatory sciences conceptually leaves you with the impression that it may also be a matter of something of the kind in philosophy, therefore, that also there one would have to proceed as, for example, in mathematics, that is, begin with axioms and continue with deductions—or as in physics, begin with suitable observations and experiments, proceed to formulations of the simplest laws, and then rise to mathe-
340 matical theory. In these sciences one does not engage in much reflection. One begins and carries on. Listeners react impatiently to long-winded reflections in the context of a mathematics or physics lecture. They say to themselves: I did not come here to reflect, but to learn about things.

This is precisely the approach you really must not adopt here. Philosophy is to a great extent a sphere of most rigorous findings, but it is not a field of explanatory theories. In its case, reflections are to a great extent the thing itself, simply because what it must above all secure—the fundamental demarcations in the field of reason—is only to be secured through reflection. Any of you who have at one point had *Kant's* critique of reason handy—and unfortunately beginners really preferably reach for this difficult book which is completely unfathomable to them—will have already noticed that this basic philosophical work is entirely different in nature from any basic work of the theoretical sciences. And yet, it is a work having the most rigorous scientific intentions. It thoroughly consists of critical reflections from which exact findings, but by no means nomologically explanatory theories ought to proceed.

Accordingly, I ask you to accept that what we have already thought through up to this point, and thus no less everything else, ought not by any means be mere preparations, but already pertains to the systematic structure of the things themselves that make up philosophical theory of knowledge. Naturally, the import

of findings made in the beginning can—and especially with respect to the loftiest philosophical problems upon which we have set our hearts—be unclear to beginners. In the course of our work together this clarity will, however, automatically set in.

After these very necessary parenthetical remarks, let us return back to our subject. I had sufficiently delineated a general Idea of pure logic from the angles of psychology and psychologically founded theory of the art of knowledge. I do not by any means have a scientifically determined conception of the clusters of problems satisfying this general framework, or of the different directions in which the Idea of the understanding, or the Idea of knowledge, gives a reason for investigating and establishing different disciplines. It is necessary to remedy this shortcoming now.

Appendix IV (to §9): <Supplement to the General
Characterization of the Noetic Theory of Justification. The Ideas
of Judgment-Events Relevant from the Viewpoint of the Theory
of Knowledge>¹

I must still emphasize that grasping Ideas about judgment-experiences can run in very different directions. I have up until now favored the Idea that underlies talk of a judgment (for instance, “All men are mortal”) where this Idea is impervious to differences of the possible liveliness of our conviction in so judging, or to differently oriented differences of clarity and unclarity, and so on. So, the difference of the Evidenz, the insight, with which what is judged stands before our eyes as factual truth—as opposed to the blindness with which we merely believe without reasons to understand—is also irrelevant for the Idea of judgment under discussion. In certain areas of logic, precisely this Idea of judgment is the necessary and governing one. We can, however, also form other Ideas, for example, the Idea of insightful judgment, the Idea of lively conviction or of conviction with varying degrees of liveliness, and so forth. We can also grasp these Ideas in purity, not therefore speak, for instance, of human or animal judging and posit the existence of a world with people and judging beings. It is just as in the

¹From the lecture course of WS 1910/11 (Editor’s note).

sphere of sounds, where we can attach the pure quality *c* as an Idea, but can also take along a certain intensity, a certain timbre with it in the pure Idea, and so on.

If I have formed the different Ideas of judgment-events, then I can state in purely ideal generality knowledge that refers to corresponding ideal relationships. There ensues—something of which it is especially a question for normative purposes—ideal relationships between the jurisdiction of truth and the Idea of insightfulness, and in the Idea this in turn relates to what the judgment judges.

Appendix V (to §12): <The Enigma of “Intentionality”>¹

Because the miracle of consciousness is the miracle of what is called intentionality. For the philosophically naïve the most obvious thing of all is the fact that in subjective experiencing, called presenting, judging, valuating, and so forth, something can be intended that is not itself an experience, but lies beyond the experience, and that in relation to such experiences, which are called “consciousness-experiences”; subjects can be certain of the objective validity of their intending. For naïve people that is completely obvious—so much so that they do not feel the slightest reason to reflect upon the fact that objects exist in their own right, states-of-affairs obtain in their own right (things change, events take place, natural laws and mathematical laws hold), and that in their experiences of the consciousness, subjects can perceive the objects existing in their own right, determine them thinkingly in valid ways, value them in valid ways, and likewise can subjectively know every kind of state-of-affairs, every kind of law obtaining in its own right. This obviousness (and already the most primitive perception of a thing of all) is the enigma of all enigmas. And, the first

342 step of the inquiry—provided it first of all only seeks to ascertain what is immanently present there—already shows that the original enigma hinges on the original fact that makes up the essential particularity of each consciousness as such, namely, that in itself each experience that we call a consciousness has a meaning. But hinging on meaning (*Bedeuten*) and the meaning (*Bedeutung*) is the enigmatic distinction of rational, or objective validity, or non-

¹From the lecture course of WS 1910/11 (Editor’s note).

validity that ought to signify “soundness”; an encounter of the consciousness with something beyond it, something transcendent: what consciousness intends as being and what is not itself consciousness actually ought to be.

This, only so that you can sense the importance of the present investigation for the loftiest epistemological interests. It is highly important for the establishment of critique of knowledge, and at the same time it carves out for us the basic concepts with whose delimitation the logical disciplines we are driving at secure their own field of work.

However, in the short digression, I have already heralded a certain extension of the concept of meaning that is indispensable and that I must now explicate more in greater detail.

Appendix VI (to Section II): <On the Content of the Theory of Forms>¹

For 1910/11

For the conception of natural process:

- 1) I have not entirely brought the theory of forms to completion. In any case, everything that is found in the theory of inference from 166 on with regard to mere (to be severed from the Idea of validity) inference-forms is to be taken out and to be placed in relationship to the part of the theory of hypothetical and inferring judgments, for example, the differences between simple and compound inferences.
- 2) Belonging within this context is also the Idea of apophantic-analytic law, of apophantic law of inference (inference-form), of law of proof (“proof-form”), indeed even the Idea of apophantic theory-form. For, a false law of inference, a false law of proof, a false analytic law is also in itself characterized as apophantic-analytic. Consequently, much of what is propounded within the context of the “transition” sphere also belongs in the pure theory of forms, especially 160ff.

An analytic inference itself, proof itself, etc. is also characterized as analytic as a result of the fact that its terms are precisely

¹ Probably Fall 1910. (Editor’s note)

nominal terms etc. and its forms “purely” analytic forms. Therefore, that also belongs in there.

- 343 3) Also, the difference between a posteriori propositions and a priori propositions, pure concept-propositions, etc.
- 4) Likewise, the difference between mathematical and non-mathematical propositions. And the difference between the analytic as apophantically analytic and the mathematical of the broader sphere. Naturally, also analytic proof in the narrower sense and higher-level mathematical proof. Therefore, rather everything in the transition area, with a little bit of elimination.

In the theory of forms, it must at least be briefly said that a theory of forms of relation-judgments, or of relat<ions> formations is needed, moreover, of the theory of forms of possible number formations (taking no account of validity), namely, of the configurations of number-formations, both in the theory of cardinal numbers and in the theory of ordinal numbers. And thus everywhere.

Likewise, a theory of forms of the formations of aggregates (set-formations) is necessary. Namely, the theory of combinations and the theory of permutations belong here.

The relationship between mathematics and ontology as formal ontology is a cross I bear. After I have, however, situated the Idea of “factualness” of reality in the realm of meaning, then I really secure the Idea of what is not-factual, and that is what is ont<ological> in the formal sense.

Then, however, relation-concepts such as “whole” and “part” also occur, concepts such as “conjunction” and so on, namely, as apophantic form-concepts inasmuch as we must incorporate these concepts into the judgment-forms as well. The being-in-something indeed occurs in the existential sphere, or as existence-concept.

Appendix VII (to §20): <Independent and Dependent Ideas>¹

We say that the Idea of a sound-concretum is independent. We imagine a sound. We take it in terms of its entire content-store, apart from its *hic et nunc*. Then, the Idea of this (no longer individual) sound is an independent Idea.

¹November 26, 1910.

We take the Idea of a sound-quality, of this specific sound-quality. Thus it is dependent, just as is the Idea of specific sound-intensity. The generic Ideas “sound-quality” and “sound-intensity” are likewise dependent. How are we to ascertain and elucidate this difference?

One could try this way: the full sound is something in its own right. Namely, if we pretended (of course, an impossibility, indeed an abs<olute> one) that nothing else existed, then that would not change anything about the being of the sound. If, however, we pretended that nothing existed but a specific Idea “sound-quality” (of the singular Idea), then it is evident that this quality cannot exist either. Its being is dependent being. Indeed, one can say of it that its “*conceptus non indiget conc. alterius rei a quo formari debeat*”; but in another sense, it certainly needs the *conc. alt. r.*, namely, another Idea. It is not an Idea in its own right, but a necessarily 344 interdependent Idea. It is a fully determined Idea only in conjunction with another Idea, and if it is regarded in its own right, as if it were a thing-in-itself. So it brings indeterminacy along with it. It is indeed determined as a singular sound-quality Idea, in its own ideal essence. But because of this “ownness”; it has another relationship to otherness with itself, and this remains undetermined. Thought in this quasi-independent way, this singular sound-quality as Idea brings along with it the Idea of “any” sound-intensity and timbre in general, or the Idea of a conjoined something in general that is only determinable by the general Ideas “sound-intensity” and “timbre.” We could also say that the sound *c* is a sound completely determined “in terms of quality.” It is not a genus and does not bring any generic generality along with it. But it brings another generality along with it, not an inner one, but an external one, and yet an ideally delimited one, delimited by a generic Idea, but by an extrinsic one. This extrinsic Idea is conjoined with the Idea “sound *c*” or the genus “sound-quality” and the genus “sound-intensity” are allied, or conjoined, genera. They necessarily belong together with regard to a reification, or to an extension of reifications. The conjunction of genera yields a unit that is not a pure genus, but is a mixed (composite) genus. Their differences are not pure differences, but composite differences based on the coalition of the genus.

In what, then, does the dependence of the allied genera, and in further consequence, of the allied differences, consist? The genus brings with it an indeterminacy that is determinability through an extrinsic genus. The difference brings with it indeterminacy that is determinability by any of the differences of the extrinsic genus.

What does the genus brings indeterminacy with it mean? That it can only be thought of as an Idea that has a certain kind of generality? It can only legitimately be thought of thus—and in turn it can only be thus. It has, on the one hand, its generic generality and, on the other hand, its allied generality, and this implies that it is what it is only in the coalition. We can also say that what cannot be legitimately thought without one another, or what is the same, what cannot be without one another, can also not be given without one another.

But what does “given” mean there? If we take sound-reification, the genus “sound” can be given without something else having had to be given. The genus “sound-quality” can, however, only be given when a specific sound-quality is given, and specific sound-quality only when specific sound-intensity is given, but any one. If, however, I bring sound-quality to givenness for myself, then I do not nevertheless bring the specific quality *c* or some other specific thing to givenness for myself, and in the same way, the Idea “intensity” and the specific intensity to givenness. I do <not>, however, need to engage in all these ideations (the presentive acts), and yet all these Ideas are “co-”given. The givenness of the Idea “sound-quality” is *a priori* of such a nature that the other Ideas are to be taken out of it by shifting one’s gaze. A dependent Idea cannot be
 345 given without the allied Ideas being given with it, and if the latter become givens, then the former is given with them. They are “there with one another”. Beholding grasp of the one necessarily contains everything making the grasping of all coalitions possible.

If, though, we have an independent Idea, then nothing is implied in it itself that points beyond it. What made it into a component of a whole is not implied in it. If it is given, then no other Idea is given with it, except those that compose it, or that are “necessarily determined” in those.

An allied Idea is not to be deduced from the allied one, or not determined in it, i.e., it is not implied in its own essence. The generic

Idea “sound-quality” has its content. Indeed, this content is precisely sound-quality, the quality purely in itself as $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}$ κατ’ $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}$. But it is bound, bound to another Idea. It is allied with it. It is not alongside it. It also undergoes something through this alliance. It acquires an extension through it, since it itself in itself has its “extension”; its “generality” as genus. But, in it itself, in its own content, nothing is implied of the other Idea. It is not intrinsically determined in it, or even more clearly, the genus is determined in the species. In the species’ own content the genus is implied as content.

