Afterword:
The Complex Imbrication of Aesthetics in the Multidimensional Process of Development

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> The founding act of human civilisation can be described as the conscious creation of distance between itself and the external world; when this space in-between became the substrate of artistic form-giving, the conditions were fulfilled for this consciousness of distance to be stabilized as a permanent social function—Aby Warburg[1]

Introduction

Considering the range of serious economic, political, social and ecological problems and challenges facing humanity today as well as the concomitant problematization of the very concept of development itself, John Clammer and Ananta Kumar Giri's dedication of an anthology to the theme of the relation of aesthetics to development at this particular juncture is undoubtedly timely and most welcome. By promoting reflection on this theme, they are clearing the way for conceptualizing, understanding and dealing with an issue that is destined to loom ever larger in the next decade, especially on the level of development practice. What the reflection stimulated in this way brings theoretically to the fore, and importantly so, is the basic problem of continuity and discontinuity, of development as a continuous temporal process and aesthetics as one of the culturally available ways in which humans introduce structure in order to slow it down and give form, at least for the time being, to the

challenges and possibilities thrown up by the relentless forward thrust of the arrow of time. The problem of development and aesthetics thus appears as being equivalent to the problem of a continuous time series and the imposition of a discontinuous structure on it in order to make it conceivable and manageable. Besides the aesthetic as a mode through which humans relate experientially and imaginatively to their world and make it manageable, however, culture of course also embraces objective and normative structures with which it is in relations of exchange and which need to be taken into account for development as a multidimensional process to be adequately grasped. It is the principle task of these retrospective reflections in the form of an afterword to this anthology to extrapolate this imbrication of aesthetics in development from the chapters and to make it explicit.

Simultaneously, the editors and contributors to this volume are effectively also rekindling attention to a more substantive problem that has been articulated first in the late eighteenth century in criticism of the emergence of modern society but has remained a part of the unattended dark undercurrent of modernity. Bringing it up-to-date with late twentieth- and early twenty-first-century conditions is a necessary and highly commendable undertaking, and the editors and contributors have gone a significant distance towards the realization of their aim of putting the question of the role of aesthetics in development on the agenda. An investigation of some of the key publications from the late eighteenth century suggests, nevertheless, that however necessary and commendable such an undertaking may be, it is not entirely without its risks. The root of these risks is to be found in a certain tendency of the philosophical tradition to treat the aesthetic in an undifferentiated manner as encompassing beauty, truth and the good at one and the same time. Here we come across the major challenge confronting an anthology of this kind. A careful reading of the chapters demands, therefore, that the deserved appreciation of the collection's achievements should be accompanied by awareness that caution needs to be exercised and that in places some refinement or more careful statement might be possible.

Of central interest in this regard is a conceptual problem adverted to above that stems from ancient Greek philosophy and is conspicuous in the eighteenth-century contributions of Karl Philipp Moritz and especially Friedrich Schiller, both critics of the nascent capitalist-industrial society. Moritz (1786, 1788), who influenced German Romanticism, not only wrote on the potential formative force of the imitation of beauty in

the creation and organization of society but simultaneously also censured the dominant idea of the useful or utility which he saw as leading to the denuding of nature and the lamentable displacement of the beautiful. In his famous book, *Über die Ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen* (1965, 1983), Schiller adumbrated the critique of the adverse consequences of the principle of purposive-rationality for the individual and the organization of social life and ascribed to art the task of re-establishing the lost totality of humanity. The aesthetic, actualized by art, for him was an autonomous sphere through which, on the one hand, the sensuous human being is led to form and thought and, on the other hand, the spiritual human being is transported back to the material world of the senses. In portraying the aesthetic as the only possible sphere or medium in which this could be achieved, however, he committed the error of conflation. In his attempt to correct Kant's (1972) formalistic notion of the aesthetic, as he saw it, by elaborating on aesthetic feeling in particular under the influence of the Earl of Shaftesbury (1709), he depicted aesthetic appearance, art and taste as elevating and ennobling forces leading to fully rounded humanity, including even humanity in a moral sense.[2] Despite expressly proceeding from Kantian premises which include a considered differentiation of the theoretical, moral and aesthetic spheres, Schiller inflated the aesthetic to such a degree that it cannibalized the moral. This is evident from his characteristic insistence that aesthetic feeling and the cultivation of taste are necessary conditions for the acquisition of individual morality-based ethics and the organization of a just society. In the end, this conflation misled him to the objectionable elitist conclusion of 'the aesthetic state' (*ästhetische Staat*)— in the sense of an exclusive cultivated society achievable only 'in some few select circles' (*in einigen wenigen auserlesenen Zirkeln*) (Schiller 1965: 125, 128)—as the apotheosis of aesthetic education and ennoblement.

It is, in particular, the sensitivity for any tendency towards this philosophically induced conceptual error and its unacceptable implications that should be kept alive in dealing with the aesthetic, all the more so in the current period where the interest in this problematic is obviously growing—and that in an atmosphere comparable in certain respects to the late eighteenth-century idealistic romantic reaction against the emergence of modern society. Today, fortunately, we have the advantage of disposing over conceptual tools made available by philosophical and subsequent social-theoretical developments which are necessary for this sensitivity to be articulated analytically and critically. These conceptual tools are relevant to the key concepts of this anthology.

Brief Overview of the Texts

The introduction by John Clammer and Ananta Kumar Giri and the first part of the volume containing the chapters of Giri, Marcus Bussey and Jens Zickgraf are theoretically important in so far as they are dedicated to putting forward the issues raised by the theme and reflecting on and teasing out some aspects of the key concepts of development and aesthetics. In their introduction, Clammer and Giri speak boldly of 'the aesthetics of development' on the basis of their acceptance of the fact that the long-dominant concept of development has been fatally problematized. Having succumbed to the ideal of univocity, it calls for conceptual re-articulation capable of respecting its multidimensional connotations. Over and above the traditional concern with socio-economic-political development and even the more recent broaching of the ethics of development, this entails the major task of restoring the aesthetic dimension to the process of development.

