

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. Oleg Grabar provides a useful summary of the evolution of Islamic institutions in *The Formation of Islamic Art* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).

1 LAND AND PEOPLE

1. For an overview of both prerevolutionary and postrevolutionary Iranian cinema, including discussion of *Bashu*, see Mamad Haghghat, *Histoire du cinéma iranien*. (Paris: BPI Centre Georges Pompidou, 1999), and Hormuz Kéy, *Le cinéma iranien* (Clamency: Nouvelle Imprimerie Labellery, 1999). In English, Richard Tapper has collected a series of analytical essays about film in the Islamic Republic. See Richard Tapper, ed., *The New Iranian Cinema* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2002).
2. Bernard Hourcade, Hubert Mazurek, Mohammad-Hosseyh Papoli-Yazdi, and Mahmoud Taleghani provide a wealth of valuable data regarding demography, religion, land use, education, and language based upon Iranian official statistics in *Atlas d'Iran* (Paris: Reclus, 1998).
3. English-language translations of Persian poetry are plentiful. For an interesting account of the influence of the Persian language, see Shahrokh Meskoob, *Iranian Nationality and the Persian Language*, John Perry, ed., Michael Hillmann, trans. (Washington: Mage Publishers, 1992).
4. For the best coverage of Iranian geography, see W.B. Fisher, ed., *The Cambridge History of Iran: Volume I: The Land of Iran* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968).
5. Edward Stack, *Six Months in Persia*, Volume I (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle, and Rivington, 1882), p. 9.
6. Rula Jurdi Afrasiab, "The Ulama of Jabal 'Amil in Safavid Iran, 1501–1736: Marginality, Migration, and Social Change," *Iranian Studies*, 27: 1–4 (1994), pp. 103–122.
7. Article XII. See Hamid Algar, trans., "Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran" (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1980), p. 32: "The official religion of Iran is Islam and the Twelver Ja'fari school of thought, and this principle shall remain eternally immutable. Other Islamic schools of thought . . . are to be accorded full respect, and their followers are free to act in accordance with their own jurisprudence in performing their religious devotions."
8. Hourcade et al., *Atlas d'Iran*. For further information about human rights abuse against Iranian Christians, see: U.S. Department of State, "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iran–1999," February 23, 2000, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/409.htm>.

9. For background on the Iranian Jewish community, see Habib Levy, *Comprehensive History of the Jews of Iran*, Hooshang Ebrami, ed., George W. Maschke, trans. (Costa Mesa, California: Mazda Publishers, 1999). Daniel Tsadik provides useful background about Iran's Jewish community with special focus on the nineteenth century in his article, "The Legal Status of Religious Minorities: Imami Shi'i Law and Iran's Constitutional Revolution," *Islamic Law and Society*, 10:3 (2003), pp. 376–408.
10. The best resource for the origins of the Baha'i community in Iran is Abbas Amanat, *Resurrection and Renewal: The Making of the Babi Movement in Iran, 1844–1850* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).
11. W. B. Fisher, "Physical Geography," in W. B. Fisher, ed. *The Cambridge History of Iran Volume I: The Land of Iran* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 94.
12. There are numerous accounts of caravans, which followed the ancient Persian postal routes, in the India Office archives in London.
13. "Memorandum by the Rev. George Percy Badger on the Pretensions of Persia in Beloochistan and Mekran, drawn up with special reference to her Claim to Gwadur and Charbar," London, December 23, 1863, FOP 60/287.

2 FROM EMPIRE TO NATION

1. Barbara Crossette, "Standoff with Iraq: Splendor and Ruin," *The New York Times*, January 31, 1998, p. A1.
2. Useful overviews include Josef Wiesehofer, *Ancient Persia* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), which covers the Achaemenid, Parthian, and Sassanian Empires, placing them solidly in their Near Eastern context (rather than studying them in relation to Europe) and including considerable material about social history as well as political and military history. On what archaeological investigations have found, see the survey compiled by Frank Hole, ed., *The Archaeology of Western Iran: Settlement and Society from Prehistory to the Islamic Conquest* (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1987).
3. Muhammad A. Dandamaev and Vladimir G. Lukonin, *The Culture and Social Institutions of Ancient Iran* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 97.
4. Dandamaev and Lukonin, *Ancient Iran*, p. 97.
5. Dandamaev and Lukonin, *Ancient Iran*, pp. 98–99.
6. Richard N. Frye, *The Heritage of Persia* (New York: Mentor, 1963), pp. 127–132.
7. Elton Daniel, *The History of Iran* (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 2001), p. 42.
8. Frye, *Heritage of Persia*, p. 128.
9. Habib Levy, *Comprehensive History of the Jews of Iran*, Hooshang Ebrami, ed., George W. Maschke, trans. (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 1999), pp. 119–121.
10. Levy, *Jews of Iran*, p. 121.
11. Levy, *Jews of Iran*, pp. 122–123.
12. Frye, *Heritage of Persia*, p. 246.
13. "... After Jesus was born in Bethlehem in Judea, during the time of King Herod, Magi from the east came to Jerusalem." Matthew 2:1. For a complete account of the many ways ancient Iran figures in both the Old and New Testament, with the

- context from Iranian history for the references, see Edwin Yamauchi, *Persia and the Bible* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1990).
14. Frye, *Heritage of Persia*, pp. 258–259.
 15. Abbas Amanat, *Resurrection and Renewal: The Making of the Babi Movement in Iran, 1844–1850* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 70.
 16. Nizam al-Mulk, *The Book of Government or Rules for Kings: The Siyar al—Muluk or Siyasat-nama*, Hubert Drake, trans. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978). The definitive discussion of this princely literature and its impact is Ann Lambton, *Theory and Practice in Medieval Persian Government* (London: Variorum Reprints, 1980), especially the essay “Islamic Mirrors for Princes,” reprinted from *La Persia nel medioevo: Atti del Convegno internazionale* (Rome, 1970).
 17. Abbas Amanat, *Pivot of the Universe* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), pp. 70–73.
 18. Bertold Spuler, *The Muslim World. Volume I: The Age of the Caliphs* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1960), p. 29.
 19. Bat Ye’or, *Islam and Dhimmitude* (Madison: Farleigh Dickinson University Press, 2002); Levy, *Jews of Iran*, p. 167.
 20. Spuler, *Muslim World*, pp. 36–37.
 21. Hamilton Gibb, *Studies on the Civilization of Islam* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 66.
 22. Spuler, *Muslim World*, p. 52.
 23. For a good overview of Iran during the ‘Abbasid period, see Richard N. Frye, ed., *The Cambridge History of Iran: Volume 4: The Period from the Arab Invasion to the Saljuqs* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Of particular value for its detail, is Roy Mottahedeh’s chapter/chronicle, “The ‘Abbasid Caliphate in Iran.”
 24. Levy, *Jews of Iran*, pp. 168–170.
 25. Levy, *Jews of Iran*, pp. 176–177.
 26. For more on classic Iranian literature, see Jan Rypka, *History of Iranian Literature* (Dodrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1968), or Edward Browne’s classic four-volume *Literary History of Persia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1924).
 27. Levy, *Jews of Iran*, p. 187.
 28. Spuler, *Muslim World*, p. 58.
 29. Perhaps the most thorough treatment of the Buyids is that of Mafizullah Kabir, *The Buwayhid Dynasty of Baghdad* (Calcutta: Iran Society, 1964).
 30. Perhaps the most thorough treatment of the Ghaznavid court is Clifford Edmund Bosworth, *The Ghaznavids: Their Empire in Afghanistan and Eastern Iran, 994–1040* (Edinburgh: University of St. Andrews Press, 1963); see especially p. 131.
 31. The classic work on the social history of these centuries is Anne Lambton, *Continuity and Change in Medieval Persia* (Albany, NY: Bibliotheca Persica, 1988).
 32. Levy, *Jews of Iran*, p. 225.
 33. For an overview of the Assassins, see Bernard Lewis, *The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam* (New York: Basic Books, 2003).
 34. Sayyid Hossein Nasr, “Sufism,” in *The Cambridge History of Iran Volume IV*, Frye, ed., pp. 442–463.
 35. Ibn Kathir, *Al-Bidaya wa’l-nihaya*, as trans. in Bernard Lewis, *Islam; From the Prophet Muhammad to the Capture of Constantinople, Volume I: Politics and War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 81–84.

36. Barbara Brend, *Islamic Art* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), pp. 132–134.
37. David Morgan, *Medieval Persia, 1040–1797* (New York: Longman, 1994), p. 66.
38. Cf. Lambton, *Continuity and Change in Medieval Persia*.
39. For an older but readily readable general history of the Safavid period, see Roger Savory, *Iran Under the Safavids* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). Rudolph P. Matthee incorporates subsequent research in *The Politics of Trade in Safavid Iran: Silk for Silver, 1600–1730* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), and adds valuable details regarding Safavid military development in his chapter, “Unwalled Cities and Restless Nomads: Gunpowder and Artillery in Safavid Iran,” published in Charles Melville, ed., *Safavid Persia* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), pp. 389–416. Rosemary Stansfield-Johnson reexamines some of Savory’s contentions about the Safavid ritual of public cursing of the Sunnis in her article, “The Tabara’iyan and the Early Safavids,” *Iranian Studies*, 37:1 (2004), pp. 47–62.
40. Savory, *Iran under the Safavids*, p. 28.
41. Iraj Afshar, ed., *Khitaynameh* (Tehran: Markaz-i Asnad va Farhang-i Asia, 1372/1993).
42. Jean Calmard, “Shi’i Rituals and Power. II. The Consolidation of Safavid Shi’ism: Folklore and Popular Religion,” *Pembroke Papers* 4 (1996), p. 139, reprinted in Melville, *Safavid Persia*.
43. Marshall G.S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam, Volume III: The Gunpowder Empires and Modern Times* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), pp. 16–27.
44. A useful overview of early modern French–Iranian relations is provided by Iraj Amini, *Napoléon et la Perse* (Paris: Fondation Napoléon, 1995).
45. Levy, *Jews of Iran*, p. 284.
46. There is a rich debate among historians about the trade routes—especially the camel caravan (i.e., all Ottoman) versus sea (i.e., Iranian/European collaboration) competition. This is the subject of some widely cited books of socioeconomic history—Niels Steensgaard, *The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974) and K.N. Chaudhuri, *The Trading World of Asia and the East India Company, 1660–1760* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978). See also the very interesting account of the Persian–Ottoman competition in Bruce Masters, *The Origins of Western Economic Dominance in the Middle East* (New York: New York University Press, 1988) and Turkish historian Halil İnalcik, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300–1600* (New York: Praeger, 1979).
47. By far, the best study of Safavid trade is Matthee’s *The Politics of Trade in Safavid Iran: Silk for Silver, 1600–1730* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). In addition, Stephen Frederic Dale presents a useful examination of the Indian component in his *Indian Merchants and Eurasian Trade, 1600–1750* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). For a translation of an Iranian account of trade with Siam, see John O’Kane, trans., *The Ship of Sulaiman* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).
48. Ann Lambton, *Landlord and Peasant in Persia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 108; and Willem Floor, in his magisterial *A Fiscal History of Iran in the Safavid and Qajar Periods, 1500–1925* (New York: Bibliotheca Persica Press, 1998), especially the summary of Abbas’s rule on pp. 222–226.

49. Sir John Chardin, *Travels in Persia, 1673–1677* (New York: Dover Publications, 1988), pp. 56–57.
50. One useful near-contemporary account is the French traveler Charles Picault, *Histoire des Révolutions de Perse pendant la durée du Dix-Huitième Siècle* (Tehran: Twenty-Fifth Shahrivar Printing House, 1976).
51. While uneventful, Karim Khan Zand's reign is addressed in great detail in John R. Perry, *Karim Khan Zand: A History of Iran, 1747–1779* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979).

3 QAJAR IRAN: DECLINE AND TUMULT, 1786–1921

1. Good general works on the Qajar period include Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly, and Charles Melville, eds., *The Cambridge History of Iran, Volume 7: From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), Ann Lambton, *Qajar Persia* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987), and Edmund Bosworth and Carole Hillenbrand, eds., *Qajar Iran: Political, Social, and Cultural Change* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1983).
2. For greater detail about Iran's economy, see Charles Issawi, *The Economic History of Iran, 1800–1914* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971); and Floor, *Agriculture in Qajar Iran* (Washington, DC: Mage Publishers, 2003), which—despite the title—is an excellent survey of Iranian social history during Qajar times.
3. Ann K.S. Lambton, *Landlord and Peasant in Persia* (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 145–147.
4. Laurence Kelly, *Diplomacy and Murder in Tehran* (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2002).
5. Denis Wright, *The Persians Amongst the English* (London: I.B. Tauris & Company, 1985), pp. 70–86.
6. Gaun Hambly, "Agha Muhammad Khan and the Qajars," in Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly, and Charles Melville, eds., *Cambridge History of Iran, Volume VII* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 169–170.
7. Nikki Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), p. 44.
8. Habib Levy, *Comprehensive History of the Jews of Iran*, Houshang Ebrami, ed., George W. Maschk, trans., pp. 427–431.
9. Abbas Amanat, *Pivot of the Universe* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), pp. 82–83.
10. R.M. Smith to Champain, Ghulhak, June 2, 1869, National Library of Scotland, ACC 4550/1/II.
11. Abbas Amanat explores the roots and development of the Babi movement in *Resurrection and Renewal: The Making of the Babi Movement in Iran, 1844–1850* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989). On Babism in the context of Qajar religious thought, see Mangol Bayat, *Mysticism and Dissent: Socioreligious Thought in Qajar Iran* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1982). See also Hamid Algar, *Religion and State in Iran 1785–1906: The Role of the Ulama in the Qajar Period* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969).
12. Abbas Amanat provides the best examination of Nasir al-Din Shah in *Pivot of the Universe*.

13. The shah also viewed the mountain passes around Herat as essential to Khurasan's defense, especially given Turkmen slave-raiding in the region. See FO 60/221.
14. *Historical Atlas of Iran*, Tehran: Tehran University Press, 1971.
15. Frederic John Goldsmid, *Eastern Persia: An Account of the Journeys of the Persian Boundary Commission, 1870–71–72* (London: Macmillan and Company, 1876).
16. For example, Amin al-Sultan, long a prime minister and close confidant of Nasir al-Din Shah, was the son of a Georgian butler. Mirza Malkam Khan was an Armenian convert to Islam who became one of the shah's most important diplomats.
17. For a more detailed study of Iranian financial practice and taxation, see Willem M. Floor, *A Fiscal History of Iran in the Safavid and Qajar Periods, 1500–1925* (New York: Bibliotheca Persica Press, 1998).
18. The reform movement under Nasir al-Din Shah and its impact are detailed in Shaul Bakhash, *Iran: Monarchy, Bureaucracy and Reform Under the Qajars: 1858–1896* (London: Ithaca Press, 1978).
19. Maryam Dorreh Ekhtiar, *The Dar al-Fanun: Educational Reform and Cultural Development in Qajar Iran*, Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Near Eastern Languages and Literatures, New York University, 1994.
20. Iraj Afshar. "Tiligraf dar Iran," *Savad va Biyaz* (Tehran, 1965); Iraj Afshar, "Badin tarikh-i iran dara-yi tiligraf shud!" *Ittila'at-i mahaneh*, III:10 (undated), pp. 17–20.
21. For example, Karpardaz-i Tabriz to Mushir al-Dawleh. Shavval, 1297, Telegram. No. 575, Carton 16, File 12/'a in *Guzidah-yi asnad-i siyasi iran va 'usmani: Dawrah-ye qajariyeh* (Tehran: Daftar-i mutala'at-i siyasi va bayn al-milali, 1991), Volume III, p. 758.
22. The Ilkhanids had tried to introduce paper currency to Iran in the late thirteenth century, with disastrous results. Iranian historical memory is long, and subsequent attempts to introduce paper currency were met with suspicion.
23. Joseph Rabino, "Banking in Persia: Its Basis, History, and Prospects," *Journal of the Institute of Bankers* 13 (1892), p. 39. The Imperial Bank of Persia concession for paper money was signed in 1889, but it took a year to print and ship the banknotes. The definitive examination of Iranian banking is Geoffrey Jones, *Banking and Empire in Iran: The History of the British Bank of the Middle East* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). For a sympathetic account of how the traditional monetary system worked, see Shireen Mahdavi, *For God, Mammon, and Country: A Nineteenth Century Persian Merchant Haj Muhammad Hassan Amin al Zarb (1834–1898)* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), which is based on the family records of one of the most important mint-masters of the period.
24. George Nathaniel Curzon, *Persia and the Persian Question*, Volume I [reprint] (London: Frank Cass and Company, Ltd., 1966), p. 480.
25. Amir Arsalan Afkhami, "Defending the Guarded Domain: Epidemics and the Emergences of International Sanitary Policy in Iran," *Comparative Studies of South Asia Africa and the Middle East*, 19: 1 (1999), pp. 122–134.
26. Nikki Keddie, *Qajar Iran and the Rise of Reza Khan* (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 1999), p. 36.
27. Nasir al-Din Shah (J.W. Redhouse, trans.), *The Diary of H.M. the Shah of Persia* (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 1995).
28. Afkhami, "Defending the Guarded Domain," p. 129.