We also say that the conclusion is determined in the premises. But, the conclusion is not really (*reel*) implied in the content of the premises as a part. But, the S “lies determined” in the conjoined linking of the premises, i.e., in the unit of the overall meaning embracing them, in the unit of the judgment-meaning P_1 and P_2 . So, that is a part-relationship. It does not say, “I have judged S, if I have judged P_1 and P_2 .” But, even when I have given, or posited, the species, for instance, sound-quality, I have not posited and actually given the genus-quality in general. But I can find the genus in the species. It is implied in it. I can also find what has been determined analytically in the judgment of the premises as a whole (in the meaning unit) if I bring this unit to givenness. In contrast, I cannot find the content of the allied Idea in the content of an Idea. In contrast, with the Idea, I can in each case find the allied one—provided it is in general given.

In the perception of a whole, the parts (provided they figure in the perception) are co-given. In the case of perception of a thing a backdrop is co-given, and so forth. Only when the whole is perceived is the component of the whole for this reason not yet perceived in its own right, and so in the genuine sense, by the same token, a moment, a coloration etc. But, even if not made into an object in its own right, it is nonetheless co-apperceived in the overall apperception. The whole appears and the part appears in the overall phenomenon, on it the backdrop also. Here, we are talking about phenomena, i.e. individual-phenomenon, individual “self-presence,” apart from the thinking-out, the thinking in its own right etc., likewise for Ideas.

If the Idea “sound-quality c” is self-given, if it figures as “self-present”, then a sound-concretum is necessarily self-given as Idea. It is thereby with the Idea “sound-intensity”:

346 If the Idea “sound-quality in general” is given, then the Idea “sound-intensity in general” is co-given. “Idea” is certainly given in the Ideas-approach, and what is co-given is also given as Idea, but I am thinking about the one Idea. The other Idea is “there”. But, I must first single it out, first make it into an object.

With that, the same thing is seemingly being said as before in the earlier pages. However, the new thing I am seeking to make clear is how individual grasping, a more or less far-reaching and complex thing-phenomenon, is to be distinguished from the genuinely objectifying thinking-out. Positing-for-itself, and since various things appear, and appear there inclusively, that can be “singled out” in different objectivations, I think, the same thing holds for ideations. The Idea is given, i.e. it appears, and if an Idea is thought, another Idea can “appear” in connection with it, namely, in a self-phenomenon.

Appendix VIII (to §26): <On the Theory of Primitive Full-Nuclei>¹

I now have to provide another important supplement to the theory of primitive presentations or primitive nuclei. It concerns the general theory of full-nuclei. –Specific features of full-nuclei, such as they, for instance, determine the difference between red and green, do not belong in the general logic of meaning. But, one can probably ascribe differences to it that are connected with the most general differences of all in the sphere of objects in general and reflect them within the nuclei.

I came to the concept of the full-nucleus by contrasting presentations such as “similar” and “similarity”, “redness” and “red”. Primitive presentations of different syntactical categories coincide, as it were, in terms of a content, the nucleus, to be precise. The same nucleus is formed nominatively on one occasion, not nomi-

¹From the lecture course of WS 1910/11. (Editor’s note)

natively on another, adjectivally or as relat<ional> within the context of a comprehensive predicate. But, I have already pointed out that not every nucleus can, for instance, arbitrarily change its syntactical category. It only holds that each non-nominatively formed nucleus can be nominalized. Inversely, not every nominal nucleus can be de-nominalized though. Every proper noun of an individual thing provides us with an example here. Corresponding to the word Napoleon is an individual proper-presentation that is nominal and can never be made into an adjective. We indeed say “Napoleonic era”, and so on. But, you readily see <how> this adjective does not have the nucleus in common with the nominal presentation Napoleon, as if the same nucleus had only changed its syntactical form. In the place of the simple nucleus of the proper-presentation is now a very complex one: an era, upon which the great spirit of Napoleon left its imprint, and the like. Likewise, it is clear that when the nominal presentation Napoleon stands alone as predicate, it is not of the nature of an adjectival presentation. 347
 “This is Napoleon” means this human being is identical with Napoleon, is the same as Napoleon. The proper noun indeed has a different function, but noun remains noun. By proper-presentations in general, <I> understand nominal presentations that include nothing of attributions. An attributive presentation is “an A”, or “this A”, or “a green house”, or “the philosopher Socrates”, and so on. A proper-presentation is “Socrates”, “two”, “redness”. Now, what is characteristic of individual proper-presentations is that their nuclei can only have a nominal form. And if we go back to primitive individual presentations (in contrast to, for example, conjunctions “Socrates and Plato”), then apparent in this particularity of presentations is that of their nuclei. Among primitive nuclei, individual nuclei form a closed class. The general-nuclei stand in contrast to them. And this difference carries over to the sphere of complex nuclei.

If we accord the ambiguous word “concept” (or presentation-content” in the meaning-theoretical sense) a fixed meaning by means of the concept “nucleus”, then we could say that concepts break down into individual concepts and general concepts (universal concepts). The latter further break down again into concrete object-concepts—such as “house”—property concepts, and

relation-concepts. Regarding the latter nuclei, that is a fundamental difference that cannot be abolished. We can also really never bring the concept “green” into the function of a relation-concept such as “similar”; and vice versa. The nominalization of non-nominal nuclei is therefore actually the only syntactical operation (namely, <the> direct one) that we can perform in the sphere of nuclei. Moreover, the nuclei in themselves are, however, fundamentally different, each one bound to specific functions. The individual proper-nuclei are pure full-nuclei and do not carry any indeterminacy at all. Where they stand in a fully determinate relationship, the property-nuclei and relation-nuclei do not carry any indeterminacy at all either. For example, “The bench is red here”; “She is standing beside that bench”; and so forth. If, however, we wish to nominalize such nuclei and form a nominal presentation out of them alone, then indeterminacies enter into the context as well, and <namely>, inseparable ones. The presentation “similarity” is actually the presentation “similarity of something to something”. The presentation “redness” is actually “redness of something”. Belonging to the essence of the property-nucleus is the fact that it points back to a subject, to the essence of the relation-nucleus, that it points back to two nominal components. One or two empty places are then necessary in the nominalization.

It results there however that the nominalizations of property-nuclei and relation-nuclei are actually no longer simple presentations, but already complex ones of an otherwise distinct type. If we remain in the primitive sphere, then we therefore have three irreducible kinds of primitive nuclei.

348 The secondary nature of those nominalizations also becomes apparent in the fact that fully elucidating, or even making clearly intuitive, leads back from such nominalizations to the non-nominal forms. Nominalization is an operation that, in virtue of a context in which precisely the property functions adjectivally, just brings about a change whose meaning constantly points back to the original form. Similarly, the original function-form of the relation-nucleus is predicative where, as a component part of an adjectival predicate, it occurs in conjunction with a noun.

Appendix IX (to §30): <Plain Predicating and Actually Identifying Predicating>¹

“This is Heinrich.” “The third man there in the line is Franz.” “This is the newly appointed mayor.” “Schulz is the newly appointed mayor.” “This is the midpoint equation of an ellipse.” “This is what is called Cardano’s formula.” There we shall not say “one and the same.” For example, in relation to the person entering and not at first identified, “This is one and the same as Heinrich.” We find two predicate forms here: proper-identifying ones—a proper name figures in the predicate position—and concept-determining ones. (In addition, mixed ones, “This is the newly appointed mayor Schulz”). Here, however, attributions are present everywhere: this is the one who has recently been appointed mayor and is named Schulz—or is Schulz.

The form with “the same”: <The> identifying linkage points back <to> a peculiar linkage of identification by means of which subjects that were determined in different judgments are posited <as> objectively one by means of predicates. Someone is not aware that the algorithm A which he or she is dealing with and which merely presented in a slightly altered form is the midpoint equation of an ellipse is the very same thing. As soon as that is noticed, it is said that “This is indeed one with the midpoint equation!” There, one can however also say, “That is indeed the midpoint equation?”

Is it not there a matter of the meaning of “is one with = is none other than”, therefore <of> cancelling an originally supposed negation, or of a belief that would be equivalent to a negation? –Or, someone speaks of Alexander and of Paris as if they were different people. Then we say, “Alexander is the same as Paris.” But is that not saying Alexander is not not Paris? The victor of Jena is the same as the loser of Waterloo (they are one and the same). The victor of Jena is not the same <as the loser of Waterloo>, is someone else. A is α , the same one is β .

In any case, we must differentiate plain predicating with a nominal proper-presentation or <a> generally determining nominal

¹ Probably from the time of the lecture course of WS 1910/11. (Editor’s note)

presentation (a conceptual one) and the actually identifying predicating, where the “concept” of identity occurs as relation-nucleus-concept. In one case, the identification occurs as a
 349 bringing-to-coincide of the nominal predicate and the nominal subject in the form of the mere Is with respect to the object, where the Is is of course the Is of identification, but does not include the concept of identity. In the other case, the concept of identity occurs.

Identification as relation: What is two is made into what is one, A and B presented in “separation” as being two are identified, made into a unit. What was presented in separation shifts over to what was separate and coincides with it.

Appendix X (to §34): <The Conjunction of a Nominal
 Presentation with the Negation of Another Nominal
 Presentation>¹

In reference to the principle that the And is automatically to have the power to have conjunctively connected nominal presentations only yield a meaning unit when they have a different objective orientation, Miss Hoffa asks how things then stand with constructions such as “Socrates and only Socrates (was the conqueror of Sophism)?” That says, “Socrates and none other than Socrates was the conqueror of Sophism?”

It is clear that we do not have two conjunctively connected nouns here. When a negation directed toward a noun is applied to it, then the whole is no longer a noun, namely, noun in the form of negation. I have passed over the forms resulting from the introduction of negation. I have exclusively dealt with plural judgments in which conjunctive concatenations of names occur, and that always yields a possible plural subject, it seems to me, when one conjoins names themselves. The conjunctions “Socrates and not Plato”; “a man and not a woman” <are> not nominal conjunctions either, but always conjunctions of a nominal presentation and of the negation of another nominal presentation. In contrast, we would have conjoined nominal presentations if we had said, “A man and someone who is not a woman”; “An a and a not-b”

¹From the time of the lecture course of WS 1910/11. (Editor’s note)

It is, however, thereby to be noted that also in the cases in which a negation is conjoined with a nominal component, a duality, a dual ray is given in the predication, but we then have a ray of positive and one of negative predication, provided indeed that the negation of the subject-nouns does not also affect the whole manner of predication. “Not Socrates was the teacher of Aristotle” really does not say that we are adding the predicate to the object called not-Socrates. Admittedly, somebody will be co-thought who was in fact Aristotle’s teacher, for instance, Plato. But, that is not stated here. It is in certain ways implied, although it is questionable whether it is necessarily <implied> in this form. So, when we say, “This is not green;” we really also as a rule have in mind another property of the This that is assigned to the This “in place” of the green, with which the green now conflicts. But it is not stated that this may have a different property of this kind. In addition to that, we would have to say this may have a property different from green. 350

On the other hand, when we direct the negation toward “Socrates;” then we nevertheless let the predicate, so to speak, obtain, and implied there however is “Someone probably, but not Socrates, was the teacher...” We do not, however, say it this way. But, must that then be the thought? Can we not think: Socrates, the teacher of Aristotle? Socrates–no. In any event, not Socrates was the teacher of Aristotle. Nothing then needs to be said about the fact that Aristotle had a “teacher”: Perhaps, he was his own teacher, was not anyone’s “student”?