In the opening chapter of Part 1, Giri starts from the problematized concept of development as well as efforts to correct it, yet despite the latter, he nevertheless still finds it necessary to draw attention to the largely neglected aspects of human development and the place and role of art and spirituality in it. His concern throughout with human development is of theoretical importance in that it calls special attention to the subjective domain of ethical practices in which the aesthetic has to be understood as being embedded, while not ignoring broader dimensions with which that domain interacts. Bussey's proposal of an 'anticipatory aesthetics', which highlights, in particular, the anticipatory, futural and orientating significance of aesthetic images, unmistakably although not entirely explicitly locates itself against the background of modern aesthetics from Baumgarten, through Kant and Schiller, to Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Bourdieu. The potent aesthetic images in question, on the one hand, depend on sensory perception and experience, yet, on the other hand, involve naturally rooted, culturally shaped 'senses' or evolutionarily, historically and psychologically sedimented sociocultural complexes, orientating capacities, agency, moods and desires. These he singles out under the titles of memory, foresight, voice, optimism and finally yearning. In the closing chapter of Part 1, Zickgraf shows that money is not just a rational, impersonal, objective and neutral medium of exchange, but more broadly a factor in world creation which, therefore, interrelates in a historically specific way with 'non-monetary institutions'

or the social and subjective domains. Money as such, not just 'modern money', links with human activities, with acts and the objectifications of such acts which have a value far beyond abstract monetary value. Yet money or, more basically, the process of 'monetarization' particularly through its aesthetic quality, the 'aesthetics of money', is central to the generation of the worlds in which such activities and their valued outcomes are possible and realized. Far from just involving exchange, at stake in this complex of relations is 'identity' which entails the obligation of having to take personal and shared 'responsibility' for 'imagining' and realizing what those involved want to be and make of themselves.

In the five chapters of Part 2, the contributors focus on substantive case studies of transformation in which art figures centrally. These include a variety of directions of social transformation. In Chap. 4, Susan Forbes reconstructs the transformation of the standpoint of academics studying primal indigenous art in the Chatham Islands from a stance that sub-served colonialism to a more symmetrical relation between an indigenous community and its observers. Marion Moya follows in the next chapter with a report on her ethnographic study of the centuries-old tradition of 'Randa' weaving-embroidery in the Argentinian province of Tucuman which was prompted by the decision of the Ministry of Culture to apply for the inclusion of this traditional handicraft in the Register of Best Practice in the framework of the UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage. The aim of the project and the official endeavour it supported was not just to secure this cultural heritage and the aesthetic expression borne by it, but also to improve the socio-economic conditions and hence the 'rights' and 'self-esteem' of the artisan producers as well as the over-arching policy and legal framework guaranteeing them. Kate Crehan and Agni Boedhihartono devote Chaps. 6 and 7, respectively, to the description of different examples of collective art production where artists collaborate with a community to create works of public art—in the former case forming part of an urban regeneration project in London, and in the latter in Congolese, Moroccan and Sudanese communities and at international conferences in Geneva, Sydney and Paris, all concerned with climate change and sustainability. Against the background of the modern art biennial movement, Marie van Eersel in the final chapter of Part 2 analyses the Istanbul Biennial with a view to determining not only the redesign of the art event itself over time but more importantly still also its transformative impact on Turkish society.

The chapters comprising Part 3, also five in number, deal each in its own way with important aspects of the practice of development. Both Giri and Nirmal Selvamony in Chaps. 9 and 10 focus on the significance of poetics as a variety of the aesthetic in development and elaborate more specifically on the role of poetry. While Giri operates with a general notion of poetics in an exploration of its significance for the constitution of a human world, Selvamony argues by means of a well-defined approach that the sequence of social formations, from the primal eco-moral Indian, via the pre-modern and modernist, to the information society, can be made intelligible by penetrating analyses of representative poems from each in terms of the poetic episteme presupposed at the time. A deeply grounded past-oriented perspective on development thus opens a future-oriented vision. Reporting in Chap. 11 on a workshop she had held with a group of Rwandan women after the genocide, Andrea Grieder shows how poetry can enable humans to establish a relation with their natural and social environment in such a meaningful way that it contributes to the healing of scars left by traumatic experiences. Both Chaps. 12 and 13 focus on the role of the theatre in development. Efua Prah describes in Chap. 12 her taking up of the tradition of 'applied theatre', particularly the 'theatre of development' variety, which seeks to critically generate conversation, discussion and communication about social life and socio-political problems and norms, in order to forge her own ethnographic method for use in the case of children in a temporary relocation camp on the outskirts of Cape Town. Besides having provided a platform for anthropological investigation, it allowed children to perform their varied experiences through playing the characters living in the camp, thereby creating an 'aesthetics of performance' that brings perennial human problems to awareness, strengthens the participants' self-presentation and authentic self-affirmation, and moreover stimulates communication in the community. In the final chapter, Pearly Wong and John Clammer offer a quite comprehensive overview of the theatre, from Bertoldt Brecht's epic theatre, via Augusto Boal's 'forum' or 'playback theatre' and forms like 'popular theatre', 'theatre of the oppressed', 'interactive theatre' and 'applied theatre', finally to the 'theatre for development'. For them, the theatre is potentially the most effective means of addressing development issues, where development is understood in a sufficiently broad sense to include in particular also 'the development of culture itself'. While their focus is on 'performance' as a means of shaking up taken-for-granted assumptions and opening

possibilities of transformation and change, the significance of artistic as well as wider social communication is also appreciated as being essential to such development.

In accordance with the kind of reflections appropriate to an afterword, it may be good to be more explicit about the conceptual and theoretical assumptions that are presupposed by and, thus, in some way or another at work in the chapters comprising this anthology. These assumptions concern the key concepts of development and aesthetics as well as their philosophical and social-theoretical backgrounds.

Reflections on the Key Concepts

The Concept of Development

In its broadest sense, the concept of development pertains to the ongoing process of the creation and organization of the human form of life involving the extrapolation and at least partial realization of human capacities and potentials. It acquired a much more specific, consciously formulated sense, however, in the wake of the emergence in the modern period of society in the strict sense of a formation that depends on the principle of association, rather than kinship or hierarchy as in the past, and which is functionally differentiated. Standing on the shoulders of Kant, Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche, Max Weber (1970, 1976) is the one who most clearly and, indeed, canonically conceived of the generation of society as a multidimensional process possessing a powerful impetus he called 'rationalization'. He furthermore understood it as having become differentiated into distinct cultural spheres, each of which aligns with a particular dimension of the process. Energized by carrier groups of actors and the emergent relations between those actors and the outcomes of their actions, the process becomes structured under particular historical conditions into distinct institutional complexes in accordance with the logics of the cultural spheres. Lacking these cultural spheres with their respective objective, intersubjective and subjective principles, namely, truth, right and authenticity,[3] the process of development would be devoid of orientation complexes, staggering without direction and abandoning world-creation to merciless circumstantial forces. Corresponding to the theoretical-instrumental, the normative-participatory and the aesthetic-expressive cultural spheres are, respectively, the institutional complexes, first, of science and technology, second of morality, law and

politics and, finally, of art and expressive-erotic patterns of conduct bound to a particular ethos and identity. While distinct from each other, the spheres and complexes nevertheless interrelate more or less closely with one another, depending on historical conditions and immediate circumstances.