29. Arnold T. Wilson, *The Persian Gulf* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928), p. 260.
30. Firuz Kazemzadeh provides the most detailed study of Russian and British relations with Iran in this period utilizing a multitude of Persian, Russian, and European sources in *Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864–1914: A Study in Imperialism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).
31. M.L. Tomara, *Ekonomicheskoe Polozhenie Persii* (St. Petersburg, 1895), pp. 8–17; and Issawi, *The Economic History of Iran, 1800–1914*, pp. 136 and 250.
32. It is difficult to gauge the importance of Afghani. The late University of London professor Elie Kedourie argued in *Afghani and ‘Abdub: An Essay on Religious Unbelief and Political Activism in Modern Islam* (London: Frank Cass & Company, 1966) that Afghani’s importance was magnified posthumously by various partisan figures and left-leaning scholars like Nikki Keddie, including in her later book *Sayyaid Jamal al-Din ‘Al-Afghani’: A Political Biography* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1972).
33. For an overview of the Tobacco Protests, see Nikki Keddie, *Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protests of 1891–1892* (Belfast: W. and G. Baird, Ltd., 1966).
34. Iranian historian Ahmad Kasravi, an early-twentieth-century historian (and friend of Edward Browne) whose work historians consider to be the definitive, seminal account, described how Iranian crowds passed telegrams from hand to hand. See his chronicle of events *Tarikh-i mashruteh-yi iran*, Vol. I, reprint (Tehran: Mu’assaseh-yi intisharat-i Amir Kabir, 1978).
35. A notable exception would be Daniel Headrick, whose 1981 book *Tools of Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press), explored the impact of technology on the timing of everything from the conquest of India to the penetration of Sub-Saharan Africa.
36. Anja Pistor-Hatam, “Progress and Civilization in 19th Century Japan: The Far Eastern State as a Model for Modernization,” *Iranian Studies*, 29 (1996), pp. 111–126.
37. Duff to Grey, Tehran, December 28, 1905, No. 98, FO 416/26.
38. For an overview of the practice, see Abbas Khalasi Shirazi, *Tarikhcheh-yi bast va bastinshini* (Tehran: Intisharat-i ilmi, 1987).
39. Iran’s Constitutional Revolution has been often studied. The definitive contemporary account was Edward G. Browne’s *The Persian Revolution*, reprint (Washington, DC: Mage Publishers, 1995). A famous Iranian account, available on the Internet in a heavily footnoted edition, is Ahmad Kasravi, *History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution*. More recent examinations include Janet Afary’s *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906–1911* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), and Mangal Bayat’s *Iran’s First Revolution: Shi’ism and the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–09* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). For a detailed look at the clerical attitudes, see Abdul-Hadi Hairi, *Shi’ism and Constitutionalism in Iran* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1977).
40. Edward G. Browne, *The Persian Revolution*, reprint (Washington: Mage Publishers, 1995), p. 127.
41. *Ruznameh-yi anjuman-i Tabriz*, reprint (Tehran: National Library of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1995).
42. Tsadik, “Legal Status of Religious Minorities: Imami Shi’i Law and Iran’s Constitutional Revolution,” *Islamic Law and Society*, 10:3 (2003), p. 406.
43. Isma’il Amirkhizi, *Qiyam-i Azarbayjan va Sattar Khan* (Tehran: Kitabfirusi Tihnan, 1977), pp. 49–52.

44. A number of telegrams sent by constituents to their Majlis representatives outlining complaints are included in Nizam al-Islam Kirmani, *Tarikh-i bidari iraniyan* (Tehran: Mu'assaseh-yi intisharat-i agah, 1983).
45. The best study of the Anglo-Russian rivalry in Iran remains Firuz Kazemzadeh's *Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864–1914*.
46. Wright, *The English Amongst the Persians*, p. 11.
47. Browne, *The Persian Revolution*, p. 249.
48. Marling to Grey, Tehran, July 4, 1908, Telegram. No. 40, FO 416/37.
49. Tsadik, "Legal Status of Religious Minorities," p. 406.
50. Morgan Shuster relates his experience in a passionate and bitter account, *The Strangling of Persia*, reprint (Washington, DC: Mage Publishers, 1996).
51. For a detailed treatment—based heavily but not exclusively on British sources—of Iran during World War I, see William J. Olson, *Anglo-Iranian Relations during World War I* (London: Frank Cass & Company, 1984).
52. Wright, *The English Amongst the Persians*, p. 174.
53. Amir Arsalan Afkhami, "Compromised Constitutions: The Iranian Experience with the 1918 Influenza Epidemic," *Bulletin of the History of Medicine*, 77(2003), pp. 367–392.
54. Nasrollah Saifpour Fatemi, *Diplomatic History of Persia, 1917–1923: Anglo-Russian Power Politics in Iran* (New York: Russell F. Moore Company, 1952) remains a classic on this period.
55. Michael Rubin, "Stumbling Through the 'Open Door': The U.S. in Persia and the Standard-Sinclair Oil Dispute, 1920–1925," *Iranian Studies*, 28:3–4 (1995), pp. 203–229.
56. For greater detail and a more sympathetic reading of the Gilan Republic, see Janet Afary, "The Contentious Historiography of the Gilan Republic in Iran: A Critical Exploration," *Iranian Studies*, 28:1–2 (1995), pp. 3–24. See also Cosroe Chaqueri, *The Soviet Socialist Republic of Iran, 1920–21* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995).
57. See Brenda Shaffer, *Borders and Brethren: Iran and the Challenge of Azerbaijani Identity* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2002), pp. 41–43. There is an inherent pro-ethnic Persian bias among many scholars of Iranian studies who ignore disputes such as those that developed over Azeri language rights. Schaffer is one of the few scholars who has consulted not only Persian-language sources, but Azeri sources as well, adding depth to her analysis.
58. Farideh Koochi-Kamali, *The Political Development of the Kurds in Iran* (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2003) provides a useful overview of the political history and sociology of the Kurds in modern Iran. Much of the subsequent material about the Simko rebellion and Mahabad Republic is drawn from his account.

4 A NEW ORDER, 1921–1953

1. The major work on Reza Shah's rise is Cyrus Ghani, *Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000).
2. For various English and Persian-language treatments of Reza Shah, see Donald Wilber, *Riza Shah Pahlavi: The Resurrection and Reconstruction of Iran, 1978–1944* (Hicksville, NY: Exposition Press, 1975); Ibrahim Safavi, ed., *Reza Shah Kabir dar Ayaneh-ye Hatarat* (Tehran: Ministry of Culture, 1354 [1975/1976] [reprinted Los Angeles, 1365/1986–1987]); and Nasr Nejami,

- Az Saïd Zeya ta Bazargan: Dulatha-ye Iran as Kudeta-ye 1299 ta Azar 1358* (Tehran: by the author, 1380 [2001/2002]), volume 1, pp. 1–481.
3. Michael P. Zirinsky, "Imperial Power and Dictatorship: Britain and the Rise of Reza Shah, 1921–1926," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 24 (1992), pp. 639–663.
 4. For an interesting and accessible firsthand account of Reza Shah's campaigns, see General Hassan Arfa, *Under Five Shabs* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1965).
 5. Arthur Millspaugh wrote extensively of his experience in Iran. See *The Financial and Economical Situation of Persia, 1926* (Boston: Pinkham Press, 1926); and *Americans in Persia* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1946).
 6. Michael J. Zirinsky, "Blood, Power, and Hypocrisy: The Murder of Robert Imbrie and American Relations with Pahlavi Iran, 1924," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 18 (1996), pp. 275–292.
 7. Ali Ansari, *Modern Iran Since 1921: The Pahlavis and After* (Essex, England: Longman, 2003), p. 25.
 8. Ansari, *Modern Iran*, p. 36.
 9. Nikki Keddie provides a useful overview of this period in *Qajar Iran and the Rise of Reza Khan* (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 1999), pp. 88–104. While she provides a wealth of detail, her analysis can sometimes be skewed by political bias—though an even more open political bias can be found in the more detailed account of 1926–1933 in Homa Katouzian, *The Political Economy of Modern Iran, 1926–1979* (New York: New York University Press, 1981), pp. 92–121. For a richer analysis, see Ansari, *Modern Iran*, and, on the economy, Julian Bharier, *Economic Development in Iran 1900–1970* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971).
 10. For by far the best account of education in twentieth-century Iran, see David Menashri, *Education and the Making of Modern Iran* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 91–162.
 11. For the most thorough coverage of Iranian health and sanitation, see Amir Arsalan Afkhami, *Iran in the Age of Epidemics: Nationalism and the Struggle for Public Health* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005).
 12. This paragraph draws on Patrick Clawson, "Knitting Iran Together: The Land Transport Revolution, 1920–1940," *Iranian Studies*, 26:3–4 (Summer/Fall 1993), pp. 236–250.
 13. For specific examples, see Willem Floor, *Industrialization in Iran 1900–1941* (University of Durham Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, Occasional Paper No. 23, 1984). See also Bharier, *Economic Development 1900–1970*, pp. 150–217.
 14. Bharier, *Economic Development 1900–1970*, pp. 102–130.
 15. Willem Floor, *Labour Unions, Law and Conditions in Iran (1900–1941)* (University of Durham Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies Occasional Paper No. 26, 1985). A useful comparison between Ataturk and Reza Shah is provided by Touraj Atabaki and Erik Zürcher, eds., *Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization under Ataturk and Reza Shah*, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004.
 16. Antoine Fleury, *La Politique allemande au Moyen-Orient, 1919–1939* (Geneva: Institut universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales, 1977), pp. 199–275.
 17. Three books that illustrate World War II Iran well are T.H. Vail Motter, *The Persian Consider and Aid to Russia* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1952), Joel Sayre's *Persian Gulf*

- Command: Some Marvels on the Road to Kazvin* (New York: Random House, 1945), which is an engaging account of the U.S. presence, and Richard Stewart's *Sunrise at Abadan: The British and Soviet Invasion of Iran, 1941* (New York: Praeger, 1988).
18. Iraj Pezeshkzad Dick Davis, trans., *My Uncle Napoleon*, reprint (Washington, DC: Mage Publishers, 1996).
 19. Decree of the CC CPSU Politburo to Mir Bagirov, CC Secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, on "Measures to Organize a Separatist Movement in Southern Azerbaijan and Other Provinces of Northern Iran," translation provided by the Cold War International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars at http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?fuseaction=topics.home&topic_id=1409.
 20. Koohi-Kamali, *Political Development of the Kurds* (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2003), p. 106.
 21. Koohi-Kamali, *Political Development of the Kurds*, p. 107.
 22. Louise Fawcett provides the definitive historical account of the Azerbaijan crisis in *Iran and the Cold War: The Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
 23. Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between the Revolutions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 218.
 24. While many studies of the period focus upon foreign policy and diplomacy, the most detailed discussion of internal politics during the period is Fakhreddin Azimi's *Iran: The Crisis of Democracy, 1941–1953* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1989).
 25. For a history of an overview of various Iranian vigilante groups, see Michael Rubin, *Into the Shadows: Radical Vigilantes in Khatami's Iran* (Washington: Washington Institute, 2001). For a sympathetic account of these groups, in the context of arguing that religious groups led the opposition to foreign influence in the first half of the twentieth century, see Musa Najafi, *Ta'amol-e Diyanat va Siyasat dar Iran* (Tehran: Moassat-e Motala'at-e Tarikh-e Moasser-e Iran, 1378 [1988/1989]).
 26. Daniel, *History of Iran* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001), p. 151.
 27. Amir Afkhami, "The Sick Men of Persia: The Importance of Illness as a Factor in the Interpretation of Modern Iranian Diplomatic History," *Iranian Studies*, 36: 3 (September 2003), p. 340.
 28. Kermit Roosevelt recounted his experience in Iran in *Countercoup: The Struggle for Control of Iran* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981). On June 16, 2000, the *New York Times* published on its website a .pdf file of a secret CIA report entitled, "Clandestine Service History, Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952-August 1953."
 29. Muhammad Musaddiq remains a well-discussed albeit polarizing figure in both Iranian domestic politics and in Iran's foreign relations. With regard to U.S.–Iranian relations during the Musaddiq period, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954*, Volume X (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989) reproduces key American diplomatic documents from the period. Mark Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne collect a number of scholarly essays exploring different aspects of Musaddiq and the coup in *Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004). They provide an excellent chronology of events. Ken Pollack provides important perspective, arguing correctly that despite the sympathy of many academics,

Musaddiq was no democrat, in his recent book *Persian Puzzle* (New York: Random House, 2004). There are also many excellent Persian accounts of the Musaddiq period. Musaddiq's memoirs have been translated by Homa Katouzian and S.H. Amin (London: Jebhe, 1988). For an example of fawning Iranian treatment of Musaddiq, see Gholamreza Najati, *Jinbish-i melli Shudan-i Sinat-i Naft-i Iran va Kudita-yeh 28-i Mordad 1332* (Los Angeles: Sehami Entasher, 1364 [1985/86]).

5 MODERNIZING IRAN, 1953–1978

1. Shahrough Akhavi, *Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy-State Relations in the Pahlavi Period* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1980), pp. 76–90, speculates the shah's aim was in part to secure clerical nonobjection Iran's entry into the Baghdad Pact later in 1955; if so, he was successful.
2. Ebtehaj's career is sympathetically portrayed in Frances Bostock and Geoffrey Jones, *Planning and Power in Iran: Ebtehaj and Economic Development under the Shah* (London: Cass, 1989).
3. Mark Gasriowski, *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 112.
4. Julian Bharier, *Economic Development in Iran 1900–1970* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 158 and 165. This, the basic reference for the period, is the source for most of this paragraph.
5. Bharier, *Economic Development 1900–1970*, p. 186. On the other hand, it is not clear how accurately government data captured the extensive traditional industrial activities, which are described in detail in Hans Wulff, *The Traditional Crafts of Persia: Their Development, Technology, and Influence on Eastern and Western Civilizations* (Cambridge, MA: The M.I.T. Press, 1966).
6. Bharier, *Economic Development 1900–1970*, p. 93. The agricultural output estimate is from p. 134.
7. Savzman-e Etella'at Va Amniyat-e Keshvar (Organization for Information and National Security).
8. Paraphrases of Arsanjani's words in 1962, as reported in Ali Ansari, *Modern Iran Since 1921: The Pahlavis and After* (London: Longman, 2003), p. 154. To understand how the shah and modernizing liberals saw the White Revolution—as a progressive force against feudal reaction—see Ali Ansari, “The Myth of the White Revolution: Mohammad Reza Shah, ‘Modernization,’ and the Consolidation of Power,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, 37: 3 (July 2001), pp. 1–24. It is easy to exaggerate the U.S. role in encouraging the reforms; the most extreme such case is James Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), pp. 131–182.
9. An account of the period is in Bagher Agheli, *Rouzshomar-e Tarikh-e Iran* (Tehran: Nashr Goftar, 1991), volume 2, which is a day-by-day description of events in Iran from 1953 to 1978 (volume 1 covers 1906–1953). An account of this period hostile to the shah is in Parvin Amini, “A Single-Party State in Iran, 1975–78: The Rastakhiz Party—The Final Attempt by the Shah to Consolidate his Political Base,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, 38:1 (January 2002), pp. 147–159 (the title of the article does not well describe its contents).
10. An excellent account of clerical politics in 1953–1965 is Akhavi, *Religion and Politics*, pp. 72–134.