Appendix XI (to §40): <Old Pages on the Problems of Propositionally Simple Judgments>¹

<a) On the Meaning of Existential Judgments. The Difference
Between Act-Analytical and Meaning-Analytical Investigations>

On the other hand, it is clear that we indeed have equivalents for existential propositions here, but find their original meaning as reality statements changed. If we state existence or non-existence

¹ Probably WS 1908/09 (appended to the lecture course of WS 1910/11 as a supplement). (Editor’s note)

of an A, then the “an A” indeed figures in the subject position, and not on the predicate side as in those indeterminacy-judgments (therefore, for example, “Something is an A”—there, I am saying that the “an A” obviously has a different position and function than in the proposition “An A exists”). Things are more promising when, the other way around, we form “An A is something”; “An A is not something”; namely, in the sense of ‘in general not’. Here, we would have a particular judgment with two terms of particularity for the apparently indefinite existential judgment. But, *nota bene!* It is not the particular judgment. We would namely have to understand it in such a way that on the subject side, the “an A” is free of any existential status, while on the predicate side, the “something” acts as a normal term with such a positing status. Of course, the “is” is not hereby equivalent to the ordinary “is identical”; although a nominal term indeed functions on the predicate side. Because the identity judgment also lies on the subject side and in the same way as on the predicate side. By introducing totality-presentations, we can equivalently substitute propositions for these propositions “An A” (or “A’s”) “is found among things, there is among the things”; “an A” (or “A’s”) “there is not among the things?” (“Thing” can be taken in the broadest sense of object.) Naturally, these are statements modified in meaning, but they function practically in thinking as a substitutes for those primitive, particular propositions in the ways described earlier. And, as earlier, the “there is”-
 351 thought attaches on to these forms, whereby then the carrying over of talk of “there is”—and related talk—to the reality-judgment becomes explicable.

It is of course doubtful whether this interpretation of existential statements is accurate (I mean now of reality statements), and whether I have not established a mere equivalence again here too, though one of value. I am inclined to the view that, understood as reality judgment, the existential judgment is a basic form that can no longer be reduced. This is not to say that reality judgments do not give grounds for any further investigations—apart from difficult investigations aiming to separate them from different judgments closely united to them through equivalence and to accord them their rightful position in the theory of meaning of judgments. But, if we <abstain> from investigations concerning the structure of the

formal logic of validity (therefore, <that> concern the laws of validity, which pertain to the different judgment-forms in accordance with their relationships of validity), these are investigations into origins, phenomenological and epistemological investigations along entirely different lines that must be carefully divorced from formal logic. The question as to how the different judgment-forms are consciously realized, the question as to how the acts, as it were, look in which the judgment meanings form the What of the thinking, which different modes of acts have the same judgment as content, how especially the experiences look in which the judgment is content of an Evidenz, and in which, consequently, the judged state-of-affairs is adequately given—are all extremely important investigations, but they do not concern the theory of meaning itself. Also pertaining to them are the questions about the “origin” of concepts that as formal meaning categories correspond to the form-giving moments of the judgments, as well as <about> the concepts related to this a priori, therefore, concepts such as unit, multiplicity, generality, individuality, having properties, non-existence, and so forth. And pertaining to this also is the concept of reality, of actual being, and on the other hand also <that of> what has been presented as such. In the case of meaning analyses, one will admittedly occasionally not be able to find it good to connect up with subjective experiences and to make any use of the phenomenological distinctions relating to them, as I have especially done in the analysis of the reality judgment. But, the goal there was merely one of putting <myself> into the state of consciousness that must be realized in a lively way for the meaning of the existential judgment that is to be differentiated and, within that, the meaning of the existential predicate to come to life. In the correlation obtaining between acts and their ideal contents, one can in general conduct meaning-analytical and act-analytical investigations in parallel fashion, and one is also compelled to do that for purposes of the deepest knowledge of this correlation. But, at the same time, a logician of meaning is left with the fact that it is not a matter of an objective discovery of the differences between acts and correlations, but of those of meanings and their essential forms, and of no more than that.

352 <b) Quarrel with Assumptions of the Traditional Theory
of Judgment>

Earlier investigations into what is called theory of judgment all failed because people were not yet in a position to separate the fundamentally different problems present there. That holds of the theories of judgment of thinkers as eminent as *Brentano*, *Sigwart*, *Bergmann*, and *Erdmann*. Their theories suffer from a faulty psychologism, from a mixing of psychological and meaning-theoretical investigations, the otherwise understandable deep-rooted ailment of logic since *Aristotle*. Despite this mixing already accompanying the oldest logic, up until the blossoming of psychological empiricism since the 1860s this traditional logic was primarily objectively oriented. Only afterward did people fully consciously set about establishing mere psychological analyses through judgment-experiences and establishing how people think only scientifically. In his *Psychology*, the brilliant *Brentano*, for example, aims to establish the descriptive differences of psychic experiences, and among them the intellectual experiences, that really obviously must form the basis of a genetic psychology. He divorces mere acts of presentation from acts of judgment, the latter distinguished by the descriptive trait of conviction, and this moment of conviction, as *Brentano* finds, is either approval or rejection. Judging is believing, and believing is believing that is or is not. And *Brentano* immediately believes the true sense, the meaning of the statement in which we express ourselves judgmentally, established in new ways and to have established it as an existential proposition. In order verbally to express a believing, a being convinced, two different things are needed: on the one hand, a sign for what we are convinced of, and, on the other, a sign for the conviction itself, for approval or rejection. Therefore, “A is” and “A is not” are the basic forms of all judgments. “Is” must be a sign of approval, “is not” sign of rejection—A, sign for the judged What, and this must, however, be present to us in the judgment. Therefore, the A is likewise expression of a mere presentation underlying the judgment. If we verbally find so many other forms of expressions—besides existential ones—then that must be merely for empirically-grammatical reasons: Language is really not a merely logical creation suited to

logical requirements. Since, the Is and <the> Is-Not as signs of approval or rejection pertain to every judgment in the same way, the Is does not have a different meaning in the categorical statement and in the existential statement, and the concept of existence arises through reflection on the approving judgment. All that is systematically thought out. But, I do not need to say that it is definitely untenable and only very interesting as a sample of an extremely psychological <logic>. Only, we have to give *Brentano* a great deal of credit on behalf of formal logic for having directed general attention to existential judgments, completely shoved aside up until then, and having made them the center of the new judgment-theoretical investigations. Those who at some point have made clear to themselves the difference between judgment 353 as judgment-experience and judgment as meaning and who comply with the principle of scientific work never to let go of a directly beheld distinction—be it even in favor of ever so beautiful fashionable theories, as the psychological ones are—cannot initiate much with such theories. Of course, it is easy to criticize from my standpoint, from the standpoint of someone who has seen through the illusion of psychologism. Some decades ago matters stood otherwise. In those days, every, the main, philosophy—even idealistic philosophy—was subject to the psychological bias, and the differences were only in the greater or lesser clarity and consistency of the implementation. The paradox of the *Brentanian* theory was manifest. Healthy human understanding resisted accepting it. Giving in to this, one's only choice though was to reject the *Brentanian* theory, but then to be inconsistent and end up with vague half-truths, or to be consistently psychological and then give in to his theory, or at most to improve it along psychological lines. So, we then actually see that *Brentano's* critics indeed otherwise know how to say many a good thing, but nothing that could neatly bring clarity to the matter in dispute.

Certainly, one can say that the essence of judging is to be defined as being convinced, and every instance of being convinced has a What about which one is convinced, a “matter”? But, this What is precisely the whole judgment in the sense of logic, judgment in the second sense, in the sense of meaning. That holds for whatever content and in whatever form I judge, whether I judge

“God is spirit!” or “God exists!” Of what am I judgingly so convinced? Well: “God is spirit!” or “God exists!” And if I judge negatively “God is not a physical being”, then the whole What that is stated in the words there is also that of which I am convinced. Therefore, belonging to this What, to the *Brentanian* judgment-matter is both the Is and the Is-Not. The conviction is not stated in any words—I believe: means— only the What of the conviction is stated. And, were the conviction said, then, for instance, the word conviction would have to occur, or some other word in which the conviction is presented and is meant by means of its meaning. If I say, “I am convinced that God exists”, then I am speaking about my conviction. I am making a statement about it, i.e. I am making a judgment about it. I then have a new judgment with a new meaning—instead of the judgment “God exists”, the judgment “I am convinced that God exists”, to which a new conviction corresponds that is expressed in this statement without any word. And so on *in infinitum*. What I am stating in my statement is not my acts of stating, but the What of my convictions, i.e. a judgment-meaning, a judgment in the logical sense, exclusively finds expression. Consequently, no reason at all, and no possibility at all, exists to identify the psychological moment of the conviction with the ideal meaning-moment of the Is or Is-Not, and in further consequence then to identify the Is of the categorical proposition and that of the existential proposition.

354 Similar fundamental errors run throughout the entire recent theory of judgment. So it is, for example, in *Lotze* and *Bergmann*. (*Lotze*, *Logik*, 1874; the shortest and most concise explanation of *Bergmann's* theories is set forth in the *Grundproblemen der Logik* (1895)). *Brentano* had given in to the illusory thought that every judgment believes something and this “something” would however have to be presented, and that accordingly every judgment depicts an act of believing that is founded in a mere presentation of what is believed. Therefore, if we judge, “S is P”—*Bergmann* then says to himself—, then to begin with I have the mere presentation or, as he says, the mere predicating “S is p”. And then, however, the judging is considering-true or considering-false, therefore, a “critical attitude” of declaring-valid is added to the “S is P” in the judgment “S is P!” and of declaring-not-valid in “S is not P”. In other

words, according to *Bergmann*, the genuine meaning is, “That S is P is valid”, “That S is P is not valid”. In a similar sense, *Lotze* had already earlier said that validity and non-validity are factual predicates that hold for the whole judgment-content. The latter is expressed in its own right without deciding in questions, and we would hence, according to *Lotze*, actually have to distinguish among three judgment-qualities: questioning, affirming, and negating.

Those are practically incomprehensible theories. If we judge, “S is P”; then we can certainly also further judge, “it is valid that S is P”; and again further, “It is valid that it is valid, that S is p”; and so forth. It is, however, evident for this reason that the judgment state-of-affairs, i.e. the judgment in the logical sense, constantly changes. And, if we take as a principle that it belongs to the meaning of every categorical statement to be predication about validity, then that would also have to hold of this predication about validity, and infinite regress would, however, be inevitable and would be *widersinnig*.

So, here again, the source of this folly is the confusing of the conviction-quality that one grasps as an experience of being affirmatively or negatively convinced and what belongs to the statement’s meaning-content. Generally, one calls judging a considering-valid or -as-true, or considering-false. In a certain sense naturally rightly so. And then, one seeks an “is valid” and <an> “is invalid” in the meaning-content of the statement and falls into falsely attributing the essentially new “that S is P is valid” to the logical judgment itself, to the “S is P”. (I am passing over other errors that are made here and that are connected with the false interpretation of considering-valid.) –The theories for the different specific judgment-forms, for example, <for> the forms of universal and <of> particular judgments, also proceed in similar ways. *Bergmann*, for example, thinks that declaring a predication to be valid can either be related to the whole extension of the subject-presentation, or to a mere part of this extension. It is accordingly universal or particular. The meaning of the “Some or all S are P” is accordingly: The predication “the S that are P” holds for all S or holds for some S.

It will be easy for you to offer criticism here on the basis of my earlier analyses. However, you see over and over, since with the wrong approach with which the investigation is undertaken, complex and reflexive forms of judgment are given for the simple basic forms, the simple forms themselves are lost, and thereby the meaning of the interpreted judgments changes everywhere, and perhaps not even the equivalency is still maintained. However, enough for criticism that ultimately would over and over lead back to the same main points.