A crucial insight gained from Weber merits highlighting and needs to be born in mind. Culture is not simply culture, a monolithic magnitude, but is of a particulate nature, comprising as it does three distinct spheres, each with its own particular meta-cultural principle. And, in addition, one has to be careful not to equate culture with the aesthetic since it also has normative-participatory and theoretical-instrumental components with which the aesthetic in some sense or another, depending on context, constantly interrelates. This raises the vexed question of the process of interrelation which is integral to the process of development. What medium makes possible the mediation among the cultural spheres, among the related institutional complexes and, finally, between the spheres and complexes? Although not explicitly, Bussey and Zickgraf each in their own way touch on this issue of mediation, but it also shines through the argumentation of many of the remaining chapters.

Against the foil of Weber's canonical philosophically backed social theory, it is almost incomprehensible that in the second half of the twentieth century, development became so narrowly conceived that the aesthetic dimension was excluded to such as extent that it now needs to be recovered, as Clammer and Giri propose. Jürgen Habermas (1987: 326) explains this reductionist error in terms of the 'one-sided rationalization' and, hence, the deficient mediation induced by capitalism and the bureaucratic state by means of their restriction and erosion of communication which alone enables the broad spectrum of mediation. In the eighteenth century, Schiller (1965) regarded aesthetics, art and beauty as the medium between affectivity and reason rather than communication which, had he acknowledged its vital role, would have precluded his conflation of the different cultural spheres. The study of the chapters in this collection would benefit from keeping in mind throughout the question of mediation and the medium through which it is accomplished. It would provide the reader with a well-defined sense of the conceptual infrastructure of the anthology and its lacunae, if there are any. Is there a tendency to neglect communication as the necessary mechanism of mediation and instead unconsciously to reproduce Schiller's understanding, thus prioritizing aesthetics in a way that would eventuate in

yet another form of one-sidedness? Is there not a danger of aestheticization of everything, just as there is evidence of scientization and technicization promoted by the technocratic ideology as well as of moralization as manifested in the past, for example, by the moral monopoly of the Catholic Church? There is a danger that the emphasis on aesthetics could perpetuate a comparable mediation problem which predictably would lead to cultural impoverishment (Strydom 1986). The pressing question, therefore, is: What exactly is the location of the aesthetic in the whole set of relations encompassing organically endowed human enculturated social actors, institutional complexes and cultural spheres? And what role does the aesthetic play in that set of relations?[4]

Table 1 summarizes the above argument that the process of development is differentiated along institutional and cultural lines, and that it is structured in its course by cultural models corresponding to distinct cultural spheres, each of which has its own characteristic meta-cultural principles that regulate the structuration.[5] Aesthetics has a particular circumscribed place in this complex of relations, which implies that it cannot completely take over the mediating function fulfilled by linguistic and symbolic communication.[6] The white background of the table represents, as it were, the communication medium that allows dynamic relations to be established among the different dimensions and components.

On the basis of insights developed by philosophers, scientists and mathematicians such as Aristotle, Galileo, Leibniz, Kant, Cauchy,

Table 1 Structured multidimensional process of development

| Dimension	Structure			
	Institutional complex	Cultural model form	Cultural sphere	Meta-cultural principle
Functional	Science and technology	Theoretical-instrumental	Objective: fact	Truth: efficiency and utility
Social	Morality, law and politics	Normative-participatory	Intersubjective: norm	Right: justice and legitimate order
Personal	Art and expressive-erotic symbolism and patterns of conduct	Aesthetic-expressive-ethical	Subjective: experience	Authenticity/ truthfulness/ appropriateness: self-expression and self-realization

Dedekind, Cantor and Peirce, we are in a position today to recognize that the process of development is potentially an infinite one and that humans are able to deal with such an infinite series only by means of limit concepts (see Strydom 2017). This is where, social-theoretically, the regulative meta-cultural principles and the more specific cultural models they make possible enter. Through their anticipatory projection of ideas and ideals, they serve as orientation complexes, largely taken-for-granted ones, that direct and guide the process and inspire actions that activate those lodestars and potentially bring them closer to realization. Given the multidimensional nature of the process of development, infinity and limit concepts manifest themselves on three distinct levels. Figure 1 depicts the infinite processes comprised of development as well as both the corresponding meta-cultural principles that are universally valid for the human form of life and the particular cultural models that humans are today striving to realize.[7] Since the three dimensions, depending on conditions and circumstances, interrelate in varying ways with one another in the course of the process of development, it speaks for itself that the subjective—and hence the aesthetic—dimension directed and guided by the principle of authenticity or truthfulness is always in some sense associated with the functional and social developments structured and regulated by the principles of truth and right, respectively. What seems to be missing most from the literature on development is less the aesthetic as such than explicit attention being given to the role of structuring principles and their relations in the developmental process.[8]

The argument in Clammer and Giri's volume is that for a considerable period, the aesthetic has been reduced to a minimum in development studies, and that it is now imperative that it be restored to its rightful place, status and role. As regards its rightful place, to begin with, Fig. 1 locates the aesthetic on the particular dimension of the process of development where it properly belongs—namely, forming part of the infinite process of human subject-formation in both its individual and collective manifestations, which are governed by the meta-cultural principle of authenticity or truthfulness.

Having considered the concept of development and having put aesthetics in its place in that context, the attention now shifts to the question of aesthetics itself, the second key concept of this anthology.

The Concept of Aesthetics

In the tradition of aesthetic thought, two conceptual lines stand out conspicuously: the first going back to the ancient Greek understanding of

Limit concept:

finite ideal:
cultural model
meaning
semantic/symbolic generality

infinite ideal:
meta-cultural principles
validity
cognitive universality

TRUTH

Infinite series:

a
b

Objective :
Functional   sustainable human-nature relation

RIGHT

a
b

Development: *Intersubjective :*   democratic-cosmopolitan society
Social

AUTHENTICITY/
TRUTHFULNESS

a
b

Subjective :   cognitively-fluid individual/collective subject
personal   appropriate to a democratic-cosmopolitan
             existence in a cared-for planetary biosphere

Key:

a = historically long-term accumulated and evolutionary stabilized universally valid rational
    potential

b = permanent action-based tendency toward a finite cultural idea/ideal which can never be fully
    realized

• = cultural model

Fig. 1   Infinite processes and limit concepts in development

sensory perception and the second being the early modern conception of fine arts and the theory of those arts. Various chapters in this volume unmistakable presuppose this rich philosophical repository, while others give substance to some aspect or another of the aesthetic sphere and of art.

Etymologically, the word aesthetics derives from the ancient Greek αἴσθησις (aesthesis), meaning sensation, perception, feeling or sense. It was Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (2013, 2007), the nominated father of philosophical aesthetics, who first introduced the neologism in 1735

in his *Metaphysics* (2013), and then lent it canonical status with the publication of his *Aesthetica* in Frankfurt in 1750. While the earlier work dealt with his theory of poetry, Baumgarten (1750: 1) devoted his main work to aesthetics understood as 'a general science of sensible cognition' focused on beauty as the perfection of sensible cognition as such. The theory of fine art also received attention in this work, although he regarded it as but a theory and not a science. It is noteworthy that his concern with this theory was exactly contemporaneous with the conclusive fixing in the eighteenth century of the word 'art' in the sense of the 'fine arts'. In this case, aesthetics became understood as pertaining to works of art as well as to both the theory and criticism of the beautiful and of taste.