11. Khomeini's activities during this period are chronicled in Sayyed Hamid Ruhani, *Bar Rasi va Tahliyati az Nehzat-e Imam Khomeini*, volume 1 (Tehran: Sherkat-e Afsat, n.d., which includes many documents from the time). See also Baqer Moin, *Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999), pp. 74–130.
12. Ervand Abrahamian, *Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 124. The fictitious Memoirs of Count Dogorouki claims to be the account by a Russian diplomat about his role in creating Baha'ism. The Khomeini quote is from the translation by the Iranian official broadcasting service, at <http://www.irib.ir/worldservice/imam/speech/13.htm>.
13. Ruhollah Khomeini, "The Granting of Capitulatory Rights to the United States," October 27, 1964, as translated in Hamid Algar, trans. and ed., *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini* (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981), pp. 181–182.
14. Gasiorowski, *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah*, p. 184.
15. This account, and the data (derived from BP), are based on Ronald Ferrier, "The Iranian Oil Industry," in Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly, and Charles Melville eds., *The Cambridge History of Iran, Volume 7: From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 639–701.
16. The full complexities of these deals, as well as the changes in the agreement with the consortium, are spelled out in Jahangir Amuzegar, *Iran: An Economic Profile* (Washington, DC: The Middle East Institute, 1977), pp. 55–59.
17. Keith McLachlan, *The Neglected Garden: The Politics and Ecology of Agriculture in Iran* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988), citing the 1948/1949 U.S.-commissioned Overseas Consultants, Inc. report. McLachlan's Chapter 5, pp. 64–104 is the basis for this account of Iranian agriculture pre-reform.
18. The description of the reform and its impact draws on McLachlan, *The Neglected Garden*, pp. 105–152, and Afsaneh Najmabadi, *Land Reform and Social Change in Iran* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1987), pp. 50–168. A more positive picture of the reform is presented in Ann Lambton, *The Persian Land Reform 1962–1966* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969). A more negative picture is presented in Eric Hooglund, *Land and Revolution in Iran, 1960–1980* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1982), which also has an excellent account of the structure of social relations in the countryside before and after reform. Much useful detail is provided in Baqr Momani, *Maseley-e Arzi va Jang-e Tabeqati dar Iran* (Tehran: Entesharat-e Payvand, 1359 [1980/1981]), despite all the Marxist language.
19. The internal workings of government economic policy in the 1960s is described in Alinaghi Alikhani (Gholam Reza Afkhani, ed.), *Siyasat va Siyasatgiri-ye Eqtesadi Dar Iran 1340–1350* (Ideology, Political and Process in Iran's Economic Development 1960–1970: An Interview with Alinaghi Alikhani) (Bethesda, MD: Foundation for Iranian Studies, 2001 [part of the interesting series from The Oral History Archives of the Foundation for Iranian Studies]).
20. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Current Economic Position and Prospects of Iran*, Report SA-23a (restricted), May 13, 1971, Vol. 1, p. 13.
21. International Labour Office, *Employment and Income Policies for Iran* (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1973), p. 31.
22. Robert Graham, *Iran: The Illusion of Power* (revised edition), (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), pp. 47–48, who also cites other examples.
23. This account of women's situation relies on Parvin Paidar, *Women and the Political Process in Twentieth-Century Iran* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

- 1995), pp. 147–167. She states on p. 157, “The Pahlavi legislation lagged far behind the progress that individual women made in social and economic fields.”
24. These data, from Iranian government household surveys, are cited in Mohamad Pesaran, “Economic Development and Revolutionary Upheavals in Iran,” in *Iran: A Revolution in Turmoil*, Afshar, ed. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), p. 30. The raw data are in Mohamad Pesaran, “Income Distribution in Iran,” in Jane Jacqz, ed., *Iran: Past, Present, and Future* (New York: Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, 1976), pp. 267–286.
 25. Jalal al-Ahmad (R. Campbell, trans.), *Occidentosis: A Plague from the West* (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1984).
 26. The best study of al-Ahmad’s relation to Third Worldist thought—specifically Fannon—is Amir Nikpey, *Pouvoir et religion en Iran contemporain* (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2001), pp. 86–92.
 27. Mehrzad Boroujerdi, *Iranian Intellectuals and the West: The Tormented Triumph of Nativism* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1996), p. 68.
 28. Negin Nabavi, *Intellectuals and the State in Iran: Politics, Discourse, and the Dilemma of Authenticity* (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2003), pp. 28–64.
 29. Boroujerdi, *Iranian Intellectuals and the West*, p. 132, as part of a chapter on academic nativism, pp. 131–155.
 30. Nikpey, *Pouvoir et religion*, pp. 92–97.
 31. The excesses of the shah’s self-glorification are tracked in Ansari, *Modern Iran*, pp. 169–175 and 187–191.
 32. Jacques Lowe et al., *Celebration at Persepolis* (Geneva: Creative Communications, n.d.), p. 46.
 33. For a general survey of Iran’s foreign policy after 1953 with particular emphasis on its relations with Middle Eastern countries, see Abdolreza Hoshang Mahdavi, *Siyasat-e Kharaji-ye Iran dar Duran-e Pahlavi 1300–1357 [1921/22–1978/79]* (Tehran: Nashr-e Alborz, 1374 [1995/96]), pp. 395–503 covers the period 1972/1973–1978/1979.
 34. Gasiorowski, *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah*, pp. 112–114, for data on U.S. military sales and a list of what was ordered.
 35. Quoted in Amin Saikal, “Iran’s Foreign Policy, 1921–79,” *Cambridge History of Iran*, Vol. 7, pp. 451 and 451–456 describe Iran’s national security policy during 1972–1978.
 36. The phrase is from the masterful study by Faisal bin Salman al-Saud, *Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf: Power Politics in Transition* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003), p. 129.
 37. This account of Iran’s oil industry in the late 1970s relies on Fereidun Fesharaki, “Iran’s Petroleum Policy: How Does the Oil Industry Function in Revolutionary Iran?” in Haleh Afshar, ed., *Iran: A Revolution in Turmoil*, pp. 99–117.
 38. This paragraph relies on the excellent account in Keith McLachlan, “Economic Development 1921–79,” in Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly, and Charles Melville, eds., *The Cambridge History of Iran, Volume 7*, pp. 627–637, and Robert Graham, *Iran: The Illusion of Power*, revised edition (London: Croom Helm, 1978), pp. 77–127.
 39. Najmabadi, *Land Reform and Social Change*, pp. 169–191. Grace Goodell, *The Elementary Structures of Political Life: Rural Development in Pahlavi Iran* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), is a fascinating account of how these corporations appeared to the residents.

40. Farhad Kazemi, *Poverty and Revolution in Iran: The Migrant Poor, Urban Marginality and Politics* (New York: New York University Press, 1980), p. 14. Kazemi presents the results of his surveys of migrants, discussing inter alia their economic situation and political involvement.
41. The best account of changes in nomadic life in the 1960s and 1970s is Lois Beck, *The Qashqa'i of Iran* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986) as well as her account of life with the Qashqa'i in 1970/1971, *Nomad: A Year in the Life of a Qashqa'i Tribesman in Iran* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). See also Richard Tapper, *Frontier Nomads of Iran: A Political and Social History of the Shahsevan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) and Jacob Black-Michaud's highly political anti-shah *Sheep and Land: The Economics of Power in a Tribal Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) about the Lurs. The best single book about nomadism in Iran—which shows its continuing importance (e.g., how the first census of nomads in 1987 found 1.2 million people) is Richard Tapper and Jon Thompson, eds., *The Nomadic Peoples of Iran* (London: Azimuth Editions, 2002), which has many stunning color photographs from the 1980s by Nasrollah Kasraian.
42. A detailed account of many of the ambitious plans of that era is from Amuzegar, *Iran: An Economic Profile*, pp. 68–127. A substantial number of the projects he describes as planned in 1976 for the near future were in fact not completed in the twentieth century, as the delays during the 1973–1978 boom gave way to the chaos of the revolution and then the exigencies of the war.
43. The irrationality of the overly rapid spending was well understood by analysts at the time; cf. *The Economist* survey of Iran in the August 28, 1976 edition, especially David Housego, “More Haste, Less Speed,” on p. 21.
44. The stabilization program introduced in 1997–1978 and its political impact are well described in McLachlan, “Economic Development 192–79,” pp. 637–638.
45. Cf. “Iran: Watch Out, if You're Rich,” *The Economist*, December 13, 1975, p. 54.
46. David Menashri, *Education and the Making of Modern Iran* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 191 and 216–219 (by comparison, 3,000 students were studying at foreign universities in 1956). University entrance problems are discussed on pp. 205–209.
47. The shah's January 29, 1974 interview with Peter Snow of ITV is quoted in Ansari, *Modern Iran*, p. 184.
48. Robert Graham, *Iran: The Illusion of Power*, pp. 159–165 as well as a listing pp. 255–258 of all known Pahlavi Foundation assets. This is the best source on the corruption of the late Pahlavi era.
49. Amini, “Single Party State,” pp. 139–140. A sympathetic account of the Rastakhiz Party is in Echo of Iran, *Iran Almanac 1976*, Tehran: Echo of Iran, pp. 105–108.
50. This account of the repression relies on Gasiorowski, *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah*, pp. 151–158.
51. Graham, *Illusion of Power*, p. 150 and pp. 144–151 describe SAVAK as generally incompetent. An interesting account of SAVAK's structure and activities is provided by a high-ranking intelligence official who defected to the Islamic Revolution, Hossein Ferdust, *Zohur va Sequt-e Saltanat Pahlavi: Jeld-e 1, Khatarat-e Arteshbod Sabeg Hossein Ferdust* (Tehran: Entesharat-e Etefaat, 1369 [1990/1991]), pp. 379–519.
52. Ervand Abrahamian, *Tortured Confessions: Prisons and Public Recantations in Modern Iran* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 119–120.

53. On the arms procurements, see also Barry Rubin, *Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 133–137 and 157–176. For a detailed account of how the corruption worked in the case of one important general, see Safa'addin Tabarra'ian, "Serab-e Yek General: Bazshenasi-ye Naqsh-e Arteshbod Tufanian dar Hakemiyat-e Pahlavi-ye Dovom" ("General Toufanian: A Review of his Part in Second Pahlavi's Rule"), *Tarikh-e Mo'aser-e Iran (Iranian Contemporary History)*, 1:3 (Fall 1997), pp. 119–182. This publication from the Institute for Iranian Contemporary Historical Studies (Moasseh-ye Motala'at-e Tarikh'e Mo'asser-e Iran) in Tehran, has many fine articles on Qajar and Pahlavi history.
54. Ann Schulz, *Buying Security: Iran Under the Monarchy* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), p. 135. John Stempl, *Inside the Iranian Revolution* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), p. 74, cites State Department data showing 53,941 Americans in Iran in 1978.
55. Schulz, *Buying Security*, p. 152; cf. p. 157 for the military budgets 1948–1977. For a contrasting sympathetic view, see Alvin Cottrell, "Iran's Armed Forces Under the Pahlavi Dynasty," in George Lenczowski, ed., *Iran Under the Pahlavis* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978).
56. International Monetary Fund, *Islamic Republic of Iran: Selected Issues*, IMF Country Report 04/308, September 2004. The quote is from p. 7.
57. For examples of exaggerations about imperial Iran's economic problems and understatement of its accomplishments, see Kenneth Pollack, *The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict between Iran and America* (New York: Random House, 2004), pp. 110–114, or James Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, pp. 168–169.

6 REVOLUTION AND WAR, 1978–1988

1. The official Iranian figure for war deaths is 218,867 (172,056 killed in battle; 15,959 killed in cities; and 30,852 died later because of injuries); see <http://www.sharghnewspaper.com/830630/societ.htm#s112668>. By contrast, Anthony Cordesman and Abraham Wagner, *The Lessons of Modern War, Volume II: The Iran-Iraq War* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), p. 3, cite Iran's war dead as between 450,000 and 730,000, using as their source an unclassified CIA estimate.
2. The poor fit between the Iranian revolution and most explanations of it is a theme developed at length in Charles Kurzman, *The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), in what is the single best book about the subject, based on an extraordinary wealth of source material. Page 121 is the source for the comparison between participation in the Iranian and other revolutions. The most famous example of a theorist of revolution presenting the Iranian revolution as an anomaly is Theda Skopcol, "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution," *Theory and Society*, vol. 11, pp. 265–283.
3. The phrase is from Ervand Abrahamian's *Iran Between Two Revolutions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 464. His analysis of Shariati continues on pp. 464–473 and 534 and in his essay "The Islamic Left: From Radicalism to Liberalism," in Stephanie Cronin, ed., *Reformers and Revolutionaries in Modern Iran: New Perspectives on the Iranian Left* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004), pp. 268–279. See also Ali Shariati, *Marxism and Other Western Fallacies*, Richard Campbell, trans. (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1980). The growth of Islamic associations

- among the intellectuals is analyzed in Said Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 96–98. The complex politics in 1965–1979 among the religious current, including the tensions between Shariati and the clergy, are analyzed in Shahrugh Akhavi, *Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy and State Relations in the Pahlavi Period* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1980), pp. 142–180.
4. Ervand Abrahamian, *The Iranian Mojahedin* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 22 has a particularly cogent analysis of how Khomeini changed traditional Shi'a language. The power of Khomeini's rhetoric is analyzed in Peter Chelkowski and Hamid Dabashi, *Staging a Revolution: The Art of Persuasion in the Islamic Republic of Iran* (New York: New York University Press, 1999), especially pp. 32–43.
 5. Kurzman, *The Unthinkable Revolution*, p. 39. Details of repression in mosques and of clerics follow on pp. 39–41.
 6. Michael Fischer, *Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 104–135, describes Qom at this time, including details about the 1975 events. He also analyzes on pp. 12–103 the decline of the traditional clerical schools, the madrassas, and on pp. 136–180 he describes the character of Shi'a religious observance in Iran of the mid-1970s. Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown*, describes what was happening at this time to the Iraqi Shi'ite centers.
 7. Cf. the sympathetic account of those political parties in Abrahamian, *Between Two Revolutions*, pp. 450–495. He analyzes the sorry record of the extreme left in "The Guerilla Movement in Iran, 1963–1977," *MERIP Reports*, No. 86 (March/April 1980), pp. 3–15, reprinted in Afshar, ed., *A Revolution in Turmoil* (Albany: State of New York, 1985). One important component of the Left opposition was among Iranian students abroad; on this, see the excellent Afshin Matin-Asgardi, *Iranian Student Opposition to the Shah* (Bethesda, MD: Mazda, 2001).
 8. Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown*, p. 98.
 9. This Khomeini quote is from Nikki Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), p. 193; the next is from Baqr Moin, *Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah* (London, I.B. Tauris), p. 155. Both these works describe Khomeini's political philosophy and activities.
 10. The most detailed chronological account of 1977–1985 is David Menashri, *Iran: A Decade of War and Revolution* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1990). Kurzman, *Unthinkable Revolution*, adds some important information from the wealth of material that became available after Menashri wrote. On the revolution against the backdrop of U.S. policy toward Iran under the shah, see Barry Rubin, *Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience in Iran* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980). Another good account of the unfolding of the revolution as seen by the U.S. embassy (in which he served at the time) is John Stempel, *Inside the Iranian Revolution* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981). These accounts are the basic sources used for this account.
 11. The details of the challenges and accomplishments are presented in Kurzman, *Unthinkable Revolution*, pp. 33–54.
 12. Postrevolution, modern liberals would mourn this missed opportunity. Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown*, p. 109, laments, "Why, instead of wringing concession after concession from a desperate Shah and a frightened military

elite, did [the reformers] choose to become subordinate allies of a man who treated them with haughty contempt and rejected their principles of national sovereignty and democracy? How can one account for the abject surrender to the clerical party of one after another of the feeble, middle-class based political factions: liberals, nationalists, and Stalinist communists alike?"