<c) Comprehensive Overview of the Main Differences
in the Sphere of Propositionally Simple Judgments>

With our analysis of existential propositions and of the meaning differences established in relation to this which determine the level of being of the presentations underlying the judging and of the judgments themselves, the main differences in the sphere of the propositionally simple judgments are established, namely, as I stress, the differences that are determined by the pure forms in the strictest sense by aiming at the basic differences among primitive presentational nuclei. The forms naturally become complex with the complexity of the presentation-components that occur in them. So, for example, the form “An A really is, an A exists” owing to which the A itself is a complex presentation that for its part can then in turn include different components that partly do, and partly do not, include reality-positing, for example, “An inhabited country on the North Pole does not exist”. A specific problem that has not yet been sufficiently tackled up to this point would go into more closely studying the meaning modifications generated in the series of forms I established through the changes in the level of being, and thereby successively separating off new and partly characteristic forms. Thus, I had, for example, originally only established the one form, “An A is something.” However, it now breaks down into two forms having different meanings. In the one case, “an A” has a positing-quality, in the other not. And, in this sense, the individual forms would be in general gone through and it <would be> to be asked to what extent changes in the level of being are to be undertaken in them. The main considerations that

have emerged as generating basic forms were: 1) the difference between singular and particular predication; 2) the difference between universality and non-universality. This was related to the fact that the predications break down into ones in which no indefinites occur, and those in which indefinites occur, and in the latter case, each of the indefinites could: either be of the nature of the *quoddam*, a certain something, something thought indeterminately, but a certain something; or of the nature of what is in general, that of generality. The fundamental distinction between universal and particular generality then concerns the latter. Judgments thus emerged having one or many universality or particularity places, and potentially both at the same time. For this reason, the distinctions go further that are contingent upon the standpoint of level of being—i.e., upon the differences between existential positing and assumptive positing on the side of the presentations founding the judgment. And still occurring under this is yet a primitive form of its own, that of existential judgment as <judgment> predicating reality.

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Intertwined with all these differences is the difference fleetingly touched upon in first position in our presentation and always set in the forefront by logicians, that of what is called judgment-quality, i.e. the difference that is generated through the operation of negation. It presented itself to us in a form associated with the basic form “S is P”, namely, as the difference between “S is P and S is not P”. Before I say anything more about negation, I still emphasize that all primitive judgment-forms that we found were of the categorical type, i.e., a subject and a predicate is to be distinguished (or on the side of meanings, a subject-presentation and a <predicate presentation>) in every primitive judgment, and the predicate is either affirmatively attributed to, or negatively denied, it. The *Brentanian* theory of subjectless and predicateless judgments, namely, in the real sense of one-place judgments—which he interprets the existential judgment as being—was not tenable. In these judgments, existence is stated of the relevant, but merely assumptive, subject concerned. An outcome of our analyses is therefore so far: Every primitive propositionally simple judgment is categorical.

Appendix XII (to §40a): <Logically Incomplete Meanings>¹

Logically incomplete meanings or meanings containing “gaps”, namely, ones that are “logically”, i.e. as thought-meanings, incomplete. The incompleteness is extra-essential when, for example, with a “this”, reference is made back to a foregoing complete meaning in the same thought context, for example “S is p—from this it follows”.

Some terms of the incompleteness. Every “this” that receives determinacy of meaning through an alogical presentation. Likewise: “a certain something”: How do matters stand with empirical meanings, with individual proper names of things, etc.? An individual thing can be thought as existing in a specific period of time or at a specific instant of its duration, namely, then, as beginning, as stopping (starting- and end-point of its duration), or at a midpoint, in-between-point of its duration. It can, however, also be thought as lasting eternally and at a specific point of everlasting time, in which case no starting and stopping point is signaled. A definite thing, something thought by its own presentation, can then also be thought indefinitely with respect to its time, as simply existing—its duration and its whole temporal determination then remaining undetermined. It can also be thought as “now”, i.e. the duration is not fully determined by thinking, but indicated deictically by the “now”, otherwise indefinitely with respect to its extension, starting- and end-point. It can also be indicated as starting “now” or stopping now, as starting “earlier”, etc., similarly with respect to determining place, spatial extension, etc. Finally, its space-filling and causal... qualities <are to be named>. When we

357 have a presentation of an individual thing, it must be presented as something lasting in time, as having spatial extension, qualities. However, the presentation cannot at all be fully determined in every respect. What then does the proper name express?

Many years ago, I already said that a proper name is actually something similar to a deictic meaning. A proper name does not conceptualize. It contains nothing of a conceptual determination. It names what is indefinitely identical in possible varied presenta-

¹December 1910

tions, even thought-presentations of the same object. Missing is only the form of the reference. Just as the *This*, the PN lacks any thought-determination of content, i.e. any moment of the meaning that determines the nominally presented object in accordance with what it is. This identical thing is not presentable and not thinkable without determining and determinability. It therefore contains the presentation of what is identical in all the indeterminacies making up its necessary determinabilities. Proper names having a grammatical form, a type, letting it be seen that it is a matter of a person, a city, a river, are naturally not pure proper names, but are tantamount to saying “the person Fr”; “the city”; etc.

We must now distinguish between apophantic (analytic) indefinites (empty places) and indefinites in the apophantic stuff (synthetic indefinites, synthetic empty places). The former pertain to the analytic form, to the apophantic form, to the form of predication as such, the latter to the form of apophantic matter. Can one perhaps also say, to the form of the alogical presentations (presentation-meanings) underlying the *apophansis*? No. Because, for instance, the intuitive presentation that underlies proper names and is repeatedly different always has different moments of indeterminacy. Proper names, however, always have the same absolute indeterminacy of meaning, namely, factual speaking, <with> respect to what is determining the object. Apophantically, a PN is something full, namely, nothing containing a form and empty place. On the other hand, however, the meaning PN is indefinite inasmuch as it fixes what is identical without any determination.

In the theory of validity it is said: Just as a “this”; a “certain thing”; also a “something”; is not called the same thing everywhere it reoccurs, neither is the PN. “This” does not validly exclude non-contradictory predicates, and PN just as little—namely owing to indeterminacy. Socrates is sick during time *t*. He is not sick during time *t'*. During his existence he is sometimes sick and sometimes not sick. The predicate “sick” is itself indefinite. It requires determination of the point in time to which it is to refer.

Logically incomplete meanings, namely, those which as logical meanings, as thought-meanings, are incomplete. We can then again distinguish between the incompleteness that lies in the nucleus, and the incompleteness that is to a certain degree incompleteness of the

expression, inasmuch as not everything thought is expressed, for example, "The paper!" Namely, horrified, I see that it is beginning to burn, and I think, "The paper is burning"; but that is otherwise
 358 not expressed, and the meaning "is burning"—and consequently the entire sentence—is not expressed. The thought-meaning is, however, not at all realized either. The unexpressed remainder is intuitively presentable—"The child!" (is falling), etc. Deciding is difficult in the case of "the" and <in the case of> this ("The paper is white"; namely, that there, in front of me). There the "the"; however, probably represents a proper name. It names the object without any mediation by general concepts, by determinations of any kind, and the object is not presented as having such. It is "directly" presented (perceived, remembered, clearly or unclearly). But, the form of the reference that is lacking in the case of the proper name is still there. The incompleteness then belongs in the nucleus. Or, more precisely, the This is incomplete here, insofar precisely as it does not make the object itself present in thought by means of a proper-meaning, as is however thought "directly." I think a number 4 and I say there, "This!" Then, the incompleteness consists in the fact that I use the form of reference and do not call what was referred to as four by its proper name. The latter is fully complete. In contrast, were I to have had a proper name for "this paper"; then that would be in a different sense, namely, in the sense in which each direct presentation of an object is incomplete, uncompleted. Consequently, I must surely say that the isolated This is in each case a place of incompleteness. We may call these places extra-essential places of incompleteness when the missing meaning is either a proper-meaning, or another one with thought-meaning standing before me. So it is, for example, when the This functions in the "the same one" that is again identifyingly still placing something before me, and before me in thought, without repeating it in the explicit expression. It is likewise extra-essential incompleteness when I say "and so forth" and thereby only indirectly refer to a completing, for instance, of a complex predicate, standing before me collectively. In contrast, I call essential incompleteness those in which a part of what was thought is not grasped in thought and expressed. For example, if we say, "Here, today it is raining"; the "here" functions similarly to a proper name of a person and at the

same time a deixis is present. That it is a matter of a time is clear. By the same token, the here is precisely the here that is prevailing. A direct presentation presents it. If, however, I say, “it is raining”; then I mean “here and now”; but I am not thinking that and am not expressing it.

Empty places are in a certain sense gaps in meaning, but they are meant gaps. It is part of the meaning of the “this” to have a gap in its meaning, of the meaning of “a certain thing”, of the meaning of every “something”. But this having gaps is a property of certain meaning elements and potentially of the whole meanings (like the functions) containing them. It is different when the gap is actually filled up, filled, but not filled in thought. It makes a big difference whether a thought with indefinites is performed in which something indefinite—something with gaps is thought (here the filling up is more precise determination and leads beyond the given meaning to new meanings)—and whether, on the other hand, an incomplete thought is performed, namely, whether a unit of belief (*Meinung*) with a meaning is performed, while only a part of this belief is grasped in thought, only a part is present as thought-meaning, while the other part is indeed believed (*gemeint*) (in a broader sense, therefore, meant), but is not logically believed in the form of a logical meaning. So it is, when we say, “There!”, namely, there—lies the (long-sought) knife. We must thereby divorce an expression’s having gaps in the external sense and an expression’s and a meaning’s having gaps in the internal sense, when, namely, the conceptual grasping is missing. Of course, one does not completely clearly transition into the other.

Appendix XIII (to §40 b): <Propositional Function and Proposition>¹

The fact that A is b holds: a) occasionally in “one case”; in several cases; a’) also holds in a certain case, holds in several certain cases, in a certain plurality of cases; and b) holds generally.

We have to distinguish 1) the “judgment-form”, “An A is b”, “A human is mortal”—the function, <the> propositional function. 2)

¹ Probably the end of 1910. (Editor’s note)

The judgment and the propositional thought, “A human is mortal.” The latter is necessarily either a universal or a particular <judgment> or a *quidam* judgment. The former is in general not a judgment, but precisely a function. And I can state of the function that it is “filled” in certain cases, either particularly <or> universally. The judgment “function” does not hold in the sense a judgment holds, but it holds formed, in the form of universality, etc. It has modal forms, but through different modal forms is identical throughout. The function can be a “mathematical” function or a non-mathematical one. In any case, the mathematical function must not contain any others as “mathematical” terms.

We would first have to distinguish between two levels of functions. Namely, if we consider the judgment-configurations of the pure theory of meaning-forms, then they are functions with A, b, etc. as arguments and, if we take forms of the kind “An A is b”, then that can be thought as a configuration of judgment-functions (not of judgements), under which “A human is mortal” etc. falls, that are themselves already functions with the empty place “a, an”. As a general configuration, it is itself a function with two different arguments, “an” A, b. The pure configurations of apophantic meanings and the configurations of meaning-functions, which we—as is to be seen—must differentiate, are both mathematical. Mathematical too are filled configurations in which mathematical concepts such as “theorem”, “number”, “nominal meaning”, etc. occur. Consequently, a function like “A human is mortal” is not mathematical. A function can be *a priori* or *a posteriori*. Namely, it can contain pure and empirical concepts. “Any red is a color” is an *a priori* function. Every mathematical function is *a priori*. There are, however, also other *a priori* functions.

360 Appendix XIV (to §40 f): <The Nominalizing Conversion
of Matter. “Being” as Predicate>¹

Instead of making judgments about meanings and of stating, as *Bolzano* says, objectivity and objectlessness of them, we can then also make statements about the objects meant, but purely as

¹ Perhaps 1911. (Editor’s note)

objects meant, i.e., we make judgments there about what is supposed as such, as something identical that can be the same both in the given meanings and in several different meanings. So, we make a judgment about the “object” regular decahedron, i.e. about what is supposed as being identical as such in the meaning “decahedron”. We posit it as something meant, something supposed, and then state being or not-being of it. We can then conclusively express what is there in this way: If we make a judgment, then what has been judgmentally supposed as such is stated, a certain state-of-affairs in its mode of being (propositional matter with its noematic quality). But, being is not thereby emphasized, let alone predicated (“Gold is yellow!”, “This table is red!”). Something similar holds for every judgment-component that as such makes a particular assertion. It is unity of quality and matter, and the quality is thereby the being-quality. Every judgment—and every nominalthetic judgment-component—can then undergo a specific shift in which a new judgment arises, in which what was previously quality, being-quality of the judgment or judgment-component, is turned into a predicate “being”. Subject is then a nominalizing conversion of the matter coming to be emphasized, namely, it becomes the state-of-affairs in quotation marks that is meant in a certain meaning-content, posited as subject, and then imparts being upon it as a predicate. Every judgment—and every nominal judgment-component—admits of this conversion. Therefore, <an> existential judgment is actually embedded in every one—*implicitly*, however, not every judgment is an existential judgment.