Against this background, the towering philosophical figure, Immanuel Kant, effectively consolidated the modern understanding of the aesthetic. He took up both the available conceptual lines of aesthetic thought. The first conception figures in the opening section of his *Critique of Pure Reason* of 1781 (1968: A19 = B34−B36 = A22) where he lays bare the most basic presuppositions making possible the human relation to objects in general—what he called the 'transcendental aesthetic' as the science of the principles of human sensibility. The basic forms of space and time contained in the mind are constitutive of 'sensibility' which enables, through 'intuition', a relation to be established to an object and, through 'receptivity', being affected by the object. In this work, Kant was exclusively interested in objects of knowledge, however, and it was almost a decade later that he turned to the second conception of the aesthetic, including specifically aesthetic objects. Accordingly, he devoted his *Critique of Judgement* of 1790 to objects worthy of the qualification 'beauty', whether the sublime beauty of nature or what he called 'beautiful art' or 'aesthetical art' (1972: 147, 148). With this work, Kant provided Hegel (1975) with the necessary basis for definitively establishing the modern meaning of aesthetics as the philosophy of art in his lectures on the topic in the 1820s.

Beautiful or aesthetic art, in Kant's view, is characterized by being designed specifically to elicit the feeling of pleasure. But in distinction to entertainment which involves pleasure based on mere 'sensations', art is a 'mode of cognition' in that it requires not only the cognitive faculties of the imagination, understanding and reason, but above all 'reflection' (1972: 134, 148–149). Experiencing a feeling of aesthetic pleasure presupposes that a work of art is consciously, disinterestedly

and contemplatively taken as art, an intentional aesthetic object exhibiting the freedom of the imagination, rather than as nature or something else. It is humanly created by a 'genius' who engages in the expression of his or her 'subjective state of mind' through 'aesthetical ideas' (1972: 150). Important is that Kant thus decisively delimited the aesthetic sphere from other cultural spheres as well as from the practice of life. Yet he nevertheless acknowledged that, depending on context, the aesthetic sphere does have varying relations to the remaining cultural spheres and to the practice of life.

As regards the cultural spheres, not only does the full appreciation of art require the objective knowledge produced by various sciences but art as such in fact also presupposes the '*truth*' (1972: 200) of objective knowledge as one of its conditions, yet without ever being the truth itself. Since art is subjective, it is a matter of truthfulness instead. Second, the experience of art relates in a distinctive way to morality (1972: 196–200)—for instance, works of art can 'symbolize' crucial aspects of the human condition or can present morally significant ideas. Yet, aesthetics and morality should not be conflated in such a way that aesthetic freedom trumps normative principles like right and justice or reduce them to some form of particularistic and exclusionary communitarianism or collectivism. The two spheres are not conceptually connected but only symbolically by means of 'analogy' and, thus, there is 'no inner affinity' between them (1972: 197, 141). While right or justice, like truth, is a determinate concept that can be substantiated, the idea or ideal of beauty is an ineffable or '*inexponible* representation of the imagination' (1972: 187) and, therefore, incapable of being captured by a concept and of being given sensible substance. It is an image or icon dependent on the imagination and shaped by the ideal of authenticity or truthfulness and a sense of perfect beauty, but an image or icon that requires to be rendered determinate and substantive by links to the intersubjective and objective cultural spheres and, hence, the corresponding concepts of right and truth.[9]

As regards the practice of life, aesthetic experience, however ineffable it may be, can nevertheless be conducive to personal ethics, appropriate moral conduct, 'social communication', 'coordination' of different 'classes', 'lawful sociability' and thus justifiable politics (1972: 148, 201). Given an image or icon regulated by the ideal of authenticity or truthfulness, aesthetic experience can concentrate feelings and emotions, clarify needs, unify the body and strengthen the will and, consequently, enable

people to engage in a motivated way in performance, action, interaction and even transformative praxis. Yet, aesthetic experience or the judgement of taste in the sense of the pleasurable feeling of the free play and harmonization of the cognitive faculties of the imagination, understanding and reason is essentially subjective. However, this by no means entails that it occludes the 'universal communicability' of subjectively expressed aesthetic ideas (1972: 133–138, 160–161). To the contrary, such communicability of subjectivity is guaranteed by the shared human organic endowment as well as by their shared faculty of distinction and judgement, but not only by these two conditions. Crucial is that judgement is anticipatory or reaching towards what is not yet in the sense that, in its reflective execution, it has recourse to 'the collective reason of humanity' by comparing itself with '*the possible* rather than the actual judgements of others' (1972: 136, emphasis added).

While Kant proved to be pivotal to the development of the concept of aesthetics, his position was subjected to varied criticisms from which something is to be learned. In his own time, Schiller was a leading critic of his, and as late as the late twentieth century, Pierre Bourdieu sharply opposed Kant's approach to aesthetic judgement. Above, indications were already given of Schiller's conflation of aesthetics and morality in so far as he proposed to base morality on aesthetic feeling and, consequently, overlooked that Kant's differentiation of these two domains allowed him to see the variety of complex relations between them more clearly than he himself envisaged. But it is not only the aesthetic and moral cultural spheres that he mistakenly merged. In a still earlier piece, Schiller (2003) also sought to counter Kant's subjectivist conception of aesthetic receptivity by opposing to it the notion of beauty as the objective property of a self-determining and self-sufficient object. In this case, he fatally ignored the fact that an appearance of such an object itself depends on human receptivity and a subjective response.[10]

In our own time, Bourdieu (1986) has rejected Kant's pure critique of aesthetic judgement in favour of his own so-called 'vulgar critique' which focuses on the divergent aesthetic tastes of the different social classes and the strategic use of taste by members of one class to attain distinction from other classes, especially ones lower down the social scale. His own theoretical strategy was to argue that Kant's view of aesthetics was itself that of a particular social class. Bourdieu's alternative approach as put forward in *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* is undoubtedly in line with the shift in post-Hegelian

and twentieth-century aesthetics away from abstract attempts to arrive at a precise determination of the concept of beauty towards the empirical side of the equation. This shift of course by no means invalidates the clarification of the necessary assumptions or transcendental presuppositions underpinning aesthetics, as, for example, presented by Kant. What is ironic, however, is that the project Bourdieu realized in *Distinction* had obviously been inspired by the *Critique of Judgement*, particularly by Kant's phrase, 'the faculty of distinction and judgement', and the anticipatory paragraph in Section 41 opening with the sentence: 'Empirically the beautiful interests only in society' (1972: 38, 139).