13. This is nicely analyzed by Jahangir Amuzegar, *The Dynamics of the Iranian Revolution: The Pahlavis' Triumph and Tragedy* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1991), p. 295 and more generally pp. 269–304.
14. Kurzman, *Unthinkable Revolution*, pp. 37, 46, 71, 75, 109, and 176–177. The imperial government's official death toll for September 8 is cited in Dilip Hiro, *Iran Under the Ayatollahs* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), pp. 77 and 378. Hiro claims that the actual death toll in demonstrations that week was 4,000—a good reflection of the accuracy of his account of developments during the revolution.
15. The account by the shah's French cancer specialist, Dr. Jean Bernard, in William Shawcross, *The Shah's Last Ride: The Fate of an Ally* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), pp. 230–238, suggests the shah may have not realized how serious his illness was.
16. See the accounts by National Security Council official Gary Sick, *All Fall Down* (New York: Penguin Books, 1985); Stempel, *Inside the Iranian Revolution* (especially good on the embassy's lack of understanding of the political scene); and advocates of a hard-line crackdown (who blame Carter administration's vacillation for the shah's fall) Michael Ledeen and William Lewis, *Debauch: The American Failure in Iran* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981).
17. Kurzman, *Unthinkable Revolution*, pp. 105–113, makes the alternative argument that more repression would not have worked. The quote from the shah in the next sentence is from Menashri, *War and Revolution*, p. 54.
18. Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown*, pp. 123–128. See also Hossein Ferdust, *Zohur va Sequt-e Saltanat Pahlavi: Jeld-e 1, Khatarat-e Arteshbod Sabeg Hossein Ferdust* (Tehran: Entesharat-e Etefaat, 1369 [1990/1991]), pp. 561–679.
19. The record of the Bazargan government is analyzed in Bakhash, *The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution* (New York: Basic Books, 1984), pp. 52–70. The Bazargan quote is from his October 1979 interview with Oriani Fallaci, cited in Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown*, p. 137.
20. This and other skillful manipulations of historical and religious symbols are analyzed—and powerfully illustrated with wonderful graphics—in Chelkowski and Dabashi, *Staging a Revolution*.
21. Cited in Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown*, p. 150. The debate about the constitution is described in detail in Bakhash, *The Reign of the Ayatollahs*, pp. 71–88.
22. For details on how the Majlis and Guardian Council were structured and functioned, with description of many of their actions in their first five years, see Sayyed Jelal Al-Din Madani, *Haquq-e Esasi-ye Jomhuri-ye Islami-ye Iran*, vol. 3 (*Qaveyeh Moqanani—Majlis-e Shuraye Islami*) and vol. 4 (*Qaveyeh Moqanani—Shuraye Negabban*) (Tehran: Entesharat-e Seda o Sima-ye Jomhuri-ye Islami-ye Iran, 1366 [1987/1988]).
23. Massoumeh Ebtekar (the hostage-taker's spokesperson), *Takeover in Tehran: The Inside Story of the 1979 U.S. Embassy Capture* (Vancouver, BC: Talonbooks, 2000), p. 76. Cf. pp. 49–53 on the fear of a U.S.-led coup, pp. 75–77 on the aim of the takeover being to forestall Bazargan's plans and p. 102 on how the seized embassy documents were selectively used to go after liberals.

24. Cited in Bakhash, *The Reign of the Ayatollahs*, p. 150. For how the hostage affair appeared in the eyes of the Carter White House, see Gary Sick, *All Fall Down*, pp. 205–402. Warren Christopher, ed., *American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), is an exhaustive and self-congratulatory treatment of U.S. policy about the embassy takeover by some of the key American actors involved, along with the text of the main documents and detailed information about the various negotiations.
25. Quoted in Bakhash, *The Reign of the Ayatollahs*, p. 97. The events of 1980 are discussed on pp. 97–124 and Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown*, pp. 141–145.
26. Cf. Paul Ryan, *The Iranian Rescue Mission: Why It Failed* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1985), and James Kyle with John Eidson, *The Guts to Try: The Untold Story of the Iran Hostage Rescue Mission by the On-Scene Desert Commander* (New York: Orion Books, 1990); as well as Richard Thornton and Alan Capps, “New Light on the Iran Hostage Rescue Mission,” *Marine Corps Gazette* (December 1991), pp. 90–95—which argues that the mission was called off for political reasons.
27. On the legal issues of the Algiers Accord (and its text), see Hossein Alikhani, *Sanctioning Iran: Anatomy of a Failed Policy* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000), pp. 90–153.
28. Quoted in Bakhash, *The Reign of the Ayatollahs*, p. 148; Bani-Sadr’s destruction is analyzed on pp. 125–165.
29. Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown*, p. 155. Bakhash, *The Reign of the Ayatollahs*, pp. 220–222, cites somewhat lower numbers.
30. Bahman Baktiari, *Parliamentary Politics in Revolutionary Iran: The Institutionalization of Factional Politics* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1996), p. 118; this is the basic source for the account of political infighting during this period, though Baktiari tends to downplay Khamene’i’s role.
31. Quoted in Baktiari, *Parliamentary Politics*, p. 142; the episode is examined on pp. 141–143.
32. For the full context of the Rushdie affair, see Daniel Pipes, *The Rushdie Affair: The Novel, the Ayatollah, and the West* (New York: Birch Lane Press, 1990).
33. Quoted in Baktiari, *Parliamentary Politics*, pp. 172–173.
34. Well documented in Chelkowski and Dabashi, *Staging a Revolution*; e.g., the revolutionary currency notes are on pp. 193–211 and the stamps are on pp. 212–219.
35. Cf. Reza Afshari, *Human Rights in Iran: The Abuse of Cultural Relativism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), including pp. 121–122 on Baha’is, p. 136 on Jews. On Baha’is, see also Firuz Kazemzadeh, “The Bahai’s in Iran: Twenty Years of Repression,” *Social Research*, 67: 2 (Summer 2000), pp. 547–558.
36. Ayatollah Khomeini on Tehran radio, September 8, 1979, as translated by FBIS, September 10, 1979 and reprinted in Barry and Judith Rubin, eds., *Anti-American Terrorism and the Middle East* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 35. On the divisions within the leadership on economics issues, see the interviews with six prominent economic decision-makers in Bahman Ahmadi Amoye-I, *Eqtasad-e Siyasi-ye Jomburi-ye Islami* (Tehran: Gam-e No, 1382 [2003/2004]), especially the interview with Nurbakhsh, pp. 59–139.
37. The economics of the early postrevolutionary period are analyzed in Bakhash, *The Reign of the Ayatollahs*, pp. 166–194. The most detailed account of the

- economics of 1980–1988 are in Jahangir Amuzegar, *Iran's Economy Under the Islamic Republic* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993). He provides a solid if dense analysis of the economic changes and detailed tables of economic statistics, which are the source for all the data cited here.
38. For examples of the corrupting and debilitating influence of the economic policies, see Patrick Clawson (under the pseudonym Wolfgang Lautenschlager), "The Effects of an Overvalued Exchange Rate on the Iranian Economy, 1979–1984," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 18: 1 (1986), pp. 31–52.
 39. A fascinating presentation of what the 1986 census data show about many social features, from mosques to housing, urban migration to education, with special emphasis on differences among the provinces, see Bernard Hourcade et al., *Atlas d'Iran* (Paris: Reclus—La Documentation Française, 1998).
 40. This account draws heavily on Parvin Paidar, *Women and the Political Process in Twentieth-Century Iran* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 265–355.
 41. The definitive study is Marie Ladier-Fouladi, *Population et Politique en Iran* (Paris: Institut National d'Etudes Démographiques, 2003); birth and fertility data are given in the table on pp. 27 and 30 respectively.
 42. This account of the war is heavily based on the definitive study by Cordesman and Wagner, *The Lesson of Modern War, Volume II: The Iran–Iraq War* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990), as well as the excellent short summary by Efraim Karsh, *The Iran–Iraq War, 1980–1988* (Botley, Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2002). The widely used account by Dilip Hiro, *The Longest War: The Iran–Iraq Military Conflict* (New York, Routledge, 1991), is inconsistent, mixing solid research and significant errors. Iraqi military performance during the war—though not the war as a whole—is analyzed in Kenneth Pollack, *Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), pp. 190–235.
 43. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/6294/A/9 from Tehran in Arabic for abroad 2010 GMT, December 8, 1979. Khomeini made similar comments; cf. "Iran Vows to Overthrow Iraqi Government," AP, April 9, 1980.
 44. Cordesman and Wagner, *Iran–Iraq War*, p. 146.
 45. Cf. Saskia Gieling, *Religion and War in Revolutionary Iran* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999).
 46. Chelkowski and Dabashi, *Staging a Revolution*, p. 289. The children's story is from pp. 135 to 136. See also John Hughes, "Children at War," *Christian Science Monitor*, October 28, 1987, p. 14.
 47. The details of attacks on shipping throughout the war are in Martin Navias and E.R. Hooton, *Tanker Wars: The Assault on Merchant Shipping During the Iran–Iraq Conflict, 1980–1988* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996).
 48. Cf. Kenneth Katzman, *The Warriors of Islam: Iran's Revolutionary Guard* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), especially p. 66.
 49. Revolutionary Guards Political Department of the General Command Post, War Studies and Research, *Battle of Faw (Valfajr Operations)*, 1988 (trans.—and misdated in several places—by Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), NES-94-076-S).
 50. Quoted in Baktiari, *Parliamentary Politics*, p. 132.
 51. John Tower, Edmund Muskie, and Brent Scowcroft, *The Tower Commission Report* (New York: Bantam Books and Times Books, 1987), p. 64.

52. Katzman, *Iran's Revolutionary Guard*, p. 69.
53. Cordesman and Wagner, *Iran-Iraq War*, p. 254. They provide a blow-by-blow account of the deterioration in Iranian zeal and improvement in Iraqi professionalism.
54. Quoted in Cordesman and Wagner, *Iran-Iraq War*, p. 299. On the reflagging crisis, see also Navias and Hooton, *Tanker Wars*, pp. 133–163.
55. Quoted in “Excerpts from Khomeini Speeches,” *The New York Times*, August 4, 1987, p. A11. The next quote is from Marie Colvin and Nicholas Beeston, “Iran Demands Revenge on Its ‘Day of Hatred,’” *The Times* (London), August 3, 1987.
56. See the description of flagging morale in Azar Nafisi, *Reading Lolita in Tehran: A Memoir in Books* (New York: Random House, 2003), pp. 202–212.
57. Cordesman and Wagner, *Iran-Iraq War*, pp. 382–383.
58. Quoted in Cordesman and Wagner, *Iran-Iraq War*, p. 397; on the Iranian collapse, cf. pp. 373–398. The casualty figures cited below are from p. 3, which cites as its source “an unclassified CIA working estimate.”
59. An account of this attack by a People’s Mojahedin participant is Masoud Banisadr, *Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel* (London: SAQI, 2004), pp. 273–290. Banisadr, who was an important People’s Mojahedin official from 1979 to 1996 when he left the group, provides the best account of what life inside the organization was like.
60. Ayatollah Montazeri, *Khaterat* (No place given: Entesharat-e Enqelob-e Islami, 2001), pp. 302–304, Documents 152–153 from 1988 speak about “the execution of several thousand prisoners in a few days.” (evidently that includes hundreds of pages of documents. See also the version at <http://gooya.com/new/memomontazeri.htm> and the translation of the passages about the People’s Mojahedin in their 1998 publication, *Crimes Against Humanity: Indict Iran’s Ruling Mullahs for Massacre of 30,000 Political Prisoners*).

7 THE SECOND ISLAMIC REPUBLIC, 1989–2005

1. Politics during the Third Majlis period are described in great detail in Bahman Baktiari, *Parliamentary Politics in Revolutionary Iran: The Institutionalization of Factional Politics* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1996), pp. 145–216. Additional information for this account has been drawn from Mehdi Moslem, *Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2002), pp. 78–195, and David Menashri, *Revolution at a Crossroads: Iran’s Domestic Politics and Regional Ambitions* (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1997), pp. 24–39, and Wilfried Buchta, *Who Rules Iran? The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic* (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2000).
2. Quoted in Moslem, *Factional Politics*, p. 80; pp. 70–81 is the best account of the constitution’s amendment.
3. David Menashri, *Post-Revolutionary Politics in Iran: Religion, Society, and Power* (London: Frank Cass, 2001), pp. 15–21.
4. Buchta, *Who Rules Iran?* pp. 52–55; Moslem, *Factional Politics*, pp. 87–89.
5. In an influential series of articles in 1994/1995, ex-industry minister Behzad Nabavi laid out the factional scene that had been solidifying since Khomeini’s death; see Moslem, *Factional Politics*, pp. 92–95. Buchta, *Who Rules Iran?*

- pp. 11–21, nicely spells out almost exactly the same scheme as Nabavi. A more detailed first-rate exposition of the factional scene, carrying the story through 1997, which is quite consistent with Nabavi is in Hejat Mortaji, *Jenabha-ye Siyasi dar Iran-e Emruz* (Tehran: Entesharat Naqsh va Negar, 1378 [1999/2000]).
6. The most important change was in television; cf. Ali Mohammadi, “Iran and Modern Media in the Age of Globalization,” in Ali Mohammadi, ed., *Iran Encountering Globalization: Problems and Prospects* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), pp. 24–46—which despite the title is almost entirely about television. On sociocultural policy in general, cf. Moslem, *Factional Politics*, pp. 166–175.
 7. Robin Wright, “Dateline Tehran: A Revolution Implodes,” *Foreign Policy*, 103 (Summer 1996), p. 167. The Azar Nafisi quote is from *Reading Lolita in Tehran* (New York: Random House, 2003), p. 275. She discusses this period on pp. 275–301; the description on pp. 299–301 of a concert in Tehran is particularly telling.
 8. Cf. Reza Afshari, *Human Rights in Iran: The Abuse of Cultural Relativism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), pp. 24–27 and 163–184, on the attempts to persuade the international community that the human rights situation had improved and the limited character of the changes, which had in fact occurred.
 9. The breadth and depth of economic (and cultural) reforms are emphasized in Patrick Clawson, *Iran’s Challenge to the West: How, When, and Why* (Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1993), pp. 10–15. For a hopeful description of the economic reforms, see Jahangir Amuzegar, *Iran’s Economy under the Islamic Republic* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993), pp. 310–325. The economic data through 1991/1992 cited here are from the detailed tables he provides; thereafter, data come from International Monetary Fund, *Islamic Republic of Iran: Recent Economic Development*, Report 98/27, April 1998 (available online at www.imf.org). A more critical view of the reforms is in Eliyahu Kanovsky, *Iran’s Economic Morass: Mismanagement and Decline under the Islamic Republic* (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1997). On the politics of the reforms, see Baktiari, *Parliamentary Politics*, pp. 193–199.
 10. Data from Amuzegar, *Iran’s Economy*, p. 380. Data on basic indicators are from Patrick Clawson, “Alternative Foreign Policy Views Among Iran’s Elite,” in Patrick Clawson, ed., *Iran’s Strategic Intentions and Capabilities* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1994), pp. 34–36.
 11. Quoted in Moslem, *Factional Politics*, p. 148.
 12. Baktiari, *Parliamentary Politics*, pp. 208–214 on the Kuwait crisis. On Iran–Saudi relations, see Henner Fürtig, *Iran’s Rivalry with Saudi Arabia between the Gulf Wars* (Reading, England: Ithaca Press, 2002), pp. 93–139.
 13. For an extremely detailed account of this and all other U.S. restrictions on economic interaction with Iran, see Hossein Alikhani, *Sanctioning Iran: Anatomy of a Failed Policy* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000).
 14. The hostage-release negotiations are described by the secretary general’s representative in the matter, Giandomenico Pico, in his book *Man without a Gun: One Diplomat’s Secret Struggle to Free the Hostages, Fight Terrorism, and End a War* (New York: Times Books, 1999). The Bush quote is from p. 104; Pico’s dramatic account about telling Rafsanjani that the Bush administration was reneging on its promise is on pp. 3–7.
 15. Anthony Cordesman, *Iran and Iraq: The Threat from the Northern Gulf* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 40.