Appendix XV (to §45 b): <Analytic and Synthetic Truths.
Concept-Truths and Truths of Matters-of-Fact>¹

We therefore ask: What kind of an essential line of demarcation within pure laws is this by which analytic laws set themselves apart from all other laws? There, a distinction with respect to the ultimate terms, the distinction between material (in the broadest sense) and analytic-categorial then gives us a clear-cut demarca-

¹From the lecture course of WS 1908/09 (inserted into the lecture course of WS 1910/11). (Editor’s note)

tion. In accordance with it, meanings, propositions, judgments divide into ones exclusively containing formal-categorical terms and ones that also contain material terms. So, purely conceptual presentations and propositions also divide up in the same way, therefore, also pure concept-propositions and laws.

You will immediately understand what it is a matter of here if we consider some examples. If <we> take concepts, if we take some terms, and preferably primitive terms, equipped with full-nuclei, then an essential difference however exists between: the <concepts> before us in the examples “green,” “sound,” “lion,”—more intensively also “psychical presentation lion,” “presentation sound”—; and, on the other hand, 1) concepts like “object,” “quality,” “property,” “genus,” “multiplicity,” “cardinal number,” “magnitude,” “state-of-affairs,” “relation,” “existence,” and so on—concepts I include under the heading “formal-object categories,” a) concepts under which every object of every imaginable sphere of objects can in principle be brought, formal-ontological ones, and b) formal-logical ones.

2) Likewise, though, also concepts such as “presentation,” “proposition,” “truth,” “subject-presentation,” “nominal presentation,” and so forth—in short the pure meaning categories.

This logically, and for this reason also epistemologically, fundamental division of terms (to which the fundamentally essentially different species corresponds, since concepts of one and another species arise), therefore creates a difference of truths. Examples on the one side are: “Red is a species of color,” “A sound of quality c is deeper than a sound of quality d,” “If any sound a is qualitatively lower than sound b, then b is qualitatively higher than sound a,” “If a is higher than b, b higher than c, then a is higher than c,” and so forth. Those are plainly obvious truths of the law-type. Outwardly, the proposition “If sound a is higher than b, then it is not true that a is not higher than b” would then belong here. In any case, material concepts, factual ones, occur everywhere here, for example, “sound,” “color,” “red,” and so forth. On the other hand, let us take examples such as, “Every object has some property,” “Any two objects stand in some relationships,” or “If it holds for any pair of terms S and α of the proposition ‘S is α ’, then the proposition ‘S is not α ’ does not hold,” or expressed equivalently, “If any object S has any property α , then it is not true that the same object does not

have the property α .' So, all truths of the theory of forms of meanings belong here, for example, the fact that any coherent meaning remains a coherent meaning if a nominal presentation is in turn substituted for every nominal presentation occurring in it, and so in general for substitutions of any kind in which only the grammatical category of the presentations in question is preserved.

We can also characterize the distinction that emerges in this way: the class set forth in the second position is the class of truths falling within the bounds of pure logic. The one clear-cut concept of pure logic is thereby defined. It embraces meaning-logic and, in further consequence, the formal ontology corresponding to both groups of categories. All remaining truths overstep these bounds precisely because they contain material concepts. Precisely because of its "formal," i.e. purely categorial nature, formal logic need not take notice of them. Instead of pure logic, we can also say analytics or science of what is analytically knowable in general, science that establishes and systematically substantiates analytic 362 laws. Material truths, and especially material law-truths, then break down again into two groups: 1) extra-essential material truths, and 2) essential material truths. (With this distinction, I am of course appealing to the highest logical principle, the principle of substitution.) Every analytic-formal law changes into a valid truth howsoever we substitute a material term of universality of the corresponding category for any formal term of universality. For example, corresponding to the formal law, "If something is a, then it is not not-a" are real propositions such as, for example, "If something is red, then it is not not-red." That is an extra-essential material truth. It is not essentially bound to the concept "red" and in general to a factual genus. It holds in relationship to the property "red," because it holds for arbitrary properties of arbitrary objects. It holds, we can also say, by analytic necessity precisely as an individual case of a formal analytic law. Extra-essential material truths of this kind fit into a broader sphere of analytic necessities. So far as <we> bring the concepts "analytic" and "formal" to coincide and consequently understand analytic laws among categorial laws, we also then have <to> understand individuations and singularizations (individualizations) of analytic laws among analytic necessities. The individualizations differ from the particularizations due

to the fact that individual presentations, and hence existence-positings, are used in substitution. For example, if we compose, "If Socrates is human, then he is not not a human?" Extra-essential material truths or analytic necessities are, as I can also say, characterized by the fact that they change into categorial law-truths when we replace their material terms with indefinite terms of the corresponding categories.¹ Every formal-logically valid inference as such is characterized in this manner, for example, "If all humans are mortal and Socrates is a human, then Socrates is mortal?" This truth is extra-essentially material, i.e. it is not essentially bound to the material concepts figuring there. It is merely a particular case of the law that is a formal-logical law, "If All A are α , and x is an A, then x is also α ?" Every such inference is therefore an analytic necessity.

If we defined analytic laws as purely categorial laws, then to hold fast to the *Kantian* analytic-synthetic terminological dichotomy, it seems we would have to call the remaining laws synthetic. On both sides, it is a matter of pure concept-propositions, therefore of a priori ones. We would therefore have analytic and synthetic a priori propositions, or rather truths. But the latter divide into analytic and non-analytic necessities, and since it is the intention of talk of synthetic laws to eliminate the analytic altogether, also as analytic necessity, then the classification is not satisfactory. Performs this elimination, one then arrives at the following distinction: Under the concept of analytic a priori propositions belong 363 both the purely categorial concept-truths (purely analytic propositions) and also those concept-truths that are the material individuations of such truths. On the other hand, synthetic a priori truths were those material concept-truths that are not be grasped through mere subsumption as individuations of purely analytic truths, which therefore when they are in general generalizable eventually lead to laws still having material content and then resist any generalization. In other words, counted among analytic a priori truths are both the purely analytic truths and also extra-essential material concept-truths. The essential synthetic truths were

¹The a priori analytic then represents a narrower concept of the analytical, the higher mathesis, a broader one.

those a priori truths that are not graspable as mere purely conceptual individuations of purely categorial laws. (*Kant* was aiming at precisely such a finding with the original coining of the concept “synthetic.”) Important too is the parallel transaction on the side of existential propositions—and more precisely of existential truths—of a posteriori truths. Through the existential positings, they contain a, so to speak, non-rational element. In this sense, they are “contingent.” By contingent truths, or a posteriori truths in the concise sense, I understand, however, those that are not only contingent insofar as they imply existential positings, but also insofar as, apart from that, they contain nothing of essence-necessities, i.e. do not present themselves as singular individuations of any a priori truths. Belonging in there are all specifically natural scientific statements, all singular statements about experimental findings, all perception- and memory-judgments etc. But, also all natural laws. All remaining existential propositions, which therefore have in common the circumstance that they are singular individuations of a priori truths, break down into analytically necessary existential truths (namely, singular individuations of analytically a priori truths) and synthetically necessary existential truths.

Analytically necessary existential truths were all applications of purely logical laws to singular individual cases, for instance, in natural science. Synthetically necessary laws, however, were all applications, for example, of geometry or similar disciplines—I cite in addition pure kinematics—to empirical nature.

People commonly say that all analytic propositions are a priori and thereby also include analytic existential truths among analytic propositions. That is justified to the extent that in the case of an empirical statement, one does not want to make statements about the existence of the objects named in the existential terms, but rather about what is attributable to them, or what would be attributable to them under such and such conditions, or was attributable, and the like. Precisely that, however, is the side of the necessity, that which derives from the corresponding analytic law. On the other hand, anyone who attaches value to perspicuity in thinking and in distinctions cannot but adhere to the divisions I have made.

364 Appendix XVI (to §50): <Indirectness Pertains to the Essence of Theorems, Directness of Insight to the Essence of Principles>¹

I am now broadening my reflections. I am leaving behind the reflection on the essence of inferences and the description of the general characteristics belonging to them. Before I turn, which is my next goal, to the apophantic theory of law, which also embraces the laws of apophantic inferences in systematic theory, let us cast yet another look at the essential characteristic of the domain of laws and ponder the question suggested to us by the distinction between direct and indirect inferences as to whether something does not also correspond to it on the side of laws of inference and of laws in general, and hence also <ponder> whether, as in the case of the hypothetical necessities, we would not also have to speak of inherently direct and indirect, inherently prior and ulterior ones in the case of the remaining necessities. These questions will surely have to be answered affirmatively.

I bring to mind the difference between inherently direct and indirect concept-truths. If we imagine a singular red, then we see with Evidenz that the truth, this red is a color, is a necessity, namely, a direct one. And likewise, <we see> that the pure concept-truth “red is a color” is a direct truth. I shall likewise speak of direct and pure concept-truths in the case of propositions like $2 + 1 = 1 + 2$ and, more generally, $a + 1 = 1 + a$ —all this in contrast to necessities, or to pure concept-truths that are remote from such “axioms” in a system of deductive theory.

Truths like those of the theorems of *Euclidean* geometry, or the theorems in a system of arithmetic, are only intelligible to us, subjectively speaking, through proofs, therefore through a chain of inferences. They thereby acquire the character of deductive necessity, but, mere deductive necessity—i.e. the necessity that every proposition deduced in any manner as such has—does not. Rather, it is part of the essence of genuine theorems that they can only be indirectly understood, and part of the essence of principles, of axioms in the concise sense that they can be directly understood. That

¹Probably WS 1908/09 (inserted into the lecture course of WS 1910/11). (Editor’s note)

is, though, not something subjective and contingent, but something belonging to the <essence> of the truths concerned. Aside from all actual understanding or not-understanding, certain truths—law-truths here—are inherently direct and others inherently indirect. Being a principle and being a theorem therefore involve something essential, something permitting one to speak of an ordering of truths in themselves, at least within closed spheres of truth, namely, a priori ones.

Accordingly, the concepts argument and conclusion, and cor- 365
relatively argument-truth and conclusion-truth acquire a concise meaning entirely of their own, that of a not merely relative, but absolute difference. The concept of inherently dependent truth being necessary conclusion is indeed to be divorced from that of generally deduced, generally inferred<truth>.

A concise concept of deductive, of inferential argumentation, and in further consequence, a more rigorous concept of deductive theory is also thereby determined. We could use the *Aristotelian* word *apodeixis* here. An apodictic inference, an apodictic proof, proceeds from genuine apodictic arguments to apodictic conclusions. An arbitrary inference and proof (an arbitrary inference, for example, through mere subsumption of a particular proposition under the universal one known beforehand) is, however, not at all of this nature. Of course, in a system of rigorous concept-truths, as in mathematics, one can infer back from truths standing in a later position in the system to ones by their very nature standing closer to basic truths precisely when one formulates these later truths purely in their own right as premises and infers in accordance with formal logical laws, with the addition of some axioms.

What is characteristic of an apodictic theory consists in the fact that a group of genuine principles, of axioms that have essential unity through a relationship to a higher generic concept—such as cardinal number, set, spatial magnitude, and so on—provides the foundation for a systematic apodictic derivation of theorems. In this sense, every purely mathematical discipline is of the nature of an apodictic theory.

With such theories, I have, therefore, also in these questions of apodicticity, opposed the psychologism and relativism that believes it can trace all theorization and all ordering of truths in the form of

systematic theories back to merely psychological or biological principles. People talk here of a thought economy, which in turn connects with the complex of facts of adaptation showing that humans have their adaptation to nature intellectually, just as in every other biological respect.