Whereas in modern times aesthetics came to be understood overwhelmingly as referring to the philosophy of art and in its applied version as concerning art, from the viewpoint of a philosophically informed social theory accommodating the problematic of development, it is necessary to adopt a broader perspective. This can be achieved by acknowledging, as prefigured by the above-mentioned two lines of thought in the philosophical tradition and as suggested in Fig. 1, that the aesthetic is closely associated with the subjective. This affinity is borne out by such matters as intuition, needs, desire, feeling, emotion, experience, identity, expression and so forth that are typically raised in philosophical and psychological discussions of aesthetics as well as in a number of the chapters in this book.[11] The proposed acknowledgement means that it is not simply the bare aesthetic dimension of development that is at issue in the present volume, but more broadly what may be called the subjective-aesthetic domain in which art is embedded and without which it would remain incomprehensible. Table 2 represents an attempt to offer an analytical overview of the dimensions and components of this domain.

In the decomposition of the subjective-aesthetic domain in Table 2, use is made of Robert Plutchik's (2001) cognitive psychological theory according to which any living organism, including humans, necessarily has to confront and deal with the four basic existential problems of life: territoriality, hierarchy, identity and temporality. The first three clearly correspond to the objective, intersubjective and subjective dimensions, while temporality adds dynamics to these world dimensions. Cross-tabulating the four subjective-aesthetic dimensions—needs, social orientation, self and will—with these existential problems yields the cells of the presented typology. It hardly needs pointing out that the concepts presented in Table 2 are to be found throughout the chapters in this anthology.

Table 2 The subjective-aesthetic domain

Dimension	Problem			
	Territoriality	Hierarchy or dominance	Identity	Temporality
Endeutic (needs)	Location	Rank	Belonging and inclusion	Well-being
Alterocentric (social)	Ethos [*morality*]	Group membership/ community	Love/collective identity	Ethical [*moral*] and self-cultivation[12]
Autonomy (self)	Self-reflexivity and self-exploration	Self-discovery	Aesthetic freedom, self-cultivation and self-identity	Self-expression, self-realization, authenticity, truthfulness, accountability and responsibility
Conative-volitional (will)	Desire and interest	Aspiration	Intuition, emotion and motivation	Performance, action and praxis

Aesthetics understood in terms of art relates most closely to the autonomy (self) dimension, concerning aesthetic freedom and subjective self-expression in an authentic or truthful manner which, in turn, presupposes self-exploration and self-cultivation—for example, in the artistic bohemian lifestyle which is characterized by a disregard of conventional social rules and often involves the celebration of liberating orgiastic sexuality, as Weber (1970) noted. This complex is of course not inapplicable to individual development more generally, but important is that since subjectivity is not just individual but also collective, the aesthetic is relevant also in the case of collective identity and hence the supporting collective ethos which becomes elaborated through collective ethical self-cultivation.[13] This could be something as innocuous as the appropriate expressive form of conduct at a wedding or a funeral, but it could also be something much more far-reaching and potentially fraught with problems, such as the cultivation of the collective identity of a group, a social movement, a community, a nation or, as today, even a cosmopolitan world society. At the core of such collective identity formation is the continual cultivation of a set of shared ethical rules in which a projected aesthetic image plays an inspiring role. This is where the strength, but also the weakness, of the aesthetic becomes apparent.[14]

Its subjective embedment and containment within those bounds indicate that the aesthetic is dependent on the free human spirit that activates the various faculties at play in art, what Schiller (1965: 57) conceived as the energetic force of the human 'play drive' (*Spieltrieb*) that connects the sensuous and the form drives with one another. It could be plausibly submitted that defining of the aesthetic is that it centrally concerns free imaginative practices rooted in creative self-cultivating and self-expressive subjectivity that produce directing and guiding anticipatory images or icons which give form to the world and thereby allow humans to relate in a meaningful way to the relevant dimensions or aspects of their world. On the production side, the subjectively embedded aesthetic manifests itself as the projection and artistic realization, borne by an authentic or truthful expression of a subjective-aesthetic idea, of an imaginary representation that takes its cues from the ideals of authenticity or truthfulness and perfect beauty. And on the reception side, an authentic or truthful and beautiful image impacts on aesthetic experience in a way that concentrates feelings and emotions, circumscribes and clarifies needs, unifies the body, strengthens the will and motivates commitment, thus leaving those involved in an enhanced position to engage in meaningful relevant self-relation, performance, action, interaction and perhaps even transformative praxis.[15] It is in these unique effects of the different art forms that their significance resides for subject-formation in general and for education in particular.[16]

If this is a description of the successful production and reception of art that is worthy of the principle of authenticity or truthfulness and the ideal of beauty, then actual reality past and present compels one to acknowledge that there are aesthetic practices which fall far short of these requirements. Given the subjective nature of the aesthetic, it harbours the inherent possibility of a tendency towards self-centeredness or particularism—what may be called 'aestheticization' (Strydom 1986), wallowing in aesthetic feeling and beauty, as it were, from a restricted individual or collective subjective standpoint to the exclusion of the other. Aestheticization in this sense has been an abiding concern in the theory of culture of Critical Theory (Frankfurt Institute for Social Research 1972) and such authors associated with it as Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno (1972), Herbert Marcuse (1972), Walter Benjamin (1980) and Habermas (1987) since the founding of this tradition of thought in the 1920s. And it is doubtlessly the case that a theory of development that wishes to incorporate the aesthetic in a way that

covers more than the dominant status quo will not be able to sidestep the requirement of critique which, of course, should not be confused with art or literary criticism. If it does not confront the negative forthright, then, like Schiller in the end, it will degenerate into a reproduction of the naïve humanist myth that helps secure the power structures of the status quo.

Now, the negative phenomenon of aestheticization occurs at both the individual and collective levels. Individual creativity and expression of subjectivity on which the persona of the aesthete as well as art depends requires aesthetic freedom. It is for this reason that authors like Nietzsche and Foucault vigorously promote this particular variety of freedom in their writings. However, unbridled aesthetic freedom devoid of any cognisance of normative principles or some moderating link to moral considerations can lead to pernicious aestheticization which could even constitute a threat to others.[17] For example, an aesthetically executed murder would be just as repulsive as the Nazi officer and art connoisseur who listened to some of Mozart's most sublime music before going out, strengthened by the experience of a perfect aesthetic image, to send Jews to their death. Under certain conditions and circumstances, at the collective level, aesthetic images play a crucial role in directing, guiding and strengthening exclusionary and discriminatory practices, among which racism is one of the most pernicious, but by no means the only instance. The history of Europe and European colonialism and imperialism are replete with graphic examples, from the early modern Spanish obsession with *limpieza de sangre*, the aesthetic image of purity of blood, via Kant's unfortunate anthropological colour-coded classification of the world population and the Dutch and especially British white supremacist legacy in South Africa, to the current concern of many Europeans with an image of their own particular ethnicity, ethos and intact way of life in the face of migration pressures.[18] To counter and overcome the inbuilt limits of the aesthetic, it has to be constrained and moderated by normative considerations—first by autonomously or ethically observed meta-cultural moral principles such as the inviolability and dignity of every person, human rights, equality, solidarity, justice and cosmopolitanism and, if necessary, eventually by legal and political measures.[19] In the 'Alterocentric' (social) row of Table 2, morality is inserted in italics within square brackets to draw attention to the tension arising in the subjective-aesthetic domain and the importance of appreciating the need to transcend the inherent self-centredness of the aesthetic

by acknowledgement of its unavoidable implication of normative, moral, intersubjective or social considerations.