16. Brenda Shaffer, *Partners in Need: The Strategic Relationship of Russia and Iran* (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2001), pp. 29–64 on the political relationship and pp. 65–81 on nuclear and arms cooperation. For an argument that Moscow's policy was dictated by commercial interests, see Eugene Rumer, *Dangerous Drift: Russia's Middle East Policy* (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), pp. 55–68.
17. Baktiari, *Parliamentary Politics*, p. 218. The techniques used to manipulate the election are described in Menashri, *Revolution at a Crossroads*, pp. 25–26. On the New Left, cf. Buchta, *Who Rules Iran?*, pp. 18–20.
18. Quoted in Moslem, *Factional Politics*, p. 216; cf. pp. 213–224 on cultural policy during 1992–1996. On Khamene'i's role in this process, cf. Buchta, *Who Rules Iran?*, p. 25.
19. Human Rights Watch, *Iran: Religious and Ethnic Minorities—Discrimination in Law and Practice* (September 1997), especially pp. 15–18 on Protestants and pp. 20–23 on Sunnis. On Protestants, see also Afshari, *Human Rights in Iran*, pp. 139–144, and the reports of the Colorado Springs–based Iranian Christians International.
20. Kanovksy, *Iran's Economic Morass*, p. 21. The exchange rate experience is discussed on pp. 58–59, and other examples of stalled or reversed reforms are on p. 37.
21. Suzanne Maloney, "Agents or Obstacles? Parastatal Foundations and Challenges for Iranian Development," in Parvin Alizadeh, ed., *The Economy of Iran: Dilemmas of an Islamic State* (London: I.B. Tauris and Co., 2000), pp. 145–176, and Buchta, *Who Rules Iran?*, pp. 73–77.
22. On the debt and economic crisis, see Menashri, *Revolution at a Crossroads*, pp. 46–48, and World Bank, *Iran—Medium Term Framework for Transition: Converting Oil Wealth to Development* (Washington: World Bank, 2003), pp. 4–8.
23. Cf. Kanovsky, *Iran's Economic Morass*, pp. 19–23.
24. Cf. Menashri, *Revolution at a Crossroads*, pp. 59–63.
25. A good summary of the harder stance of the Rafsanjani second term is Kenneth Pollack, *The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America* (New York: Random House, 2004), pp. 253–277.
26. Clawson, *Iran's Challenge to the West*, pp. 15–18; for the view that the 1991 conference was done to embarrass Rafsanjani, cf. Baktiari, *Parliamentary Politics*, pp. 214–216. On Iranian actions in the mid-1990s, see Anthony Cordesman and Ahmed Hashim, *Iran: Dilemmas of Dual Containment* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 147–164, and Michael Eisenstadt, *Iranian Military Power: Capabilities and Intentions* (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1997), pp. 65–78, which also is the source on Iranian assassinations of dissidents abroad.
27. Eisenstadt, *Iranian Military Power*, 48–62.
28. Pollack, *The Persian Puzzle*, pp. 278–302, summarizes this period in a chapter entitled "To the Brink." Indeed, it is striking to see Pollack, a Clinton appointee at the National Security Council official, arguing on p. 298, "It would have been much better for America's deterrent posture in general, and specifically with regard to Iran, if the U.S. government could have found a way to have mounted a major military retaliation against Iran for the Khobar Towers bombing."
29. *The Soref Symposium—Challenges to U.S. Interests in the Middle East: Obstacles and Opportunities* (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1993), pp. 4–6.

30. John Diamond, "Replacing Iran Regime Advocated by Gingrich," *Washington Post*, February 9, 1995.
31. Alikhani, *Sanctioning Iran*, pp. 182–203; on the passage of the D'Amato bill, cf. pp. 288–320.
32. Quoted in Menashri, *Post-Revolutionary Politics*, pp. 188–189; cf. pp. 182–202 on the issue of relations with the United States.
33. Voting data for 1997 and previous presidential elections are in Buchta, *Who Rules Iran?* pp. 34–37. The Khatami election campaign is described in detail in Ali Ansari, *Iran, Islam and Democracy: The Politics of Managing Change* (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000), pp. 94–109. For the argument that "American policy did contribute to Khatami's election," see Pollack, *Persian Puzzle*, pp. 293–294.
34. Haleh Esfandiari, "The Politics of the 'Women's Question' in the Islamic Republic," in *Iran at the Crossroads*, John Esposito and R.K. Ramazani, eds. (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 90.
35. On the Baha'is, see Nazila Ghanea, *Human Rights, the UN, and the Baha'is in Iran* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002), pp. 145–154, and Firuz Kazemzadeh, "The Baha'is in Iran: Twenty Years of Repression," *Social Research*, 67: 2 (Summer 2000), pp. 546–547. On the arrests of Jews, see Ariel Ahram, "Jewish 'Spies' on Trial: A Window on Human Rights and Minority Treatments in Iran," *Research Notes*, No. 7 from The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (also available at www.washingtoninstitute.org), August 1999. On the situation of Kurds and Azeris, see Maurice Copithorne, "Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Iran," UN Commission on Human Rights Report E/CN.4/2002/42, January 16, 2002, pp. 18–19 and 25–26.
36. On the serial killings, see Michael Rubin, *Into the Shadows: Radical Vigilantes in Khatami's Iran* (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2001), pp. 89–94; Buchta, *Who Rules Iran?* pp. 176–178 describes the continuing reprisals against reformers after the serial killings affair.
37. This account of 1997–1999 relies on Buchta, *Who Rules Iran?*, pp. 140–153 and, on the 1999 local elections, pp. 178–182; the Yahya quote below is from p. 143. Cf. also Menashri, *Post-Revolutionary Politics*, pp. 87–101, especially on Khatami's cabinet, and Ansari, *Iran, Islam, and Democracy*, pp. 158–168, especially on bazaar attitudes toward Karbaschi.
38. On the July 1999 protests, the definitive work is the collection of articles from every major political camp in Iran in Mahmud Ali Zekriayi, *Hejdehom-e Tir Mah 78 be Revayat-e Jenahba-ye Siyasi* (Tehran: Entesharat Kavir, 1378 [1999/2000]). The best accounts in English are: Buchta, *Who Rules Iran?*, pp. 187–192 (the Khatami quote is from p. 191); Menashri, *Post-Revolutionary Politics*, pp. 142–159; Rubin, *Radical Vigilantes*, pp. 64–75; and Ansari, *Iran, Islam, and Democracy*, pp. 186–196.
39. On Khatami's dedication to the Islamic Republic, see Moslem, *Factional Politics*, pp. 246–250, and Menashri, *Post-Revolutionary Politics*, p. 91.
40. International Monetary Fund, *Islamic Republic of Iran: Recent Economic Developments* (September 2001), p. 56. The economic data cited here come from that report; Islamic Republic of Iran: Staff Report for the 2003 Article IV Consultation, August, 2003; and Islamic Republic of Iran: 2004 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report and its statistical appendix. The evaluation of the Second Five Year Plan is from p. 51 of the 2001 report.

41. According to the IMF reports (p. 104 of the 2001 report and p. 23 of the 2004 report), the population aged 15–54 went from 30.85 million in 1996/1997 to 36.52 million in 2000/2001 while those employed went from 14.57 million to 16.44 million (and that was an upward revision from the 15.63 million jobs in 2000/2001 estimated in the IMF's 2003 report).
42. Khatami's August 1998 speech laying out his economic program is cited at length in Ansari, *Iran, Islam and Democracy*, pp. 171–173. An excellent summary of Khatami's economic performance during his first years is in Buchta, *Who Rules Iran?*, pp. 170–173.
43. IMF, *Recent Economic Developments*, p. 51. The World Bank's evaluation of the Plan, on p. 7 of *Converting Oil Wealth to Development*, is harsher.
44. Report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and expression Ambeyi Ligabo: Addendum, Mission to the Islamic Republic of Iran, UN Commission on Human Rights, January 12, 2004, Report E/CN.4/2004/62/Add.2, p. 3. The print media and journalists are discussed on pp. 12–15. More details about violations of press freedom, and also other forms of repression, can be found in the February 2004 U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2003: Iran, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27927.htm>.
45. On the serial killings Amadaldin Baqi, *Tragedi-yeh Demokrasi dar Iran: Bazikhoani-ye Qatela-ye Zanjiri* (Tehran: Nashrani, 1378 [1999/2000]). On the parallel prisons, see Human Rights Watch, *"Like the Dead in Their Coffins": Torture, Detention, and the Crushing of Dissent in Iran*, June 2004. See also Maurice Copithorne, "Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran," UN Commission on Human Rights Report E/CN.4/2001/39, January 16, 2001, especially pp. 7–8 on students and pp. 19–20 on the Berlin Conference aftermath; Rubin, *Radical Vigilantes*, pp. 96–107; and, on Ganji, Afshari, *Human Rights*, pp. 212–215.
46. Some of these stirring tracts that boldly criticize the Islamic Republic and defend Enlightenment values are: Mohsen Kadivar, *Beha-ye Azadi* ("The Price of Freedom," being his defense before the special clerical court) (Tehran: Nahshrani, 1378 [1999/2000]); Abdullah Nuri (Akbar Ganji, interviewer), *Naqdi Berayhe Tamam-e Fazul* (Tehran: Entesharat Tarh-e Now, 1378 [1999/2000]); and Akbar Ganji, *Kimiabi-ye Azadi* (The Chemistry of Freedom, being his defense before the court trying him for participating in the Berlin conference) (Tehran: Entesharat Tarh-e Now, 1380 [2001/2002]).
47. For an account of 2000–2002, see International Crisis Group, *Iran: The Struggle for the Revolution's Soul* (Brussels, August 2002) especially pp. 22–23. The account is extended into 2003 by the subsequent International Crisis Group report, *Iran: Discontent and Disarray*, October 2003. See also Ambeyi Ligabo, "Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of Freedom of Expression: Mission to the Islamic Republic of Iran," UN Commission on Human Rights, Report E/CN.4/2004/62/Add.2, January 12, 2004, including p. 14 on the Aghajari case; Human Rights watch, *"Like the Dead in Their Coffins": Torture, Detection, and the Crushing of Dissert in Iran*, June 7, 2004, <http://hrw.org/reports/2004/iran0604>; and U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2004: Iran*, February 28, 2005, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41721.htm>. For a contrasting generally optimistic outlook on Khatami's reelection and the prospects for reform, see Haleh Esfandiari

- and Andrea Bertone, eds., *An Assessment of the Iranian Presidential Elections* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, 2002).
48. The “twin bills” issue is discussed in A. William Samii, “Dissent in Iranian Elections: Reasons and Implications,” *Middle East Journal*, 58: 3 (Summer 2004), pp. 416–418.
 49. See Joe Klein, “Shadowland: Who’s Winning the Fight for Iran’s Future?” *The New Yorker*, 78: 1 (February 18 and 25, 2002), pp. 66–76, and Parisa Hafezi, “Iranian Students Heckle Khatami,” Reuters, December 6, 2004.
 50. Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance, *Arzesh-ha va Negaresh-bayeh Iranian* (Tehran: Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance, 1380 [2001/2002]) summarized (as is the 2002 poll) in Nazgoul Ashouri, “Polling in Iran: Surprising Questions,” *PolicyWatch*, No. 757 from The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 14, 2003, available at www.washingtoninstitute.org. The 2001 poll has a wealth of information about social attitudes and practices, e.g., asked “How Often do You Participate in the Friday Prayer?” 29% said rarely and 38% never, which is consistent with traditional Iranian ways of expressing religiosity.
 51. On the role of soccer in Iranian politics, see Shiva Balaghi, “Football and Film in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” *Middle East Report*, 229 (Winter 2003), pp. 54–56. On the June 2003 student protests, see Karl Vick, “Iran Faults U.S. for 5 Days of Protests; Demonstrations Landed by Bush as Positive,” *Washington Post*, June 16, 2003, PA16.
 52. This account draws on ICG, *From Discontent to Disarray*, pp. 4–10. See also Mohsen Sazegara, “Iran’s Road to Democracy,” <http://www.openDemocracy.net>, April 11, 2005.
 53. On the 2004 election turnout, see Samii, “Dissent in Iranian Elections,” pp. 418–422, and Siamak Namazi, “An Analysis of the Seventh Parliamentary Elections in Iran,” *Post-Khatami Iran*, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Middle East Program *Occasional Paper* (Summer 2004), pp. 4–6.
 54. Angus McDowall, “The Great March Backwards,” *MEED*, October 8–14, 2004, pp. 4–5; and Gareth Smyth, “Iran: Risky Business,” *The Banker*, December 1, 2004.
 55. Esfandiari, “The ‘Women’s Question’ in the Islamic Republic,” p. 91.
 56. See Richard Tapper, ed., *The New Iranian Cinema: Politics, Representation, and Identity* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002), especially the essay on the sad state of viewership: Hossein Ghazian, “The Crisis in the Iranian Film Industry and the Role of Government,” pp. 77–85. The information on counterfeiting was collected by Clawson in Iran, September 2004; cf. “Gamha-ye Mo’aleq-e Qachaqchi,” *Hamshahri*, 12 Azar 1378 (December 2, 2004), p. 22.
 57. See Maria Blake, “Targeting Tehran,” *Columbia Journalism Review*, 43: 4, November/December 2004 about 26 Persian-language satellite television stations run by expatriates, in addition to programming by various governments, including that of the United States.
 58. Presumably Khatami based his statement on the November 2003 census at <http://www.blogcensus.net/?page=lang>, which found 69,021 Persian blogs. A more recent estimate is 75,000 (N. Alavi, “Freedom in Farsi blogs,” *The Guardian*, December 20, 2004, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0.3858,5089675-111748,00.html>). However, there are no good data on blogs, in part because so many become inactive. See also Human Right Watch, “Iran: http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/04/04/iran/10415_txt.htm,” *Middle East Economic Digest*, “Special Report: Iran and IT,” June 25, 2004; Michael Theodolou,

- “Iran’s Hard-Liners Turn a Censorious Eye on Web Journalists,” *Christian Science Monitor* (October 28, 2004); Reporters Without Borders, “Internet under Surveillance 2004: Iran,” June 22, 2004, http://www.rsf.org/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=433; and Megan Stack, “Iran Attempts to Pull Plug on Web Dissidents,” *Los Angeles Times*, January 24, 2005.
59. Hassan Hakimian, “Population Dynamics in Post-Revolutionary Iran: A Re-Examination of the Evidence,” in Parvin Alizadeh, ed., *The Economy of Iran: The Dilemmas of an Islamic State*, London, I. B. Tauris, 2000, pp. 177–203, argues that only minor changes are needed. More persuasive and much more detailed is Marie Ladier-Fouladi, *Population et politique en Iran* (Paris: Institut National D’Etudes Démographiques, 2003), pp. 21–40 and, on marriage, pp. 41–70. The birth data quoted are from p. 27; the total fertility rate, p. 30; the contraceptive use, p. 37.
 60. World Bank, *Converting Oil Wealth to Development*, p. ii. The analysis here of Iran’s employment problem draws heavily on this 240-page report, especially the Executive Summary and pp. 13–25. The report presents a detailed proposal for reforming energy pricing inside Iran. It also provides much information on structural barriers to private sector development.
 61. Census data for women 10 and over, showing 59% were homemakers, 27% students, 8% working, and 6% unemployed or economically inactive but not students or homemakers. By contrast, 56% of men 10 and over were employed and 29% were students.
 62. There are no good data on overall emigration from Iran. Many reformist Iranian government officials have made exaggerated statements about emigration, sometimes misquoting a 1998 IMF report (“How Big is the Brain Drain,” IMF Report WP/98/102). Many references to such exaggerated statements can be found on the Internet and in Iranian newspapers, including to Science and Technology Minister Mostafa Moin’s 2001 statement, “some 220,000 leading academic elites and industrialists had left Iran for Western countries over the past one year.” Population and travel data clearly show was not true. Akbar Torbat, “The Brain Drain from Iran to the United States,” *Middle East Journal*, 56: 2 (Spring 2002), pp. 272–295, analyzes emigration to the United States by those with college education. For an account of educated young Iranians’ dreams about leaving the country, see Afshin Molavi, *Persian Pilgrimages: Journeys Across Iran* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2002), pp. 298–307.
 63. For the official estimate of drug use, see “Iran has 1.2 Million Hooked Drug Addicts: Official,” <http://www.payvand.com/news/03/jun/1161.html>; for other estimates, see Golnaz Esfandiari, “New Ways Considered For Tackling Growing Drug Use Among Young People in Iran,” <http://www.payvand.com/news/03/dec/1023.html>. On divorce, see Sussan Tahmasebi, “Moving Forward: Prospects for Iranian Youth in the Post-Reform Period,” in Wilson Center, *Post-Khatami Iran*, pp. 10–12. On prostitution, see Islamic Republic News Agency, “Iran Juggles with Taboos, Holds First Session of Prostitutes and Police,” <http://www.payvand.com/news/02/dec/1032.html>.