I need not embark here on criticism of the commonness of such theories. In any case, according to them, the principles in deductive theories—considered in themselves and *a priori*—would have no intrinsic merit. It would just merely be a matter of accidental human development that precisely propositions having such content, and not some far-flung theorems in the system instead, make sense to us directly. If, however, one delves into the meaning-content of argument-truths and of theorem-truths, one soon realizes that the distinction between indirectness and directness is purely intrinsically and essentially inherent in them themselves. Theorems in themselves refer back to indirect relationships and in themselves require going back to the same analyzing subsumption under principles and associated primitive inferences. The theorem is valid in itself because the principles hold, and this “because” has a status different from that of any random “because.” If I already know, no matter how, for instance, because my teacher has told me so, that of A and B, only one is valid, and if incidentally, I know in
 366 some other way that A is not valid, then I naturally then know that B is valid. But, although this propositional inference assures me of the validity of B, it does not substantiate the truth of B in the apodictic sense. I naturally also say here, “B is valid, because of A and B only one is valid etc.,” but the “because” does give any genuine essence-argument, any apodictic argument here. “Deduced” is then no longer the same as “substantiated.”

I must mention one more thing. If we consider the properties and relations pertaining *a priori*, therefore, purely conceptually, to the objects of a general concept G, therefore, encounter a series of direct concept-truths destined to act as axioms for a deductive discipline, then it is not excluded that, despite their directness, these direct axioms are not then deductively independent from one another. In other words, it can be there that in the series of direct axioms A_1, A_2, \dots, A_n , one or another of them can turn out to be a mere deductive consequence of the remaining ones, without however one’s being able to say for that reason that it is apodictically

substantiated it them. A technically perfect deductive theory is then constructed in such a way that one takes a system of principles deductively independent from one another as axioms as a basis and from there apodictically derives, therefore potentially also proves, some propositions that are in themselves of the nature of principles as good as the axioms given priority. Similarly, for further progress, one will not be able to say either that this must be unambiguous. Groups of other equivalent propositions in the stage of indirectness will be possible whose apodictic derivation offers various possibilities in such a way that if one of them has been proven from the axioms, the others ensue as consequences, but also the other way around. So the system as a whole is on the whole apodictic while it cannot be said that every other course is not apodictic. Examples of this are provided by our mathematical sciences which, as is well known, fail to produce a construction that one could say is the absolutely necessary one. However, all that would require yet closer exploration.

Appendix XVII (Original Version of §§60–62): <The Problems That Make a Systematic Investigation of Entirely Different Regions of Possible Being and Possible Science Necessary>

Formal ontology—or, as we for good reasons also might call, the *mathesis universalis*—is the ultimate unfolding, in a different respect, however, also purifying, of the Idea of traditional formal logic. It is logic in a finalized and no longer extendable sense. It <is> analytics inasmuch as it brings a prominent tendency of *Aristotelian* analytics to pure development. It is absolutely complete in itself, entirely divorced from all other sciences in a clear-cut way and stands in the same relationship to them all, in a relationship that we could call science-theoretical. Its immense meaning for all of human knowledge in general is based precisely 367 on this.

If we again take up¹ the Idea of the theory of science guiding us from the beginning, then, as the formal theory of meaning and ontology described, logic is the first manifestation of this Idea.

¹This paragraph corresponds to the first paragraph of Chap. 12 above. (Editor's note)

Knowing (*Wissen*) in the sense of science (*Wissenschaft*) is thinking or thought-state-of-mind that refers back to thinking. Corresponding to thinking is something thought, and so corresponding to every science is a system of judgments in my meaning-theoretical sense, a system of postulated truths and probabilities, and these refer to objects and states-of-affairs. The science of meanings in general, of truths, possibilities, probabilities in general, of objects in general in absolutely pure, formal universality, yields a system of absolute truths to which every science is obviously bound, and which are prior in terms of validity to every science in general—as already to every judgment in general.

Naturally, if it is itself thereby prior in this sense, it refers back to itself. This reflexivity characterizes it precisely as genuine theory of science and obviously does not involve any vicious circle. One would initially like to find a problem here. Formal logic sets forth the truths that are conditions of the validity of every particular truth in general. But, it is itself nevertheless a science. It establishes particular truths, deduces particular truths from particular truths, constructs theories, and so forth. Does it not thereby presuppose the truths that it very first establishes? Now, obviously, it would cancel itself out if it presupposed those truths as premises. But, it is precisely—and no less obviously—not a question of that. Formal logic begins with the fact that it establishes axioms as direct givens having absolute validity, and if it draws consequences and deduces, for example, derived laws of inference, precisely every step itself falls directly under axioms to be fixed. Formal logic's reflexivity does not therefore harbor within it any puzzle, although it is otherwise a striking characteristic of formal logic as compared to other factual sciences.

¹ I now ask whether we cannot broaden the Idea of the theory of science, whether we cannot characterize new fields of investigation, and perhaps whole disciplines that—even if in a different respect—are prior to all particular sciences and consequently do not presuppose any of them in terms of their content.

¹The following paragraphs correspond to the text of §§60–62 of the lecture above that starts here and ends with the words “in the usual sense of physical nature?” (Editor's and translator's note)

I add an explanatory remark here. We can initially call generally science-theoretical the exploration of everything concerning the Idea, the essence of a science as such in unconditional generality. That initially refers to knowledge that concerns what is constitutive of the Idea of a science, i.e. concerns essence-moments that necessarily construct the Idea of science. The Idea of meaning, ³⁶⁸ more precisely of judgment, is such a constructive moment, and so the whole of apophantics is theory of science in a magnificent sense—and likewise the whole of formal ontology, since the Idea of object in general, along with all related Ideas, such as property, relation, and so on, is constitutive of the Idea of science. Science is indeed science of any objectivity that is called its domain.

We can then, however, surely stretch the concept of science-theoretical to such an extent that <it> includes everything that, according to its essence, no preexisting science presupposes or that belongs within the sphere of any particular science and is otherwise of such a nature that every particular science could in principle make free use of it, without for that reason forfeiting its own domain, whether it actually finds reason for that then or not. In this sense, the formal theory of theories is already science-theoretical. It is not part of the constitutive essence of every science to be theoretical science in the precise sense I have described, therefore, to derive theoretical deductive systems out of basic laws as a priori or empirically obtained foundations and, thereby, to have to engage in theoretical explanation. That does not however change anything about the fact that the theory of theories is science-theoretical, because the Idea of deduction, of proof, of theory, or the Idea of manifold is by essence prior to any science, and it is thereby a matter of higher essence-configurations that further form constitutive concepts of science in pure universality.

We shall from now on hold fast to this most universal concept of “science-theoretical” as theory of science and reflect together about what may emerge *a priori* as science-theoretical fields of investigation. It is clear that from now on, we are changing outlook, that we must forgo abstraction from the nature of the nuclei. Analytics is the scientific field of pure form. We now have to take into account what is called the matter of knowledge.

Let us take up the Idea of mathematics. According to my analyses, there was a difference between analytic-formal and non-analytic mathematics. Everything that pertains to analytic categories in mathematical disciplines figures then on one side, therefore, the arithmetic of cardinal numbers, the arithmetic of ordinal numbers, and so on, as well as the formal theory of manifolds, not, however, geometry as theory of space, pure chronology as theory of time, and so forth.

Are these disciplines then not science-theoretical? They are obviously not so in the most universal sense, because not every science deals with spatiotemporal objectivities. That is certainly not true, for example, of the *mathesis universalis*, or of analytics itself with all its disciplines. On the other hand, one will nevertheless be able to point to the fact that, within the vast complexes of sciences of nature referred to as non-analytic (therefore synthetic), the mathematical disciplines play a role similar to the analytic mathematical disciplines, therefore, that within the bounds of nature and natural science, they are science-theoretical in nature.

If we survey the host of natural sciences, then each one of them theoretically explores some domain of the totality of nature. In theory, though, each one of them can make just as free use of all the synthetic-mathematical disciplines as of the formal-mathematical ones. The reason is obvious. Just as the objectivities falling under the heading of “nature” are precisely objectivities—subjects of properties, relation terms of relations, components of conjunctions, parts of wholes—, in short, have an analytic-ontological form, on account of which they come under analytics, so it as nature has a form. *Kant* spoke of *natura formaliter spectata*. Everything worthy of the name thing has a bodily figure that takes its place in space, that has the formal properties of a three-dimensional *Euclidean* manifold, and consequently requires the familiar geometry as unfolding of its essence. Furthermore, any concrete being exists in time and moves in space, and is consequently subject—something which concerns the temporal-figures and movement-figures—to chronology and the theory of motion (kinematics). Furthermore, every thing has its real properties and is a temporal unit amid change in these real properties. In this respect, we call it a substantial unit. And substance again stands in a close relation-

ship to causality. The thing changes preserving its real identity in the changing, but it changes in such a manner that its changes are dependent on those of other things, namely, in accordance with fixed causal laws. In other words, every change has its causes. Each is necessary. Each points to laws of change that unify and govern the functional dependencies of the changes in different concrete things. No thing is isolated. Every thing is a component of a causal-coherent nature. Similar characteristics belong to the essence of thing and nature.

Specific natural sciences explore specific things, specific real properties, real changes, specific real laws as causal laws of the changes. Every <natural science> accepts things experienced simply as things and only asks what holds of them more specifically. In all its ways of being experienced, in all its statements about things, each is, however, bound to what the Idea of thing and nature prescribed *a priori*, or in *Kantian* terms, to the form of nature. The knowledge proper to the form, to the spatiotemporal form, as well as, *formaliter*, to the store of real spatiotemporal plenitude owing to which the thing is a natural reality, all that is prior to the specific natural sciences, is a common base of scientific knowledge of which each specific natural science can make free use and which does not belong in any of them. That also holds for the most universal, what are called abstract, natural sciences. They concern specifically given nature, though with the greatest universality. They already presuppose that nature exists as a system of things that is 370 subject to the form of nature as an *a priori*, as an *eidos* that is prior to all specific nature to be given empirically.

All that is beyond doubt, and so in the realm of natural knowledge, analytic-formal ontology comes before synthetic-formal ontology, namely, the ontology of nature. It would break down into several separate disciplines, <into> the disciplines that explore the *a priori* of space and time, therefore geometry, chronology, and kinematics, on the other hand, <into> those disciplines that would correspond to *Kantian* “pure” natural science, therefore, explore the *a priori* of spatiotemporal reality (matter)—except for pure space- and time-form. One then observes that the analytic categories, the categories of objectivity in general in the natural sphere would come before the categories of nature. We could say: the cat-

egories in the original *Aristotelian* sense, where we would, however, have to exclude all “psychical nature”, to which *Aristotle* surely thought his categories also referred. We could again say the *Kantian* categories, since in his theory of categories, *Kant* was essentially guided by nature in the usual sense of physical nature.

All the same, ontology of nature is, however, science-theoretical only in a limited sense, insofar as it only precisely deals with an area of science, with that defined by means of the Idea of nature. Besides, there may be other sciences and areas of science concerned with objects whose unity is due to a different Idea binding them. And, accordingly, we would also have ontologies that would develop the ideal essence of such objectivity and that, with regard to the sciences of objects of this nature, would have to be science-theoretical in nature in a similar way—but precisely again limitedly science-theoretical. The full universality of the concept of the theory of science would then be abandoned.

Different would be an investigation setting itself the task of looking for the entirely different regions of possible being and possible science, and within each region, the chief basic concepts that had earned them the name “categories” and would represent the defining concepts of the ontology proper to any such domain. Those highest concepts that define the regions would then differ from those concepts in which the essence of the relevant primitive concept, of the highest of the domain, unfolds from the point of view of objects. I could say that the regional concept theoretically fixing a scientific region must differ from the genuine categories.

We know two regions in advance, the analytic <region>, whose regional concept is “something in general” or “object in general”; and the natural scientific region, whose regional concept is “thing of nature”. One also at the same time observes, notes in passing, that the *Aristotelian* table of categories begins with οὐσία and proceeds to quality, quantity, place, time, relation, and so forth, that the first component has an entirely different status and differs in
 371 nature from the remaining ones, which alone are real predicables, while substance actually only denotes the identical thing, insofar as it is the bearer of such predicables. At one point in the *Prior Analytics*, *Aristotle* himself contrasted οὐσία with all other categories and called the latter συμβεβηκότα.