Perhaps, this juncture is the appropriate place to raise the vexed question of morality and ethics, philosophically known as the problem of *Moralität und Sittlichkeit*—the latter usually translated as 'concrete ethical life'—and thus reinforce what was submitted in endnote 12. Generally, there is much confusion about the distinction between morality and ethics, and in the present volume, there is also some evidence of lack of clarity. For instance, what is meant and implied by the phrase 'the ethics of development'? It becomes problematic in the light of the distinction between morality and ethics. Ethics concerns the subjective domain encompassing both the individual and collective subject. It is in this domain that the individual acquires a personal ethics with its particular values in the context of the ethos and accompanying substantive or conventional cultural values of the collectivity to which he or she belongs. Such a personal ethics and values remain subjective and particularistic, however, as long as they are acquired exclusively with reference to the ethics and ethos of the particular group or nation alone and, hence, lack acquisition by recourse to meta-cultural moral principles that transcend the collectivity concerned. These principles—e.g. right, justice, equality, solidarity, etc.—belong to the normative-participatory domain that accommodates morality which, in turn, provides a basis for law and the core problems of politics. Morality and ethics have to be clearly distinguished otherwise the whole range of relations and interactions between them remains opaque.[20] The conclusion follows that if development were to be theorized properly, it would not be sufficient to add only aesthetics to its socio-economic-political and ethical dimensions, since the normative or moral dimension would still be absent. The latter has to be explicitly acknowledged in its own right.

Considering that the task of the present section is to clarify the key concept of aesthetics, however, it is necessary finally to dwell on its subjective nature. As suggested in Fig. 1, this entails focusing on the infinite subjective process and its limit concepts in the guise of the aesthetic-ethical meta-cultural principle of authenticity or truthfulness and the corresponding cultural model. Here, however, all of this has to be specified more particularly in terms of aesthetics or art. In Fig. 1, the subjective dimension of the overall process of development is conceived as the infinite process of subject-formation and self-cultivation which is structured by the meta-culture principle of authenticity or truthfulness

beyond the situation and inside the situation by the cultural model of a cognitively fluid individual and collective subject appropriate to a democratic-cosmopolitan existence in a cared-for planetary biosphere—that is, individual citizens and nations who are able to generate and support the current emergence of a global society that is characterized by legitimately organized interpersonal relations and both respects and takes care of the organic foundations of all life on planet Earth. However, when one focuses more specifically on the process from the perspective of aesthetics, particularly of art, it becomes apparent that the meta-cultural cognitive order is more complex than just the principle of authenticity or truthfulness and, further, that the identification of more appropriate cultural models is required. Figure 2 is a proposal to specify the subjective-aesthetic process together with its meta-cultural principles and cultural models with special reference to art.[21]

For some 40,000 years, having started in Hohlenstein-Stadel, Germany, and the Dordogne, France (e.g., Mithen 1998: 176–177), the infinite process of the creation and judgement of art has been underway, borne by repeated attempts to pursue and realize cultural models of representations or symbolic codes that advance the aesthetic ideas and ideals which immediately within the situation give structure, direction and guidance to the processes of creation and judgement. While there is thus a constant tendency towards those idea- and ideal-bearing cultural models, humanly they can at best only be approximated but never fully realized. In addition to their unattainable ideal value, such cultural models are subject to time and, therefore, to periodic transformation and change. Given the variety of relevant models, these eventualities occur on a number of different levels.[22]

Due to historical economic, social, political and even ecological changes, the subject-formation and self-cultivation processes of both individual (e.g. artist and art consumer) and collective subjects (e.g. artist groups, nations and states) are reconstituted in accordance with the modification entailed by the concurrently emerging or new cultural model of the subject. As an example, one could recall the shift at the macro-level of the collective subject from nineteenth-century liberal society to early twentieth-century social democracy which, in turn, was accompanied by a qualification of art production by the individual genius, as Kant called it, by the introduction of collective art production. Not only did the early twentieth-century avant-garde reject the idea of individual production in favour of forming movements (Strydom

Meta-Culture:
AUTHENTICITY
TRUTHFULNESS
BEAUTY
APPROPRIATENESS

Process:
Subjective-aesthetic:

Individual & collective

Cultural Model:
• appropriate subject:
  - individual
  - collective : artistic & societal
• currently relevant model of beauty
• type/genre/format/content of art, e.g.:
  - literature, painting, music, theatre
  - poetry/prose, realist/abstract art,
    early/classical/world music,
    playback/applied/development theatre
  - community, public, land, installation,
    multimedia art etc.
• technique

Fig. 2 Infinite subjective-aesthetic process and its limit concepts relative to art

1994) but also the Surrealists under André Breton even engaged in the collaborative creation of works of art, for instance, the famous-notorious painting, 'Exquisite Cadaver' of 1926.[23] It should be pointed out that, irrespective of whether individual or collective art production, the individual artist him- or herself nevertheless still pursues such other established more specific cultural models as self-cultivation, self-exploration, self-discovery and self-expression, as well as often a model of collective identity.

As the shift in the cultural model of the individual and collective subject takes effect, the particular cultural model of beauty accepted in the situation under historical conditions also undergoes a change. Compare, for example, the early modern ideal of beauty as perfect form shared by Kant and his predecessors starting with Aristotle to the French poet Lautréamont's definition: 'Beautiful as the chance encounter of a sewing machine and an umbrella on an operating table' (quoted in Osborne 1988: 529) which influenced the Surrealists[24]; or Picasso's epoch-making *Les Demoiselles d'Avignon* of 1907 with its characteristic violently anti-traditional form to Leonardo da Vinci's *Mona Lisa* of 1504 with its defining *sfumato* effect; or compare twentieth- and twenty-first-century

installation art or community art to the museum art of the nineteenth century.[25] Then, there are the many still more specific cultural models that are relevant to the production and reception of works of art, whether they specify ideas and ideals of the type, genre, format or content of art or of the suitable technique applied.[26] It goes without saying, of course, that there is no pretension here that the above represents a comprehensive list of relevant cultural models.