8 FOREIGN RELATIONS UNDER KHATAMI

1. The relationship between the activities discovered in Iran and the route to a nuclear bomb is summarized in “Steps to Developing a Nuclear Weapon: The

- Uranium Route,” *Arms Control Today*, 34: 7 (September 2004), pp. 34–35. How Iran’s civilian nuclear program puts it in a good position to develop a nuclear weapon is detailed in Victor Gilinsky, “Iran’s ‘Legal’ Paths to the Bomb,” in Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson, eds., *Checking Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2004), pp. 113–128, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pdffiles/00359.pdf>, pp. 23–38.
2. Chen Zak, *Iran’s Nuclear Policy and the IAEA* (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2002), pp. 36–54; Eisenstadt, “Living with a Nuclear Iran?” *Survival*, 41:3 (Autumn 1999), pp. 130–132, and Geoffrey Kemp, “Iran’s Nuclear Options,” in Geoffrey Kemp, ed., *Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Options* (Washington: The Nixon Center, 2001), pp. 14–15 analyze why such an approach is attractive. Zak argues that another attractive alternative would be running a clandestine weapons program in parallel to the legal peaceful program.
 3. International Crisis Group, *Dealing with Iran’s Nuclear Program*, http://www.icg.org//library/documents/middle_east___north_africa/18_deal_with_iran_nuclear_pgm.pdf, October 2003, pp. 4–5.
 4. The history of Iranian nuclear power activities under the shah and the Islamic Republic are detailed in Anthony Cordesman, *Iran’s Military Forces in Transition: Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), pp. 365–378.
 5. On the U.S. successes with European and developing countries, see Cordesman, *Iran’s Military Forces in Transition*; Eisenstadt, “Living with a Nuclear Iran?” pp. 140–141. On Russia’s role in the Iranian nuclear program, see Brenda Shaffer, *Partners in Need: The Strategic Relationship of Russia and Iran* (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2001), pp. 69–78; Eugene Rumer, *Dangerous Drift: Russia’s Middle East Policy* (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), pp. 15–26, 35–38, and 55–65; Robert J. Einhorn and Gary Samore, “Ending Russian Assistance to Iran’s Nuclear Bomb,” *Survival* 44: 2 (Summer 2002), pp. 51–70; and Anton Khlopkov, “Iran’s Nuclear Program in the Russia-U.S. Relations,” *Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest*, 8: 1 (Winter/Spring 2003), pp. 55–88.
 6. “Iran Failed to Comply with Nuclear NPT, IAEA Reports,” *Arms Control Today*, 33:6 (July/August 2003).
 7. The October 2003 statement and many other documents about Iran’s nuclear program are reprinted in *Iran’s Nuclear Programme: A Collection of Documents* (London: The Stationery Office, 2005). Paul Kerr, “With Deadline Looming, European Foreign Ministers Strike Deal to Restrict Iran’s Nuclear Program,” *Arms Control Today*, 33: 9 (November 2003), pp. 24–25. On the importance of the August letter and the Russian supporting actions, see *Considering the Options: U.S. Policy Towards Iran’s Nuclear Programs* (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2003), <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/speakers/iran100903.pdf>, pp. 9–21.
 8. While the IAEA reports and resolutions are available on its website (www.iaea.org), they are very dense. An excellent summary is Paul Kerr, “Global Nuclear Agency Rebukes Iran” and “IAEA Report Questions Iran’s Nuclear Programs,” *Arms Control Today*, 34:6 (July/August 2004), pp. 24–28; and Paul Kerr, “IAEA Cites Iran Progress, Raises Questions,” *Arms Control Today*, 34:10 (December 2004), pp. 28–29.

9. Cf. Paul Kerr, "Iran-EU Nuclear Negotiations Begin," *Arms Control Today*, 35:1 (January/February 2005), pp. 30–31; International Crisis Group, "Iran: Where Next on the Nuclear Standoff?" *Briefing* (November 24, 2004); Patrick Clawson, "Clarifying and Strengthening the Iran-European Nuclear Accord," *PolicyWatch* 920 from The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, November 22, 2004; and Patrick Clawson, "Carrots for Iran? Lessons from Libya," *PolicyWatch* 928 from The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, November 28, 2004.
10. Mastering the trigger problem was the key constraint India faced in building its nuclear weapon, and polonium was the easiest though not the best solution; cf. George Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 173 and 272. On the March 2005 U.S. action, see Steven Weisman, "Europe and U.S. Agree on Carrot-and-Stick Approach to Iran," *New York Times*, March 12, 2005, p. A8. On the May letter by the European foreign ministers, see Dafna Linzer, "European Officials Issue Iran a Warning," *Washington Post*, May 12, 2005, p. A1 and Alan Cowell, "Britain Backs Penalties if Iran Restarts Nuclear Program," *New York Times*, May 13, 2005, p. A3. On the Russia–Iran deal, see "Bush Gets Fuel Delayed in Russia Nuclear Deal," *Iran Times*, March 4, 2005, pp. 1–2. On Iran's less-than-full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, see Richard Bernstein, "Nuclear Agency Says Iran Has Blocked Investigation," *New York Times*, March 2, 2005, p. A5.
11. The Mohajerani and Rasfanjani comments, and the context in which they were made, are in respectively, Michael Eisenstadt, "Living with a Nuclear Iran?" p. 129; Eisenstadt, "Living with a Nuclear Iran?" p. 130; and Eisenstadt, "Delay, Deter and Contain, Roll-back: Toward a Strategy for Dealing with Iran's Nuclear Ambitions," in Geoffrey Kemp, ed., *Iran's Bomb: American and Iranian Perspectives* (Washington: The Nixon Center, 2004), p. 25.
12. For a critical evaluation emphasizing the problems in using nuclear weapons to meet Iran's threats or expand its influence, see Shahram Chubin, "Iran's Strategic Environment and Nuclear Weapons," in Kemp, *Iran's Nuclear Weapons Options*, pp. 17–33.
13. The nationalist factor is explored in Nasser Hadian, "Iran's Nuclear Program: Contexts and Debates," in Kemp, *Iran's Bomb*, pp. 51–67; the letters are described on p. 58. The earlier Iranian skepticism that the country would be able to carry out a successful scientific and technological nuclear program is detailed in Farideh Farhi, "To Have or Not to Have? Iran's Domestic Debate on Nuclear Options," in Kemp, *Iran's Nuclear Weapons Options*, pp. 35–53, especially pp. 44–45.
14. Farideh Farhi, "To Sign or Not to Sign? Iran's Evolving Debate on Nuclear Options," in Kemp, *Iran's Bomb*, pp. 32–50.
15. Michael Rubin, "Tapping the Hornet's Nest," *Haaretz*, December 10, 2004.
16. Michael Eisenstadt, "The Prospects for Nuclear 'Roll Back' in Iran," in Johannes Reissner and Eugene Whitlock, eds., *Iran and Its Neighbors: Diverging Views on a Strategic Region*, Volume II (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik), pp. 39–42, http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?id=786, explores what would have to happen for Iran to make such a decision.
17. On the impact of an Iranian proliferation breakthrough, see Carnegie Endowment, *Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004), p. 77; and Patrick

- Clawson, "The Potential for Iran to Provoke Further Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East," in Reissner and Whitlock, *Iran and Its Neighbors*, pp. 53–56.
18. Cordesman, *Iran's Military Forces in Transition*, pp. 284–328, including pp. 312–316 on Russian–Iranian cooperation and U.S. pressure about this matter. For a briefer survey, see Richard Speier, "Iranian Missiles and Payloads," in Kemp, *Iran's Nuclear Weapons Options*, pp. 55–62. The dangers to the United States from potential future Iranian missile developments was highlighted by Robert Walpole, the National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs in his September 1999 statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015," www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/archives/1999/walpole.htm. On the relation between the missile and nuclear programs, see Carla Anne Robbins, "As Evidence Grows of Iran's Program, U.S. Iran's Quandry," *Wall Street Journal*, March 18, 2005, pp. A1 and A10.
 19. Central Intelligence Agency, "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, January 1 through June 30, 2003," November 2004, http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/jan_jun2003.htm#iran. See Cordesman, *Iran's Military in Transition*, pp. 336–354 (see also pp. 355–361 on biological weapons); Gregory Giles, "The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons," in Peter Lavoy, Scott Sagan, and James Wirtz, eds., *Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 79–103. Joost Hiltermann, "Iran's Nuclear Posture and the Scars of War," *Middle East Report Online*, January 18, 2005, <http://www.merip.org/mero/meroo11805.html>, argues convincingly that Iran never used chemical weapons in the war with Iraq. Zak, *Iran's Nuclear Program and the IAEA*, pp. 38–39, discusses Iran's declaration under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
 20. U.S. Department of State. "Patterns of Global Terrorism-2003," April 29, 2004, <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/31644.htm>.
 21. Wolfgang Saxon, "Arab Leaders Call Iran Shift Historic," *New York Times*, February 14, 1979, p. A9; and James Markham, "Arafat, in Iran, Reports Khomeini Pledges Aid for Victory over Israel," *New York Times*, February 19, 1979, p. A1. For more on Iranian–Palestinian ties in the first months of the Islamic Revolution, see John Cooley, "Israel and the Arabs: Iran, the Palestinians and the Gulf," *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1979).
 22. Meir Hatina, *Islam and Salvation in Palestine* (Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies of Tel Aviv University, 2001), especially pp. 53–58 and 107–115.
 23. The considerable impact of the *Karine-A* on U.S. Middle East policy is detailed in Robert Satloff, "The Peace Process at Sea: The *Karine-A* Affair and the War on Terrorism," *The National Interest*, 67 (Spring 2002), pp. 5–16.
 24. Matthew Levitt, "Iranian State Sponsorship of Terror," Testimony to a joint hearing of subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia and the subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation of the House Committee on International Relations, February 16, 2005, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC07.php?CID=228>.
 25. For a thorough background and analysis of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' formation and early years, see Kenneth Katzman, *The Warriors of Islam: Iran's Revolutionary Guard* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993).

26. Martin Kramer provides an excellent overview of Hizbullah ideology and early years in *Hezbollah's Vision of the West* (Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1989).
27. Ze'ev Schiff, "How Iran planned the Buenos Aires Blast," *Ha'aretz*, March 18, 2003. For more on subsequent accusations of an Argentine cover-up of Iranian and Hizbullah complicity, see Martin Arostegui, "Argentina's cover-up for Iran," United Press International, March 22, 2004.
28. Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War* (New York: The Modern Library, 1998), pp. 319–320.
29. *9–11 Commission Report*, Washington: The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, July 24, 2004. See pp. 61, 169, and 240–241.
30. Human Rights Watch, *Afghanistan: Crisis of Impunity—The Role of Pakistan, Russia, and Iran in Fueling the Civil War*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (C), July 2001, especially pp. 35–40 about Iran's double role, simultaneously arming the Northern Alliance and undercutting it. See also Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004).
31. "Nearly 400 Al-Qaeda Members and Other Suspects in Iran." Agence France Presse, July 15, 2004.
32. Zalmay Khalilzad, "Address to the American Iranian Council," March 13, 2002, <http://www.payvand.com/news/02/mar/1079.html>.
33. "Secretary Rumsfeld Press Conference in Turkmenistan," Department of State *Washington File*, April 29, 2002, <http://usinfo.org/wf-archive/2002/020429/epf108.htm>; and Matt Kelley, "Iran Mixes Role in Afghanistan," AP, July 13, 2002; and "US Official Accused Iran of Harboring Al-Qaeda Militants," Agence France Press, August 2, 2002.
34. On Iran's role in Bahrain, see "Government Accuses Iran of Coup Plot," Middle East Economic Digest, June 14, 1996. On Iranian involvement in the intra-Kurdish civil war, see Kerim Yildiz, *The Kurds in Iraq* (Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 2005).
35. Ali Reza Nurizadeh, "Revolutionary Guards Accompanied Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution and Al-Da'wah Party Fighters Across the Border Into Iraq" *Ash-Sharq al-Amsat*, April 25, 2003. Reports on Iranian involvement in Iraq can be found in the weekly Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty "Iraq Report," www.rferl.org/iraq-report.
36. See Michael Rubin, "Bad Neighbor," *The New Republic*, April 26, 2004 and Michael Rubin, "Sadr Signs," *National Review Online*, April 6, 2004.
37. <http://www.clintonpresidentialcenter.org/legacy/052997-joint-press-conference-with-pm-blair.htm>. On Khatami's unexpected focus on foreign policy in his first year in office, see Patrick Clawson, "The Khatami Paradox," in Patrick Clawson et al., *Iran under Khatami: A Political, Economic, and Military Assessment* (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998), pp. 1–12. On the fingerprinting, which began in 1996, see Kenneth Katzman, *U.S.-Iranian Relations: An Analytic Compendium of U.S. Policies, Laws, and Regulations* (Washington: The Atlantic Council of the United States, 1999), pp. 206–207.
38. <http://www.asiasociety.org/speeches/albright.html>, also reprinted in Katzman, *U.S.-Iranian Relations: A Compendium*, p. 22; Kharazi's speech is at <http://www.asiasociety.org/speeches/kharrazi.html>.
39. On the meetings about Afghanistan, see Kenneth Pollack, *The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict between Iran and America* (New York: Random House, 2004), pp. 320–321 and 345–350.