Were one to succeed in breaking down the realm of possible knowledge into regions in essential and not haphazard ways, then this would result, for one thing, in a fundamentally essential classification of sciences—and along with that at the same time a theory of categories, a theory of the regional and specifically categorial concepts.

Belonging to every regional <concept> would at the same time be an a priori ontology, which would have to act as a theory of science specific to the corresponding scientific area.

All these ontologies would be formal in the same sense, just as geometry and pure natural science are called “formal”; namely, <as> sciences of the “form” of possible nature-thingness as such or of the possible natural world in general.

Taken together, these formal disciplines would lend knowledge a formal scaffolding to which every possible individually actually existing objectivity and conjunction of objects is bound as a priori schema. All such investigations are then obviously science-theoretical in my sense. They really do not arrive at any knowledge within the particular sciences and do not presuppose any such <science>. They do not state anything at all about the fact that there really are such kinds of objectivity and what really holds for them. They are only concerned with the Idea of possible objectivities in general—thoroughly *a priori*—and inquire precisely into the regions and categories into which possible objectivities must fall.

In the last lecture, we reflected upon which general science-theoretical investigations may possibly present themselves above and beyond those of apophantics and ontology, and in initially continuing to use the ontic approach, we came upon the characteristic features of the nuclei and the characteristic features of the scientific fields corresponding to them. Analytic-formal ontology abstracts from all such characteristic features. It explores the a priori pertaining to meanings and objectivities in general when we abandon all “matter” of knowledge in indefinite generality. It is precisely universal mathesis. It mathematizes all nucleus-contents within their nucleus-categories, and for that reason its universality is precisely all-encompassing, because every meaning—let us say, every judgment, and likewise correlatively every objectivity—first and foremost has a mathematical form, an analytic form that can

be considered in ideal universality and then prescribes laws for possible meaning-validity and possible existing objectivity in general. If we then also take into consideration what is called the matter of knowledge, we do not mathematize the ultimate concept-contents that we called “nuclei” (and correlatively the actual store of the objectivities), then it becomes apparent that, for this reason, we must not yet be in the particular individual sciences—provided namely we can still maintain our investigation at a high level of generality—that it may deserve to be called formal, and even science-theoretical. I illustrated that using *Kantian* talk of a form of nature. We recognized that there is a formal ontology of nature that, along with the disciplines of geometry, chronology, kinematics, and the rest of pure natural science, plays an analogous role for the series of diversely defined natural sciences, just as analytic-formal ontology does for all sciences in general. Corresponding here to the analytic *Widersinn* springing from the violation of analytic-formal laws is the natural scientific *Widersinn* springing from an infringement of the laws pertaining to the a priori form of nature, and this *Widersinn* is still prior to every empirical natural science.

Once again, I said that the analytic-formal categories of being in general in the sphere of nature have a counterpart in the categories of natural-material being.

If, then, a formal ontology like that of nature is really not science-theoretical in the most encompassing sense of all, then we however readily see that in this most encompassing sense, an investigation would have to be called science-theoretical that would survey the entire field of possible particular sciences in general and go in quest of the essential demarcations that break it down radically into regions of being. Therefore, such an investigation is not thought of here as a merely comparative reflection on factual sciences, therefore presupposing that there already are such sciences and that particular objectivities exist that they explore. On the contrary, an investigation is possible that starts from the Idea of knowable objectivities in general and then asks into which domains they would have to split *a priori*, which categories would have to pertain to them as forms by virtue of the regional concepts defining the domains and, furthermore, which

formal ontologies would then be to be constituted, defined by precisely those concepts, more precisely by the regional <concepts>. That does not preclude looking at the given factual sciences and at the fields under consideration in them as factually obtaining spheres of objectivity, only that it is just not a matter of facticity and the investigation is an a priori one. Similarly, in the formal theory of meaning and formal ontology, we really start from examples that may be taken from the sphere of actual judging and actual objectivities. But, the existential positings remain excluded where it is a matter of pure investigation of essence.

The problem indicated is now an exceedingly difficult one, and its solution outstrips our capacities. The fact that it has not yet been solved up until now, indeed, not actually properly grasped in its full generality, is partly due to certain prejudices stemming from natural habitual ways of thinking, partly to the fact that the method of such investigations is more idiosyncratic and differently oriented than one would at first like to assume.

As far as the first is concerned, the prejudices, those come into consideration here that grow out of the habits of the natural attitude that initially incline us to see only nature, nature in the narrower and in an extended sense. Indeed, in certain ways, the circle is still closing in owing to the fact that since the rise of the magnificent sciences of physical nature, there has been a growing inclination to extend unjustifiably concepts and methods of physical natural science, on the other hand, however, to explain away what is actually given and the corresponding chief differences of objectivity. 373

The realm of the spirit, which has again and again been wrongly naturalized in the psychology of the last centuries, is already afflicted by this.

As for what secondly concerns the method, let it just be indicated to start with that an avoiding of all errors of the kind indicated earlier and a true grasping of the essential demarcation between the regions are impossible without a phenomenological analysis also resorting to the consciousness of givenness itself.

Before I now enter into more detailed explanations, I realize that it is natural to begin with the difference between individual objectivities and the eidetic-ideal objectivities—the difference that

I have also called in the most general way that of the *a priori* and *a posteriori*. In a certain sense, all essence has some universality. An extension corresponds to it as long as the ability to refer to an undetermined multiplicity of particulars corresponding to it is part of the essence. So, for example, the essence “number” has its extension in an undetermined and unrestricted generality of possible sets that are denumerable by means of it. The Idea (the essence) of a specific red has its extension in just such a multiplicity of individually singular red-moments. It is otherwise to be noted that not every essence is a genus. The difference between genera and species, as it obtains between color and red, is not to be confused with the difference between Idea (or essence) and extension of possible particulars. The generic universal color is differentiated as far down as red, as far as the totally determined shade of red. In the gradation of generic differentiation, the last one is ideal, what is called the final difference. However, this itself in turn has an extension, which however is not now an extension of species, but of singular particulars. The relationship of this final difference to the particulars is thereby essentially different from that of the genus to the difference. The genus and every essence have an extension of individual particulars. For example, the genus color <has> the individual moments, which are individual singularizations of colors. And, it is thereby part of the essence of these situations that this singularization is only possible because some least difference between colors is singularized at the same time. The individual color moment is a singularization of a specific shade of color and only for this reason of color in general.

374 Assuming this,¹ it is clear that the eidetic sciences will not separate off in accordance with individual essences, but in accordance with higher genera, under which all related series of other genera and species fall, where whether the disciplines have an intrinsic relationship and intertwine or not will depend on the store of essence relationships of the governing genus-essences. In the first case, precisely higher generic concepts will create a unity. This is what happens, for instance, with the theory of cardinal numbers,

¹ Compare the “Textkritischen Anhang”, p. 515 f. (to p. 281, line 4) of Hua XXX to the following text up to the end of the Appendix. (Editor’s note)

set theory, and so in general <with> the disciplines of formal ontology, and also <with> disciplines such as geometry and kinematics within the ideal science of the essence of nature.

It is furthermore clear that by virtue of the a priori relationship that obtains between <the> Idea and its individual extension, all eidetic knowledge makes unconditional general statements without further ado, or by turning things around implies statements about possible individual particulars that correspond to the Ideas. If we therefore compare eidetic sciences or sciences of essence to sciences of individuals, then we are obviously thinking of sciences in which individual existence is posited and in which new knowledge is determined by the givenness of actual existence, knowledge that is not merely valid as analytic or synthetic necessities in relationship to corresponding knowledge in analytic or synthetic essence-sciences. Essence-knowledge is, however, naturally applied to what is individual, enters into the sciences of individual existence, and plays its role there.

If we then look around at what can be judged about in the sphere of the individual existence of the a posteriori, then we first encounter the region of nature as physical nature. One sees or, so to speak, feels that¹

Appendix XVIII (to §64): <The Problem of Reason>²

<a) The Ideal Structure of the Realm of the Spirit: Individual Experience and the Thought-Acts Logically Processing These, on the One Hand, the Experienced Objects and Thought Truths, on the Other Hand>

In the last lectures, I spoke of the essential demarcations in the realm of the sciences. I spoke of the demarcation that concerns all empirical sciences of nature. Nature is a basic regional concept, and pertaining to it is the ontology of nature that describes and brings to theoretic-scientific elaboration an a priori prior to all

¹Continuation in the second sentence of the third paragraph of §62 above (Editor's note)

²From the lecture course of WS 1910/11. (Editor's note)

possible natural sciences. Nature finds the realm of the spirit. A new regional concept is “Animal” <as> bodily-spiritual being, and pertaining to it is the concept “mind”, initially as individual mind. I
 375 also then further discussed the unity of animal-human society and the corresponding pure intellectuality, namely, the communal spirit, with its different correlates. Pertaining to that were the psychological disciplines and those of the humanities and social sciences, as well as, by virtue of the relationship between mind and nature, the necessary psychophysics, inasmuch as, besides the inner mental relationships, the functional dependencies of the bodily and mental ones must be explored. Pertaining to the new regional concepts are new a priori ontologies that, on the one hand, have to explore the immanent a priori of individual and social consciousness as well as, on the other hand, the a priori that may pertain to the form of psychophysical unity.

Have I thereby situated all sciences, all empirical existential sciences on one side, all ontologies and all a priori sciences in general on the other?

Let us reflect once more on the scope of the realm of the spirit and what belongs in it. The individual mind, let us say, the individual human being, is an experiencing being, and its experiencing is constantly I-experiencing. We all know what that means. Every one of us says, “I experience, I think, I feel, I desire and will”—and thereby the difference that *Hume* had in mind as the difference between impressions and Ideas is everywhere. For example, I experience, namely, I perceive, I remember, I expect, and I perform such “acts” with varying degrees of clarity up to the point of full <clarity> and intuitiveness. For example, when experiencing clear perception, something tangible itself figures presently existing before me. And that “figuring before me in that way” is something I can attend to. I can be entirely given to the object perceptively, or also be attentively directed toward the perceiving as consciousness in reflection. In contrast, we also engage in act modifications. We speak of fantasy. If we fantasize, something self-presently existing does not actually figure before us, but, as it were, just imaginarily. And similarly, when we engage in memory-fantasy, expectation-fantasy. We see that standing opposite the originary acts in which something is “actually” conscious are everywhere

certain modifications in which something in principle the same or similar is not actually conscious to us, but is so in a modified way, in a “quasi” mode—in mere fantasy, or whatever we might otherwise call it. Let us therefore limit ourselves to the unmodified consciousness, the originary acts, the act impressions, to use the *Humean* expression.

There, we therefore initially have experiencing acts, such as perceptions, memories and the ones related to them in which direct existence is conscious. The ego is directly conscious of a present, past, or future existence, and that concerns either tangible existence, existence of nature—then, the acts are called external experiences—or it concerns existence of its own acts of any kind, insofar as the ego reflectively directs its gaze toward its experiences. We then speak of inner experience. Likewise, in the direct reciprocal understanding in which the ego enters into a communicative relationship with another ego, <we> naturally also <speaks of> experience of someone else’s inner life, experience of human beings as such, of their experiences, and so forth.

In so doing, express reference is however still to be made to the correlates to be grasped with these ego experiences. While I am perceiving and perceiving precisely this thing there, I can also take heed of the fact that it is given to me now in this, and then in that, way of appearing. I can take heed of the perspectival adumbrations, namely, of the adumbration of tangible forms, colors, and so forth, precisely as they are given to me. I can not only direct reflection to the perception-consciousness, but also to the ways of appearing of the object, toward which I am not turned when I look at the object and toward which I nevertheless can turn at any time.

The ego does not, however, only have experiences, whether primary and reflectionless or reflective experiences. It also thinks, and in thinking makes judgments. That means that the plain experiences form the foundation for new, explicating, relating, concatenating acts, thereby, the acts of considering-true and <as-> probable, and above them, yet another fully new layer, the comprehending, the thinking layer in the specific sense. It is the layer associated with words coming to “expression” in stating. Or better yet, full stating is thinking basing itself upon plain experiencing and explicating acts and understanding them in themselves.