Amid the historical changes at all these levels, indeed, despite all these changes of cultural models in the course of the subjective-aesthetic process, the evolutionarily stabilized meta-cultural principles of authenticity, truthfulness, beauty and appropriateness remain relatively intact—at least for the time being while we are the kind of human beings we are, with the kind of brain-minds we have acquired relatively recently in the evolution of our species. They provide the cognitive infrastructure of the human form of life and thus ultimately structure and regulate the lower level cultural models.[27] In philosophy, mathematics and linguistics, for example, the status of these meta-structures has been the subject of much thinking and clarification. They are properties that are conceived as infinite ideal limit concepts, not finite ideal limit concepts such as those embodied in cultural models. For Kant, the human 'imagination'…[or]… mind…requires totality…[and finds it]… 'unavoidable to think the infinite (in the common judgement of reason) as *entirely given* (according to its totality)…[thereby]…surpass[ing] every standard of sense…[towards the]…supersensible' (1972: 93). In the field of number theory, the mathematician Richard Dedekind (e.g. Dantzig 2007: 179) comparably identified a special classificatory device, what he called the 'cut' (*Schnitt*), that the power of the mind imposes on a continuous series or infinite straight line in order to make sense of it. For his part, the cognitive linguist Ray Jackendoff regards culture as an emergent order of 'observed complexity of structure' of a 'conceptual' nature (2007: 154; 2010: 9). It makes available 'universal aspects of culture, taken for granted, that form the skeleton of issues around which cultures are built'—and that despite the 'considerable variation from culture to culture' (1999: 74).

From this, it follows that all meta-cultural principles, from truth and right to the subjective-aesthetically relevant authenticity, truthfulness, beauty and appropriateness, are evolutionarily stabilized emergent properties of human actions and historical processes which represent imaginative anticipatory projections of totality, special classificatory schemes or

conceptual underpinnings. Aesthetic practices and art simply cannot do without these meta-cultural structures, nor for that matter can development more broadly. But for the actual pursuit and realization of practices of development as of art, of course, contextually and situationally relevant and appropriate cultural models—from models of art and models of development[28] to models of suitable corresponding practices— are needed. Such models are crucial since it is they that allow different interpretative approaches to and uses of those enabling meta-cultural structures.

Conclusion

In keeping with the aim of this anthology, the variety of chapters makes a rich substantive contribution to the conceptual and theoretical understanding of the place, status and role of the aesthetic dimension in the process of development as well as to the incorporation of aesthetic practices and different art forms into the practice of development. Through argumentation, the presentation of actual cases of aesthetic practice and the reflection so generated, the volume leads the reader to understand, first, that development as an ongoing process is an infinite or continuous time series which we conceive by means of the conception of the arrow of time and, second, that humans nevertheless are able to give form and shape to this relentless process by imagining limits to it. Aesthetics, the imagining of an authentic or truthful and beautiful totality, marks a crucial sensibility-based limit imposed on the process in so far as it entails the anticipation and attempts to attain an authentic or truthful subjective expression and appropriate objectification by means of aesthetic practices guided by the idea and ideal of beauty. But the chapters also draw attention to the relation of interchange in which the aesthetic stands to both the objective world of nature and the intersubjective world of society in respect of which humans, respectively, seek true theoretical-instrumental knowledge and the right legitimate way to organize interpersonal relations.

By making this threefold relation visible, the volume effectively goes further than just incorporating the aesthetic dimension in development, as the title leads one to think. It also points to how, under particular conditions, authenticity, truthfulness, beauty and appropriateness are variably articulated with truth regarding nature and the rightness of social relations in the unfolding of the process of development. In this lies the

merit of this anthology—that by suggestion, argumentation, demonstration and giving rise to serious questions, it contributes to a conceptual and potentially practically meaningful grasp of the complex imbrication of aesthetics in the multidimensional process of development.

Notes

1. Quotation from Gombrich (1981: 382) in my translation from the German.
2. For a critical assessment of Schiller, see e.g. Hamburger (1965).
3. In Weber's case, this threefold distinction goes back especially to Kant and from there back to ancient Greek philosophy. In Chap. 10, however, Selvamony effectively reminds us that it can be traced back still further when he writes: 'The early Indian eco-moral vision involved three ultimate values—morality (*aRam*, which included justice), substance (*poruL*, economy) and happiness (*inpam*; *tolkaappiyam*)'. 'Ultimate values' should here be understood as invoking meta-cultural principles which, in turn, should be distinguished from substantive cultural values playing the role of models within situations.
4. A further extremely serious question arises here: Which of the two enjoys developmental priority—aesthetics or social concepts?
5. This description of the process of development resonates with Selvamony's apt conception of 'differentiated continuity' in Chap. 10. By means of this notion, he implicitly raises the question of the general presupposition underpinning the concept of development which in the opening paragraph above was identified as 'the basic problem of continuity and discontinuity', that is, development as an infinite process to which humans give form by imposing different types of cultural structure on it by institutionalization.
6. The central thrust of Boedhihartono's argument in Chap. 7 is the significance of communication and the role art can play in stimulating such mediation. Where Giri and Selvamony dwell on poetry in Chaps. 9 and 10, respectively, overtones suggest that one could charitably interpret them as more broadly being concerned with the medium of communication. It is central also to the accounts of Prah in Chap. 12 and Wong and Clammer in Chap. 13.
7. In Chap. 13, Wong and Clammer take the typical anthropologist's position against universalism in their discussion of the concept of culture. It should be pointed out, however, that while they do not distinguish between context-immanent cultural models and context-transcendent or meta-cultural principles, in their account they nevertheless regularly invoke the latter kind of universal cultural structures—for example, when

they call on 'authenticity', 'rights' and 'justice', all of which, mediated through particular cultural models, are without exception assumed by all normal human beings.

8. For example, in Chap. 9, Giri writes that 'Development is a multi-dimensional aspiration, struggle, *sadhana* (striving) and process of change and transformation'. While the concatenation of concepts in this formulation is perfectly in order as far as it goes, it conspicuously lacks the inclusion of the cultural features—the meta-cultural principles and cultural models—which are structurally at play in the process.

9. When one approaches this threefold relation from the perspective of inference, the experience-based exercise of the aesthetic imagination is equivalent to subjective 'abduction'. It is confirmed and elaborated by engagement in a particular situated practice which deals with actuality and is thereby equivalent to 'induction'. But none of this is possible unless there is a moment of 'deduction' from the conceptual level. Here aesthetic ideas and ideas such as authenticity or truthfulness and beauty are central, even if they are for the most part simply taken for granted. However, since the aesthetic does not appear in isolation but in some sense relates to both objective and social reality, ideas and ideals such as truth and right also come deductively into play. On inference, see e.g. Strydom (2011).