40. Hossein Alikhani, *Sanctioning Iran: Anatomy of a Failed Policy* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000), pp. 288–396, especially pp. 320–333. ILSA remains on the law books, having been renewed in 2001 for a second five years, but its impact has been limited.
41. The details of changes in the sanctions in 1995–1999 are covered in Katzman, *U.S.-Iranian Relations: A Compendium*, pp. 37–39.
42. On the Iranian reaction, see Elaine Morton, *Thinking Beyond the Stalemate in U.S.-Iranian Relations, Volume II—Issues and Analysis* (Washington: The Atlantic Council of the United States, 2001), pp. 2–4.
43. The initial report was by Ali Nourizadeh in the Kuwaiti newspaper *Al-Watan*, summarized in “Clinton Asks Khatami to Hand Over Bombing Suspects,” *Mideast Mirror*, September 10, 1999. See also John Lancaster and Robert Suro, “Clinton Reaches Out to Iran for Information on ’96 Bombing,” *Washington Post*, September 29, 1999, p. A2, and Jane Perlez and James Risen, “Clinton Seeks an Opening to Iran, But Efforts Have Been Rebuffed,” *New York Times*, December 3, 1999, p. A1.
44. The Clinton administration position, as put by Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Martin Indyk, “We have information about the involvement of some Iranian officials in the Khobar attack,” but “we have not yet reached the conclusion that the Iranian government was involved or responsible for the attack.” Cf. Elsa Walsh, “Louis Freeh’s Last Case,” *The New Yorker*, May 14, 2001, http://newyorker.com/archive/content/?040419fr_archive02.
45. Pollack, *The Persian Puzzle*, pp. 341–342.
46. “Iran-US Contacts in Bonn Conference not a New Development: Kharazi,” Agence France Press, December 12, 2001; “Iran: Foreign Minister Welcomes Bonn Agreement Despite Its ‘Weak Points,’” Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), December 7, 2001; Stephen Collinson, “Powell Accuses Iran of ‘Meddling’ in Afghanistan,” Agence France Press, February 7, 2002.
47. George W. Bush, “The President’s State of the Union Address,” January 29, 2002. Available online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>.
48. Edith Lederer, “In New York, Iranian Minister Says Tehran is ‘Shocked and Disappointed’ at Bush Speech,” Associated Press (AP), February 2, 2002.
49. The first court case awarding damages against Iran was brought by the family of Alisa Flatow, which had been active in promoting the changes in law that allowed such suits to proceed; cf. Morton, *Issues and Analysis*, pp. 94–98.
50. On this poll and on why the context of polling in Iran suggests it may be accurate, see Nazgol Ashouri, “Polling in Iran: Surprising Questions,” *PolicyWatch* No. 757, May 14, 2003, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, which summarizes Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, *Arzesh-ha-ye va Negaresb-ha-ye Iranian: Yafteh-ha-ye Peymayesh dar 28 Ustan-e Keshvar* (Tehran: Vezarat-e Farhang va Ershad-e Islami, 1380 [2001/2002]).
51. Barbara Slavin, “Iran, U.S. Holding Talks in Geneva,” *USA Today*, May 11, 2003; and Barbara Slavin, “Mutual Terror Accusations Halt U.S.-Iran Talks,” *USA Today*, May 22, 2003, p. 10A.
52. Iran turned down a proposal that Elizabeth Dole, a Republican senator and former U.S. Red Cross president, visit Iran in association with the earthquake relief; cf. Mohsen Asgari and Gareth Smyth, “Iran Gives Views on Talks with US,” *Financial Times*, January 5, 2004, p. 6.

53. On Iranian interest in exploring a grand bargain, see Guy Dinmore, "US Split Over Iranian Bid to Renew Relations," *Financial Times*, March 17, 2004, p. 1, and "Washington Hardliners Wary of Engaging Iran," p. 9. For an extended discussion of whether a grand deal is either practical or desirable from a U.S. point of view, see The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, *Considering the Options*, pp. 63–76.
54. Geoffrey Kemp, *America and Iran: Road Maps and Realism* (Washington: The Nixon Center, 1998), p. 99. A similar judgment is made by a Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Task Force chaired by Zbigniew Brzezinski and Robert Gates (Suzanne Maloney, project director) in its 2004 report *Iran: Time for a New Approach*, p. 3.
55. Speaking in London in November 2003 at Whitehall (<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031119-1.html>). He expressed rather similar sentiments earlier that month in a speech at the National Endowment for Democracy.
56. For instance, Bush's welcoming June 2003 student protests in Iran with the words, "This is the beginning of people expressing themselves towards a free Iran, which I think is positive" (Karl Vick, "Iran Faults U.S. for 5 Days of Protests," *Washington Post*, June 16, 2003, p. A16).
57. A point rather caustically made by Danielle Pletka, "The Hawks and the Doves are Aflutter over U.S. Iran Policy," *Los Angeles Times*, July 23, 2004, <http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/opinion/la-oe-pletka23jul23,1,2821837.story>.
58. On EU–Iranian relations under Khatami, see Belén Martínez Carbonell, "EU Policy Towards Iran," in Reissner and Whitlock, *Iran and Its Neighbors*, pp. 17–23.
59. CFR Task Force, *Iran: Time for a New Approach*, pp. 4–6. Along similar lines, Pollack, *Persian Puzzle*, pp. 400–424, proposes holding open the prospect of a grand bargain, offering "a true carrot and stick approach," and preparing for containment.
60. One remarkable June 2003 poll posted on Rafsanjani's website found 45% of Iranians preferred "change in the political system, even with foreign intervention" rather than reform or continuation of present policies; cf. Patrick Clawson, "Reading the Popular Mood in Iran," Washington Institute *PolicyWatch* No. 770, July 7, 2003. On the letters about a possible U.S. intervention, see Patrick Clawson, "Iran: Demonstrations, Despair, and Danger," Washington Institute for Near East Policy *PolicyWatch* No. 766, June 11, 2003.
61. The problems with military action are analyzed in Michael Eisenstadt, "The Challenges of U.S. Preventive Military Action," in Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson, eds., *Checking Iran's Nuclear Ambitions* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2004), pp. 113–128. For a vigorous exchange about the pros and cons of military action, see The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, *Considering the Options*, pp. 22–34. On the flights by U.S. unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, see David Fulghum, "Hide and Seek," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, February 28, 2005, pp. 24–25.
62. Cf. Patrick Clawson, "How to Rein in Iran Without Bombing It," *Los Angeles Times*, October 15, 2004.
63. President Bush, "Statement by the President," July 12, 2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020712-9.html>. The Khalilzad quote is from Zalmay Khalilzad, "Where is Iran—and U.S.-Iran

- Policy—Headed?” address at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC07.php?CID=168>.
64. Pollack, *Persian Puzzle*, pp. 396–397.
 65. CFR Task Force, *Iran: Time for a New Approach*, pp. 11–12.
 66. In 2003, the most active proponent of such actions, Senator Sam Brownback (Republican, Kansas), introduced an Iran Democracy Act (see Sam Brownback, “The Future of Iran,” American Enterprise Institute, http://www.aei.org/news/newsID.17134/news_detail.asp, May 6, 2003), but what Congress actually passed was quite different. Typical of proposals for a more active U.S. role to promote democratic change in Iran is the Committee on the Present Danger’s Policy Paper, “Iran—A New Approach,” http://www.fightingterror.org/newsroom/CPD_Iran_policy_paper.pdf. For a vigorous debate about how much the U.S. government can do to promote democratic change in Iran, see The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, *Considering the Options*, pp. 49–62. For the impact of Bush statements on reformers in Iran, see Ray Takeyh, “Scared Straight?” Washington Institute *Policy Watch* No. 622, May 3, 2002; and Patrick Clawson, “Iran’s Reaction to New Bush Policy Shows America-Bashing is Out of Style,” Washington Institute *Policy Watch* No. 647, August 7, 2002.
 67. At congressional direction, the State Department in fiscal year 2004 funded about \$1 million in activities by nongovernment organizations promoting reform in Iran (specifically, a Yale University group documenting human rights abuses) and has authority to fund more for the same purpose in fiscal year 2005.
 68. Besides the Brownback speech cited earlier, see Committee on the Present Danger, “Iran—A New Approach,” December 2004, <http://www.fightingterror.org>; and “Democracy for Iran” (editorial), *Wall Street Journal*, December 8, 2004.

9 SUMMARY AND PROSPECTS

1. World Bank, *Iran—Medium Term Framework for Transition: Converting Oil Wealth to Development*, Washington: World Bank, 2003, p. 13.
2. “Still Failing, Still Defiant,” the *Economist’s* December 11, 2004, pp. 23–25 special report on Iran, describes the dramatic change in mood since mid-2004, in which the hardliners have tightened their grip on power.
3. International Crisis Group, “Iran: Where Next on the Nuclear Standoff?” *Briefing*, November 24, 2004, pp. 9–10; and Vali Nasr and Ali Gheissari, “Foxes in Iran’s Henhouse,” *New York Times*, December 13, 2004, p. A29.

INDEX

- Abadan, 84, 91, 106–7
Abadgaran, 161
Abbas I, 26–8
Abbas II, 28
Abbasid dynasty, 18, 21
Abbas Mirza, 32, 34
Abdi, Abbas, 154
Achaemenid (Persian) Empire, 5, 8,
13–14, 18, 22, 31, 53, 78
Afghanistan, 13, 19, 22–3, 27–8, 30,
159–60
and Iran, 148–9
and Qajar dynasty, 31, 34, 36–8
and Taliban, 119
and UN's "Six plus Two" contact
group, 151–5
Africa, 19, 26, 58, 67
Afshar, Nadir Khan, 29
Aghajari, Hashem, 132
Ahmadinejad, Mahmud, 135
Ahmad Khan, 29
Ahmad Shah, 47, 51, 53, 59
Albright, Madeleine, 151–2
Algiers Accord, 84, 97–8
Al-Jasim, Latif Nusseif, 106
al Qaeda, 148
Amini, Ali, 71–3
Amuzegar, Jamshid, 81
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, 63–4
Anglo-Persian Oil Company, 46, 49,
54–5
Anglo-Russian competition in Iran, 45–7
Ansar-i Hizbullah, 128, 130
anti-Semitism, 26, 63, 72, 130
Aqazadeh, Gholamreza, 123
Arabs, 2, 11, 106, 159
invasion of Iran, 16–21
in Iran, 7, 60, 61, 94
and Iraq, 60, 83
Arafat, Yassir, 146–7, 153
Araki, Ali, 117
Armenia, 2, 8, 10, 14, 27, 35, 56,
61, 121
Christians of, 47, 50, 60
and Iranian rule, 31–2, 34, 37
Ashura, 122
Asia, 1–3, 6–7, 11, 30
Central Asia, 14, 19–22, 27
European influence in, 32, 67, 159
Turkish migration into, 19–21
Assembly of Experts, 94, 117–18
Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal, 56
axis of evil, 1, 153
Azerbaijan, 2–3, 27, 60, 70, 121
and Iranian rule, 27, 31–2, 34,
37, 52
Jews in, 35
post-WWII crisis in, 61, 67
and Qara Qoyunlu confederation, 23
Tudeh and, 58–9
Azeris, 7, 30, 59–60

Babism, 8, 36
baby boom, 104, 136–7
Baghdad, 9, 14, 17–19, 21, 24, 26,
28, 39, 70, 105–7, 109–10, 113,
145, 150
Baha'ism, 3, 8, 99, 159
anti-Baha'ism, 70, 72
marginalization of, 38, 57, 72
Muslim persecution of, 35, 36, 47,
52, 101, 129
Bahrain, 10, 26–7, 104–5, 125,
134, 149
Bakhtiar, Shahpur, 48, 92–3, 121
Bakhtiyari, 45, 47–8, 56
Baluchi, 6–7, 60, 123
Bandar Abbas, 26

- Bani-Sadr, Abhol Hassan, 94, 96,
98–9, 107
- Bank Melli, *see* National Bank
- Barzani, Mulla Mustafa, 60–1, 84, 149
basij, 108, 111, 122, 161
- Basra, 16–18, 21, 29, 39, 109,
111–12, 150
- Bazargan, Mehdi, 62, 89, 93–6, 99
- Berlin, 38, 121, 126
- bonyads*, 102–3, 123
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 95
- Bush, George H.W., 120
- Bush, George W., 1
concerns about Iran's nuclear
program, 142–3
diplomacy with Iran, 152–3
and Iranian regime change, 156–7
- Bushehr, 9, 37, 39, 126, 139–43, 145
- Buyids, 19–20
- Byzantine Empire, 15–16
- Carter, Jimmy, 1, 158
diplomacy with Iran, 87, 90
and hostage crisis, 95–7
- Caspian Sea, 7, 78, 151
Iranian plantations along, 6, 27
separatist violence near, 49–50
- Caucasus, 37
and Iranian rule, 30
Russian involvement in, 32, 34, 48
- censorship, 57, 118, 130, 136
- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 65,
146; *see also* Roosevelt, Kermit
- Chenomyrdin, Viktor, 145
- China, 24, 145, 156–7
and Iranian nuclear program, 141
and trade routes, 14, 18, 25
- Christianity, 8, 15, 21, 24, 35
clerical rule, 93–7
- Clinton, Bill, 151
and “dual containment,” 125–6
and economic sanctions on Iran,
123–4, 152
- Cold War, 3, 64
Iran during, 58–61
Iranian relationship with U.S. during,
62, 157
- Combatant Clergy Association
(*Ruhaniyat*), 118
- Combatant Clerics Society
(*Ruhaniyun*), 118, 122
- Communism, 49, 58–9, 72, 83–4, 99,
135; *see also* Tudeh party
- Conoco, 124
- Constitutional Revolution, 42–5, 50,
51–2, 56, 88, 160
violence during, 46–7
- Cossacks, 46, 51
- cultural restriction, 119, 122
- al-Dawleh, Vusuq, 60
- de Cuellar, Javier Perez, 120
- demonstrations, 64, 91, 95–6, 104,
121, 124
- Developers, *see* *Abadgaran*
- Durrani dynasty, 29
- Ebtehaj, Abol Hassan, 69–70
- economic development, 67, 70, 79–84,
102–4, 134–5, 160
- education, 34, 38, 54, 56, 63, 70, 82,
104, 117, 119, 129, 137–8
- Egypt, 32, 67, 70, 110
- Eisenhower, Dwight, 65
- El-Baradei, Mohamed, 143
- elections, 71, 134–5
and clerical rule, 94–5
during Mussadiq's administration, 63
Guardian Council's influence on,
124–5
and Khatami, 127–9
and Majlis, 44, 100, 116, 132
manipulation of, 121–2
- ethnic minorities, 101, 129; *see also* Arabs;
Azeris; Kurds; tribes; Turkmen
- Europe, 3, 5, 11, 20, 51, 147, 151,
158–60
commercial interest in Iran, 40–2,
44–6, 64, 124
diplomacy with Iran, 119–21,
125–6
early contact with Iran, 23–9
imposition of borders, 37–8
influence on Middle East, 32, 34–5
Reza Shah and, 51, 53–6
- European Union, 139, 142–3, 155–6
- Expediency Council, 100
- Fao Peninsula, 34
- Fath Ali, 32, 34
- Fida'iyan-i Islam, 62–3
- Firdowsi, 19