Therefore, people judge. They judge individually. They come to an understanding regarding their judgments. They influence one another's convictions, and in this reciprocal coming to an understanding and reciprocal influencing, they make ever new judgments that are built upon one another in different forms. In other words, people prove, theorize, practice sciences, and in such a way that the accomplishments of individual ones—reciprocally determining other ones—enter into the cultural construct “science” having its intersubjective, collective-mental objectivity. Thereby, however, both in relationship to individual human beings and in relationship to the human community, the fleeting store of simple acts of judgment, acts of inferring, of proving, of theorizing differs from what figures in these acts as true and probably valid, as directly grasped truth or as indirectly proven truth, or even as proof of this truth, as recognized theory and the discovered, demonstrated end result of the theory, and so forth. Each of us makes these distinctions whenever we but become aware of them. Claimed truth figures as an objectivity, as do claimed theory and science. And for us, everything is *de facto* science, a term for a sphere of intersubjectively supposed or valid truths that ought to hold as it holds, whether we or anyone else is concerned judgmentally with them in momentary, actual experiences or not.

The Idea of Reason in Relationship to the Correlation
Between Consciousness and What One Is Conscious
of as the Subject of a New Science. Ontology as Science
Directed Straight to That Itself Needs Reason-Theoretical
Elucidation

377 Accordingly, within the ideal framework that the sciences of the individual mind and <of the> communal spirit explore, we therefore find, on the one hand, all experiences occurring in individual actual minds and also all experiences of logically processing thought-acts, on the other hand, however, their correlates, therefore the experienced objectivities, the thought truths and probabilities that refer to such objectivities, and highest of all, the empirical sciences. Within the framework of the sciences of human civilization belong, for example, also all natural sciences, namely, insofar

as we take these sciences to be cultural phenomena in the different stages of their development.

But, we thereby immediately become aware of the constraint. Each empirical act and thought-act, all inferring, proving, and theorizing belongs in the individual field of the humanities and social sciences, or in psychology. Precisely for this reason, each thing thought as such, believed as such, deduced, proven, <each thing> theorized as such, belongs in them. And, precisely the same likewise belongs within the framework of the history of the sciences of the communal spirit in general if we take human beings as a component of the human scheme of things, for instance in their individuality, as object of the historical life of the spirit. Nothing at all though is thereby stated about the truth of what has been thought, about the truth of the theory, of the science that is humanly thought, explored, conceptualized.

Psychology, history, empirical humanities and social science in general deal with facts. Experiencing, experience with respect to judging, i.e. being convinced or presuming are psychological and social facts. Implied there is that the people involved are convinced by one fact or another. Substantiating as proving and as theorizing are likewise facts. But in this respect, alchemy is just as much a fact as chemistry, astrology as much as astronomy. Alchemists had their convictions, had their arguments, their theories, just as much as chemists have them today. Therefore, it is clear that the exploration of thinking as fact and the exploration of science as cultural phenomenon are something different from the exploration of the rightness of such thinking, or the answering of the question as to whether the thought, supposed truth, is in fact truth. It is clear that the historical findings about the content of Greek or Arabic natural science only state what was considered to be scientific truth in the psychological forms of knowing and substantiating thinking of the Greeks and Arabs, <which> though still does not say anything about whether <and> to what extent this supposed science is science in the sense of Idea.

Through this contrasting of supposed science and “actual” science, we then immediately become conscious of the Idea of reason and with it of a new science. The outcome is therefore the following: In multiple acts of experiencing, something experienced

supposedly stands directly before us as something existing (whether it is something present, something past or something in the future). In thinking it is thought, is determined as being in such and such a way. At the same time, something like an empirical truth figures before our mind's eye in judging empirical thinking, in like manner, an empirical theory, an empirical science. But, this figuring before us amounts to no more than a supposing figuring before us. Experience and empirical thinking can, people also say, be rational and non-rational, and only when it is rational, can it be legitimately said that the objectivity may in reality be so, one theory or another may in truth be valid on account of that, this or that natural law, and so forth. We therefore have an encounter with the Idea of reason, more specifically here: experiencing reason relative to the remarkable correlation between consciousness and what one is conscious of, between experience and what is experienced, empirical thinking and what is empirically thought. All such thinking thinks—as can be stated evidently in virtue of its essence—something, an empirical objectivity with such and such properties. And yet, this thinking need not be either rational, or legitimate. How does thinking show its legitimacy, its rationality? How does it show that there are things, properties of things, laws about things, and the like positing with such and such content, and that something is thereby posited that actually is? And likewise in the empirical sphere in the broadest sense, which also includes along with it psychical being and existence in the communal spirit.

Now, one will at first perhaps presume that we are only reverting back to formal ontology and the ontologies of the realm of the spirit. For what is existing is indeed something objective. Formal ontology explores what pertains to what is objective as such. If what is objective is nature, then we in turn know that nature explores ontology—what pertains in natural-formal generality to precisely all existence of things as such in conformity with the Idea of thingness. And some such thing <holds> for the realm of the spirit.

However, the first thing to be said there is that all ontology is for us though the correlate of ontological investigation. Investigating ontologically, we recognize that such and such formal or real ontological laws hold. We recognize this. Namely, we perform such and such presentations and such and such thought-acts.

These can, however, be valid or invalid, rational and non-rational. How is this difference clarified? How do we come in this way to distinguish evaluatively, so to speak, and ontologically to accord certain thought-acts the value of valid and rational <thought-acts>, to others the <value> of non-rational <thought-acts>? If our ontology is really a system of truths, then truth must be able to show itself in our actual thinking. What does this self-showing itself look like? How is its legitimacy understood as opposed to the illegitimacy of all of the possible errors occurring for us in these spheres?

Second, it is to be noted that ontology exclusively states propositions precisely about ontological systems and laws. In stating these propositions and thinking them, we are turned, for instance, toward numbers and number relationships, spatial figures, number systems, the Ideas “substantiality” and “causality,” and so forth, and all that from an a priori perspective. However, we are not at all turned to the consciousness of counting, to the consciousness of intuiting space and thinking about space, or to the spatial phenomena pertaining to them with their remarkable sequences of adumbrations. In the exploration of the essence of substantiality and causality, we are not turned toward the consciousness of the unity of multiple phenomena in which substance comes to givenness and toward the consciousness of necessity whose correlate is causality. We must, however, expressly turn toward all of them, just as we pose questions about reason, so we want to have it understood what ontological knowledge of this kind may justify, how it—which, however, occurs in the factual order as an empirical fact in human consciousness—may come to accord the status of an unconditional law independent of human existence to what is putatively known in it. Investigation of reason, therefore, aims at consciousness, if it is to be valid, and precisely thereby at consciousness in relation to its meaning- and object-correlates. Ontological investigation aims, however, at objects, more specifically, at objective essence and, if need be, at the same time, at meanings. 379

Third, it finally needs to be said that ontology only generally, and in formal universality, says what in general holds for what is existing, for instance, for what is existing in general in formal universality, or for what is existing in nature, what is existing in the mind. In empirical science, however, we do not judge formally and

we ultimately establish details down to their individual specifications. The question of reason concerns all these findings. They are all realized in human experiencing and thinking, and all such experiencing and thinking is subject to the question of reason, the question of legitimacy. The general ontological-noetic question was: How is it comprehensible that only thinking corresponding to the ontological laws can be objectively valid, rational? The present question reads: If thinking is then already bound to ontological laws, what guarantees its objective truth, its truth for the specific case going beyond that? Or, expressed in *Kantian* terms, the one question reads: How is pure natural scientific knowledge possible, how is pure geometrical, pure kinematic knowledge possible? Following upon that is however also the further questions: How is empirically-natural scientific knowledge possible so far as it is not predetermined by ontological knowledge? How is the difference between rational, objectively valid, and non-rational experience, or empirical scientific knowledge to be understood?

Before I delve into the unique nature of noetic problems, I wish to draw yet further lines of thought.

I have intentionally only limited myself to looking at experiencing as the complex of acts positing existence and thinking only insofar as it presents itself as empirical thinking. Human beings do not, however, merely experience. They adopt other position-takings. They evaluate things as beautiful and ugly, where we understand beauty in the broadest sense that concerns the esthetic only as a special case. Human beings are, however, also striving human beings. They act and create. And in thinking, human beings are also active in these axiological and practical realms. Naturally, all these position-takings and the accomplishments of the individual and social mind proceeding from them as facts belong in the domains of the relevant sciences of existence, of psychology and psychophysics, history, sociology, and so forth. To the extent that deeds implying physical existence thereby come into consideration, <they belong> also in the realm of the physical natural sciences. But, this again does not suffice, and it is of the greatest importance to grasp the parallels pertaining to my foregoing series of observations.

<c) Recapitulation: The Question of Reason Is to Be Posed
in Relation to the Possibility of All Kinds of Knowledge>

In the last lecture, we have made the need for a theory of reason clear to ourselves, namely, to begin with, in the empirical realm. In experience and in empirical thinking, every kind of existence ought to be thought, known, and ultimately scientifically known. How is the fact to be understood that among all the acts in which experiencing and empirical thinking is performed, certain <acts> do and can spontaneously claim to be rational, legitimate, objectively valid? All empirical judging is supposing to have objective truth and with that to state something that holds for actual existence. The fact that anything exists is only true for us because it is experienced, it is potentially substantiated, and conceived in thought. On the other hand, being, for example, the being of nature, is not the same as consciousness of it, the experiencing it, thinking it, substantiating-its-being. How is one to understand the fact that consciousness, while being consciousness of, is capable of spontaneously positing something existing as something being in itself that, however, ought to be what it is, whether it is something someone has been conscious of or not?

If one makes a distinction between rational and non-rational experiencing and empirical thinking, and if the rational ought to involve authority for determining what is intrinsically being, then precisely this distinction must be explored and be made understood. If the empirical science of the individual mind and communal spirit explores consciousness as something existing within the context of the life of the spirit—for example, judging at the moment, theorizing at the moment—as a fact of human thought-life, then obviously needed is then a science of judging reason, of the relationship among judgment, truth, objectivity being and being so—a science that deals with these relationships, not as relationships of psychological facts and facts of the social sciences and humanities, but from the viewpoint of validity or <of> rationality. And, more specifically, needed is a science that not only establishes the conditions of legitimacy or rationality, but procures for us clarity about the essence or meaning of such claims to legitimacy and proofs of legitimacy on ultimate grounds. Two layers of problems emerge

here with respect to the existential sphere. On the one hand, with regard to the ontology of the existing order, <we> have the problem as to how it may be “possible”; i.e. how the possibility of ontological knowledge may be understood, the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge, knowledge in the existential sphere, therefore <the possibility> of geometrical, chronological, and kinematic kinds of knowing in general, how the claim to legitimacy of such knowledge <may be> understood—as a claim to prescribe laws for
 381 all possible natural existence, although it nevertheless is what it is, even if it is never ever known. Added to that, however, is the same problem for the empirical sciences. How is reason or the authority of a posteriori natural knowledge, the possibility of empirical knowledge in all non-ontological natural sciences elucidated? *Kant* did not raise the latter question. In his thought, the first one comes up in the questions about the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge of mathematics and pure natural science.

Of course, we have to bring up precisely both these sets of problems for the ontology of spirits and the empirical humanities and social sciences. At the same time, a more general question stands out for us that was completely overlooked by *Kant*. It concerns the possibility, not <of> synthetic, and more precisely, <of> existential knowledge, but <of> analytic <knowledge>. How is, were we to have to formulate it, analytic knowledge a priori possible? How is analytic reason to be understood and to be elucidated? For all natural knowledge is first, in general, knowledge. Analytics, analytic formal ontology, stands above ontology of nature and above all ontologies in general, and to be asked in relationship to it is also the question of reason. The latter is, so to speak, in a position of its own, and if yet other object domains and ontologies should emerge than those discussed up until now, then it naturally lies just as high above them as above the ontologies and sciences of the existential sphere.

Before we then delve further into the particularities of noetic problems, we must then draw new lines of demarcation, present new domains and ontologies, and precisely thereby new noetic clusters of problems. It is indeed already becoming clear that we have to have just as many theories of reason as domains and ontologies.

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