

NOTES

1. The terminology here is J. L. Austin's, and is explained in his *How to Do Things with Words* (1962), pp. 94 ff. Briefly and roughly, the distinction Austin has in mind is that between *what is done by* saying something, e.g. getting a person to go away, and *what is done in* saying something, e.g. ordering him to go away. *What is said*, of course, is distinguishable from both of these.

2. *Principia Ethica* (1903), p. 6.

3. *Principia Ethica*, p. 162.

4. See, for example, J. M. Keynes, 'My Early Beliefs', in *Two Memoirs* (1949); and Leonard Woolf, *Sowing* (1961).

5. *Mind*, 1912; reprinted in *Moral Obligation* (1949), pp. 1-17.

6. *Moral Obligation*, pp. 16-17.

7. See, for example, *The Right and the Good* (1930), chap. ii, and *Foundations of Ethics* (1939), pp. 83-84.

8. R. Carnap, *Philosophy and Logical Syntax* (1935), p. 24.

9. M. Schlick, *Problems of Ethics* (1939), particularly chap. i.

10. For an excellent short account of Stevenson's view, see his 'The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms', *Mind*, 1937; reprinted in *Logical Positivism*, ed. Ayer (1959).

11. *Logical Positivism*, p. 269.

12. On this point see Hare's admirable paper in the symposium 'The Freedom of the Will', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary volume xxv, 1951.

13. On this distinction, see Austin, *How to Do Things With Words*, particularly Lecture x.

14. Stevenson, in *Logical Positivism*, p. 280.

15. *Freedom and Reason* (1963), p. 4.

16. 'The study of imperatives is by far the best introduction to ethics.' *The Language of Morals* (1952), p. 2.

17. *The Language of Morals*, p. 1.

18. P. H. Nowell-Smith, *Ethics* (1954), p. 98.

19. On this point see particularly *Freedom and Reason*, part ii.

20. Cf. Philippa Foot's very able article 'Moral Arguments', *Mind*, 1958.

21. K. Baier, *The Moral Point of View* (1958), and D. P. Gauthier, *Practical Reasoning* (1963).

22. *Ethics* (1954), p. 229.

23. See *Freedom and Reason*, particularly chap. 8; and P. F. Strawson, 'Social Morality and Individual Ideal', *Philosophy*, 1961. There are relevant observations also in Stuart Hampshire's *Thought and Action* (1959), particularly pp. 249 ff.

24. See P. L. Gardiner, 'On assenting to a moral principle', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1954-5.

25. I take some view of this nature to be implied by J. Bennett in his critical discussion (*Mind*, 1965) of Gauthier's *Practical Reasoning*.

26. This is a view, of course, which has never lacked defenders. Among recent writers I think one might assign Nowell-Smith, Toulmin, Baier, Gauthier, and (most clearly) Mrs. Foot to this camp — not that they all say the same thing, but that they see the same *kind* of thing as needing to be said.

27. It might be objected that, in suggesting that a concern with human benefit or harm is essential to anything deserving the name of a moral view, one is illicitly incorporating some kind of utilitarian 'humanism' into the very definition of morality. Would not this suggestion be indignantly repudiated by, for instance, the religious believer, for whom the foundation of morality is the Word of God? But I am inclined to think that such an objection would be unsound. For I suspect that religious views differ from 'humanist' views, not by denying the essential moral relevance of human benefit or harm, but rather by incorporating very different beliefs as to what really is good or bad for human beings. The religious believer finds in a supernatural order a whole extra dimension of pre-eminently important gains and losses, benefits and harm; his difference with the non-believer is not on the question whether these are of moral significance, but simply on the question whether they are real or chimerical. He might also wish to expand what might be called the moral population to include moral beings supposed not to be human; but to this, if there are such beings, no one surely will object.

28. See H. L. A. Hart, *The Concept of Law* (1961), p. 177.

29. *Freedom and Reason*, pp. 125-9.

30. 'Hume's Law ("No 'ought' from an 'is'")', to which I have repeatedly declared my adherence.' Hare, *Freedom and Reason*, p. 108.

31. Cf. Toulmin and Baier, 'On Describing', *Mind*, 1952.

32. The case has been excellently discussed by Philippa Foot, in 'Moral Beliefs', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1958-9.

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A useful collection of readings is W. S. Sellars and J. Hospers (eds.), *Readings in Ethical Theory* (Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1952).