- foreign debt, 110, 119, 123–4,
131, 134
- foreign trade, 55, 100, 102
- foundations, *see bonyads*
- France, 38, 110, 112, 121
concern over Iran's nuclear program,
141–2
Khomeini's exile in, 73, 92
- Freeh, Louis, 152
- Ganji, Akbar, 132
- Germany, 97, 121
concern over Iran's nuclear program,
141–2
and WWII, 55, 57, 65
- Ghorbanifar, Manouchehr, 111
- Gilan, 49, 52, 59, 61
- Gingrich, Newt, 126
- globalization, 49, 135–5
- Gore, Al, 145
- Great Britain, 6, 60, 62, 141–2
and Iranian Cossack Brigade, 51–2
rivalry with Russia, 40, 45–52, 57
- Guardian Council, 94, 100, 118, 122,
133–5
- Hague, 97
- Hajjarian, Sa'id, 132
- Hashemi, Mohammed, 115–16, 118,
122, 143, 146
- Herat, 6, 23–4, 34, 36–7, 60, 149
- Hizbullah, 120, 125, 147–8
- Hojjatiyyeh, 99
- Hoveyda, Amir Abbas, 78
- human rights, 90, 126, 133, 142,
156–7
- Hussein, Saddam, 150, 156
and Algiers Accord, 84
and Iran–Iraq War, 60, 104–5
rebuilding of Babylon, 11
U.S. overthrow of, 26
- India, 6, 39, 53
Arab invasion and, 16–20
British rule of, 37, 46
European influences, 25–7, 34
and Iranian empire, 14–15
- industrialization, 53, 55, 76, 79
- Indyk, Martin, 126
- International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), 139, 141–4
- International Monetary Fund (IMF),
71, 84–5, 103, 122
- internet, 136, 158
- Iran
birth of empires in, 11, 13–16
early European contact with, 25–9
geography, 6–7, 9
language, 5–6
religion, 7–8
- Iran Air Airbus, downing of, 113
- Iran–Contra affair, 110–11, 120,
126, 155
- Iran–Iraq War, 8, 13, 67, 97, 104–13,
135, 146
- Iran–Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), 151
- Iraq, 47, 48, 73, 123, 153–6, 160
invasion of Kuwait, 58, 120
and Iran–Iraq War, 96–7, 98, 100,
104–13, 146, 150
Iraqi Kurds, 60–1, 149
- Ironside, Edmund, 51
- Isfahan, 8–9, 18, 20, 22, 26–7, 29–30,
41, 133
- Islamic Republic, 7–8, 20, 133, 139, 146
calls for, 91, 94
First, 97–104
Second, 116–27
and terrorism, 148–51
- Islamic Republican Party, 96, 99
- Islamic Revolution, 7–8, 62, 80
background of, 87–90
effect on foreign relations, 104–13
effect on internal politics, 98–104
seizure of power, 90–3
- Islamists, 72, 91, 121, 128, 148
- Ismail Shah, 23–6, 34
- isolation, 10, 30, 35, 48, 50, 96,
112, 124
- Israel, 61, 70, 145–8, 150
Arab–Israeli conflict, 139, 142–3, 154
and Iran, 63, 110, 129, 156–7
and Iraq, 84
and terrorism, 125, 153
- Jangali movement, 49–50
- Jews, 44, 47, 148
and blood libel slander, 26, 35, 101
during Abbasid period, 18
Islamic oppression of, 8, 20, 24, 48,
57, 129
see also anti-Semitism

- Kadivar, Mohsen, 128
 Karbala, 17, 26, 34, 36, 41, 47, 107
Karine-A, 147, 153
 Karrubi, Mehdi, 117, 135
 Kashani, Abdul Qasim, 62–4
 Kasravi, Ahmad, 61–2
 Kennedy, John F., 71–2
 Khalilzad, Zalmay, 149, 157
 Khamene'i, Ali
 presidency of, 99–100
 and reform, 129–33
 and terrorism, 148, 150
 United States and, 125–7
 Khatami, Mohammad
 election of, 115, 122, 126, 161
 and nuclear program, 141
 Rafsanjani and, 118
 and reform, 127–38
 United States and, 151–6, 158
 Khayami, Ahmad, 76
 Khobar Towers, attack on, 125, 148, 152
 Khomeini, Ruhollah Musavi,
 115–17, 146–7
 exile of, 72–3
 and Iran–Iraq War, 105–8, 111–13
 and Islamic Republic, 98–102
 and Islamic Revolution, 87–96
 Khurasan, 6–7, 17, 19–21, 36, 59
 Khuzistan, 13–14, 27–8, 48, 52, 60, 64, 105–8
komitehs, 119
 Kuchek Khan, Mirza, 49
 Kurdistan, 6, 27–8, 39, 50, 52, 59–61, 77, 149
 Kurds, 5–7, 13, 27–8, 50, 59–61, 94, 101, 105, 123, 129, 149
 Kuwait, 58, 106, 109, 111, 120

 land reform, 71–2, 74–5, 88
 Lebanon, 7, 23, 110, 120, 146–8

 Mahabad, 50, 59–61
 Majlis, 1, 42–4, 46, 53, 57–8, 61, 64–5, 71–2, 78, 94–6, 98–100, 122–5, 127, 129–35, 146, 153
 creation of, 43–7
 Fifth (imperial), 52
 First (Islamic Republic), 100
 Fourth (Islamic Republic), 121
 Musaddiq and, 63–5
 Second (Islamic Republic), 100
 Third (Islamic Republic), 116–17, 121
 Manichaeism, 15
 Marxism, 72, 77, 83, 88, 91, 98–9
 Mashhad, 6, 9, 29, 35, 42–3, 57, 89
 McFarlane, Robert, 111, 147
 Mecca, 16, 53, 82, 112
 Middle East
 Arab invasion and, 16–17
 Baghdad Pact, 70
 European imposition of borders, 11, 37
 Iran's distinct place in, 3, 5–7, 11, 159–60
 Napoleon and, 32
 terrorism and, 147
 United States and, 154–6
 women's rights in, 119
 Millspough, Arthur, 52, 58
 Mirlawhi, Mujtaba, 62
 modernization, 53–5, 58–9, 66, 69–71, 77–8, 87–8
 industrial, 40–2
 modernization agenda, 69–71
 telegraph system, 38–9
 tumult due to, 71–3
 see also industrialization; land reform
 Mohajerani, 'Ata'ollah, 130, 143
 Mojahedin-e Khalq, *see* People's Mojahedin
 Mongol hordes, 2, 11, 21–3, 25, 35
 Montazeri, Hossein 'Ali, 101, 111, 113, 117, 128
 Moscow, 57, 61, 121, 140, 145
 Mughal, 20, 25, 27–9, 31
 Muhammad, Qazi, 60–1
 Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, 57–8, 61, 66, 77–8, 84
 al-Mulk, Mu'in, 40
 al-Mulk, Nizam, 16, 20
 Musavi, Mir Hossein, 95, 99–101, 116–17
 Musavi-Khoeniha, Mohammad, 95
 Musaddiq, Muhammad, 3, 52, 62–6, 69–70, 72, 95

- Najaf, 26, 36, 44, 47, 107, 150
- Nasir al-Din Shah, 16, 36–42, 45, 48, 58, 66–7, 84, 150
and modernization of Iran, 38–42
- Nateq-Nuri, ‘Ali Akbar, 127
- National Bank (*Bank Mellî*), 55, 70
- National Front, 63–5, 70, 89, 92
- National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), 64, 74, 79
- Nixon, Richard, 78, 83
- NPT, *see* Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
- nuclear power, Iranian development of, 80–1, 126, 139–40
- Nurbakhsh, Mohsen, 102
- Nuri, ‘Abdollah, 130
- oil
boom, 80–1, 138
income from, 55, 71, 73–4, 79–81, 85, 103–4, 109–10, 123
prices, 69, 79, 103, 119, 131, 134, 160
see also Anglo-Iranian Oil Company; Anglo-Persian Oil Company; National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC); Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
- Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 73–4, 79, 103, 161
- Ottoman Empire, 24, 37, 45, 56, 67, 105
and Safavid Empire, 24, 25
- Pahlavis, 51, 53, 82, 134
see also Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, Reza Khan
- Pakistan, 19, 69, 84, 148
and Baghdad Pact, 70
Iranian rule of, 13, 27, 37
nuclear weapons program, 144
- Palestine, 49, 57, 63
- Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 146
- Palestinian Islamic Jihad, 146–7
- Paris, 37–8, 40, 54, 78, 88, 93, 98
- parliament, *see* Majlis
- pasdaran*, *see* Revolutionary Guard
- Pax Mongolica*, 6, 21
- People’s Mojahedin, 91, 98–9, 113, 141, 149
- Persian Gulf, 6, 9, 14, 26–7, 55, 58, 67, 79, 81, 84, 110, 125, 144–5, 149
- Plans (economic)
Fifth Plan, 80–1
Five Year Plan (Islamic Republic), 119, 121
Fourth Plan, 76
Third Plan, 76
- polls, 133–4
- privatization, 123, 135
- Qajar dynasty
‘*Abdnama* and, 16
and Constitutional Revolution, 42–5
modernization during, 38–42
Muhammad Shah and, 31–6
see also Nasir al-Din Shah
- Qashqa’i, 48, 56
- Qavam, Ahmad, 60–2
- Qazian, Hossein Ali, 154
- Qom, 18, 89–90, 118, 125, 150
- Qoyunlu, 23–5
- Qur’an, 2, 8, 96, 128
- Rafsanjani, Ali Akbar Hashemi, 94, 128, 155
and economic policy, 102
and Iran–Iraq War, 110–11
and Majlis, 96, 99–100, 132
presidency of, 115–26, 137–8
in 2005 presidential election, 134–5
on weapon development, 143, 146
see also Islamic Republic: Second Raja’i, Mohammad-Ali, 96
- Razmara, ‘Ali, 63
- Reagan, Ronald, 110–11
and arms for hostages deal, 110, 147
see also Iran-Contra affair
- reform
hardliners’ opposition to, 131–5
international community’s encouragement of, 150–8
policy options regarding, 154–8
setbacks to, 127–31
- Régie concession, 41
- regional stability, 79, 150, 156
- Reuter concession, 40–1

- revolution, *see* Constitutional Revolution; Islamic Revolution
 Revolutionary Council, 94–5
 Revolutionary Guard (*pasdaran*), 98, 147, 161
 and enforcement of laws, 117, 124, 129, 135
 international involvement of, 147, 149–50
 Iran–Iraq War and, 107–9, 111–13
 and Islamic Revolution, 93, 95, 98
 Reza Khan
 and modernization of Iran, 53–7
 rise to power, 51–2
 and separatist movements, 50
 Roosevelt, Kermit, 65
Ruhaniyat, *see* Combatant Clergy Association
Ruhaniyun, *see* Combatant Clerics Society
 Rumsfeld, Donald, 149–50
 Russia, 9–10, 27, 121, 151
 Baha'ism and, 72
 expansion into Iranian lands, 34–6
 influence on Iran, 31–2, 42–3, 44
 Revolution, 49
 rivalry with Great Britain, 40, 45–52, 57
 support for Iranian nuclear program, 139–41, 143, 145

 al-Sadr, Muqtada, 150
 Safavid dynasty, 7, 30, 34, 87, 147, 159
 as Iran's Golden Age, 23–5
 Samanid dynasty, 19
 sanctions, 123, 126, 145, 151–2, 156
 Sassanians, 14–16, 18–19, 26, 53
Satanic Verses (Rushdie), 101
 Saudi Arabia, 2, 15, 110, 157, 160
 Iran and, 120
 OPEC and, 73, 79
 September 11, 2001 attacks and, 148
 Shi'a riots and, 104, 105–6
 terrorism and, 152, 154
 SAVAK, 71, 83, 90–1
 Schwarzkopf, H. Norman, 58
 Seljuqs, 16, 20, 24, 30
 separatism, 14, 19, 22, 25, 49–50, 59, 61–2, 67
 Servants of Reconstruction (*Kargozaran-e Sazandegi*), 124–5

 Shahnameh, 13, 19–20
 Shariati, Ali, 88
 Shari'at-madari, Mohammad Kazen, 99
 Shatt al-Arab, 84
 Shi'a, 7–8, 26, 44, 99, 150
 Hidden Imam, 36, 89
 Iran–Iraq War and, 104–8
 Mahdi, 89
 power in Iran, 24, 29, 41
 Sunnis and, 20
 Shiraz, 8–9, 13, 20, 29, 35–6, 41–2
 Six Plus Two group, 151–3
 social restrictions, 102, 119, 122, 128, 137
 Soroush, 'Abdul-Karim, 119, 128
 South Persia Rifles, 48, 52
 Soviet Union, 112, 131, 157
 expansion of, 62
 Iran and, 64, 67, 70, 83–4, 121
 WWII and, 57–61
 strikes, 29, 63, 71, 92, 106, 112, 157
 Sufism, 21, 23, 35, 53
 Sunnis, 7, 59, 123
 Safavid empire and, 23–4
 Seljuqs and, 20
 Shi'a and, 17, 28–9
 Supreme Leader, 120, 133, 135, 150
 see also Khamene'i, Khomeini

 Tabriz, 5, 9, 23–6, 32, 34, 36, 39, 41–4, 47, 61, 90
 Taheri, Jalaluddin, 133
 Taliban, 133, 156
 U.S. military action against, 148–9, 152
 women's rights and, 119
 Tehran, 6, 8, 9, 32, 77, 96, 112, 134
 development of, 38, 53, 54
 unrest in, 40, 43, 46, 47, 91, 93, 130
 Tehran Accord, 74
 telegraph, 9, 35, 37–9, 41–4, 46–8, 54, 66, 73, 84
 terrorism, 142, 156
 Iranian ties to, 120, 125–6, 146–50, 153–4
 Khobar Towers attack, 148, 152
 September 11, 2001 attacks, 148, 153
 Third Worldism
 Bani-Sadr and, 96–8

- Islam and, 88–9
 as reaction to Western influence, 77–8
- Timur the Lame (Tamerlane), 11,
 22–4, 29
- tobacco, 41–2, 44, 46, 50–1, 66, 72,
 88, 158
- Tower Commission, 110
- Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
 Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 139,
 140–2, 144
- tribes, 17, 29, 80
 centralized governance of, 9, 13, 25,
 37, 52, 53
 Germany's arming of, 48
 rebellions by, 45, 47, 50, 56, 58, 60
 Samanids and, 19
 tribal confederations, 23
see also Bakhtiyari; Baluchi; Qashqa'i;
 Qoyunlu
- Truman, Harry, 60, 64
- Tudeh party, 58–61, 63–5, 69, 89, 99
- Turkey, 1, 14, 27, 70, 73, 110
 influence on Iranian reforms, 56
 World War II and, 57
- Turkmen, 7, 31, 34, 61, 94
- Twelver Shi'ism, 23
- Umayyad, 17–18, 47, 159
- unemployment, 62, 131, 137–8
- United Arab Emirates, 79, 84, 125
- United Nations (UN), 120, 156
 Afghanistan and, 149, 151–2
 concern for human rights and, 132
 Non-Proliferation Treaty and, 142–3
 territory disputes in Middle East and,
 10, 60
 U.S. hostage crisis and, 96
 United States, 60, 79, 84, 148,
 156–7, 160
 concern over Iran's nuclear program,
 140–2, 144–6
 diplomacy with Iran, 124–6, 139,
 150–4
 hostility toward, 1–2, 64, 66,
 72–4, 88, 100, 119–20,
 129, 149
 as Iranian ally, 49, 62, 64, 69–71
 Iranian view of, 134, 136
 and Iran–Iraq War, 110–13
 and Islamic Revolution, 87, 95–7
U.S.S. Bridgeton incident, 112
- Vance, Cyrus, 97
- vigilantes, 99, 119, 123, 128, 130,
 132–3
vilayat-i faqih, 89
- Waldheim, Kurt, 96
- weapons, development of, 139–46
 chemical, 109, 112, 146
 missile, 139, 144–7
 nuclear, international concern over,
 139–46, 154, 156–7, 161
 weapons of mass destruction, 139
- White Revolution, 69, 73–9, 80, 161
- World Bank, 76, 122, 137–8, 160
- World War I, 47–50, 56
- World War II, 56, 57–8, 65, 67,
 76, 137
 international relations during,
 62–3, 65
 post-war period, 87–8
- Yazd, 8, 39
- Yazid, 17, 47
- Yeltsin, Boris, 126
- Zahedi, Fazlullah, 65, 69–70
- Zill al-Sultan, 45
- Zoroastrianism, 2, 8, 18, 47, 57
 decline of, 17
 revival of, 14–15