10. In Chap. 5, Moya argues comparably that the 'Randa' textiles created by the 'Randeras' or traditional artisan producers are not autonomous objects. While articulating social, economic, technical and aesthetical dimensions, they are the materialization of the subjects' creativity which belong ontologically, morally, psychologically and socially to their producers, even if they eventually circulate, apparently in an autonomous fashion, in the market.

11. The contributions of Giri and Grieder in Chaps. 1 and 11, respectively, exhibit most emphatically the concern with subjectivity, while Moya in Chap. 5 also explicitly refers to the 'subjectivity' of artisan producers of the traditional Argentinian handicraft 'Randa', which she understands in both an individual and a collective sense.

12. Note that whereas ethics is typically confused with morality, they should be carefully distinguished. Since ethics falls in the subjective-aesthetic domain and morality in the normative-participatory domain, there is a tension between them that often manifests itself in social life. Either moral monopoly snuffs out ethical freedom, or ethical obsession leads to such postures as individual arbitrariness, irresponsibility and unaccountability or particularistic exclusionary collectivism which ignores or denies universalistic meta-principles. Morality is included in Table 2 in italics within square brackets to draw attention to this tension which is discussed below.

13. Giri's abiding concern in both Chaps. 1 and 9 is what he calls 'human development' which covers precisely these different aspects.

14. Giri draws a distinction between 'poetics of valorization' and 'poetics of annihilation' in Chap. 9, thereby registering the limiting, in fact potentially bigoted and even dangerous, double-edged nature of the aesthetic due to subjectivity's tendency towards egocentrism.

15. A core thread of Grieder's account in Chap. 11 is the ability of poetry to concentrate experience, to strengthen the relation to self and the will and to inspire meaningful engagement. The same holds for Prah's discussion of the role of theatre and performance in Chap. 12.

16. In Chap. 7, Boedhihartono refers to the role of art in education, while in Chap. 9, Giri devotes a section of his paper to this relation in which reference is made to the leading educational contributions of Sri Aurobindo, Gandhi, Tagore, Dewey and Steiner.

17. Although not in terms of aesthetics, Honneth (2011) offers an exemplary discussion of 'reflexive freedom'—in the sense of the subjective self-relation—in terms of both its strengths and its limits, particularly as the latter become visible from the perspective of 'social freedom'. For a review, see Strydom (2013). In Chap. 1, Giri appreciates both the positive and negative sides of Foucault's emphasis on aesthetic freedom in the form of his characteristic insistence on the project of the self as a work of art. He specifically warns against the narrow emphasis on 'the care of the self" and the 'hegemonic implications of the project of ethics'—implications that can be grasped only from a normative or moral and, for Giri, a spiritual perspective.

18. In Chap. 4, Forbes shows how Western academic judgements of indigenous art which reflected colonialism had negative consequences for the self-understanding and self-image of the tribe concerned. The overly ambitious missions of art biennials and especially their calculated distance from the local level noted by Van Eersel in Chap. 8 could also be seen as an example of unacceptable aestheticization in the sense of a cultural mediation problem.

19. Foucault (1988: 49), commenting on the aesthetic form a subject adopts for recognizing itself and presenting itself to others, draws a distinction between the Ancient and Christian versions of the 'ethics of existence'. While the former was a 'search for a personal ethics…[of]…liberty', it became displaced by the latter's emphasis on 'obedience to a system of rules'. When I refer to the constraining and moderation of the aesthetic, it is by no means intended in the Christian sense which entails a moralistic cultural model, but should rather be understood in the sense of the creative employment of the potentialities and possibilities made available by both meta-cultural principles and cultural models—that is, it should be

understood in terms of my cognitive theoretical approach. This approach is precisely an articulation of what Wong and Clammer imagine in Chap. 13 when they write that social theory should be regarded as being close to 'chaos theory'—that is, culture understood as particulate or componential and hence allowing infinite composition or combinations in the course of the non-linear construction of courses of action, institutions and society.

20. Selvamony touches on the relations and interactions between morality and ethics in Chap. 10 where he offers a stunning analysis of a poem by Robert Frost, using such words as 'moral', 'right' and 'ethical or unethical'.

21. Although not explicitly adopting these concepts or thinking about them as aspects of reality and as analytical tools, the chapters in this volume are nevertheless replete with assumptions about and examples of both meta-cultural principles and cultural models in the aesthetic field.

22. While various chapters touch on questions of time and its implications, Marie van Eersel's account of the broad-ranging impact of the Istanbul Biennial in Chap. 8 gives substantive insight into it in terms of the multilevel transformations and change both in the model of biennials and in Turkish society that subsequently followed. Selvamony's account of the historical sequence of forms of poetics in Chap. 10 graphically captures the temporal nature of cultural models at that particular level.

23. In Chaps. 6 and 7, respectively, Crehan and Boedhihartono give graphic examples of collective art production where artists collaborate with a community to create works of public art. Collective art production in the form of the theatre is central to the accounts of Prah in Chap. 12 and Wong and Clammer in Chap. 13.

24. This distinction is similar to Benjamin (1963) and Adorno's (1970) between organic or symbolic and non-organic or allegorical works of art—a distinction originally inspired by Brecht.

25. Forbes draws a similar distinction in Chap. 4 between the forest gallery art of the Moriori of the Chatham Islands and museum art. Relevant, too, as a suggestion of distinct cultural models structuring poetry is Grieder's contrast of Japanese 'haiku' poetry, which is guided by the contemplation of nature, and Rwandan 'kwivuga' poetry, which metaphorically emulates the strength of nature or of animals.

26. In Chap. 5, Moya offers a good example of the cultural model of a technique, namely, of the weaving-embroidery technique employed in creating 'Randa' textiles.

27. While the meta-cultural principles have entered consciousness only gradually after having started to become formulated probably only since the fourth millennium BC, they have been taken for granted all along since the cultural explosion of 60,000–30,000 years ago, the very origin of

art, which itself presupposed the fundamental change of the brain and mind that are characteristic of *Homo sapiens sapiens* (e.g. Mithen 1998; Stringer 2012; Wilson 2012). Boedhihartono opens Chap. 7 by recalling these origins of art many millennia ago. Recalling Aby Warburg quoted in the epigraph at the top of this Afterword, it should be noted that human civilisation rests on the creation and maintenance of distance between humans and their external world, although they remain part of that very world. Art was the original means of accomplishing this difference during the primal cultural explosion, and it is art that ever since has centrally seen to its reproduction. In this lies the general significance of the aesthetic.

28. In Chap. 13, Wong and Clammer invoke different cultural models of development when they write: 'Any model of development contains a particular worldview…'. But it should be remembered that every worldview can be constructed at all only by drawing from, interpreting and using a selection of the meta-cultural principles that for the time being (i.e. in evolutionary, not historical terms) underpin the human form of life.

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